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1 



THEORIES OF THE WILL IN THE 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



A THEORY OF CONDUCT. 12mo $1.00 

SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 12mo . $1.00 



THEORIES OF THE WILL 



HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 



BY 

ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER 



NEW YOEK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1898 









COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY 
CHARLES SCSUBNER'S SONS 

4314 




2nd COPY, 
1896. 



TWO COPIES RECEIVED. 
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4 ft 9 8 . Not&aot) $tt8B 

J. g. Cubing* Co. -Berwick* Smith 

Norwood Mass. U.S.A. 



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PREFACE 



In the following chapters will be found a concise 
account of the development of the theory of the 
will, from the earliest days of Greek thought down 
to about the middle of the present century. It is 
not sufficiently comprehensive to be called a his- 
tory, for it includes only the theories of the more 
important philosophers, and does not by any means 
exhaust the literature of the subject. In addi- 
tion to contributing something to the history of 
philosophy, it has been my purpose to introduce 
in this way a constructive explanation of voluntary 
action. After some years of study in the prepara- 
tion of such a constructive theory, I am confirmed 
in the opinion that a historical treatment is indis- 
pensable to a proper presentation of the subject ; 
and this essay is the first of a series. The account 
closes with the theory of Lotze, chiefly as this is 
contained in his earlier treatise, Medicinische Psy- 
chologie. This termination is not altogether arbi- 
trary. During the last quarter of a century, as all 
readers of philosophy are aware, the methods of 



VI PREFACE 

psychology have been greatly modified, if not revo- 
lutionized. It is a change which has been brought 
about by several causes. Without doubt, the most 
efficient of these has been the rise and increasing 
importance of the theory of natural evolution, as 
presented by Darwin, and as adopted or modified 
by his successors. Whether we admit the princi- 
ple, wholly, or in part, or not at all, it will hardly 
be denied that the effect of the emphasis laid 
upon evolution has been to regard no psychical 
states as self-explanatory, but rather as a result of 
antecedent conditions, possibly as a compound of 
simpler elements. This has been manifested con- 
servatively in the tendency to seek the germs of 
psychical states in the adult, in the conscious life 
of the infant ; it has been manifested more radi- 
cally in the attempts made to find at least analo- 
gies, if not connecting links, between the psychoses 
observed indirectly in the lower animals and those 
observed directly in man. In the same way, the 
tendency to seek in the lower species initial stages 
in that process of which man's body is the present 
result, has led to the special study of the human 
brain from the point of view of comparative anat- 
omy and animal physiology. The union of such 
methods with older methods which had led to the 
localization of mental functions in the organs of 



PREFACE VII 

the central nervous system, while beset by many 
difficulties, is likely to produce important results. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that the genesis of 
conscious volition may be explained not only by 
the more rudimentary processes in the child, but 
also by the phenomena presented in the lower 
animals. 

In this account of the earlier theories, I have 
tried to avoid intruding my own opinions as much 
as possible. But it may appear that speculation 
and the introspective method of studying the will 
have almost reached their limits. The state of 
contemporary psychology makes this equally ap- 
parent. I have ventured to express an individual 
judgment only on matters of doubtful interpreta- 
tion, and it is hoped that where the interpretations 
of higher authorities are questioned, there is justi- 
fication for at least a difference of opinion. 

In some cases the chronological order has been 
disregarded, in order to exhibit more clearly the 
logical relations of certain doctrines to each other. 
The doctrines of the will in Christian Theology 
have been considered in a separate chapter, al- 
though they form a part of the development of 
systematic thought. I have used the term will 
with and without the definite article ; and neither 
use is to be understood as implying or justifying 



Vlll PREFACE 

any particular theory of faculties. I make no 
apology for the extensive quotations from certain 
authors, without translating them into English. 
Especially in the case of the German writers, the 
advantage of quoting the original is self-evident. 

* A. A. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Introduction 1 

CHAPTER I 
Theories of the Will in the Socratic Period 23 

CHAPTER H 
Stoic and Epicurean Theories of the Will 55 

CHAPTER HI 
Theories of the Will in Christian Theology 76 

CHAPTER IY 

Theories of the Will in British Philosophy 

from Bacon to Reid 158 

CHAPTER V 

Continental Theories of the Will from 

Descartes to Leibnitz .... 215 

CHAPTER VI 

Theories of the Will in German Philosophy 

from Kant to Lotze 256 

ix 



INTRODUCTION 

Nemesis follows philosophers in their efforts to 
use language with precision. A writer may coin 
words to define his scientific doctrine, or may adopt 
words from ordinary speech, and give them a special 
meaning. Like the coinage of money, the coinage 
of words must represent some recognized standard. 
The technical terms must be redeemable in language 
which can be understood, or there will be obscu- 
rity and pedantry. Unfortunately ordinary words 
adapted to philosophical uses carry their popular 
associations with them, and are often inadequate 
to convey distinct impressions. Conversely the 
language of philosophy finds its way very soon into 
the speech of every day, and its original meaning 
is lost. In addition to this, language has been 
used ambiguously by philosophers themselves. An 
author will often use a word in more than one sense, 
and two or more authors will often use the same 
word in different senses. This misfortune has been 
all the greater, because of the interchange of philo- 
sophical conceptions among nations speaking differ- 
ent languages. There was less confusion from this 
cause when Latin was in general use, although com- 
plaints might be made of what Lucretius calls 
egestatem linguae. But philosophy now speaks the 



2 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

languages of all civilized nations, and in the trans- 
lation of terms there is wide opportunity for error. 
The philosophy of the Absolute translated literally 
into English, furnishes an example of such con- 
fusion. The word will is an example of this unfort- 
unate ambiguity. Among some writers on psychol- 
ogy there is reluctance to use it, and a tendency to 
resort to various devices in order to escape equivo- 
cation. The ambiguity extends to many words 
often used in connection with the subject; such as, 
motive, choice, freedom, and necessity. A definition 
of will involves a consideration of the history of 
theories; it involves criticism, and even contro- 
versy. Some writers have denned the term, others 
have thought it indefinable. It has been used in a 
general psychological sense, to denote the whole 
character and disposition of man, together with the 
expression of these in action. It has been used in 
a special sense to describe the fiat of the mind 
in effecting action, an intellectual affirmation or 
denial, an impression, a muscular feeling, or a ner- 
vous impulse. It has further been used to denote 
a general metaphysical or moral principle, as in 
the systems of Kant and Schopenhauer. Moralists 
have fixed its meaning in conformity to their prac- 
tical needs; metaphysicians have sometimes dis- 
cussed it, with very little reference to the facts of 
consciousness. Above all, the whole subject has 
been confused by that interminable dispute usually 
called "the free-will controversy." Probably the 
most fruitful source of obscurity has been the readi- 
ness of both learned and unlearned men to launch 



INTRODUCTION 6 

themselves upon this debate without determining 
the nature of the will, before discussing its free- 
dom. 

While, at the outset, it seems inadvisable for 
me to attempt to define the will, a provisional state- 
ment may be made in order to point out the general 
field which is to be traversed. Will is a general 
term, applicable to certain psychical events, and is 
primarily an object of psychology. These events 
are not all of the same kind. They cannot be called 
conscious states or acts, for some philosophers hold 
that there is unconscious volition. They cannot be 
said to be peculiar to man, for theologians treat of 
the will of God ; and there are no good grounds for 
denying that there is will in the lower animals. 
They cannbt be said to be altogether deliberate, for 
there is a distinction between impulsive volition, 
and volition with a purpose. However we may in- 
terpret the proposition, i" will, there is substantial 
agreement as to that which is to be interpreted. 
But theories of the will in the history of philoso- 
phy vary so widely, that any definition given now 
would be inadequate to comprehend them all. 

The student of philosophy is concerned chiefly 
with the human will. The will of God, either 
transcendent or immanent, is more properly an 
object of theology. The will as an ontological 
principle, not identified with God, calls for inci- 
dental notice, although this conception has not 
been of frequent occurrence in Western thought. 
The physiological aspects of subject have not been 
of importance until the present century. I shall 



4 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 

therefore consider principally the psychological and 
ethical doctrine of the will in the history of phi- 
losophy. 

Like some other conceptions of psychology and 
ethics, a doctrine of the will cannot be merely 
descriptive ; it involves explanatory discussion. 
It is closely related to problems of ontology, the 
theory of knowledge, and logic. In successive sys- 
tems, there have been various methods of inter- 
preting this relation. Some philosophers deduce 
their theory of the will from general principles; 
others are satisfied with the results of the empirical 
method, or an appeal to consciousness ; others draw 
conclusions as to what the will is, by setting out 
with a moral theory of what the will ought to bo. 

The historical method of introducing this subject 
has certain serious disadvantages. It leads the 
student through chapters of unprofitable contro- 
versy. The history of the doctrine has been to a 
great extent a history of the dispute about freedom 
and its opposite, which has an unpleasant notoriety. 
Any one who troubles himself or others with this 
subject is popularly looked upon as the victim of une 
id&efixe, and consigned to the class of zealots who 
have hopes about the quadrature of the circle. 
Few will agree with Milton that discourse upon 
necessity and free will is to be reckoned among 
the joys of Paradise. Many will remember with 
approval that Laud forbade his clergy to preach 
about predestination. There are legends of those 
who have been driven to suicide by the mysteries 
of Calvinism or the Third Kantian Antinomy. But 



INTRODUCTION 7 

lieved in free will. The teaching of the Critique 
of Pure Reason does not consistently apply to the 
Critique of Practical Reason. There is an em- 
pirical theory of knowledge, but it does not imply 
necessarily any particular theory of the will. 
Empirical principles may lead logically to a 
certain view of volition, but we shall find no his- 
torical justification for saying that they have always 
done so. I shall therefore first simply consider the 
origin of the doctrine of the will in Western thought, 
and then proceed to give an account of a series of 
typical examples. 

Attention was attracted to some of the phe- 
nomena of will at a comparatively early period. 
Without repeating the familiar story of the rise of 
systematic philosophy out of the primitive mythol- 
ogy and cosmogony of Greece, there are two ideas 
which first emerged, and which may be first dis- 
cussed. 

I. The Principle of Fate in relation to human 

action; 

II. The Opposition discovered between Reason, 

or Understanding, and Feeling. 

In relation to these two ideas a theory of the 
will was developed. It need not be asked which 
came first in order of time. In the earlier litera- 
ture they were synchronous. In each of them a 
conflict is implied, — in the one case between a 
supernatural principle and a natural order; in the 
other, between a rational tendency and the feel- 
ings. To adjust the conception of man's autonomy 




8 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

to belief in the irresistible power of Pate was 
the first problem. In solving it, or attempting 
to solve it, the science of ethics was born. Thus 
volition was first distinguished as a principle of 
ethics. 

There should be caution in making psychological 
inferences from the free and naive language of the 
early poets, — such as the terms used in Homer to 
denote different states of mind. They have little 
more scientific significance than his well-known 
localization of psychical functions in organs of 
the body. Germs of subsequent philosophical 
opinion are doubtless to be found in his epics; 
as, for example, where he is cited by Plato 
as a witness to the difference between the rational 
and emotional elements in man. 1 The characters 
of the Iliad and of the Odyssey are distinctly 
drawn, while the souls of gods and heroes are por- 
trayed as an arena upon which feelings are contend- 
ing for the mastery. Where it is not explicitly 
stated, it is at least implied that the reason can 
control the passions ; but the crude psychology of 
the poet need not be further noticed. We find in 
Homer, however, a plain recognition of divine 
supremacy, particularly the supremacy of Fate. 
This conception is characteristic of almost all 
Greek thought and Greek literature, down to the 
time of the Alexandrian schools. It is a concep- 
tion which has philosophical importance. The 
term Fate is used indifferently in the singular and 
plural. The Greek terms M$$f?a and ^'^apfievq refer 
1 See Homer, Od. i. 



INTRODUCTION 9 

to that which has been actually allotted or ordained. 
The Latin equivalent is Parcae, used in the plural 
only. According to Hesiod, the Fates, three in 
number, have an origin ; yet Moipa from the earliest 
times was looked upon as an independent principle, 
and sometimes as superior even to Zeus. Aristotle 
is inclined to identify the fatal principle with God 
to whom many names are given. One of the 
names is Fate, another is Necessity. 1 The Fa 
are originally the decrees or allotments of the g 
especially of Zeus. In the literature before 
totle there had been two views taken of the r' 
between Fate and God. On the one han 
was a decree, dependent for its effectiven 
the divine will. On the other hand, it w? 
fied, and conceived of as an independent 
controlling the acts of gods and of men. 
former view is that of Aristotle also, and he is thu. 
free from the inconsistency of the popular myths 
which sometimes left the relation of Fate to Zeus 
undetermined. Du Maistre has said that Greece 
was born divided. It was natural that the patron- 
age and influence of the gods should be associated 
with the fortunes of individual men and commu- 
nities. The defeat of one city by another, the 
successes and disasters of particular families or 
persons, was ascribed to the agency of the gods. 
A god had conferred or withdrawn his favor. The 
plans of one deity had been thwarted by another. 
The power of the lesser gods was merely relative. 
The vicissitudes of Greeks and Trojans in the 

1 Aristotle, De Mundo, 401, b. 20 f . 



10 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

Iliad were ascribed to the alternate successes 
and failures of protecting divinities. But the inter- 
vention of Zeus was always sufficient to decide the 
conflict. Defeat or victory came at his bidding. 
He had local temples, but was not a local divinity. 
He was without fixed prejudices. He had unlim- 
ited power. In the council of the gods, the plans 
of Zeus are law. In the changes of war, the gods 
appeal to him. He is king of mortals and im- 
mortals. 1 He is the god of kings. Even in the 
tragedies his sovereignty is recognized. None of the 
gods is eternal. In Hesiod's Theogony we are 
left in doubt as to the beginning of divine existence, 
unless we regard the eternal universe as the parent 
of all deities. In the old polytheism, therefore, 
there is the inconsistency of a Supreme God who 
has an origin in time. Evidently in allusion to 
the mystery of their influence, the Fates, like sleep 
and death, are children of Night. 2 The distinction 
noticed by Hesiod between the fatal three was 
adopted by later writers, explicitly by Plato and 
Aristotle. It is seldom that the decrees of Zeus are 
considered as subject to the control of Fate. There 
is a notable exception in the Iliad, where Sarpe- 
don's life is in danger. Zeus is summoned to inter- 
fere, but refuses on the ground that the hero's death 
had been ordained by Fate. 8 In the Prometheus 
of iEschylus it is said that Fate is above Zeus, but 

i Homer, II. I. 525, 554; XII. 241, 242; Od. IV. 78, 237. 
^schylus, Suppl. 589 f.; Prom. 550. Sophocles, Electra, 174, 
175 ; Antigone, 604, 610. 

2 Hesiod, Theogon. 217. 8 Homer, II. XVI. 433 £. 



INTRODUCTION 11 

the surprise and horror of the chorus at the 
speaker's impiety show that this sentiment was 
not in harmony with the ordinary belief. 1 The 
harmony of both views is evident, if it be remem- 
bered that the decrees of God were thought to be 
fixed as soon as uttered. They could not be re- 
called. This is the interpretation of Seneca, who 
finds consolation in the inevitable necessity of Fate 
which governs both gods and men. Jupiter ipse 
omnium conditor ac rector inscribes the Fates, yet 
follows them. 2 The Latin writers followed the 
Greek in their conception of the fatal principle. 
Thus even the conceits of the old mythology have 
a philosophical meaning. This belief in a mythical 
principle, which was afterwards to assume an ab- 
stract form, was an article of the popular religion. 
The old creed was deeply fixed in the mind of the 
people. The frequent comments on the poets in 
the writings of philosophers, and the respectful 
attitude of historians, show how firm a hold the 
earlier epics and stories had acquired. The 
persistence of this religious faith is further exhib- 
ited by the success of Neo-Platonism, in which an 
abstract and metaphysical polytheism was presented 
in speculative dress. Negatively it is evident that 
Augustine, when at a late day he attacked the old 
Koman religion in his De Oivitate Dei, was re- 
ferring to opinions still firmly held by his contem- 
poraries. 

The idea of Fate is one of the marks of the 
transition from the mythical to the philosophical 

i ^schylus, Prom. 513-520. 2 Seneca, De Provid. V. 



12 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

conception of nature. It shows, at any rate, a 
tendency to reach a principle of unity higher than 
the gods. At length the mythical idea of Fate was 
exchanged for that of fatal necessity as a principle 
of philosophy. This doctrine of fatal necessity 
prevailed in a great part of ancient thought. It 
was rejected, however, by the later Academy, and 
by the Epicureans ; and Cicero declares : anile sane 
et plenum superstitionis fato nomen ipsum. 1 

According to Hegel, Fate was the necessary prin- 
ciple which controlled generally the acts of gods 
and men. The gods were creatures of the popular 
imagination. The fatal principle had its own 
sphere, and interfered when there was a collision 
of interests. 2 Comte, regarding polytheism as a 
development from fetichism, and monotheism as 
a transition to a positive view of nature, shows 
that polytheism, when fully developed, introduced 
under the name of Fate or Destiny a general concep- 
tion to serve as a fundamental principle of invari- ' 
able natural laws. To the primitive man, nature 
seemed arbitrary and irregular ; experience revealed 
the uniformity of natural law. To the ancient 
world, Fate was the principle of unchangeable uni- 
formity, the necessary corrective of polytheism. 3 
This view is consistent with that of Aristotle, to 
which reference has just been made. 

The relation of this principle to human action, 
as well as to the purposes of the gods, was also 
considered by Greek and Roman writers. How- 

1 Cicero, De Divin. II. 7. 2 Hegel, X 2 , 100. 

8 Comte, Phil. Pos. III. 308, 309. 



INTRODUCTION 13 

ever genial and attractive the earlier polytheism 
may have been, a minor note is audible in all classi- 
cal literature. There is a point at which human 
effort and human action are in vain. While it is 
expressed in the earlier epics, and recognized by 
some of the elegiac and lyric poets, the principle 
of Fate appears most prominently and significantly 
in the tragedies. The stories or legends upon 
which these were founded were well adapted to 
illustrate the subjection of man to this higher 
power. There is a difference which is very sug- 
gestive, between the view of this taken by iEschy- 
lus and Sophocles respectively. The Fate of the 
former is less blind and arbitrary. The events are 
inevitable, but they follow each other with some 
show of justice. The moral questions are less per- 
plexing. The rebellion of Prometheus is the ground 
of his torture and perdition. It is necessity which 
makes the retribution inevitable; but there is no 
intimation that necessity impelled him to steal the 
heavenly fire, or to defy the power of Zeus. The 
Persce preaches resignation to the evils sent by 
the gods. 1 The Septem declares that submission 
is the parent of beneficence ; 2 the Agamemnon, 
that justice will be done to the poor and humble ; the 
Choephori connects the Furies with retribution, 8 
while the Eumenides presents an impressive pict- 
ure of deities pleading in the court of Areopagus. 
It is chiefly in the Prometheus that the moral 
difficulty of divine omnipotence is raised. We ask 

i jEschylus, Pers. 285. * i<j. , Sept. contr. Theb. 206. 

s Id., Choeph. 636 f. 



U.- 



14 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

whether a man, who has defied God for t 
of his fellows, should be found guilty. The 
supremacy is vindicated at the expense of justice 
and mercy. The catastrophes in the other trage- 
dies of iEschylus are of another kind. Clytem- 
nestra, with her guilty love for iEgisthus, is not a 
very suitable instrument for executing celestial 
justice, and avenging Iphigenia's death. But Cly- 
temnestra perishes by the hand of Orestes. If the 
sacrifice of Iphigenia was justifiable, Agamemnon 
was unjustly slain; but if Agamemnon was justly 
slain, the vengeance of Orestes was unjust ; if the 
vengeance of Orestes was unjust, he was unjustly 
acquitted by Athene, but if just, the torments in- 
flicted by the Furies were unjust. Such are some 
of the alternatives suggested. The moral of these 
tragedies is that punishment follows crime. Fate 
makes the punishment inevitable. Justice is allied 
with Fate, and the Furies are their ministers. 1 
The subjective states of the dramatis personae are 
of secondary importance. 

The moral issues raised by Sophocles are even 
more perplexing. The blind and arbitrary work of 
Fate is vividly set forth in the familiar story of 
Laius. A series of inevitable catastrophes over- 
whelm the unconscious agents. (Edipus, for exam- 
ple, leaves the oracle aware of his criminal destiny. 
He kills his father at the trivium, not because of par- 
ricidal feelings, but in ignorance of his parentage. 
He is a victim of events in which he has been the 
chief but most unconscious actor. It is repugnant 
1 -aSschylus, Eumen. 324. 




INTRODUCTION" 15 

to ordinary conceptions of responsibility. It is 
quite in accordance with Greek ideas that the con- 
sequences of his acts should pursue him. The 
suicide of his mother, and his own self-inflicted 
blindness, are the beginnings of the misfortunes 
which are continued in the GEdipus Coloneus and 
in the Antigone. The same relentless Pate ap- 
pears in the pathetic story of Philoctetes, whose 
bravery is rewarded by the persistent tortures of 
his wound, and in the Ajax, where the hero has 
sacrificed his honor in a fit of madness. Of Sopho- 
cles one may say with the scholiast : " He would 
affirm that neither the things done in heaven, nor on 
earth, nor in the sea happen, except according to 
Fate." 1 It is this which determines the death of 
Laius, 2 the crimes of (Edipus, the madness of Ajax, 
the sorrows of Philoctetes, and the vengeance of 
Orestes and Plectra. There is a collision between 
the individual purpose and the divine order. 

The form of the Prench classic drama, borrowed 
from the Greek, illustrates the same kind of 
ideas. Carlyle has compared this unfavorably 
with the conceptions of English and German 
dramatic writers. 8 But in the latter, although the 
effects are not always attributed to Pate, the prin- 
ciple appears disguised in psychical and ethical 
forms. Faust may deliberately and freely bind 
himself to the devil, but after the compact has 
once been made, there is no retreat. The "Pate 

1 Scholia, Sophocles, Antigone, 951. 

2 Sophocles, CEdip. Rex, 711-714. 
" Carlyle, VII. 154. 



16 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

and metaphysical aid " 1 of Macbeth and his con- 
sort is unscrupulous ambition, so uncontrolled as 
to become the " insane root that takes the reason 
prisoner." Even the irresolution of Hamlet seems 
to be inevitable and to produce inevitable results. 
It is the manifestation of a character which he is 
unable to overcome. He is an example of the Pyr- 
rhonist, who submits to the order of circumstances, 
rather than resist the course of events and oppose 
a sea of moral troubles. In the modern drama the 
determination of actions is ascribed to subjective 
states. Fatalism holds that certain results will be 
effected, whatever may be willed to prevent them. 
The ordinary theory of moderate predestination is 
kindred to this ; the purpose of God will be accom- 
plished, whatever may be willed to the contrary. 
Logically the fatalist should say that the will is 
determined by means of motives. There is an 
obvious difference between the assertion that an 
end will be attained because men are determined 
so to will, and the assertion that an end will be 
attained whatever men will. It was possibly the 
idea of the fatal order as divine which gave the 
ancient tragedies their religious importance. If 
we remember the fear and reverence of the gods in 
the Greek and Eoman world, the recognition of 
divine supremacy and human dependence, we can 
understand the significance of the Epicurean revolt 
against the popular theology, and the substitution 
of chance for necessity in spite of a materialistic 
philosophy. We may also understand why Lucre- 

1 Shakespeare, Macbeth, 1. 5. 



INTRODUCTION 17 

tius thought belief in the gods to be one of the two 
great evils, and preferred to imagine them as remote 
from all human interests. And yet the fatalism 
of the Stoics was not altogether in harmony with 
the ethics of the Greek theatre. The Stoics were 
impressed by the needless display of passion on 
the stage. In reacting against emotional tenden- 
cies, they taught the wisdom of apathy, of submis- 
sion to the fatal or natural order, which could not 
be changed, which should be endured. 

Belief in a fixed supernatural order of events is 
related also to man's curiosity concerning the 
future. The ancient fatalism, like the modern, 
was a motive to seek knowledge of what was about 
to happen. In the absence of a prophetic class, 
such as was to be found in ancient Israel, the 
Greeks and Romans consulted oracles at the seats 
of the gods, examined the entrails of animals, ob- 
served omens and prodigies, in order to gain knowl- 
edge of the future. Aside from the repeated 
references by historians to these practices, the 
treatise of Cicero, De Divinatione, presents the ar- 
guments employed in their favor, but argues that 
these practices are unnecessary and useless. Divi- 
nation was favored even by the Emperor Julian, 
who himself assumed the functions of an augur. 
The oracular sayings were usually so ambiguous as 
to justify the idea that the future was contingent. 
But it is logical to infer that if coming events can 
be foretold, their occurrence must have been pre- 
viously determined. If the prophecy or oracular 
prediction could be reversed by human agency, the 
o 



18 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

information acquired might be useful, but would 
prove to be untrue. This contradiction is well 
represented in the famous dilemma of the croco- 
dile, which so amused the ancient authors. 1 

The crocodile promises to return the child which 
he has taken, on condition that the parent is able 
to say truly what the animal has decided to do. 
If the parent says that the child is about to be 
returned, when the crocodile has determined to 
devour him, then the child will be lost; but if the 
parent says that the child is not about to be re- 
turned, when the crocodile has determined to return 
him, then the child will likewise be lost. The 
crocodile will adhere to his determination in any 
event, and it is this which creates the difficulty. 

Fatalism and indeterminism have one point in 
common. Both minimize the importance of ante- 
cedent causes in relation to human action. What 
Fate accomplishes, irrespective of human volitions, 
that is effected by liberum arbitrium, when the action 
of the will is undetermined. The problem of the 
freedom of the will in its philosophical sense was 
not suggested until the subjective side of man's 
nature had become an object of inquiry. The 
philosophical theory of fatal necessity recognized 
the determination of the will by necessary causes, 
but did not apprehend the psychological process 
involved. A merely theological or metaphysical 
answer is insufficient. The problem is chiefly 
psychological. 

1 See Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22 ; Hermot. 81 ; and Lotze, Logik, 
337. 



INTRODUCTION 19 

Having thus noticed the antithesis between Fate 
and human action, as suggesting the questions about 
the will, I shall turn to the other antithesis, be- 
tween the emotional and rational elements in man's 
nature. 

The psychology of all the Socratic philosophers 
was undeveloped, and their moral teaching was 
independent of their metaphysical and physical 
theories. Our sources of information show that 
their view of the will was only rudimentary, if 
indeed they can be said to have had the subject 
before them at all. The ethics of the period be- 
fore Socrates were didactic, and were commonly in 
the form of maxims. In no instance is there any 
scientific treatment of human conduct. In the 
primitive Pythagorean doctrine, attention was di- 
rected to the relation of the body to the soul. The 
soul was said to be imprisoned in the body; its 
activity is hampered and hindered by this connec- 
tion. 1 This view was in accordance with the as- 
cetic morality of the order. The object of the 
Pythagorean discipline was to attain to commun- 
ion with the gods. To this religious end, all the 
exercises of soul and body are directed. The limi- 
tation of the soul by the body is a conception 
which does not involve a theory of volition, but its 
relation to such a theory is obvious. The direc- 
tions given for the attainment of this end imply a 
belief that, although the body limits the soul, it is 
itself subject to voluntary restraint. The Pythag- 
oreans insisted upon the control of the appetites, 

i Plato, Phaedo, 62. 



20 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the observance of stated periods of silence, and 
temperance. In their psychology, they are said to 
have anticipated the Platonic partition of the soul 
into the rational and irrational, 1 as well as the 
threefold division of the parts of the soul, and the 
specification of the different kinds of knowledge. 
Plato objects to the Pythagorean doctrine that the 
soul is a harmony, on the ground that by this the 
body is made the master of the soul. The philos- 
ophy of Heraclitus, in which may be discerned 
germs of Stoic doctrine, lays emphasis upon the 
worth of the rational, as distinguished from the 
sensual or emotional life. Virtues such as orderly 
living and contentment are placed above conformity 
to the lower appetites. 2 Empedocles notices feel- 
ings of pleasure and pain in relation to human 
action. The object of the will is pleasure, and the 
will itself is said to be formed of a mingling of 
elements ; 3 but his conception of the faculty is 
very indefinite. Just as his theory of similia sim- 
ilibus percipiuntur maintains a certain likeness be- 
tween the knowing power and the thing known, so 
we may here suppose that there is a correlation 
between appetite and will on the one hand, and the 
object sought after on the other. The psychology 
of the early Atomists is likewise imperfect. While 
the Epicureans, who taught the freedom of the will, 
derived their physics from Democritus, the early 
Atomists show no signs of holding any such doc- 
trine. Nothing exists except atoms and empty 

1 Cicero, Tusc. IV. 5 ; Theognis. V. 1053. 
2 Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. I. 660. 8 Plutarch, Plac. V. 28. 



INTRODUCTION" 21 

space, and the soul is composed of atoms. There 
is no beginning of motion, and Aristotle says that 
the philosophers of this school never investigated 
the origin of motion. Whatever happens, happens 
of necessity. The soul which is composed of atoms 
must come under this general law. 1 In his prac- 
tical teaching, Democritus observes the distinction 
between the happiness which comes from within 
by the rational ordering of the soul, and that which 
comes from external causes, preferring the former 
to the latter. 2 A like disparagement of outward 
or sensible good is found in the doctrine of Anax- 
agoras, who is said to have attached value rather 
to the contemplation of the structure of the uni- 
verse, than to the satisfaction of the appetites. 
Thus the Eleatic distinction between the world of 
sense and the world of reason has its ethical cor- 
relative in most of the Pre-Socratic philosophy, in 
the antithesis between the moral life of the reason 
and that of the appetites. Among the Sophists, 
the theory of Prodicus of Ceos alone has special 
reference to the will. He is the author of a fable 
on the choice of Hercules, 8 in which a distinction 
is implied between desire for pleasure on the one 
hand, and moral purpose on the other. It is plain 
from this famous story that where attractive ob- 
jects lure the appetite, the moral agent has it in 
his power to resist and refuse them. 

This antithesis between the rational principle on 
the one hand, and the sensual principle on the other, 

1 Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, Art. Atom. 

2 Fragm. I. 2, 8. 8 Aristotle, Eth. Eud. I. 1215, b. 6. 



22 THEORIES OF THE WU 

which appears in the early philo ever 

disappeared from moral science. ized 

in modern language as well as in . ght. 

We say that a man is overcome wi ver- 

powered by ange?, or is under t . of 

appetite; we do not say that he is a victim to 
reason, or a slave to any cognitive process. And 
in the pathology of the mind we recognize emo- 
tional insanity, where the feelings are of such a kind 
or of such intensity as to set at naught the rational 
processes. The appetite belongs to its subject as 
really as the train of thought or reasoning, but it 
is recognized that self-control is the control of the 
passions by the reason. It may be added, however, 
that of late years psychologists have been made 
familiar with an obsession of the mind by sugges- 
tion, — some intellectual phenomenon, a fixed idea, 
which is sufficient to govern the normal passions 
and the normal process of knowledge. There is 
therefore justification in philosophy for Goethe's 
words : — 

Zwei Seelen wohnen ach ! in meiner Brust. 



RIOD 25 

lie will do it. 
the good is the 
intellectual, not 
> knows the good 
e vicious, then it 
CHAPTER FIRSle will. This is 
luced from the 

THEORIES OF THE WILL IN" THE SO 

,rics alone made 
In the accounts of the teaching - 
_ -. ,. _ _ . , . . for certain rea- 

nnd that he dealt with the doctrine c , -, 

. . _ ■ _ . re conveniently 

its moral side. In some respects i, eaching of the 

distinguish between his views upo 

and those which were held by Plato. 

terest in practical questions was not 

as in the period after Aristotle, tl 

losophers of this era were deeply 

, . - , -, , . i ,, • T .them m then- 

questions of theoretical ethics. In t 

theories of Socrates, Plato, and Arist . 

general head of the Socratic period, ". 

, , , ,, , ,, ion may there- 

understood as supposing that they 

ticular theory of the will in common. 

is a general likeness between the dc J ' 

j. j tii x. XT. £ a h m this sense, 

rates and Plato, the views of Ar' 

subject are radically different. All ,, 
, ,,,,..,, . ,re the form3 or 

phers represent the highest dev* 1 n , 

f, ,. r , .,, Jf . ;g things bear the 

thought, and with them ■ , . : , , . . 
. ^e is wnat it is, not only 

science. . ,, . / 

m , i j t • hi the universal essences, 

I he moral teaching „ . . 

. r, -, , ' , , copy of a perfect pattern." 

influenced by the com ,, w x ,. .. .-. -, 

, . . . , , the noumena as distinguished 

popular religion and ■ 

did not satisfy the . ^ 8 - 

• Repub VI B01 , IX. ad fin. 



22 TH 

JSORIES OF THE WILL 

which appears i . . _, , . 

-,. j £ am the universe. The demand for 

disappeared froi . „ , 

, , atic treatment of such questions, 
m modern langr . * ' 

•vTtx . , , .ons of ethics, may be inferred from 

We say that a n „ i . . ' *, 

•j , of the previous philosophy, and from 

... ymas of the Greek tragedies already 

appetite; we d ° J 

reason, or a sla ,,,,„, , , . 

' fh -Hi 1 L P e( locles had found a correlation 

. . , . ..id pleasure, or rather between pleas- 
tional insanity, r ■ „ ' . _ ^ 

-, , . nands of the organism, so Socrates 

T , <od as correlative to the will. 1 That 

,, ', t is the good; the good is that which 
really as "ciie "urj n .. . _ 

i ,, appears from the account given by 
is recognized tl rr & , . ^ 

, ,, a and Plato, that Socrates believed 
passions by the , ; , ' . ^ ^ . .. __.. 

i;, , « , low what he thought to be good. The 

tnat ox late y _ ... .. 

- .,. .,, ;s was not to correct the will, but to 
familiar with a n . TT . , . , . -, 

, . . ier standing. Virtue is not acquired 

tion,— some m ° x 

-, . , . ^ practice. Virtue is knowledge." It 
which is sulfur n . n T , . , . 

, ,, Reachable. It is because virtue is 

., „ . ,.it it is teachable. 8 It is not know- 
therefore lusti: , , ... . , . ,. ., 
, _ ular good things, such as an mdivid- 

or utility ; it is knowledge of the 

Zwei See This shows it to be in relation to 

•.eory of conceptions. 4 Just as true 

i in such a knowledge as will make 

uition of the thing known; so true 

"nsists in such a knowledge as will 

<*■ the good sought. If the object 

be related to the genus 

of the genus is virtue. 

\6. 
7. Plato, Laches, 194. 
. ' * Id., ib. 74. 



IN THS SOCKATIC PERIOD 25 

When the man knows the good he will do it. 
Pleasure is not the good, although the good is the 
useful. 1 The virtuous principle is intellectual, not 
emotional, or voluntary. If he who knows the good 
will do it, and only the ignorant are vicious, then it 
is knowledge which determines the will. This is 
the conclusion which must be deduced from the 
ethics of Socrates. 

Of the Socratic schools, the Megarics alone made 
the will an object of inquiry. But for certain rea- 
sons, the Megaric theory may be more conveniently 
considered in connection with the teaching of the 
Post-Aristotelian philosophers. 

Plato 

Plato distinguishes between voluntary and in- 
voluntary actions. lie discusses them in their 
psychological and ethical relations. The theory 
fundamental to h,'.s whole philosophy is the Dialec- 
tic, the theory of \ Ideas. The question may there- 
fore be raised at tlie outset: what relation, if any, 
have the Ideas to ihe voluntary actions of man. 

The Ideas are universal essences, in this sense, 
that they are the i aal being by virtue of which all 
tilings are what tl.ey are. They are the forms or 
archetypes of whbh all existing things bear the 
image. The object of sense is what it is, not only 
because it participates in the universal essences, 
but also because it s a copy of a perfect pattern. 2 
The Ideas ai-3, furth it, the noumena as distinguished 

l Plato, Protag. 358, 

3 Id., Timaaus, 2 ; Eepub. VI 501 ; IX. ad fin. 



26 THEORIES Off THE WIIiL 

the phenomena, Tae latter are unreal, and 
transitory; the former are real, and abide, 
individual objects of the i phenomenal world are 
known by the w opinion ; l the eternal 

essences are known by the reason only. The Ideas 
are sometimes represented as dynamic essences, as 
forces, which produce effects in the phenomenal 
world;, 2 and in the later philosophy of Plato, the 
Ideas are described as numbers ■ conformity to 
the Pythagorean doctrine t'bat the apxq of the 
verse is number. All the Ideas have an essential 
connection with the Idea of the good ; which is in 

lance with the optimism and ethical chai 
of the Platonic philosophy. This is the Platonic 
realism, which the schoolmen epitomized in the 
phrase universalia ante rem. It has beer ' 
realism involves determinism, and that to held the 
] ogical doctrine necessitates a denial edom 

of the will. If this be admitted; Plato' 
of the will should be deterministic, if the Tdeu,s 
be regarded in their dynamic aspect, it might be 
held that their relation to individual is ex- 

cluded the idea of freedom; It lever, im- 

possible to rest satisfied with such inferences. For 
the chief obstacle to a clear undei 
is the obscurity which surrounds his docvi 
way in which the objects of sense and opinion are 
related to the Ideas. The former are said to share 
or participate in the latter ; but the term used is 

umciently explained for us to re?ah any par- 

i Plato, Bepub. V. 477, X. 596; Ttauaus, 51. 
*ld., Pluedo, 16. 




IN THE SOCttATIC PERIOD 27 

tieular conclusion as to ~he relation between man's 
ion and the Ideas. 1 At times, however, the 
Dialectic is so closely related to the psychological 
and ethical theories. fch?a>t complete separation of the 
two is impossible. In the Phaidrm, for example, 
the soul is said to be immortal and self-moving, and 
immortal because self-moving. 2 While the context 
discusses the nature of indvidual souls, it is prob- 
able that the earlier part of the passage refers to 
the soul as Idea or universal. It is the divine as 
well as the mortal soul which is said to be the 
source and first principle of all motion ; and it can- 
not be the individual human k.ouI which is meant, 
where it is declared that if it did not exist, the 
whole heaven and all created things would stand 
still. In this universal, soul the particular souls of 
gods and men participate. Particular souls are in 
a state of preexistence in the realm of Ideas ; and, 
guided by some god, each of them is led to the con- 
templation of eternal truth. They are compared to 
winged creatures which ascend to this ideal vision. 
But among those who are so guided, there are some 
which lose their feathers, and are unable to behold 
the truth. These fall, and in consequence of their 
fall are united to mortal bodies. In the Timceus, 3 
the manner of the union of soul and body is thus 
described: The offspring of God received from him 
' ; 'inning or principle of the soul, to 
they joined the body as its vehicle. In addi- 
tion to the immortal principle, a mortal soul was 

1 Plato, Parmen. 130, 131. S. Thomas Aq. 1. 1. Q. V. 2. 

2 Plato, Phaedras, 245. « Id., Timsus, U. 



28 THEORIES Oil THK WIl.li 

placed within the body. r Jhe latter was Bubjecl 
jpassion, swayed by pleasure and pain, by ras^ 
and cowardice. Each of these souls had its plaoe 
in a certain part of the bodA, The immortal prin- 
ciple was pul in the head; While the mortal soul 
was divided into two parts, tie emotional soul, and 
the sensual or appetitive sojil. The former was 
fixed in the region above, tho. latter in the region 
below the diaphragm. Both wer? ted to the 

sway of the reason. The control of the appetites 
was effected by^fche immortal reason, which was 
reflected upon the shiny surface of the liver. The 
emotions were governed through the blood which 
passed from the head into the cavity of the thorax. 
This fanciful account is presented by Plato as a 
mere probability, and as founded on diw 
tion. The threefold partition of the soul is further 
discussed in the Phcedrus and the Republic. 

In the former of these dialogues the doctrine of 
Preexistence is asserted, but there is no intimation 
that the emotional and appetitive principle 
mortal. The elements or parts of the soul are 
compared to two winged steeds and a charioteer. 1 
The latter is the reason, while the two form 
the emotional and appetitive principles. The con- 
trol of the horses by the driver is evident! 
relative, for it is shown that the black ho: 
represents the appetites can bring the chariot to 
ruin, by rebellious behavior. The souls o 
gods are also compared to two-horse chariot 
though neither horse is said to be unruly, an 

* Plato, Phsedrus, 245, 240 f. 



IN" THE SOCBATK PERIOD 29 

charioteer meets with no mishap. If we unite the 
statements of the Timceus and of the Phcedrus, we 
have the inconsistency of the emotional and appe- 
titive souls in the gods, which souls are elsewhere 
declared to be mortal. But in the Phcedrus it 
is expressly stated that the gods have these three 
souls, and that the two lower souls are parts of 
the mortal principle. One of these parts is the 
more noble, which is the emotional; the other is 
less noble, which is the sensual part. In agreement 
with the Timceus the Phcedrus declares that the 
lower souls are swayed by the reason. The 
steed which represents appetite, upon seeing the 
object of pleasure, becomes excited, and unless 
steadily controlled, will bring the charioteer to 
grief. In the impulsive soul there is a rational 
element, and it is more obedient to the command 
of the charioteer. In each of the three souls there 
is an element of knowledge, for the appetitive soul 
has a knowledge of the pleasurable object, and the 
emotional soul has an apprehension of that which 
excites its anger or courage or ambition or fear. 
In each of the three souls there is also ill, as well 
as knowledge. That which wills the satisfaction 
of appetite resides in the lowest soul ; that which 
wills the facing of danger, the avoidance of cow- 
ardice and rashness, resides in the emotional soul. 
Will in a higher sense, as deliberate, conscious pref- 
erence, is in the reason. This threefold division 
is explicitly recognized in the Republic. 2 The 
reason is the instrument of knowledge, or learn- 
i Plato, Timseus, 69 f , 2 id., Repub. IV. MO t. 



30 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

ing; the emotional soul is subject to anger, fear, 
courage, and the noble emotions; the lowest soul 
desires the satisfaction of the appetites. The act 
of volition is compared to answering a question by- 
assent; this assent, in the case of appetite, may be 
forbidden by the reason. There may be a collision 
between the assent of the appetite and that of the 
reason; or between the assent of the emotional 
soul and the reason. The emotional soul is like- 
wise at times in conflict with the appetite, because 
it is on the side of the rational principle. The 
emotional soul is naturally good, but may be cor- 
rupted by education. The reason issues its com- 
mands to the Ov/ios, 1 dictating what it should follow 
or fear ; just as in the state, the philosophers con- 
trol the lower classes of citizens. The reason rules 
by virtue of its knowledge. And just as in the 
state, the control of the laboring class is disas- 
trous, so in the soul, disaster follows the dominion 
of the appetitive part. 

Plato rejects the Pythagorean doctrine that the 
soul is the harmony of the body, on the ground 
that it implies the control of the soul by the body. 2 
In the Phcedo however, the discourse of Socrates 
includes a statement of the relation of soul and 
body, which bears much likeness to the Pythagorean 
teaching. So far is he from supposing that the 
body is an advantage to the soul, in knowledge and 
virtue, that he views the relation as a misforturie for 
the soul, as a limitation and imprisonment of its 
powers. And in the tenth book of the Republic, 

i Plato, Timasus, 70. * Id., Phaxlo, 86, 94. 



IN THE SQTbCiSATIC PERIOD 31 

/ 

to deserve the nam' said to belong not to the essence 
ng d^ Plato le?i to be incidental to its disfigured 
existence in the body. 1 We are not to conceive of 
Plato as teaching any doctrine of an Ego, or of one 
psychical principle acting by means of the three 
parts, as if these were faculties. The three parts 
are compared to the high, middle, and low musical 
notes of the scale. When the soul is harmonious, 
each of the three has its proper proportion in the 
acts of man. But the essence of the soul is rational ; 
the conflict between reason and appetite is not a 
civil war in the soul, but rather a war of the higher 
soul with invaders. If we consider will in its 
aspect as an energy, power, or impulse, we may 
identify the emotional soul, 6vfi6s, with that faculty ; 
if, on the other hand, we consider will in its de- 
liberative, decisive, aspect, as arhitrium, we may 
place the will in the rational principle of Plato's 
psychology. 

But will in its more general sense cannot be 
attributed to one part to the exclusion of the others. 
In some passages Plato speaks as if the appetite 
swayed a man against his will. A man may be 
thirsty, and yet unwilling to satisfy his thirst. 2 
There is something within him which invites him, 
but there is also something in him which prevents 
him. The different species of knowledge described 
by Plato all imply a certain activity of the soul. 
Opinion (S6$a) is the pursuit of knowledge by the 
soul. 3 Intelligence (vcfyo-is 4 ) is the longing of the 

i Plato, ib. Repub. X. 603, 610 et passim. 

2 Id., ib. IV. 439. » Id., Cratyl. 420. * Id., ib. 411. 



32 THEORIES UP 1JIE WILL 

soul after what is novel or uict to anger, fear, 
(/3oi5A.eo-0ai) is said to involve the idethe lowest s.o>ul 
and deliberating; the voluntary (Ikow-iov) is con- 
trasted with the resistance of necessity. 1 It is the 
yielding of the soul to the movement of the will, 
and not opposing it. Necessity is spoken of as 
that which opposes our will, and things done from 
necessity imply mistake and lack of knowledge. 
The emotional soul (6 dv/Aos) is a rushing impulse; a 
and thus the same term stands for the act as for 
the faculty. The practical working of the triple 
soul is further discussed in the Republic. Emotion, 
which is a kind of desire, is also to be found 
contending on the side of the reason. Both of 
these principles may combine to keep in subjection 
the appetites ; the reason deliberates, and the emo- 
tional soul fights under the reason as its com- 
mander. Where the lower parts of the soul are 
deficient in knowledge, the deficiency is supplied 
by the superior knowledge of the reason. The 
latter is that which decides ; and it is when reason 
is asleep that the appetites are awake. 8 In this 
account of the relation of vov<s to i7n$vfiia, we find 
the germs of that theory of the will which views it 
as executing the commands of the understanding; 
as subject to the control of the reason, and carry- 
ing out its intentions. But it is only the germ, 
and we are left in doubt as to whether acts in 
obedience to appetite which imply the overpower- 
ing of the reason are to be considered voluntary, 
or whether only deliberate 3ts should be thought 
1 Id., ib. 420. 2 id., i b , 4if s id., Repul). IX. 571. 



IN THE SOCBATIC PERIOD 33 

to deserve the name. Certainly the ethical teach- 
ing of Plato leads us to accept the latter alterna- 
tive. 

If we turn to the moral teaching of Plato, we 
find that his doctrine of virtue is essentially that 
of Socrates. It consists in "knowledge. 1 Know- 
ledge is its source, and it is manifested in the har- 
mony of the soul. As has been shown, the pristine 
state of the soul was one in contemplation of the 
eternal Ideas, and the ethical end is to rise once 
more to a knowledge of these, particularly to a 
knowledge of the Idea of the good. 2 When the 
good is known, it will be realized in the individual 
life and in the community. The realization of the 
good in this sense is virtue. Virtue is not a habit 
of the will, nor does it depend upon conformity to 
a given moral standard. Its essence is knowledge. 
That which a man does is determined by that which 
a man knows. No one who does wrong does it 
voluntarily, 3 and so there are no voluntary actions 
which are bad. The threefold division of virtue 
corresponds to the threefold division of the soul. 
Each part of the soul has its own appropriate 
virtue. 4 But each of these virtues is due to know- 
ledge. Temperance and courage, like wisdom, 
depend on proper knowledge. 5 It must then be in- 
ferred that the intemperate man and the cowardly 
man are involuntarily vicious, for they would be 

i Plato, Meno, 87, 89 f., 97, 99 ; Repub. VII. 518. 

2 Id., Phsedrus, 247 ; Repub. VI. 500, 505, 516, 517 ; Timseus, 37. 

8 Id., Protag. 356 ; Legg, IX. 860. 

4 Id., Repub. IV. 440 f. Jt Id., Laches, 195. 

D 



34 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

temperate and brave if they had the proper know- 
ledge. The knowledge of the particular good, the 
good of mere opinion, which is derived from the 
senses, is not sufficient. There must be knowledge 
| of what Socrates called the general good, that is, 
of the Idea. If, then, knowledge of the good is 
imparted to man, his will is determined by that 
knowledge. It would follow that in such a case 
he would practically have no choice ; deliberation 
! would be superfluous. The will is determined by 
knowledge, not as mere motive, but as necessary 
cause. 

It is significant of the equivocation which belongs 
to discussions about the will, that philosophers 
have differed with respect to the relation existing 
between knowledge on the one hand and will on 
the other. According to some, the more perfect 
the knowledge, the greater the freedom; while, 
according to others, it is only ignorant acts which 
can be called free acts. Knowledge has a causal 
relation to the will, they say, and it determines 
the will. The conclusion to be accepted will de- 
pend very much on the meaning which is given 
to the term freedom. If the Platonic doctrine 
be true, it would seem that willing the good de- 
pends on knowing the good, and the will in well- 
doing is absolutely determined by knowledge which 
in so far as it is knowledge is involuntary. Plato 
does not raise the question whether knowledge is 
voluntary or not. Still, he does fine virtue 

as a willingness to know, but as knowk ■ Ige. It is 
conceivable that a man should refuse to be taught, 



IN THE S0CRATIC PERIOD 

and if the refusal is involuntary, the refusal is not 
vicious, but the ignorance which causes the refusal 
is vicious. If the refusal is voluntary, then it is 
virtuous ; for no one voluntarily does what is wrong. 
Taking this doctrine in connection with that con- 
cerning the teachableness of virtue, it is difficult to 
see in what sense Plato can be said to have taught 
the freedom of the will. 

In addition to the psychological and ethical view 
of the will, one may notice also the stress laid by 
Plato upon the relation of native character, and 
education to virtue. There is perhaps nothing 
more modern than the teaching regarding this 
which is to be found in the Republic. Just as it 
is maintained in other dialogues that virtue is teach- 
able, so in the Republic it is said that education 
is necessary in order to morality. Eules are laid 
down for the proper training of those who are mem- 
bers of the community. Periodical siftings and 
promotions occur. The warriors of the state must 
be chosen and set apart from the laborers, and the 
rulers must be selected from the warriors. All men 
are not capable of being thus educated, and some 
remain in the lowest and least virtuous class through 
their defective apprehension. Still fewer are ca- 
pable of becoming philosophers, and of rising to the 
highest kind of virtue. 1 The famous figure of the 
cave, 2 in which Plato represents men as bound, with 
their faces towards the shadows, and away from the 
light, illustrates the natural condition of a majority 
of men. To say that virtue is teachable does not 
i Plat , Repub. II. 376 et seq. ; X. 618. 2 it. yil. 514. 



36 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

mean that all men can be taught. It is in one 
respect the fault of native character and breeding. 
I For this reason directions are given with respect to 
the procreation of offspring in the ideal state. It 
is taught that character is largely dependent on 
inherited characteristics. 1 But even in the pre- 
existent state of the soul the character is decided, 
and we are thus led to consider the Platonic view 
of the will in relation to the principle of necessity. 
Necessity in the Platonic sense is only another 
name for fatal necessity, and is not to be under- 
stood in the more modern logical and metaphysical 
sense. In the tenth book of the Republic, a 
myth is narrated with some elaboration of detail. 2 
The distaff of Necessity, or the distaff which re- 
volves on the lap of Necessity, is a centre about 
which are gathered the three Pates, Lachesis, Clotho, 
and Atropos. These are called the daughters of 
Necessity ; and clothed in white robes, they sing in 
harmony with the warning sirens. Clotho sings 
of the present, Lachesis of the past, and Atropos of 
the future. A prophet approaches and takes from 
Lachesis the lots or apportionments of life. He 
then proclaims the decree of Lachesis. He ad- 
dresses the preexistent souls of mortals. He sets 
before them a choice of virtue. Virtue does not take 
them, but they must take virtue. The choice of the 
life to be lived will determine the destiny of each 
soul. The choice is free. He who chooses is re- 
sponsible for his choice, a n d God is not responsible. 
The destiny taken, determines the future character 
i Plato, Repub. V. 460 3 id., ib. X. 616. 



IN THE SOCKATIC PERIOD 37 

of each one. The preexistent soul is thus free in its 
choice, and determines its own character. Upon 
making their choice, the souls go in order to Lache- 
sis, who sends them to Clotho, who in turn conducts 
them to Atropos. The latter spins the threads of 
their destiny, and it is thenceforth irreversible. 
That the doctrine here presented is a doctrine of the 
freedom of choice in a preexistent state, there can 
be no doubt. Plato teaches that the preexistent 
soul is free, but has its character determined irre- 
versibly before its union with the body. Just as 
Christian theology teaches that Man in a state of 
innocence was free, but lost his freedom by the fall 
of Adam, so Plato would affirm that the preexistent 
soul is free, until it has chosen its lot in life. If 
it be asked, what makes one soul choose a bad, and 
another a good character, there is no answer in 
Plato. If it is the badness of the soul which makes 
the choice bad, then the character of the soul is 
determined antecedent to the choice of the char- 
acter, and the latter becomes a useless formality. 
To explain why a soul with a character which is 
neither good nor bad, chooses one destiny rather 
than another is, however, impossible. 

Plato ordinarily employs the myth to explain 
what is otherwise inexplicable. Whether this 
particular allegory is to be construed as containing 
his philosophical doctrine of character or not, 
the fact that it is introduced, shows the determin- 
istic nature of his system. It is probable that he 
found it necessary to wcount in some way for the 
differences among men, in matters of morality. 



38 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

For an inconsistency is manifested in the Repub- 
lic, where the instability of the ideal state is 
referred to. 1 The decay of such a state is owing 
to the degeneracy of the citizens; but it is hard 
to understand why the virtuous should become 
vicious, if virtue depends on knowledge, or is 
one with knowledge. Upon such a principle a 
ruler becomes corrupt because he has forgotten the 
good, not because he wills the evil; for vice is in- 
voluntary. If the warrior becomes cowardly, it 
must be likewise due to f orgetf ulness ; for coward- 
ice is involuntary, and he who knows the good, will 
be courageous. A disordered people would thus be 
logically a forgetful people, if at any time they had 
been virtuous. It is not to be understood, however, 
that such conclusions were actually drawn by Plato 
or any of his school. 

If the Hippias Minor be a genuine work of Plato, 
a view of the will is there presented which is 
inconsistent with the account which has just been 
given. There Socrates defends the opinion that 
voluntary wrong-doing is better than involuntary. 
But if the contention in the other dialogues is well 
founded, that no man does wrong voluntarily, it is 
idle to discuss the question whether voluntary or 
involuntary wrong-doing is worse. Aside from the 
doubtful authenticity of the Hippias Minor, the 
manner of Socrates at the close of the argument is 
so ironical, and his words so hesitating, that he 
may well be believed to reject the conclusion into 
which he seems to be forced, 

i Plato, Reput> 



IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 39 

But as I have said, I am always wandering up and 
down about these things, and never abide in the same opin- 
ion. Nor is it surprising that I, nor that common men, do 
this, if wise men like yourselves also wander about. But it 
is dangerous to us, if when we have come to you, we do 
not cease to wander. 1 

It seems to me, therefore, that if compelled to 
choose between the statement of the Protagoras 
and that of the Hippias Minor, it is more reason- 
able to consider the former the true Platonic doc- 
trine. 

Aristotle 

In the philosophy of Aristotle there is both a 
psychological and an ethical doctrine of the will. 
Will is considered as a faculty of the soul and as 
an element in all moral action. In the writings of 
Plato, opinion and knowledge are called faculties, 
but his conception, as we have seen, is that of parts 
or kinds of soul, and the word faculty is seldom 
employed. With Aristotle there is a connection 
between his theory of faculties and his definition 
of the soul itself. 

Soul is defined as the first entelechy of a natural 
organized body. 2 By entelechy 3 is meant imper- 
fect realization or actualization. Entelechy is mid- 
way between potentiality and completed actuality. 
Aristotle speaks both of faculties, 4 and of different 
species of souls ; but he rejects the idea of parts. 
There is a nutritive soul, which is the entelechy of 

i Plato, Hipp. Min. 376. 3 m. 412, a. 22 ; 1050, a. 23. 

* Aristotle, 412, a. 19 f. ; 412, b. 5. * Id. 414, a. 29 et al. 



40 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

plant life; there is a sensitive soul, which is the 
enteleehy of the sensitive animal; there is a de- 
siring or motive soul, which is the enteleehy of the 
emotional and moving animal body; and there 
is a rational soul, which is the enteleehy of the 
intellectual and rational human being. 1 Some of 
the faculties are common to man and the lower 
animals, others are peculiar to man. Like Plato, 
Aristotle set forth no doctrine of personality. It 
is therefore not explained in what way the several 
faculties are related to the subject of thought, nor 
how they are related to one another. But with the 
operation of these faculties in conformity to the 
end (tcXos) of each, enteleehy becomes energy. 

That which distinguishes man from the lower 
animals is the reason. The universal reason is 
God, but in man there is an individual reason. 
The relation of the particular to the universal 
reason in Aristotle's system has caused some dis- 
pute among commentators. Some prefer to regard 
his philosophy as pantheistic, but it seems more 
probable that Aristotle taught a theistic doctrine. 
While, according to his Logic, the universal is in 
each of the particulars, the substance of everything 
is individual. And it is not justifiable to interpret 
logical realism as pantheism, however close the 
connection between them may be thought to be. 
God is the first mover, but the soul is also said 
to move itself. As the soul is said to be moved 
by appetite, desire, and understanding, as well as 
by the image of external objects, the self -moving 

1 Aristotle, ib. 



IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 41 

of the soul is to be construed as signifying spon- 
taneity. For in the individual soul there is no 
absolute beginning of motion. God is not universal 
substance, for the only substances are singular sub- 
stances. He is a substance along with other sub- 
stances, and not the substance of substances. But 
in the first mover is the source of all other motion 
and the thought of thought. 

There is a theoretical and a practical reason. 1 
The former is always passive. It receives know- 
ledge, but originates nothing. It is not a faculty of 
immediate knowledge, except in so far as the appre- 
hension of first principles or axioms is concerned. 
The highest principles are not deductions; for all 
deductions rest ultimately upon certain evident 
truths (cjxivepa), and these are known by the reason. 
The practical reason is not passive, but active 
and creative. Thus in Man the reason is both 
receptive and spontaneous. As theoretical it is 
tabula rasa, and receives the writing of experience. 2 
When experience ceases, the writing must cease, 
and the passive reason is not immortal. 8 The 
theoretical reason knows what is true or false ; the 
practical, what is good or bad. The practical 
reason may both deliberate and act. Its delibera- 
tion takes the form of the practical syllogism. The 
major of this is a universal in which the desirable- 
ness of some object or end is set forth. The minor 
is a particular in which some act is said to be sub- 

1 Aristotle, 430, a. 18; 432, b. 27. 

2 Id, 430, a. 1; iv ypap.p.arel(j} <p fitdhv iirdpx^ ivreKex^t 
yeypawiivoy. 3 Id. 430, a. 22. 



42 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

sumed under the general conception. The conclu- 
sion which follows is a decision that the end is to 
be sought. 1 The intellect (Atavoia), which is some- 
times used to denote the opposite of body, is often 
synonymous with reason, for in the De Anima, 
practical intellect is used interchangeably with 
practical reason. 2 

In the soul there are two moving principles, — 
desire and reason. 8 Desire is caused by an object, 
and the object of desire is the occasion for the 
praxis of the reason. The praxis of the rea- 
son is its act when something is declared to be 
either pleasurable or painful. When the object is 
declared to be pleasurable, the reason pursues it; 
when painful, it avoids it. While desire and 
reason are the moving principles within the soul, 
Aristotle finds the remote cause of action in the 
object of desire. But desire is the immediate 
cause of motion. It may be either irrational, in 
which case it is called appetite (imOvfiLa), 4 or it 
may be of a certain end, in which case it is called 
will. There are, however, two kinds of will, — 
the will of an end and the will of means to an end. 
The lower desires, or appetites, are common to man 
and the lower animals. When there is a general 
will for an end, the means to the end are willed by 
a union of desire and reason, which may be trans- 
lated deliberate choice (Trpocupeo-is). Desire may 
therefore be a will for an end, or a will for the 
means to an end. It is not necessary that there 

i Aristotle, 434, a. 16. 8 Id. 433, a. 9. 

2 Id. 433, a. 13. * Id. 433, a. 21 ff. 



IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 43 

should be deliberate choice in willing, but wherever 
there is deliberate choice, there must be a will of 
the end. 1 

Will in the general sense (BovX-qms) is said to be 
constituted or stationed in the reason. 2 The rea- 
son does not desire or will, but desire cooperates 
with reason; and the lower species of desire, the 
appetite, may contradict the reason. The means 
by which the object desired is effective on the desire 
may be either the practical syllogism already re- 
ferred to, or may be a mental image or phantasm. 
In the former case, it is not necessary that the 
premises and conclusion should be fully and ex- 
plicitly stated. The practical syllogism often has 
the form of an enthymeme. The highest form of 
knowledge possessed by the lower animals is the 
image-making faculty. Neither reason nor phan- 
tasy (<f>avTa(ria) are motive without desire. 

The feelings are excited through the senses, and 
where there is sensation there may be either pleas- 
ure or pain. We feel the pleasure and pain as good 
and bad; so that the object of desire is the good, 
either real or imagined. 8 

These doctrines, which are to be found in the 
Aristotelian psychology, are further noticed in his 
Ethics. It has thus far been shown : — 

1. That God is the first mover, but that the 
reason in man is spontaneous. 

2. That the reason alone is not will, except so 
far as deliberation and judgment are will. 

i Aristotle, Eth. Nic. III. 4; 1111, b. 4 ff. 
a Id. 432, b. 5. s id. 434, a. 5. 




44 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

3. That it is desire which moves the soul, and 
that this is determined by the object desired. 

It is impossible logically to conclude that Aris- 
totle taught indeterminism in his psychology. The 
springs of action are proximately desire and rea- 
son; remotely, the spring of action is the object 
desired. The knowledge of the theoretical reason 
is not voluntary; the knowledge of the object which 
awakens the desire is not voluntary. The practical 
reason alone cannot move to action, and both prac- 
tical reason and desire are moved by the object 
of desire. 

The faculty of deliberate choice is spoken of as 
something lying between the reason and the de- 
sires, but partaking of the nature of each. 1 The 
dominant principle of action is either desire or 
deliberate preference, and there is no choice where 
there is no act of intellect. Things which happen 
through deliberate choice are likewise distinguished 
from those which happen according to fortune. 
But some light is thrown upon the psychological 
doctrine by a passage in which will and thought (17 
vo^ons) are represented as different aspects of the 
same conception. 2 Thought determines desire; 
and, on the other hand, desire is excited by the 
object which is presented to thought. 3 

This view of the will is still further developed 
in the Ethics. All practice and all deliberate 
choice are directed toward some good. There are 

1 Aristotle, 1065, a. 32 ; 700, b. 18, 23. 

2 Id. 406, b. 25. 8 Id. 701, a. 36. 



IS THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 45 

relative or intermediate ends to which man's action 
is directed, but these in turn are only means for 
the ultimate attainment of the good. The good 
does not seem the same to all men, for it may be 
either real or apparent. The chief good is happi- 
ness, and there will be as many kinds of goods as 
there are kinds of men, according to character and 
disposition. There is a good which is the end of 
appetite, but appetite is irrational. Yet, although 
it is irrational, it has a capacity to submit to the 
reason. 1 It is obedience to the reason which con- 
stitutes the virtue of appetite. The intellect also 
has its virtues. Corresponding to the distinction 
between the desires and the intellect is the distinc- 
tion between ethical and dianoetic virtue. "Wisdom 
and prudence are dianoetic, while liberality and 
temperance are ethical virtues. 2 

In relation to the will, the conditions of a virtu- 
ous act are as follows : — 

1. It must be an intelligent act. 

2. It must be a deliberate act, proceeding from 

7T/ooatpecris. 8 

3. It must be performed upon some fixed prin- 
ciple. 

Thus the feelings are neither virtuous nor vicious. 
There must be deliberate choice of a course of action 
before there can be virtue or vice. Nor are the 
virtues faculties or powers. They are acts of de- 

ild. 1102, b. 13. 

2 Id. 1103, a. 4. 

8 At* avra, for the sake of an end. 



46 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

liberate choice, or at least they are not without 
deliberate choice. Virtue is a habit. It is a habit, 
not of knowing, but of willing; or, to speak more 
precisely, it is a habit of deliberate choice before- 
hand. That which is to be willed or chosen before- 
hand is the mean between extremes. This mean 
is determined, not by feeling, nor by passion, but 
by the reason. Thus while virtue is essentially 
dependent on the will, the object of virtuous action 
is fixed by the reason. *Eotiv apa y aperf ?£is 
7rpocupeTiKT], iv juecroT^Ti ovaa rrj 7rpos ^as, <apL<Tp.£vq 
Xoya) Kat oSs av 6 <j>povip.os opicraev. 1 

In this definition the rational element is twice 
emphasized. The act is not only deliberate, which 
implies a rational process, but it is defined by 
reason (Aoyos) and by prudence ($p6vip.os), which 
refers to an intellectual virtue. 

In the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
the nature of voluntary actions is more specifically 
discussed. The distinction is here expressed by the 
adjectives : eKovmov and aKovcnov. Involuntary ac- 
tions are those which are done either through com- 
pulsion, or through ignorance. 2 In the former case, 
the coercion is from without, and in spite of man's 
wish. But actions which are performed because of 
threats (under duress) are mixed. They resemble 
voluntary actions, however, for when they are per- 
formed there is an act of will, and the end of the 
action is related to opportunity (/cara tov KaipoV). 8 
The will moves the body, and the beginning of the 

i Aristotle, 1106, b. 36. 
2 Id. 1109, b. 35. « Id. 1110, a. 14. 



IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 47. 

movement is from within the man himself. 1 In 
connection with this, Aristotle notices the question 
whether a man may be coerced by desirable objects, 
such as honor or pleasure. He decides that actions 
from such motives are not compulsory. They are 
performed because they are pleasurable ; so that a 
man cannot complain that outward circumstances 
forced him to take a pleasurable course. Compul- 
sion refers to the external force, and Aristotle's 
argument is that no act is virtuous which is forced 
upon a man from without. 

Actions done through ignorance may be due to 
ignorance in general, or ignorance of what one 
should do under certain circumstances. 3 A drunken 
man, or an insane man, or a vicious man, acts 
through one kind of ignorance, in the sense that 
he does not know what he ought to do ; but his acts 
are not involuntary. Yet a man may act under a 
misapprehension, by mistaking a friend for a foe, 
by doing something which is forbidden, in ignorance 
that it was forbidden, as in striking another acci- 
dentally when trying to assist him. These are 
oluntary actions. Thus the essence of the vol- 
untary act lies in the person or doer himself. An 
act, however, does not have to be rational in order 
to be voluntary, for there are purely emotional or 
appetitive acts which are voluntary (from Ovfios or 
i-jnOvyLux) . 8 

As has already been said, deliberate choice is 
a species of will, and is essential to moral action. 

i Aristotle, 1110, a. 11. ^ &pxh *" ry irpdrrovri. 1110, b. i. 
2 Id. 1110, b. 18. « Id. 1111, a. 25. 



48 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Children and the lower animals have will, but no 
deliberate choice. 1 The will in moral acts is there- * : 
fore different from fiovXrjcns or 0u/xo's or linOvixCa. 
The will or wish for the end may be directed to an 
object which it is impossible to attain, as well as 
to possible objects; deliberate choice is always of 
the possible, and of the possible only. Appetite is 
likewise opposed to deliberate choice ; it is directed 
towards the pleasurable, but deliberate choice is not 
necessarily so directed. Will or wish in general 
is of the end, while deliberate choice is of the means 
to an end. The latter is not emotion, for it has a 
rational element; it is not mere opinion (8o£a), for 
opinion refers simply to what is true or false, not 
to the faculty of taking or choosing. As Aristotle 
says, deliberate choice partakes of reason and intel- 
lect, and a choice of some things rather than a 
choice of others. 2 The object of irpoatpeo-ts is an ob- 
ject of both deliberation and desire. In relation 
to the practical reason, the decision reached by the 
deliberate act of the faculty of choice is the same 
with the conclusion of the practical syllogism. 8 

Aristotle does not agree with Plato that vice is 
involuntary. According to him the power to do 
involves also the power not to do. That virtues 
and vices are within the power of the moral agent 
is proved by the fact that men are held responsible 

i Aristotle, 1111, b. 9. 

2 ij ykp irpoalpeiris /texi \6yov ko.1 diauolas, virocnjfjLalve l 8 
ZoiKe Kal rovvo/xa a>s ov vpb Irtpuv alperbv. Aristotle, Eth. ( „ 
1112, a. 15. 

8 4k tov fiov\ev<Ta<r$ai y&p Kplvavrei 6pey6p.eda Kara 
(3ov\ev<rtv. 1113, a. 11. 



IN THE SOCKATIC PERIOD 



49 



and punished for their misdeeds, unless these are 
done under external compulsion. Even faults com- 
mitted through ignorance are punished, when the 
agent had it in his power to acquire the requisite 
knowledge. Plato was wrong in supposing that 
men were involuntarily depraved and vicious ; for 
when a man becomes intemperate or indulges in 
other vices, he does so voluntarily. In ethical 
virtue the habit of willing may make the act in- 
voluntary, but volition was necessary to form the 
habit. But Aristotle does not meet the possible 
objection, that the morality of the virtuous act 
done on account of habit, is at variance with his 
definition of moral action, which involves deliberate 
preference. From his point of view it would seem 
that all acts proceeding from ethical virtue were 
moral only in the beginning, when the habit was 
voluntarily formed. That the term " in our power " 
does not necessarily refer to the so-called freedom 
of the will is evident from the identification of that 
which is voluntary with that which is in our power. 1 
It may be said that all men strive after the apparent 
good, and are not masters of the imagination or 
phantasy which places before them the object de- 
sired. But Aristotle replies that a man is the 
author of his own habits, and is also the cause of 
his own imagination. Both of these are within 
him, and are not external to him. The phantasy 
is thus placed on the same footing as the will, — 
both are in our power; and a man is as responsible 
for his imagination as for his will. Aristotle re- 

i Aristotle, 1111, b. 20 ft. 



50 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

plies also to Plato, who taught that some men were 
virtuous and some vicious by nature. To this t/je 
answer is made that if a man be born with a know- 
ledge of virtue, just as he is born with a power to 
see, so that he cannot be anything but virtuous, 
then virtue is as involuntary as vice. 

Still, the Ethics of Aristotle do not seem to me 
to affect the conclusion which I have drawn with 
respect to his psychology, — that he held a doc- 
trine of determinism. It must be remembered that 
in the defence of the voluntary character of virtue 
and of vice, he is not arguing in favor of any form 
of the doctrine of freedom. He had, rather, two 
definite objects in view. 1. He wished to refute 
the Platonic theory that vice is involuntary, and 
that no man would do wrong voluntarily. Virtue 
is to him a habit of willing; but the habit is deter- 
mined by the intelligence (Aiavota), 1 which is a 
faculty of knowledge, and by prudence, which is a 
dianoetic virtue. So, while virtue is theoretically 
a habit of the will, in order that the habit may be 
acquired, the intellect must know the mean between 
the extremes, as well as the fact that virtue con- 
sists in such action. The intellect so far deter- 
mines the virtuous act. 2. He wished to establish 
his ethical theory for the sake of his Politics. 
The chief good is a political good, and the truly 
virtuous man is the truly virtuous citizen. The 
good to be aimed at is political, and all other goods 
are means to that end. At the very outset of his 
Ethics he declares that they are subordinated to 
i Aristotle, 1113, b. 3 ff. 



IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 51 

Politics. The acts of the citizen which are to be 
called moral are those which he does voluntarily, 
without external compulsion, and irrespective of 
legal penalties. Consequently, while there is no 
sign of the modern issue which is debated by deter- 
minists and their opponents, the declaration that 
only voluntary actions are virtuous or vicious does 
not imply indeterminism. It is not the action 
which is determined by motive, or effected by 
causes, or dependent on character, which he op- 
poses to voluntary actions; but those which are 
done by compulsion or through ignorance. It 
may be added that the term " in our power " was in 
use among the Stoics, 1 who were certainly not in- 
determinists. 

Aristotle does not, like the Atomists, attribute 
everything and every event to necessity. While 
he identifies God with fate and necessity, he recog- 
nizes an element of fortune or chance in the world. 
Although some uncertainty surrounds Plato's view, 
he had maintained that the development of the state 
seemed to be due to chance or fortune, but that a 
necessary principle had really brought it into being. 
Aristotle employs the term necessity as an equiva- 
lent of force, and from this point of view voluntary 
actions are of course not necessitated. The essence 
of the voluntary act is that it is in our power, and 
due to deliberate choice or to spontaneity. If we 
accept the doctrine that God is the first mover, 
that he is one with Necessity, and that he is 
the form-giving principle, the first efficient and final 
1 Epictetus, Enchir. I. 



52 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

cause, it is difficult to exclude the will from his con- 
trol. The action towards an end is determined. 
There is, however, a sphere in which the casual and 
fortuitous play a part. This may be shown most 
plainly by considering Aristotle's opinion con- 
cerning the principle of contradiction in relation 
to necessity. While the logical principle of con- 
tradiction is very conspicuous in his Organon and 
Metaphysics, he takes a peculiar view of the re- 
lation of this principle to future time. It applies 
absolutely to past and present events. It ap- 
plies to the future only under certain limitations. 
The past is necessarily what it is. The present is 
what it is necessarily. But Aristotle denies that 
all things which are about to happen are about to 
happen necessarily, and he endeavors to demon- 
strate this by an examination of the disjunctive 
proposition. He holds that there is a beginning 
of future things, and a possibility of their being 
or not-being. Their being is not necessary, even as 
their not-being is not necessary. Things are not 
brought about necessarily, for that would leave 
no place for chance. All things, then, do not 
come into being of necessity; being must of neces- 
sity be when it is, and not-being when it is not; 
but it is not necessary that being should be, nor 
that not-being should not be. It is necessary that 
a naval battle shall happen or not happen to- 
morrow. It is not necessary that the battle shall 
occur, nor is it necessary that it shall not occur. 
It is only necessary that it either shall or shall 
not occur. It is, in" other words, a contingent or 



IN THH SOCRATIC PERIOD 53 

fortuitous event. Chance is in antithesis to na- 
ture, which is something fixed and invariable. 
Chance is introduced to explain the variations due 
to deliberation and other contingencies. It is 
evident that Aristotle did not shrink from apply- 
ing necessity to the will, except in so far as to 
maintain that if the future were necessarily de- 
termined, man would be unwilling to deliberate. 1 
Nature is regular and may be predicted ; but 
chance is irregular, and its events cannot be 
foreseen. Specifically, it is evident that Aris- 
totle regards mere spontaneity as contingent, and 
actions directed towards an end as determined. 
As future events, the acts of the will are not 
necessary, but necessity, in a limited sense, ap- 
plies to events which are past. Like many phi- 
losophers, Aristotle confounded the objective with 
the subjective in his treatment of modality, as 
may be seen still further in his opposing the neces- 
sary to the possible, so that some necessary events 
might seem to be impossible. He ascribes the con- 
tingent to fortune. It may intervene in voluntary 
as well as involuntary acts, in an external or in an 
internal manner. The problem left unsolved by 
Plato is not solved by Aristotle. Admitting that 
virtue is a habit, its beginning is not habitual, and 
the habit must have a beginning. Virtue is a habit 
of willing a mean between extremes, and so vir- 
tuous action must be determined by knowledge. If 
virtue is voluntary, the knowledge of the mean 
between extremes must be either voluntary or not. 

i Aristotle, 18, 19. 



54 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

If this knowledge is voluntary, it is not explained 
by Aristotle why some men have Sidvoia of the mean 
and some have not. If the knowledge is involun- 
tary, there is a contradiction in Aristotle's theory 
of virtue. 



CHAPTER SECOND 

STOIC AND EPICUREAN THEORIES OF THE WILL 

In these two schools, theory is subordinate to 
practice, and the problem to be solved is the prob- 
lem of life and of character. This may have caused 
that specialization of the conception of the will 
which we find in their writings. Voluntary acts 
were now discussed in relation to the principle of 
fatal necessity, moral responsibility, and certain 
logical categories. In this discussion Megaric and 
Academic philosophers also had a part ; and their 
doctrines will be considered incidentally in this 
notice of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. 
Both Stoics and Epicureans recognize three parts 
of philosophy, which may be generally described 
as, 1. Physics, including Theology; 2. Logic; 
3. Ethics. Their theories about the will are re- 
lated to all of these parts. But I shall reserve for 
special treatment their discussion of voluntary ac- 
tions in connection with logical principles, and shall 
first consider the physical and ethical principles of 
the two schools. 

The Stoics were materialists ; for they denied that 
anything exists except the corporeal. They were 
also pantheists, in that they identified the universe 
65 



56 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

•with God. Particularly among the later philoso- 
phers of the school, however, language was used 
which was quite consistent with belief in a personal 
God. They affirmed that even abstract notions 
were material. Some writers of the school identify 
God with a primitive material principle, but all 
recognize that there is a governor of the world : — 

Kvdi<rr' ddavdrooy, iroKvdvvfie, irayKparis aiel, ZeO, ipicreas 
&pxvy£> vbfJAV /i4ra irdvra KvfiepvQv. 1 

And Seneca says : — 

sed eundem quem nos Jovem intelligent, custodem recto- 
remque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operia 
dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis ilium 
fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hie est ex quo suspensa 
sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis ilium providentiam 
dicere? recte dices. Est enim cujus consilio huic mundo 
providetur, ut inconfusus eat, et actus suos explicet. Vis 
ilium naturam vocare ? Non peccabis. Est enim ex quo 
nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu vivimus. Vis ilium vocare 
mundum ? non falleris. Ipse enim est, totum quod vides, 
totus suis partibus inditus, et se sustinens visua. 2 

From this doctrine of God the Stoics drew the 
logical inference that all events were determined 
by him. As they found no difficulty in supposing 
the soul of man to be material, so they attribute to 
the material universe irpovoia and providentia. 3 The 
old doctrine of Fate becomes the doctrine of fatal 
necessity to which all things are subject. 

The soul is denned as -rrvtvfw. or breath, the Latin 

i Cleanthes, in Stobaeus, Eel. I. 30. 

2 Seneca, Nat. Qu. II. xlv. 

» Cicero, De Nat. Deor. II. 5, 22, 29; I. 8. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 57 

spiritus. It is corporeal, and embraces and pervades 
the entire body. It is one and not many ; and the 
Stoics insisted on this unity more emphatically than 
did any of their predecessors. The soul has facul- 
ties. These are variously enumerated by different 
writers. 1 All knowledge originates with the senses, 
and there is nothing in the understanding which 
was not previously in the sense. It was not con- 
sistent with their view of the origin of knowledge 
that they should ascribe spontaneous activity to the 
soul in the act of knowledge. 2 Impressions are 
made upon the soul through the senses, and cause 
phantasms, which are apprehended ; and the know- 
ledge is preserved in the memory (fivrjfiT]). From 
single perceptions are formed general ideas (koivcu 
€wotat). The assent of the mind to knowledge thus 
received is voluntary. It may reject or accept that 
which is presented to it. Opinion of the truth or 
falsity of that which originates in the sense, is not 
compelled but is voluntary. 3 The ruling principle 
in Man which is sometimes identified with the soul 
itself is to lyye/AoviKoV.* 

Instead of separating the rational, sensual, and 
emotional principles and faculties in man, as Plato 
and Aristotle had done, the Stoics taught that the 
affections and appetites, as well as the reason and 
the will, reside in the ruling principle. But they 
distinguish various stages in volition, as follows : 
1. Purpose ; 2. Impulse ; 3. Preparation ; 4. Appre- 

1 Tertullian, De Anim. 14. 

2 Plutarch, Plac. IV. 11. 

8 Cicero, Acad. 1. 14, 40. * Cicero, Nat. Deor. II. 11. 






58 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

hension ; 5. Choice ; 6. Deliberate preference ; 
7. Will of the end; 8. Decision (arbitrium). 1 

The soul comes open-handed into the world, and 
grasps first partially and then wholly the objects 
which are presented to it. The activity of the 
emotional states is attributed to the universal life 
of Nature, and yet these affections and impulses do 
not constitute virtue or happiness. To follow these 
is not the object of the virtuous man. Pleasure 
and pain are not the criteria of moral conduct. The 
virtuous life is not emotional, but rational ; and the 
virtuous man must cultivate not the passions (iradtj), 
but apathy (cfo-afleia), which is indifference to both 
pleasures and pains. 2 In the unvirtuous man, the 
ruling faculty or principle is the seat of the affec- 
tions and impulses, which are opposed to virtue. 
In the virtuous man, it is the ruling principle, free 
from emotion and passion, which controls. While 
the rjye[j.oviK6v is the seat of emotion and passion, it 
is both a rational and a voluntary power. So far it 
corresponds with the Nous of Plato and Aristotle. 
The will is a principle not of emotion or passion. 
It is a principle of apathy. The voluntary ele- 
ment in both knowledge and action is natural to the 
soul. The Stoics held that virtue is voluntary, and 
also agreed with Socrates that virtue is teachable. 
The union of these two doctrines raises a difficulty 
which the school did not attempt to remove. If 
virtue is teachable, it is manifest that most men are 
unvirtuous from an incapacity to learn, rather than 
from an unwillingness to act. Yet the Stoics held 

i Stobaeus, Eel. II. 162. a Diogenes, VII. 117. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN - 59 

that knowledge, i.e., assent, is voluntary. Chrysip- 
pus declared that man's nature predetermines the 
will to assent, and the will to act. The will is like 
a cylinder which is made so as to be capable of re- 
volving, and has this capacity as part of its nature. 
It revolves when it is set in motion. It would not 
revolve from its shape alone, nor from its motion 
alone. 

But the idea of a virtuous aristocracy which was 
characteristic of the systems of Plato and of Ar- 
istotle, is apparent in the teaching of the Stoics. 
They did not share the exclusive sentiment of the 
earlier philosophers, but sought to abolish the bar- 
rier which separated Greek and Roman from Bar- 
barian. Yet the virtuous man is the exception, 
not the rule. In one sense virtue is voluntary, be- 
cause the ruling faculty can control the affections 
and passions ; yet, on the other hand, man's actions 
are determined, not only by overruling nature or 
fatal necessity, but by circumstances, by disposi- 
tion and education. The individual volitions are 
determined, as well as the causes which lead to the 
willing of a particular end. Chrysippus maintained 
that law forbade the performance of bad actions to 
foolish men, but made to them no positive com- 
mands, because such persons were incapable of 
doing what is right. 1 The peculiarity of the Stoic 
determinism is its intellectual character. While 
the unvirtuous man has his will determined by his 
feelings and passions, the wise or virtuous man is 
theoretically he who resists his feelings, and rises 

i Plutarch, Stoic. Repugn. 23, 24. 



60 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

superior to pleasure and pain. Thus the will of 
the wise man. is determined, not by the desires or 
affections, but by ratio recta. 1 The doctrine that 
knowledge is voluntary, that the soul is one and 
not many, and that both knowledge and will belong 
to the rjyefioviKov, does not seem to have been thought 
inconsistent with the denial of freedom. 

The supremacy of the ruling faculty or principle 
is well set forth by Cicero, who says : — 

Natura est igitur, quae contineat mundum omnem, eum- 
que tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. Om- 
nem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit, neque 
simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem 
in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in bellua quiddam 
simile mentis, unde oriantur rerum appetitus. In autem 
arborum et earum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus 
inesse principatus putatur. Principatum autem id dico, 
quod Graeci fiye/xovi^v vocant : quo nihil in quoque genere 
nee potest nee debet esse praestantius. Itaque necesse est, 
illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae principatus, esse om- 
nium optimum, omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque 
dignissimum. 3 

The opposition which was noticed in the phi- 
losophy of Plato and of Aristotle, between the 
rational and emotional elements of the soul, is here 
described as taking place within the ruling prin- 
ciple itself. In the vicious as well as in the virtu- 
ous man, it is the rjye/AoviKov which controls. The 
difference between the virtuous and the vicious is 
that, with the former the rational principle or ele- 
ment is in the ascendant, while with the latter the 

i Cicero, Tuac. IV. 15, 34. a id., Nat. Deor. II. 11. 



STOIC AND EPICUKEAN 61 

emotional principle or element controls. Accord- 
ing to Plutarch, the Stoics taught that the rational 
control by the fjye/xvoiKov effected virtue, and that 
this ruling principle was exposed to invasion by 
the sensual, bestial, and unreasonable passions. 
They become the masters of a man's actions. 
When the reason becomes corrupt, the judgments 
in moral matters become perverted. False opinion 
(86£a) is at the root of all vice. The soul is moved 
in opposition to virtue, by what the Latins called 
perturbationes, and when such emotions control, 
false opinion arises. This explains why Epictetus 
and others declared that pain and pleasure depend, 
not on things themselves, but only on our opinions 
about them. The perturbationes and the false opin- 
ion are to be corrected by recta ratio. Chrysippus 
denied what was afterwards called the liberty of in- 
difference, holding that it was repugnant to nature 
to suppose that there could be any effect without a 
cause. And in this statement we find, for the first 
time, this historic argument against indetermin- 
ism. He illustrated his meaning by the balance 
which is weighed down, now on one side, now on 
the other, but always in consequence of some active 
cause. There may be no manifest cause for a given 
volition, but there are always causes, which may be 
hidden, which secretly move and induce men, and 
so determine their volitions. In the face of this 
statement, he maintained, however, that certain 
volitions may be due to chance, that is, may be 
fortuitous. 
That man should have natural emotions and pas- 



62 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

sions at all is due to misapprehension ; and so the 
Stoics virtually accepted the Socratic doctrine that 
no man errs voluntarily. They agree also with 
Aristotle that emotions may be awakened by an 
exciting phantasm, or image. The contradiction 
in the Stoic ethics may be partially reconciled, if 
we regard them as making virtue depend on both 
knowledge and volition. Whichever element be 
emphasized the result is the same. If strength of 
will be required for self-restraint, the strength is 
necessarily predetermined; and if knowledge be 
required to prevent the control of passion, man errs 
through ignorance, although the connection of as- 
sent with voluntary elements does not warrant one 
in drawing the same conclusion as was reached 
with respect to the determinism of Socrates. While 
assent is voluntary, it does not follow that all 
knowledge is voluntary, and that the virtue of 
prudence which is intellectual is controlled by the 
will. Self-control and prudence were, according to 
Stobseus, identified by the Stoics; and Seneca makes 
virtue a habit of the will depending on recta ratio, 
which is dependent on right knowledge. The 
moral quality of conduct belongs not to the acts 
of a man per se, nor is it conditioned by freedom 
in willing. Acts are virtuous or not, according 
to the intention of the agent. Whether the act 
be performed or not, the intention to perform it is 
sufficient to constitute a virtuous action. 

In the Stoic philosophy, there is the same con- 
ception of man as being in slavery to passion which 
was characteristic of the older ethics. When 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 63 

Seneca arraigns the race for its wickedness, and 
enslaving passions, lie is painting a picture of the 
age of Nero, and is expressing faithfully the gen- 
eral Stoic pessimism with respect to the rarity of 
virtue. The whole school was not successful in 
explaining how it was that a vicious man could 
ever become virtuous. By some of them it was 
described as a sudden change, like the " immediate 
conversion" of Christian theology. Yet it was 
not demonstrated that a man who was vicious 
could become virtuous. It was evident that a man 
could not always be taught to be virtuous, so that 
the will as well as the knowing faculties were 
involved ; yet to suppose that the will was amen- 
able to recta ratio was to suppose that the man was 
already virtuous, and was living in rational con- 
formity to nature. The practical result of the 
Stoic discipline was to produce apathy amid the 
changes and fortunes of life. It would not be true 
to affirm that there is a necessary relation between 
such an attitude and a theory of predeterminism ; 
yet it is interesting to notice that this apathy or 
ataraxia is characteristic of those oriental systems 
which combine pantheism with a doctrine of fatal 
necessity. The Christian doctrine of resignation 
to the will of God resembles the Stoic apathy, and 
yet very few of those who have been conspicuous 
examples of resignation have denied the freedom 
of the will. Self-abnegation has been thought rather 
to be an admirable illustration of free submission. 
The idea that a providence or fatal necessity has 
predetermined all that is to come agrees well with 



64 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the practical submission to the course of nature, 
which can be neither averted, nor resisted. 

Chrysippus endeavored to reconcile this deter- 
minism with man's moral accountability. He held 
that, while men do right or wrong because they 
are fated to do right or wrong, in either case they 
act according to their own character. While he 
defined Fate as "sempiterna quaedam et indecli- 
nabilis series rerum et catena, volvens semetipsa 
sese et implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, 
ex quibus apta connexaque est," * he illustrated the 
property of man in his own acts, by supposing a 
stone which is thrown from a height. It falls, not 
because of the impulse alone, but because of its 
property thus to fall. The man born with an evil 
character wills evil, in accordance with that char- 
acter, just as the stone falls because it is heavy. 
As Cicero says : " Dum autem verbis utitur suis 
delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati 
confirmet invitus." 2 

The fact that the physics of the Epicureans are 
derived from the Atomists might lead one to expect 
that they would adopt also the Atomic doctrine of 
necessity. On the contrary, Epicurus avoided this 
by an ingenious device, and maintained that the 
will is free. He was without doubt led to this 
position by the subordination of theory to practice 
in his philosophy. The doctrine of indeterminism 
may have been accepted in order that moral quality 
might be attributed to the motion of the soul in 

i A. Gellius, VI. 2. « Cicero, De Fato, 17. 




STOIC AND EPICUREAN 65 



the direction of pleasure. While accepting the 
Atomic materialism, that nothing exists except 
atoms and empty space, Epicurus attributes the 
world not to any necessity, but to a fortuitous con- 
gressus of atoms. The soul itself is composed of 
atoms, but the will is free. This is only one of a 
number of inconsistencies in the Epicurean phi- 
losopy. There are gods, but they are not related to 
the universe, and are indifferent as to its welfare; 
the pleasures of the mind are to be preferred to 
those of the body, and yet pleasure is the only good 
and pain the only evil. The test of truth is sensible 
perception, and yet it is true that there are invisible 
gods, and there are atoms which cannot be detected 
by any of the senses. If only atoms and the vacuum 
exist, the motion of the atoms in all its variety is 
hard to explain. While this is ascribed to chance, 
it would seem that chance was only a name for the 
mode in which the atoms affect one another, so that 
worlds rise and are dissolved. 

In emancipating the universe from supernatural 
causation, Epicurus and his followers were not so 
successful in gettting rid of causality in the atoms 
themselves. Dernocritus had taught that the fall- 
ing of the atoms through empty space, together 
with the whirlings and reboundings, produced the 
universe. But the Epicureans saw that it must 
be explained how, from this inevitable flux of 
things, free will could emerge. For here was a 
lifeless, uncaused universe, which was bound by 
no unchangeable principle, and yet was as likely 
as not to go on as it had begun. There was no 



66 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

reason why it should go on without deviation, and 
yet no reason why it should deviate. To introduce 
any outside cause to account for irregularities or 
peculiarities of volition would have been contrary 
to the principle of the school, ex nihilo nihil Jit. 
The Epicureans attempted to meet this difficulty 
by, first, a modification of the old Atomic theory, 
and, second, a denial of the logical principle of 
contradiction. 

They agree with Democritus that the soul is com- 
posed of atoms, and their further description of its 
structure need not here be repeated. 1 The soul is 
a principle of rest and of motion ; and it is some- 
times defined as Trvevfia. When the body is dis- 
solved, the soul perishes. All knowledge is derived 
from the senses, and the test of truth is reality to 
the senses. 2 This was virtually the doctrine of Pro- 
tagoras, and there is a sceptical element in the 
Epicurean logic. 

The ethical end of conduct is pleasure, and pru- 
dence is needed in order that a man may employ 
the best means for attaining pleasure. 8 . In the 
choice of such means, the will is free. The early 
Atomists had regarded the universe as under the 
control of necessity; but the Epicureans, in order 
to avoid the conclusion that necessity would upon 
this principle govern voluntary action, modified the 
Atomic philosophy. In the falling of the atoms, 
according to Epicurus, there is a deviation (declina- 
tio) from their straight line of descent. And that 

1 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III. 216 f . 
8 Cicero, Acad. II. 32. 8 Diogenes Laertius, 128. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 

this deviation is possible is a ground for the doctrine 
that the will is free. 

Sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari fati necessitatcm 
putat. Itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus 
et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo. . . . 
Sequitur enim, ut si alia ab alia nunquam depellatur, ne 
contingat quidem alia aliam : ex quo efficitur, ut jam si sit 
atomus, eaque declinet, declinare sine causa. Hanc ratio- 
nem Epicurus induxit ob earn rem, quod veritus est, ne, si 
semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, 
nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus, ut 
atomorum accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam 
a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere. 1 

This accommodation of the original theory of the 
Atomists to his practical conclusions does not ex- 
hibit Epicurus as a consistent teacher. It is, in 
fact, a denial of some of the more important prin- 
ciples of Democritus, and sets aside the idea of 
a reign of law in nature. If there exists nothing 
except atoms and empty space, and if it is due to 
gravity that the motions of the universe occur, 
then it must be inferred that the declinatio is 
uncaused, or else the leading Atomic doctrine 
must be abandoned. The connection of the Epi- 
curean physics with the doctrine of the will, and 
the Epicurean theory of indeterminism, is thus 
set forth by Lucretius: — 

Denique si semper motus connectitur omnis, 
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo, 
Nee declinando faciunt primordia motus 
Principium quoddam quod fati foedera rumpat, 

1 Cicero, De Fato, X. 



THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Es infinito ne causam causa sequatur : 

Libera per terras unde haec animantibus extat, 

st haec (inquam) fatis avolsa voluntas, 
Per quam progredimur, quo ducit quemque voluptas ? 
Declinamus item motus, nee tempore certo, 
Nee regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens. 
Nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 
Principium dat. l 

The atoms of the soul, then, are excepted from 
the law of cause and effect, just as the physical 
atoms may decline or deviate in the universal 
descent, according to the law of gravity. This 
is the unexplained wandering of the atom. It 
is due to no principle of the soul apart from the 
atoms. And this is the Epicurean theory of free- 
dom. 

Keference has been already made to a discussion 
in the Post- Aristotelian period with respect to the 
relation of voluntary actions to certain logical prin- 
ciples. This discussion originated at an earlier 
day, and was at first a debate about the principle 
of contradiction, that a thing cannot both be and 
not be at the same time. Aristotle mentions the 
denial of this principle by certain philosophers, 
and the reference is supposed to be to Heraclitus. 2 
By Euclid, the founder of the Megaric school, the 
possible and the actual were identified, for he 
maintained that whatever is possible is. Diodorus 
of the same school, and one of the most acute of 
the ancient dialecticians, taught more specifically 

i Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, II. 251 et seq. 

2 Aristotle, Met. 1005, b. 25: rivis ofovrai \iyeiv 'Hpii<\etTov. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 69 

that the possible is not only that which is, but also 
that which is about to be. And, he added, that 
which is about to be is necessary. According to 
Diodorus, nothing impossible can follow from the 
possible. 1 It is impossible that any past event 
should be other than it already is. If such a thing 
had been possible at any earlier time, something 
possible would have given rise to something im- 
possible, which is absurd. For in this case the 
event was never possible. Consequently it is im- 
possible that anything should ever occur except the 
actual. No act of man could have been differently 
performed, and no act which has been performed 
could have remained unperformed. All has been 
determined in the past. The future is also prede- 
termined, and all events that are about to happen 
are about to happen necessarily. Aristotle had 
denied the necessity and affirmed the contingency of 
the future. 2 In this he was followed by Chrysippus, 
who held that only events which had already oc- 
curred were necessary. 3 They are necessary because 
they are immutable, and whatever has been true in 
the past cannot be changed from true to false. But 
the future is contingent. Events are possible which 
are never about to happen. The actuality of future 
events is dependent upon certain contingencies ; as, 
for example, it is predetermined that a certain man 
will be drowned if he goes to sea, but it is not pre- 
determined whether he will go to sea or not. The 

i See Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. II. 230. 
8 Aristotle, De Interp. 19, b. 5. 
8 See Cicero, De Fato, 6 et aeq. 



70 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

drowning being contingent upon his going to sea, 
and his going to sea being a contingent event, his 
drowning is also contingent. Chrysippus is of the 
opinion that even predictions of a divine oracle are 
not about to be fulfilled necessarily. The only pre- 
determination, then, is contingent predetermina- 
tion. The practical inference from this doctrine 
is that no man can say that because a certain end 
is predetermined, he need not employ means to 
further or defeat the end. Nor is the fact that one 
of two alternatives is predicated of the future a 
ground for affirming that one of the two will neces- 
sarily be true. One of the alternatives is true only 
under certain contingencies. If I say I shall either 
die or recover from this illness, I am not at liberty 
to conclude that action on my part is useless. 
Either alternative is predetermined only contin- 
gently; and the end is fixed only conditionally on 
the means to the end being realized. In opposition 
to both Diodorus and Chrysippus, the Epicureans 
denied the principle of contradiction. According 
to Cicero, Epicurus feared that if he should admit 
this principle, he must also admit that all things 
are determined by fatal necessity. Chrysippus had 
followed Aristotle in insisting upon the importance 
of this principle, and he speaks of it as an axiom. 
He feared that if he should deny it, his doctrine 
that all things are accomplished by fate would not 
be tenable. The supposition that there was a 
swerving aside (declinatio) of the atoms, was used 
by Epicurus in support of his denial of fatal neces- 
sity. In this way, he implied first of all that events 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 71 

can happen without a sufficient external cause ; sec- 
ond, that fatal necessity does not control events; 
and, third, that the will of man is free. While 
Chrysippus made a distinction between antecedent 
and necessary causes, and held that only the former 
control the volitions, Epicurus seems to have ex- 
cluded from his theory of volition whatever could 
be interpreted as moving cause. 

Carneades x of the New Academy differs with both 
Stoic and Epicurean, yet is far removed from the 
position of Diodorus. While he agreed with the 
conclusion of Epicurus, he feared to adopt the theory 
of declination, lest he should seem to deny the prin- 
ciple of cause and effect. He preferred to appeal 
to the fact of free voluntary actions in order to 
disprove the doctrine of necessity. His argument 
against the Stoics is thus stated by Cicero : if all 
things are accomplished by antecedent causes, all 
things are bound together and are dependent on 
one another. If that be so, then necessity is the 
efficient cause of all things. And if that be true, 
nothing is in our power. Carneades therefore 
denies the consequent, and holds that inasmuch 
as there are certain things within our power, all 
things are not effected by fatal necessity. Car- 
neades affirms that . not even Apollo can predict 
the future. But he does not deny the principle of 
cause and effect. The cause of the volition is in- 
trinsic not extrinsic ; because it is in the nature of 
the will to be free from the law of external causa- 
tion and external necessity. 

1 Cicero, De Fato, 11. 



72 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Whether voluntary actions are necessarily deter- 
mined, and whether the principle of contradiction 
is applicable to future events, are two separate 
questions, and, as Bayle has shown, the connection 
of voluntary action with the disjunctive proposi- 
tion was irrelevant. 1 

In general, it may be said that of course the past 
must remain as it is, and that there is no possibil- 
ity of the present being other than it is. Whether 
the past might have been different under certain 
contingencies is another question which need not 
here be considered. Whether the principle of 
contradiction is applicable to the future may be 
easily seen in connection with any disjunctive 
proposition where the alternatives exclude one 
another. If I say : either James or John will die 
to-morrow, both of these alternatives may be true 
and both may be false, or either one may be true, 
while the other is false. By accepting one alterna- 
tive I have not rejected all other possible cases. In 
logical language, the disjunction is not complete. 
But if I say : James will either die or not die to- 
morrow, the negative alternative embraces all other 
cases or conditions except the death of James. 
The proposition is equivalent to saying that if 
James does not die, he will live, that he cannot 
both live and not live, nor die and not die. It is 
not implied that he must die ; it is not implied that 
he must live. It is not even implied that it is fixed 
whether he must live or must die. Nothing is said 
about either of the alternatives taken by itself. It 
1 Bayle, Diet. Art. Epicure. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 73 

was therefore unnecessary for the Epicureans to 
dispute the validity of the principle of contradic- 
tion in order to establish their indeterministic 
doctrine. But if the Epicurean contention was 
unnecessary, the Stoic doctrine is inconsistent with 
itself. Let it be assumed that James will be 
drowned if he goes near the water, and that this 
has been predetermined by fate. If we understand 
by fate the operation of necessary causes, then I 
mean not that James will be drowned in spite of 
anything that he may do, but only that by a series 
of inevitable causes and effects the last effect will 
be the drowning of James. Either the end is pre- 
determined or it is not predetermined; if it is, then 
the means to the end are predetermined, and con- 
tingency is excluded. To say that inaction on 
James's part is unnecessary because one of two 
alternatives must come to pass, is to assume that 
the true alternative is known. If it is not known, 
then by his inaction, if he escapes drowning, his 
escape will be effected ; and by his action, if he is 
drowned, his death will be effected. To say that 
by venturing on the water he predetermines his 
death by drowning, is either to deny that his drown- 
ing is predetermined, or else to affirm that his vent- 
uring on the water is predetermined. 1 In addition 
to this, the whole argument between these various 
philosophers illustrates the effect of regarding 

1 Compare Lessing, Der Freigeist, I. 3. Dageht Er nun und 
spintisirt von dem was ist, . . . von der Nothwendigkeit, der 
halben und ganzen, der nothwendigen Nothwendigkeit und der 
nicht nothwendigen Nothwendigkeit. 



74 THEORIES OV THE WILIi 

necessity, possibility, and actuality as purely ob- 
jective categories. 

While the philosophy of Carneades is sceptical, 
other ancient sceptics carried their doubt to a 
greater extreme. The atheism and the denial of 
fate and necessity among philosophers of the later 
Greek schools were unfavorable to a belief in de- 
terminism. The sceptics did not hold that nature 
is genetrix omnium, but were disposed rather 
towards an individualism and subjectivism out of 
harmony with philosophical tradition and the popu- 
lar religion. In particular, some of them denied 
the principle of cause and effect. They did not, 
as some modern philosophers have done, simply 
deny the connection between effect and cause, but 
they held it to be impossible that causes and effects 
should exist at all. iEnesidemus, of Cnossus, a 
contemporary of Cicero, was one of those who thus 
disputed the reality of causality. 1 It is probable 
that indeterminism was held by all the Greek scep- 
tics. As an illustration of the connection between 
their theory of knowledge and their theory of voli- 
tion may be mentioned their so-called suspension 
of judgment with respect to the events of life. 
Pyrrho had recommended apathy and indifference, 
because there is nothing certain. And if nothing 
is certain, nothing is either good or shameful. He 
was followed in this by Timon of Philus, his suc- 
cessor. Carneades, as we have seen, defended the 

1 Sextus Emp. Hypotyp. Pyrrh. I. 180. It may be added that 
Sextus himself denied the possibility of causes and effects. Adv. 
Math. 207 f. 



STOIC AND EPICUREAN 



75 



freedom of the will, and the conclusion which he 
drew was that apathy (a7rd0aa, drapa^a) was the 
proper attitude for the philosopher. Besides the 
suspending of judgment, the sceptics of the more 
extreme class also recommended the suspension of 
volition. 1 The combination of this conclusion with 
their denial of fatal necessity is worthy of con- 
sideration. The objection which had been brought 
to the determinism of Chrysippus was that human 
action is useless, if all is necessarily predeter- 
mined; and it has been seen how the objection 
was answered. The later sceptics maintained that 
human action is useless, because knowledge is 
uncertain, although the will is free. While one 
must accept with caution the extravagant stories 
which are told of the extremes to which the sceptics 
were led by their doubts, their philosophy was un- 
doubtedly far more practical in its results than is 
the scepticism of more modern times. 

1 'A<f>a<rla and y AKaTa\r)\pla. 



CHAPTER THIRD 

THEORIES OF THE WILL IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 

In Christian theology, doctrines of the will have 
been complicated with doctrines relating to the 
prescience of God, the predestination of all events, 
original sin, and grace. Possibly, owing to these 
complications, the discussions concerning the nature 
and freedom of the will have been far more exten- 
sive and far more animated among theologians 
than among philosophers. Even if it be denied 
that these theological discussions have contributed 
much to our positive knowledge of the will, it must 
be admitted that they have often brought out very 
clearly, not only the different species of volition, 
but also the issues involved in the free-will debate. 

The consideration of the will in Christian the- 
ology has prominence, because of the Christian con- 
ception of God as the personal and moral governor 
of the world, and because of the ethical character 
of Christianity as a system. The Christian concep- 
tion of God is derived directly from the religion of 
Israel. Jehovah is rarely conceived of as a distant 
creator and first cause only. He is an active and 
intelligent power, who interferes repeatedly and 
directly in the events of nature and history. And 
76 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 77 

he interferes in order to carry out to the end a pre- 
conceived and prearranged plan. In the execution 
of his designs, God is represented as acting either 
through human agency or without human agency. 
His purpose is accomplished, sometimes in conform- 
ity to natural laws, at other times by supernatural 
interposition or miracle. He is often represented 
as forming and executing his plans, contingently 
upon the acts of his creatures. But this anthro- 
morphism is evidently not fundamental to the 
Hebrew idea of God. The prevailing conception in 
the old faith is of a God who governs all events, 
either by permissive decree or by positive agency. 
The call of Abraham, the choice of Isaac, the apos- 
tasy of Esau, the commitment of the divine reve- 
.ation to the chosen people, the required ritual of 
tabernacle and temple, the rise and fall of kings, 
the fortunes of war, — all these are attributed to 
God's almighty power, and all are parts of the 
divine plan. This is also the conception of the 
New Testament writers ; but in the Old Testament 
this theory of divine omnipotence and sovereignty 
is not brought into opposition with any scientific 
view of the will, and it remained for Christian 
writers first to notice this opposition. The germs 
of the great discussions of later theologians are con- 
tained only indirectly in the recorded sayings of 
Jesus Christ. It is in the Epistles of Paul that 
the first explicit suggestions of the great contro- 
ij are to be found. From his time down to a 
comparatively late date, theological interest has 
been attracted to questions which grow out of the 



78 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

old Hebrew conception of God's sovereignty, — the 
questions of predestination, of sin, and of grace. 

St. Paul 

If any excuse were needed for including a notice 
of the doctrines of Paul in explaining the develop- 
ment of philosophy, it might be found in the in- 
fluence which his writings have had upon European 
thought. Like Plato and Aristotle, he has been 
cited as an authority in many differing schools. 
The Gnostics and the Manicheans appealed to his 
writings in support of their opinions ; his views de- 
termined the course of Patristic and Scholastic 
thought; the sources of both Catholic and Protes- 
tant teaching are in his Epistles. While he taught 
no theory of systematic philosophy, there are impli- 
cations of some modern philosophical doctrines in 
his teaching ; and it is possible that his influence 
upon later philosophy has been too little considered. 

Attempts have been made to trace a very close 
connection between the teaching of Paul and the 
Greek philosophy. In spite of the distinguished 
names connected with this attempt, I can find no 
proof of such a relation. The impression conveyed 
by the text of the Epistles is, that of a man who has 
a religious message to deliver, which he puts into 
words such as will be readily understood by those 
to whom they were first addressed. Erom a strictly 
philosophical point of view, Christianity is + 
coordinated with those systems of practical phUos 
ophy which arose in the Post-Aristotelian period, 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 79 

which sought a standard of conduct, and practical 
rules of living. With these forms of philosophy, 
the teaching of Paul has some affinity, especially 
with the Stoic ethics ; and there are also analogies 
between his thought and that of Plato. But the 
psychological terms used by Paul are mostly to be 
found in the LXX. translation of the Jewish Script- 
ures, and some are common to him and the Jewish 
philosophers of Alexandria. Beyond this, there is 
very little reason to believe that he was indebted 
for his ideas to any of the Greek philosophers. 
Where he uses terms of philosophy, he does it with 
a certain independence, and in a way peculiar to 
himself and other Christian writers. And yet no 
very definite psychology can be found in his writ- 
ings. The most that one can hope to do, is to trace 
in his thought some elements which entered into 
the theories of fathers, and schoolmen, and re- 
formers, and which indeed have not disappeared 
from scientific philosophy. 

The object of Christianity as a practical system 
is, according to Paul, to make men righteous or 
holy. 1 The aim of his teaching is thus similar to 
that of the Greek ethical schools, which was to make 
men virtuous. The need of a solution of Paul's 
problem is evident from his own statement that the 
race of man is corrupt, and is dead in sin. 2 This 
theory, which is known as the doctrine of original 
sin and human depravity, underlies all Christian 
theories of the will down to the seventeenth cen- 

i Titus, II. 11-14; Kom. XII. 1. 
2Kom. I. 18 f.; III. 9-18; Eph. II. 1. 



80 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

tury. What effects original sin has produced may 
be best determined if we turn to the psychological 
language of Paul's Epistles. 

I. The Psychological Terms of the Epistles. The 
most general of these is the_heart (fcapSta), which is 
a Hebrew rather than a Greek form of expression. 1 
It has both an intellectual and a moral meaning. 
It is a principle of 'thought, of intention, of desire, 
and of faith, as well as of deliberate choice. 2 It 
is emotional, for the love of God is shed abroad 
in it ; 3 it is a moral faculty, for the law is written 
upon it. 4 It is the abode of Christ and the princi- 
ple of inner character. It does not necessarily con- 
note any moral quality, for there may be a bad 
heart, as well as a good. The term soul (}]/vxv) is 
less often used than heart. It refers both to life, 
and to that which in man is distinct from the body. 6 
The term reason occurs more frequently than soul. 
It may denote a theoretical or a practical faculty. 6 
With (yvwfx.r]) it is used to indicate a fixed way of 
thinking or a conviction ; it may mean the mind 
or the moral faculty in man. It has both a good 
and a bad connotation, according to the way in 
which it is qualified. It is the " law of my mem- 
bers " which wars against the " law of my mind " 
(voiis) ; but there are men with a " reprobate mind " 
(yovs)- 7 

The word body (o-5/ia), so often used by Paul, 

i LXX. Gen. VI. 5, VIII. 21 ; Eccl. VIII. 11. 

2 Rom. X. 1, 6, 8, 9, 10 ; 1 Cor. II. 11, IV. 5. 

3 Rom. V. 5. * Rom. II. 15. « Rom. H. 9, XI. 3. 

6 Rom. VII. 23, XII. 2; 1 Cor. I. 10, II. 16, XIV. 19, 

7 Rom. I. 28. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 81 

presents no difficulty of interpretation, in spite of 
conclusions which have been drawn from his lan- 
guage. It is the ordinary mortal and natural body 
of man, and it does not connote any bad moral 
qualities. 1 Paul speaks of the mortal body, of the 
appetites of the body, declares that it is subject to 
redemption, and that it is to be changed so as to 
become like the glorified body of Christ. Absence 
from the body is presence with God. 2 

More difficult is the interpretation of the terms 
flesh (a-dpi) and spirit (rrvefyia). The former is not 
derived from Greek philosophy, but from the Hebrew 
writers. 3 In the writings of Paul, it has the general 
traditional meaning of human nature, or mankind. 
But because human nature is corrupt, and is dead in 
sin, to be in the flesh is ipso facto to be sinful and 
morally dead. That it is not used in this unfavor- 
able sense everywhere, is proved by the references 
to Christ who was made of the seed of David ac- 
cording to the flesh; 4 there is the circumcision of the 
flesh ; 5 Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh. 8 
In one instance it is used to denote not merely 
human, but also animal nature of every kind. 7 But 
theologically it has a bad meaning. It is the unre- 
generate principle in man. They that are in the 
flesh cannot please God. To be carnally minded 
is death. Flesh is the seat of the lower appetites 

i Bom. I. 24, VI. 12, VII. 24, VIII. 23, XII. 1 ; 1. Cor. VI. 15, 
XII. 12. 

* Phil. III. 21 ; 2 Cor. V. 8. 

8 LXX. Gen. VI. 13, VII. 21; Is. XL. 5, 6. 

* Rom. I. 3. 6 Rom. II. 28. 6 R om . VIII. 3. 
7 1 Cor. XV. passim. 

a 



82 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

(to imdvfjLrjTiKov of Plato). In it dwells no good thing ; 
it wars against man's higher nature ; it cannot in- 
herit the kingdom of God. 1 But ethically it is not 
to be identified with body ; nor put in antithesis to 
soul. 

Another more peculiar term is spirit (VveC/m)- 
It may denote the Spirit of God or the soul of 
man. In the latter application, it is the regenerate 
part of man. It cannot be clearly distinguished 
from mind and heart. It is apparently the self- 
conscious spirit, the principle of real inner life. It 
is the true opposite of body (o-5/x.a), and is only 
once distinguished from the reason. Most com- 
monly it is opposed to flesh, simply because the 
Spirit of God acts upon the soul, and not immedi- 
ately upon the body. When the soul is regenerated, 
it is antithetical to the corrupt nature, whether the 
latter be corporeal or incorporeal. 2 Flesh does not 
apply to body alone as the Manicheans supposed ; 
for to be carnally minded, not merely to be in the 
flesh, is moral death, and the carnal Ego is sold 
under sin. 3 The adjective spiritual (-TrvevfAaTiKos) 
refers to the regenerate soul and all its concerns. 4 
The law of God is spiritual. There is the law of 
the spirit of life in Christ Jesus ; Christians walk 
not after the flesh but after the Spirit. There are 
spiritual gifts, and those who have them are 

i Rom. VIII. 3, 5, XIII. 14; 1 Cor. I. 26, XV. 50. 

2 Rom. I. 9, VII. 6, VIII. 10, 11 ; 1 Cor. II. 4, 11, V. 3, 5, 
XIV. 14, 15. s R 0m . VIII. 6, VII. 14. 

4 But compare irpbs to wveviJ.aTi.Ka ttjs irovqpias. Eph. 
VI. 12. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 83 

irvevfiaTiKoi, although this term is evidently not 
indicative of a caste or esoteric circle within the 
Church. 1 

II. Sin and Grace. From what has just been 
said, it will have been seen that all or nearly all 
the psychical principles in man are corrupted by 
sin. And Paul teaches that this condition is due 
to the fall of Adam. The death of man in sin 
brings upon him the curse of God, involving guilt 
and punishment ; while subjectively man is unable 
to keep the moral law. The will is determined 
to evil by the birth of man in sin. This is of 
great importance in relation to later philosophy. 
For here is the origin of the doctrine taught for 
many centuries, that the human will is in slavery 
to sin, and that there is no free will in the sinner. 
Naturally the will is determined to sin because the 
character is sinful, and man cannot change his 
character. The change which enables man to 
escape the curse and to obey the law is effected by 
the grace of God. Grace produces faith, and Paul 
expressly says : (1) that man is justified by faith ; 
(2) that man is saved by grace through faith. 2 
Theologians are not at one as to what is meant by 
faith. It is not necessary that I should offer 
any particular interpretation either of the term 
justification or of the term faith, about which there 
has been so much dispute. But it is perfectly 
plain that Paul regards faith to be instrumentally 
the cause of justification, and grace to be efficiently 
the cause of faith. God is the author of faith, 

1 1 Cor. XIV. 1, XII. 1. 2 R 0m . v. 1 ; Eph. II. 8. 



84 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

and man is the recipient. Jesus Christ is the 
object of faith. The breach between man and God 
is healed through faith, and the holy life begins 
with faith. Grace and original sin are antitheti- 
cal. Just as birth into the human race carries 
with it the sin and corruption of the flesh, so the 
new birth by which faith is given to man enables 
him to live a holy life, and carries with it the 
beginnings of obedience to the moral law. The 
will which in the unregenerate is predetermined to 
sinful acts, in the regenerate is predetermined to a 
holy life. 

III. Tlie Conflict of the Will For the first 
time in the history of thought, Paul presents from 
a subjective point of view the conflict of a man 
between two moral alternatives. While the aspects 
of this conflict are chiefly theological, it is evident, 
I think, that the subject involves principles of 
philosophy of no ordinary interest. Among inter- 
preters, discussion has arisen as to the place which 
should be assigned to that part of Paul's writ- 
ings in which this conflict is described. 1 Does it 
represent the man in a state of sin struggling to 
obtain grace and righteousness; or is the picture 
that of a man who has known the effects of grace, 
and who is seeking to attain to holiness, agonizing 
to overcome the corrupt principle which rebels 
against the changed character ? It is perhaps 
needless to settle this question in interpreting 
Paul's conception of the will. If the chapter be 
taken in connection with the context, it would seem, 
l Rom. VII. 14 ff. 






ITU CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 85 

however, that in the person of Paul is represented 
the man who has been already justified by faith, 
and who is at peace with God. In the sixth 
chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the question 
discussed is whether such a man, who has escaped 
the unequal warfare with God, is obliged to keep 
the moral law. But in the seventh chapter, the 
question is not, must man keep the moral law, but 
why is he so incapable of keeping the moral law? 
The struggle is thus, apparently, not in the soul of 
the unregenerate man who is supposed to be dead 
in sin, but in the soul of the regenerate man who 
has been pardoned and is endeavoring to keep the 
law. In a state of sin, the will is determined 
towards the bad; in a state of grace, the will is 
determined towards righteousness ; but not wholly 
so, for the flesh is not at once subdued, and there 
is a war between the good and the bad principles 
of action in the soul of him who has been pardoned. 
The conflict is described in a soliloquy, in which 
there is some confusion of psychological terms. A 
series of good principles is enumerated in opposi- 
tion to a series of bad principles. It is not the 
Ego warring with a principle of evil, nor is it the 
war of grace with the unregenerate Ego. It is 
the law which is spiritual (vofios TrvcvfiarLKos) in 
conflict with the carnal Ego ('Eyw trap/a/cos); it is 
the Ego hating one course of action, and yet per- 
forming it; willing one course of action, and per- 
forming another. It is the Ego which serves the 
God, warring against the Ego which serves 
- w of sin, the Ego as rational (iv t<S voi) 



86 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

in conflict with, an Ego which, is carnal. It is 
opposition between the law of my mind or reason, 
and the law or principle of sin which is in my 
members (fieXif). The Ego is apparently the agent 
in either case, whether the spirit or the flesh con- 
quers. There can be no doubt that Paul regards 
the attainment of holiness as progressive and not 
instantaneous, and so the conflict thus described is 
theologically free from difficulty. Philosophically, 
it is impossible that the Ego should be ranged on 
either side exclusively in this inner conflict. But 
it is ranged first on one side, and then on 
another; it is evident that there is something 
more than a mere impersonal conflict between two 
principles, good and bad. If we eliminate as im- 
possible the idea that Paul was setting forth the 
modern psychological theory of a double person- 
ality, it is plain that he views the will as de- 
termined by one or the other of two conflicting 
motives, and acknowledges that without prede- 
termining grace, it will be predetermined by sin 
which is resident in human nature even after 
grace has been imparted. 

This interpretation of the seventh chapter of 
Romans is further justified by the continuation of 
the discussion in chapters eighth and ninth. The 
antithesis between the carnal and the spiritual is 
again emphasized. The carnal mind is enmity 
against God ; it cannot obey the law of God. They 
that are in the flesh (iv aapKi) cannot please God. 1 
The subjection of the creature to the vain principle 

i Rom. VIII. 7, 8. 



IN- CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 87 

of the flesh, is not voluntary, and the creature will 
be freed from the slavery of corruption. To those 
who are freed from the bondage of the flesh, a hope 
of glorification is offered. 1 If it be asked who are 
to be glorified, it is found that whom h< did fore- 
know, he also did predestinate, and whom he pre- 
destinated, them he also called, and whom he 
called, them he also justified, and whom he justi- 
fied, them he also glorified. 2 If this should be 
thought consistent with an indeterministic view of 
the human will, it is difficult to explain why in the 
ninth chapter Paul should be at pains to answer 
objections to determinism. It is quite irrational to 
defend indeterministic doctrine against objections 
which have force only against deterministic doc- 
trine. It seems equally irrational to employ posi- 
tive arguments which lead to determinism, if the 
proof of indeterminism be the end in view. 

If those who are glorified are those who have 
been predestinated, then there has obviously been an 
election or choice of those who are predestinated, 
called, justified, and glorified. Not all the chil- 
dren of Abraham were elected, but only Isaac ; not 
all the sons of Isaac, but Jacob only. The elec- 
tion was unconditional, for it was made before the 
birth of the children, and the election was not 
according to works, but according to the mind of 
God. This is not merely the choice of a nation, 
for not all are Israel which are of Israel; neither 
because they are Abraham's seed are they all chil- 
dren ; but in Isaac shall thy seed be called. But 
i Rom. VIII. 20. 2 Rom. yill. 29. 



THEORIES OP THE WILL 

if God thus unconditionally decides who are to be 
elected, it/ is possible that a man may say that 
God is unrighteous. The Apostle's protest is not 
;-«,c "■:.' j the doctrine of unconditional predestina- 
tion and determinism, but against the man who 
.trds such a theory as impugning the righteous- 
ness of God. Moses received a manifestation of 
divine glory, not from anything which he had 
done to deserve it, but out of God's unconditioned 
determination. Pharaoh was not one of the chosen 
race, and God hardened his heart; the reprobation 
of Pharaoh as well as the election of Moses is 
expressly taught. Almost every objection which 
can be made to the doctrine here laid down is 
stated and answered ; and the writer intimates that 
human criticism is out of place: who art thou, O 
man, that repliest against God ? Why doth he yet 
find fault, for who hath resisted his will ? The 
clay cannot find fault with the potter, unless it has 
authority to legislate for the potter. The vessel is 
not made dishonorable, but it is made a vessel unto 
dishonor. In the case of Pharaoh, which excited 
great attention in most of the later Christian theol- 
ogy, Paul seems to say : God is not the cause of 
evil in the mind of Pharaoh ; but in any event God 
is the cause of Pharaoh's existence. And indeed it 
might be urged that if God foreknows the dishonor 
of Pharaoh, and yet brings Pharaoh into the world, 
the objection made to the doctrine of unconditional 
election applies also to that of conditional election. 
It is possible that so strict an interpretation of a 
passage, which is in the main practical and horta- 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 89 

tory, should not be offered; and it may be urged 
that Paul probably bad no definite conception of 
the philosophical bearings of what he was affirm- 
ing. Even admitting the force of this objection, 
the fact remains that in all theories of the will in 
the history of Christian theology the doctrines of 
Paul have been so extensively interpreted that I 
have been unable to give any account of the one, 
without a notice of the other. 



The Greek Fathers 

The earlier part of the Patristic age was a period 
in which Christian writers were chiefly engaged in 
defending the faith against Anti-Christian oppo- 
nents, such as the Neo-Platonists and the Gnostics. 
Christianity was in conflict also with the old poly- 
theism of the Greek and Roman religion. In this 
earlier period, emphasis was laid upon the unity 
of God, as opposed to the many deities of pagan 
religion and the Gnostic dualism. The govern- 
ment of the world was held to be in the hands of 
providence, and not under fatal necessity. To 
avoid the Gnostic conclusion that God is the cause 
of evil, the early Fathers contended that God had 
simply permitted evil, and that the free will 
of angels and of men was responsible for sin. 
This raised the question, first, as to the way in 
which man came to sin by his own free will ; and, 
second, as to what effect the fall of man had upon 
the race. This became the subject of debate be- 
tween Augustine and the Pelagians. Consequently 



90 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the theories of the earlier Fathers were indeterrain- 
istic, and the pronounced determinism of Augustine 
was a result of the rise into prominence of the 
doctrine of original sin. 

The greater part of the later period of the Pa- 
tristic age was occupied with purely theological 
disputes, first, as to the Holy Trinity, and then as 
to the person and nature of Jesus Christ. When 
such doctrines had been defined by general councils, 
the subject of man became a centre of interest. 
And this engaged the attention of the Latin 
Fathers in their opposition to the Pelagians. 

The tendency of the Eastern Fathers to hold an 
indeterministic theory of the will arose from the 
fact that they were obliged to meet in controversy 
the pagans who believed in fatal necessity, and the 
Gnostics who made God the author of evil. While 
there were Gnostics who taught explicitly a doc- 
trine of freedom, the views of the school regarding 
matter and the body were not favorable to a 
belief in indeterminism. The limitation of the 
soul by evil matter, which was a principle of both 
Gnostic and Manichean, would lead some to the 
logical conclusion that under such bondage the 
volitions of man must be determined by this 
corrupting influence. It was the Christian doctrine 
of original sin which was the chief cause for the 
appearance in theological discussion of the problem 
of the will. "This is that hereditary corruption 
which the Fathers called original sin, meaning by 
sin the depravation of a nature previously good 
and pure; on which subject they had much conten- 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 91 

tion, nothing being more remote from natural reason 
than that all should be criminated on account of 
the guilt of one, and thus sin become common; 
which seems to have been the reason why most 
ancient doctors of the church did but obscurely 
glance at this point, or at least explained it with 
less perspicuity than it required. Yet this timidity 
could not prevent Pelagius from arising, etc." 1 
Even Augustine was at first little disposed to de- 
velop a doctrine of the will in accordance with the 
theory of original sin. His earlier opponents were 
mostly Manicheans and pagan philosophers; and 
from a letter written by him shortly before the 
outbreak of the Pelagian controversy, it is plain 
that he had hitherto paid no particular attention to 
the questions which Pelagius had raised in Rome. 

Justin Martyr, the earliest of the Patristic writers, 
teaches that God foreknows all that is about to come 
to pass, and that prophecy will most certainly 
be fulfilled. But he opposes the fatal necessity of 
the Stoics. While angels and men were created to 
obey the law of God, their punishment is fore- 
told, because God foreknew that they would sin. 
For angels and men were created with free will, 
capable of virtue or vice, and therefore subject 
to reward or blame. It is not the fault of God 
that they have sinned. 2 Man was not made like 
the quadrupeds and other lower beings. He is 
endowed with freedom, without which he would 
have been undeserving of punishment and un- 

1 Calvin, Inst. II. 1, 5. 

* Justin Martyr, In Apol. I. 28, 43. 



92 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

worthy of reward. Justin, however, does not define 
will, nor give any psychological explanation of it. 
Irenaeus, who was one of the chief opponents of 
the Gnostics, teaches a doctrine of general predes- 
tination, and the unity of the divine plan, in dis- 
tinction from dualism. He criticises those who 
attribute the creation of the world to angels, and 
declares that God alone is creator, who has predes- 
tinated all things according to his pleasure, by his 
word. 1 Man is endowed with reason, and in this 
respect is like God. He has free will, that is, he 
has power over his own actions. He is said to be a 
cause unto himself. 2 This expression which origi- 
nated with Justin Martyr was afterwards adopted 
by Spinoza in his definition of God. If the theol- 
ogy of Irenaeus be separated from his anthropology, 
his language when he refers to the sovereignty of 
God will be found to be as decided as that of 
Augustine. The Son of God is the revealer of the 
Father's will, and reveals the Father to whom he 
wills. Without the good will of the Father, and 
the agency of the Son, no man can know God. 3 
One chapter of his work against heresies is de- 
voted to a consideration of the freedom of the will. 
In this he presents a form of indeterminism. Man 
is called upon to obey freely, and not by any exter- 
nal or internal compulsion. God has commanded 
obedience, and the law has sanctions. Men are 
judged, not by their natures, but by their actions. 
They deserve no praise for having a good nature, 

1 Irenseus, Adv. Hseres, II. 2. 
2 Id., ib. IV. 4. a Id., ib. IV. 6, 7. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 93 

nor blame for having a bad nature. Obedience is 
possible to the commands of God, whether the 
nature of man be bad or good. Ireneeus defends 
the singular theory that if God had created devils 
and men who were predetermined to resist his will, 
it would argue impotence in God. The opposite of 
this has sometimes been held by advocates of pre- 
destination, that if a man has free will, the omnipo- 
tence of God is limited. It is interesting to find 
Irengeus taking a contradictory view. The man 
who does not obey the commands of God, is the 
cause of his own disobedience. Those who do not 
see the light are blind through their own fault, 
for the light is there. The fault is not God's but 
man's; he has been created a free agent with 
power over himself. 1 

Hippolytus, a disciple of Irengeus, and another 
opponent of the Gnostics, criticises Plato for his 
" fatalism," directing his attack against the Pla- 
tonic statement that vice is involuntary. He crit- 
icises also the Stoics for their doctrine of fatal 
necessity, and the Epicureans for their belief in 
chance. 2 A treatise on the freedom of the will is 
attributed to Methodius, but is of doubtful authen- 
ticity, and of small importance. It teaches that 
man was created free, so that it might be possible 
for him to obey or to disobey the commands of 
God. Evil has come into the world as the effect 
of disobedience. Having originally had power, 
man has enslaved himself. While this exhibits 

1 Irenseus, Adv. Hseres, IV. 37. 
a Hippolytus, Refut. 1. 16-19. 



94 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

some signs of the Pauline doctrine of inability, it 
is doubtful whether the writer of the treatise in- 
tended to speak except figuratively of the slavery 
of the will. 

The ablest theologians among the Eastern 
Fathers, were Clement of Alexandria and Origen. 
Although they opposed the Gnostics, there are 
signs of Gnosticism in some of their own opinions. 
Clement attacked the theory that God is in any 
way the author of evil. He was the first to intro- 
duce a distinction which ever since his day has had 
a prominent place in theological literature. He 
affirms that God is not the cause of evil, but 
that God permits the existence of evil. 1 There 
was a purpose which God set before him, and 
which required for its accomplishment the creation 
of man. 2 When man sinned, God simply did not 
interfere to prevent the occurrence. Not to pre- 
vent an event, is different from causing an event. 
God is therefore not the cause of evil, except in so 
far as he did not interfere to prevent it. God fore- 
knows all that is about to happen. The ground of 
predestination is this foreknowledge. Foreknow- 
ing, for example, that certain men will be right- 
eous, God predestinates them unto eternal life. The 
devil had free will and was the cause of sin, and 
God is not responsible for the volitions of the 
devil. 3 Sin is the result of free inclination and 
choice. Yet while God permits evil, he overrules 
it for good. As God is not the cause of sin, so also 

i Clement, Strom. I. 17. 
2 Id., ib. I. 3. 8 id., ib. I. 17. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 95 

he is not the cause of the will to become righteous. 
Christ saves men by drawing to himself those who 
are willing to be drawn. Everything which did 
not hinder man's free choice, God rendered auxili- 
ary to well-doing, in order that the divine goodness 
might be revealed. 1 

More specifically, Clement teaches that self- 
determining choice has been imparted to the soul. 2 
Voluntary actions are of three kinds : (1) those 
which are done according to desire; (2) those 
which are done by choice; (3) those which are 
done intentionally. There is a corresponding 
threefold division of evils into (1) sins, (2) mis- 
takes, (3) crimes. Both of these divisions are 
obscurely drawn. Sins and mistakes are said to 
be merely errors ; voluntary sins are crimes. 3 To 
commit sin lies within man's power, and depends 
upon his volition. Will takes the precedence of 
all other human powers, and the intellect is its 
servant. In this Clement departs from the Pla- 
tonic tradition, and defends the primacy of the 
will. 4 God has set before men good and evil 
objects of choice. Men are not made originally 
virtuous or vicious. Sin is dependent on the will ; 
and faith as well as the intellectual powers is 
subject to will. 

Origen, like the other Greek Fathers, defends 
indeterminism, although his doctrine of providence 
is in accordance with belief in predestination. Ac- 
cording to him none of the events which happen to 

i Clement, Strom. VI. 6. 
a Id., ib. II. 4. 3 Id., ib. II. 15. * u. } n,. n. 17. 



96 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

man, happens by accident. All occurs in accord- 
ance with a plan so stupendous, and yet so care- 
fully considered, that even the hairs of the head 
are numbered. 1 Nor does Origen shrink from 
admitting that some men perish in accordance 
with the will of God ; as in the case of Pharaoh, 
whose heart God hardened. His less general treat- 
ment of the will forbids the supposition that he 
believed it to be determined. He makes a dis- 
tinction between objects which have a cause of 
motion from without, and those which are moved 
from within. To the latter class belong animals, 
plants, possibly metals, fire, and fountains. Most 
animate things are moved by a phantasm spring- 
ing up within them, which incites to effort. But 
the rational animal is incited to effort by 
something in addition to phantasm. There 
may be some external cause which incites the 
reason, but it is the latter which determines what 
the action shall be. It is not possible to distin- 
guish the reason and the will completely in the 
writings of Origen. The incitement of the reason 
is not irresistible. In the presence of the same 
temptation one man will resist, another will yield. 
The action is not dependent solely on the external 
cause. Men are not dragged about as slaves ; nor 
is the action of the will determined by the consti- 
tution of the body. In opposition to the Gnostics, 
Origen holds that the reason sits as a judge over 
all external incitements. It is probable that he 
means that choice is a function of the reason. In 

1 Origen, De Princip. II. 11. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 97 

a fragment of Origen found in Jerome's epistle to 
Avitus, it is said that all men have free will, and 
that it lies with each one to improve or to degrade 
his life. 1 

The most striking aspect of Origen's psychology 
is his theory adopted from Plato, of the pre- 
existent soul. The conduct of man is determined 
not by the Creator, but by the will of man as 
a rational creature. When it is said that men 
are created to dishonor, it is meant that this is on 
account of their preexistent characters and conse- 
quent free actions. 2 This suggests the theory of 
the Platonic myth, that it lies in the power of pre- 
existent souls to choose their own destiny. It may 
be noticed that this explanation is not sufficient to 
account for the preexistent character of the soul, 
nor does it prove that acts of free will determine 
the character. This view of the will is to be found 
repeated throughout Origen's theology. He dis- 
cusses the case of Pharaoh, and maintains that the 
statement of the Bible is quite in harmony with 
free will. It had been argued that if God hardened 
Pharaoh's heart, then Pharaoh's will was not free. 
In opposition to this Origen maintains that if 
Pharaoh had an earthy nature, so that he disobeyed 
God because of such a nature, there was no need 
that his heart should be hardened. If he had not 
an earthy nature, God would not have hardened 
his heart, because God would not cause a man 
to sin, unless the man's character was bad. Origen 

1 S. Hieroti, Epist. ad Avit. 

2 Origen, De Princip. II. 10. 



\ 
\ 



98 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

therefore does not hold trie doctrines of original 
sin and depravity. The origin of repentance is in 
the heart of man. When men come of their own 
free will to God, he removes the stony heart. 
This view is enforced by the quotation of many 
practical exhortations from the Scriptures. 1 

The soul of man in its present state is one of 
three principles in man. Human nature is made 
up of spirit, soul, and body. Each part has its 
own will. It is difficult to determine in which 
of these three, the unity of the will is to be 
found. The psychical will is the most important 
morally. For the will of the soul is said to obey 
either spirit or body of its own free choice. It is 
better that the soul should follow altogether the 
will of the flesh, than that it should waver. For 
in such an extreme condition, there is a more 
favorable prospect of reformation. Men fail to 
\ come to God, not because of God's inability to draw 
them, but because of their wayward wills. 2 

The Latltst Fathers 

tertullian. 

The thought of the Latin Fathers is so well 
represented in the writings of Augustine that it 
will not be necessary to consider their theories in 
great detail. Among them there is no more inter- 
esting writer than Tertullian. While in time, he 

1 Origen, De Princip. III. 1. 

2 See particularly Origen TLepl rod AtiTei-ovelov, I. 1-7 ; De 
Princip. III. 4 ; Contra Cels. VI. 57. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 99 

belongs to the age of apologies, his doctrine has not 
been without positive influence on Christian theol- 
ogy. Yet his frequent inconsistencies, his declama- 
tory manner, and his arbitrary distinction between 
matters of reason and matters of faith make it 
difficult to present a satisfactory account of his 
philosophical opinions. 

His chief psychological treatise contains no syste- 
matic account of the soul. It is for the most part 
a fierce polemic against the theories of the Greek 
and Roman philosophers. His teaching has more 
affinity to the philosophy of the Stoics than to that 
of any of the Greek schools. 

He rejects the Platonic theory of preexistence, 
and holds that the soul is generated and propagated 
with the body. In conformity with this principle, 
he teaches that the soul is corporeal in its nature. 
He speaks even of God as corporeal. 1 While many 
have interpreted these expressions as evidence that 
Tertullian was a materialist, it seems more rational 
to regard them as manifestations of impetuous and 
inconsistent speculation. For he attacks the Gnos- 
tic doctrine that matter is coeternal with God. 

The soul cannot be called an animal body {corpus 
animate) nor a non-animal body (corpus inanimate). 
For it is that which makes a body animal by its 
presence, and non-animal by its absence. In op- 
position to those who hold that the soul is incor- 
poreal, from the fact that the soul can be moved 
from without by bodily objects, and can itself 
produce motion of bodies, it is proved that it is 

i Tertullian, De Anim. XXI. 



\ 



100 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

corporeal in its nature. Conatus ejus extrinsecus 
foris parent. Hands, feet, eyes, and tongue are 
moved by the soul. 1 Tertullian opposes also the 
Platonic threefold division of the soul, holding that 
there is reason in appetite and emotion, as well 
as in the thinking principle. 2 

The Traducian theory held by Tertullian does 
not, according to him, exclude the possibility of a 
subsequent change in the nature of the soul. A 
bad character will necessarily effect bad actions; 
yet, to use his language, divine grace can change 
stones into the children of Abraham, and a genera- 
tion of vipers into the fruit of penitence : vis divinae 
gratiae potentior utique natura, habens in nobis sub 
jacentem sibi liberam arbitrii protestatem quod to 
avTeiovo-iov dicitur. This is the term used by the 
Greek Fathers to denote free will. It is a native 
power of the soul. Thus the nature of man is 
not fixed in evil, as some of the Gnostics taught, 
but can be changed by grace. Tertullian empha- 
sized the efficiency of grace more than any of the 
Greek Fathers had done. Grace is more powerful 
than nature ; and free will is drawn under the sway 
of supernatural power. Free will, however, is part 
of the essence of the soul. It belongs both to 
fallen and to unfallen man. God not only made 
man a free master of his actions, but also imposed 
laws upon him. This would not have been done, 
had not man had it in his power to disobey as 
well as to obey. The reason why exhortation 
and persuasion are effective is because of man's 

i Tertullian, De Anim. I.-V. 2 Id., ib. XVI. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 101 

free will. The original liberty of man was a 
manifestation of the goodness of God ; for man 
was made in the image and likeness of God, a part 
of which is free choice. The sin of man is no re- 
flection upon the goodness of the Creator. 1 In 
opposition to Marcion, Tertullian argues that if 
God had intervened to prevent the fall of man, and 
to keep the serpent away, Marcion might have said 
that it was a faithless Lord who abridged the liberty 
which he had first bestowed. The same free will 
which succumbed to the temptation becomes at 
length the conqueror of the devil, by obedience to 
the law of God. Man is responsible for his use 
and misuse of freedom. Yet the predetermination 
of events is stated very distinctly : nihil origine 
sua prius est in agnitione, quia nee in dispositione. 
Subito filius, et subito missus est, autem dispositum. 
... At quin nihil putem a Deo subitum, quia nihil 
a Deo non dispositum. 

St. Jerome 

The theory of Jerome deserves notice more on 
account of his prominent part in the Pelagian con- 
troversy than because his opinion has intrinsic im- 
portance. In his writings, there is a departure 
from the indeterminism of the earlier Fathers and 
an approach to the position afterwards occupied by 
Augustine. His psychological views are rare, and 
always unsystematically expressed. His references 
to the will are for the most part theological. These 

i Tertullian, Anti Marc. II. 5, 6. 



102 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

are scattered throughout his formal treatises and his 
letters. All the Patristic writers agree that Adam 
was originally endowed with free choice of good 
and evil. The only question is whether the will 
of fallen man is free, without freedom being given 
by the grace of God. This, as has been already 
said, unites the theological discussion of the will 
to the doctrine of grace. Jerome's theory is theo- 
logically defended by reference to the New Testa- 
ment rather than to the reason. 

1. He teaches a doctrine of providence in har- 
mony with predestination. All things are con- 
trolled and directed by the providence of God. It 
was owing to the divine foreknowledge and predes- 
tination that the prophets were enabled to see the 
future, as if it were already past, and to make 
truthful predictions. Predestinatio is different 
from propositum. The former refers to the inten- 
tion of God a long time prior to the event deter- 
mined. The latter is applied to a plan in the 
immediate future : — 

de quo . . . Paulus ait ; ut autem venit plentitudo temporis, 
misit Deus Filium suum ; qui ante venire non potuit nisi 
mysterium temporis impleretur. 1 

Jerome reproves those who seek to discover why 
God has willed as he has. 2 But he wavers between 
the theory of conditional and that of unconditional 
predestination. Among several strong passages in 
his commentaries is one in which he interprets the 
words secundum propositum suae voluntatis, in the 

i S. Hieron, Opera, IV. i. 330. « Id., ib. IV. n. 604. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 103 

Epistle to the Ephesians, as meaning, according to 
the purpose of God, independent of the will of 
man. And he explains the words in the Romans, 
his qui secundum propositum vocati, etc., by saying 
that men believe because they have been predesti- 
nated to eternal life. To the objection of the Pela- 
gian that if God predestinates all human actions, 
he is commanding certain things which are impos- 
sible for man to perform, Jerome replies, that 
many things are ordained as lawful and proper, 
but that it is not the duty of every man to do 
them all. 1 Some commands do not apply to all men. 
Throughout his works, however, Jerome refers to 
the mystery which surrounds this subject: a me 
sententiae et dispositionis Dei causas requiris? 

2. He teaches also a doctrine of indeterminism. 
While his defence of freedom is not in harmony 
with many of his statements concerning grace, he 
asserts very emphatically the doctrine of free 
will : — 

sed liberum dedit arbitrium Deus, quod aliter liberum non 
erit, nisi fecero quod voluero. 2 Liberum arbitrium dat 
liberam voluntatem, et non statim ex libero arbitrio homo 
facit, sed Domini auxilio. 8 

While Jerome asserts that man has fallen, is in 
a state of sin, and cannot of himself do any good, 
the part that grace performs in man's obedience is 
not quite clear. Man is free, because he has grace. 
On the one hand it is said : — 

i S. Hieron, Opera, IV. n. 497. 
« Id., ib. IV. ii. 478. « Id., ib. IV- H. 481. 



104 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

sed si quid in me boni habeo, illo suggerente et adjuvante 
completur, 1 

which is in harmony with a moderate degree of 
freedom even in fallen man. On the other hand, 
the freedom of the will is ascribed wholly to grace : 

ut enim liberum possideamus arbitrium, et vel ad bonam 
vel ad malam partem declinemus propria voluntate, ejus 
est gratiae, qui nos ad imaginem et simitudinem sui tales 
condidit. 2 

This difficulty arises in more than one of the Patris- 
tic theories. The will in fallen man seems to he 
determined to evil. It is freed by grace. If grace 
is given in consequence of man's will to have it, 
then freedom is not wholly lost in the fall; and if 
not, then the questions are raised, — first, is the sin- 
ner responsible for his sins, and, second, is the man 
in a state of grace responsible for his holy actions? 
These questions were discussed more fully by 
Augustine. The obscurity of Jerome's theory is 
further increased by his remarks on the harden- 
ing of Pharaoh's heart. Here he represents God 
as acting conditionally and not unconditionally. 
Pharaoh's heart was hardened not through the direct 
agency of God, but because of its native character, 
just as certain substances are not softened by the 
warmth of the sun : — 

Alicquin unus est solis calor, et secundum essentius sub- 
jacentes, alia liquefacit, alia indurat, alia solvit, alia con- 
stringit. Liquatur enim cera, et induratur lutum : et tamen 

i S. Hieron, Opera, IV. n. 485. » Id., IV. n. 486. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 105 

caloris non est diversa natura. Sic et bonitas et dementia 
Dei, vasa irae quae apta sunt in interitum, id est populum 
Israel, indurat. 1 

The same difficulties reappear from time to time 
in later theological discussions of the will. Some 
of the inconsistencies of the earlier Fathers are 
corrected in the philosophy of Augustine. 

St. Augustine 

Augustine's interest in the will is chiefly theo- 
logical. He treats of predestination, sin, grace, 
and their effects, but contributes very little to the 
psychological doctrine of volition. In this respect, 
he falls behind some of his predecessors, notably 
Aristotle. 

I. The Nature of the Will. Two terms are used 
by him to denote the faculty of will. The first of 
these is voluntas; the second, arbitrium. Voluntas, 
in addition to its executive signification, compre- 
hends also the character, inclinations, and affec- 
tions of man. In many cases it is synonymous 
with arbitrium,. The latter denotes the will as a 
decision of the soul. Its primary meaning is pres- 
ence — the presence of judges in a court. It was 
then applied to judicial decisions, and was adopted 
into philosophy to denote a decision of the soul or 
mind. Augustine sometimes speaks of arbitrium 
voluntatis, possibly to distinguish will from arbi- 
trium intellectus. Yet Lucretius uses arbitrium to 

i S. Hieron, Opera, IV. i. 182. 



106 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

denote the act of the mind which executes the in- 
tentions. 

According to Augustine, the creature is endowed 
with will by a creative act of the Trinity. 1 
Whether he held that the individual soul was the 
result of a creative act, or was transmitted by the 
laws of ordinary generation, cannot be directly de- 
cided, nor is it of much importance to the present 
inquiry that it should be decided. Beings which 
have will, even if the will be evil, are to be ranked 
higher than those which have none. The will is 
defined as an act of the soul, either towards the not 
losing or towards the gaining of something without 
coercion, — voluntas animi actus, cogente nullo, ad 
aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum. 2 
This act or motion is not physical. But it is felt 
far more intimately than any other fact. The will 
is almost the same with the person, — voluntas est 
quippe in omnibus: immo omnes nihil aliud quam 
voluntates sunt. 8 The soul is present in every part 
of the body, and is moved by the will spontane- 
ously, and by nothing foreign to itself. Certain 
Manicheans had affirmed that the soul is moved ab 
extra, and had inferred that man is not responsible 
for his deeds. Augustine holds that every volition 
belongs to the man who wills, and that he is there- 
fore responsible for his actions. 4 

It might be demonstrated that Augustine's doc- 

1 S. Augustin. Opera, III. Part I. 242. (The references are 
to the Benedictine edition of 1685.) 

2 1. 24; cf. VIII. 71, 85; X. 1261, 1263. 

« VII. 354 ; X. 610. * 1. 13, 613 ; X. 717 ; II. 874. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 107 

trine of the will was modified at different parts of 
his career, according to the theological opposition 
by which he was confronted. He had been early 
trained in the philosophy of the Academy, and by 
education would be disposed to indeterminism. 
But he had afterwards become a Manichean, and 
his conversion from Manicheism to Catholic Chris- 
tianity had produced in him a strong reaction against 
that heresy. With the Academic teachings he never 
altogether lost sympathy ; but during his ecclesias- 
tical life the Manicheans were among his most for- 
midable antagonists. It is, however, interesting 
to remember that Augustine and his followers were 
accused of Manicheism by the Pelagians. During 
his earlier life as a Christian, he was also opposed 
to the doctrines of the Greek determinists and fatal- 
ists. There was nothing in the theories of these 
adversaries which made the defence of predestina- 
tion and original sin essential to Augustine's 
apologetic. It was not until the Pelagian heresy 
arose, and agitated both East and West, that those 
principles which have since been called Augustinian 
were clearly formulated in Latin theology. And 
even after Pelagian doctrines had spread through- 
out the Church, we find Augustine expressing igno- 
rance of the nature of the controversy. 1 In order 
to understand Augustine's theory of the will in 
relation to the doctrines of predestination and 
original sin, it is proper that some account should 
be given of the points in this dispute, which ex- 
cited the whole Church to lively debate, and caused 
1 Vit. S. Augustini, ed. Bened. VII. c. vm. 



108 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the interference of the Holy See and of the Roman 
Emperor. 

II. The Pelagian Doctrines. From the fact that 
Pelagius was a British monk, and had been at least 
familiar with the religion of the Druids, if not 
himself a Druid, it has been sometimes said that 
his doctrine of in determinism was Druidic. There 
seems to be no necessity for such an inference, 
especially as there had been an indeterministic 
tendency among the Eastern Fathers prior to his 
own time. As he left no writings, it is difficult 
to say what he actually and uniformly taught. He 
made several recantations of his heresy, as did also 
his chief follower, Coelestius, and it is not known 
to what form of doctrine they adhered. Pela- 
gianism was without doubt primarily an ethical 
movement, which afterwards became a theological 
revolution. At Rome, at Carthage, and in the East 
the Pelagians contended that predestination led 
first to determinism and then to lawlessness. This 
opinion afterwards prevailed in the Semi-Pelagian 
monastery of Adrumentum. A powerful moral and 
theological impression was made upon the Christian 
Church, from Rome to Carthage, and from Carthage 
to Jerusalem. 

In general, the Pelagians taught: that Adam's 
death was not a consequence of his sin; that the 
sin of Adam was not imputed to his descendants ; 
that there is no original sin; that all sin is actual, 
and is the result of volition ; that the will in each 
man is undetermined towards the bad or the good ; 
and that even without the help of divine grace man 



\ 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 109 

can avoid sin. Men are thus the authors of their 
own salvation; the unaided will is sufficient for 
righteousness, and there is the liberty of indiffer- 
ence in every man. It follows, to cite the famous 
dilemma of Coelestius: Si necessitatis est, pec- 
catum non est; si voluntatis, vitari potest. 1 In 
the East the Pelagians encountered Jerome, and in 
the West they encountered Augustine. 

III. The Doctrine of Predestination. This had 
already been taught by the Greek Fathers, but 
Augustine presented it in a much more decided 
form. According to him, all events are foreknown 
to God, because he has predetermined them. 2 The 
causes of predestination lie hidden from human 
sight, and man cannot discover them. In the same 
way, the righteousness of the divine plan is beyond 
the criticism of men. Reasoning from the omnipo- 
tence of God, it is shown that all events are either 
predestinated or permitted by him. Even the 
actions of the wicked are included in the divine 
plan, so that they may serve as lessons for the good. 
From the conception of God are deduced his im- 
mutability and the necessary counsel of his will. 8 
So inclusive is the predestinating purpose of God, 
that in it are comprehended all inner and outer 
events, from the creation to the fall of man, and 
from the fall, to the beatification of the elect, and 
final punishment of the unjust. God's purpose 
is thus described in a classic passage from Be 
Civitate Dei: — 

1 X. 168. 2 iv. 1501 ; VII. 410 ; X. 17, 18. 

8 IV. 1479. 



110 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

"Verumtamen omnipotent Deo, sumrao ac summe bono 
creatori omnium naturarum, voluntatum autem bonarum 
adjutori et remuneratori, malarum autem relictori et damna- 
tori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, 
quo certum numerum civium in sua sapientia predestina- 
tum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae Civitatis im- 
pleret : . . . Cur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos 
esse pfaescivit ; quando quidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum 
culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset osten- 
dere, nee sub illo creatore ac dispositore perversa inordinatio 
deliquentium rectum perverteret ordinem rerum ? 1 

This leads to the consideration of Augustine's 
doctrine of the will in relation to original sin and 
grace. It is virtually his answer to the Pelagians. 
IV. The Doctrine of the Will in Relation to Origi- 
nal Sin and Grace. If God has predetermined 
all events, this must be made to harmonize with the 
doctrine of the origin of sin. Augustine's method 
of reconciliation is founded on two general prin- 
ciples. The first is deduced from the character of 
God. Because God is good, he is not the author 
of sin. 2 Whatever idle speculations men may make 
about God, and whatever inferences they may be 
tempted to draw from the nature of sin, the fact 
remains that God is good, and that evil cannot be 
attributed to him. 3 Sin is not the result of the 

; will (voluntas) of God. It is the effect of God's per- 
mission, and of a defect (defectus), that is, a failure 

I on the part of God to will certain positive results. 
God is negatively, not positively, the cause of evil. 
But evil wills are said to have no efficient cause. 

i VII. 377. 2 vi. 234. 

8 IV. 1244. See De Libero Arbitrio, Liber II. ad init. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 111 

The second of these principles is that sin is origi- 
nally due to the free will of man. This has some 
importance in the philosophical theory of Augus- 
tine. Eor in predestination he finds no contradic- 
tion of the freedom of unfallen man. 

Animae rationali quae est in nomine, dedit Deus liberum 
arbitrium. Sic enim posset habere meritum, si voluntate, 
non necessitate boni essemus. Cum ergo oporteat non ne- 
cessitate sed voluntate bonum esse, oportebat ut Deus animae 
daret liberum arbitrium.i 

Original freedom was lost at the fall of Adam. 
Since then, man has been the slave of sin ; of him- 
self he is unable to avoid sin and attain to holiness. 
No external obstacle hinders him. The cause lies 
within him ; for his will is corrupt. Without the 
will, there is no sin. 3 Augustine speaks of a good 
will and a bad will, meaning in general the dis- 
position and affections of a man. The natural will 
of man in this sense is predetermined to evil, be- 
cause of original sin. Good and bad wills are com- 
pared to the roots of trees. The good will is the 
root of the good tree, and the bad will is the root 
of the bad tree. The fruits are good or bad ac- 
cording to the quality of their roots. The root 
although called voluntas, includes much more than 
the mere volition. 

In permitting man to sin, God had an occasion for 
the exhibition of his glory in the work of redemp- 
tion. This doctrine, which is one of the leading 
conceptions of Calvinism, has also been adopted in 

i VJII. 98, 2 vill. 101. 



112 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

effect by later optimists, who, instead of deducing 
God's moral qualities from the phenomena of the 
world, explain the existence of evil by causes lying 
beyond the will of God and outside of his character. 
The remedy for the evil of original sin is found 
by Augustine, even as by Paul in divine grace. 
When this is imparted to a sinful man, it may be as 
the effect or consequent of an outward as well as of 
an inward call (vocatio). 1 Grace is given to man, 
and man responds freely. Man is separated from 
God by sin, and cannot return of his own will. 
He must seek a physician who can heal him, and 
not try to heal himself. 2 This return to God lies 
in his power, only by the help of God (arbitrio ad- 
jutorio Dei). If men remain without vocatio, it is 
the depravity of their own minds which makes them 
sin. For that the grace of God enables a man to re- 
turn to God, does not mean that man's will has no 
part in the act. The return is voluntary. Free will 
is not taken away by grace, but is established. 3 The 
foreknowledge of God is held not to be inconsistent 
with this view. Those who have been predestinated 
to be delivered from sin have this grace. 4 They 
are made free, because they have been chosen ; and 
their own choice is the effect of God's choice. Sed 
quia electi sunt elegerunt ; non quia elegerunt electi 
sunt. 5 Inclinations and feelings are changed by 
the grace of God, and so the volitions are changed. 
Predestination is said to be the preparation for the 
gift of grace; and grace the gift itself. But the 

i X. 717, 834. 2 v. 352. 8 X. 114. 

* X. 839, 840 ; VII. 124 ; V. 762. 6 X. 738, 812. 



IJST CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 113 

affirmation of efficacious grace does not involve the 
denial of second causes. The order of causes in 
the world has been fixed and foreseen by God. 
The will is a cause in the order of nature: — 

et ipse quippe nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, 
qui cerus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur ; quoniam 
et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae sunt. 
Atque ita qui omnes rerum causas praescivit, profecto in 
eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, 
quas nostrorum operum causas praescivit. 1 

The so-called fortuitous causes of the Greek and 
Roman philosophy are called by Augustine la- 
tentes ; it is not denied that natural causes are 
efficient. They proceed ultimately from the will 
of God. They cannot be altogether separated from 
the will of him who is the author and founder of 
nature. Augustine explicitly rejects the concep- 
tion of Fate, and that of fatal necessity. With re- 
spect to a decree of God, it may be said, however, 
fatum est. If it be held that our wills are con- 
trolled by necessity, so that we cannot will what we 
please, experience proves the contrary : — 

necesse est ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita flat, nescio cur earn 
timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. 2 

It is God's grace which operates (operare) ; it is 
man's will which cooperates (co-operare). 3 The 
change of will is experienced subjectively as a 
change of feeling or desire; so that even as man 
freely desires, so he chooses the good. 

1 Vn. 123. 2 vil. 124. 

s De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 33 ; cf . Y. 832. 
i 



114 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Is the will thus transformed, free or not ? This 
is one of the obscure points in Augustine's doctrine. 
On the one hand grace restores the liberty which 
was lost at the fall of Adam ; for Adam originally 
had free will. 1 On the other hand grace determines 
the will to what is good, just as before it had been 
determined by original sin. Augustine speaks of a 
freedom from righteousness, as well as a freedom 
from sin. The will to righteousness is effected by 
the grace of God. Whether Augustine's theory is 
compatible with freedom in the modern psychologi- 
cal sense, is doubtful. The perplexity and contro- 
versy which his doctrines have caused in the history 
of theology are a sufficient commentary on the 
difficulty of interpreting them consistently. There 
are parts of Augustine's writings in which he im- 
plies that the effect of grace is to restore the reason 
(ratio) to its lost supremacy in the soul. For he 
describes it as in the citadel of the soul, 2 swaying 
its movements, controlling its evil affections, and 
furthering righteousness of character and life. 

As has been said above, men are held responsible 
for their actions. Those who deny that they are 
responsible, because their wills are determined by 
the grace of God, are accused of pride and irrever- 
ence. But those who have been predestinated and 
elected, and moved by grace, will persevere, and 
can never relapse into the state of depravity from 
which they have emerged. 3 Those who have simply 
the outward call, but are not predestinated, will not 
be saved. 

i De Gratia et Lilbero Arbitrio, X. 765. 2 yil. 370. « X. 195. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 115 



St. Anselm 

In general Anselm's theory of the will is the 
same with that of Augustine. Like the latter, he 
considers it principally in relation to original sin, 
grace, and righteousness. Like Augustine he lays 
emphasis upon the doctrine of predestination. 

He does not define the term will as, according 
to him, it is equivocal. It may mean the instru- 
ment of willing (instrumentum volendi), or an affec- 
tion of that instrument (affectio ejusdem instrumenti), 
or a use or practice (usus). It is placed on an 
equality with the reason, and priority is given to 
neither. There is something higher than both, 
which employs both as instruments. This higher 
something is the immaterial soul. As affection, 
the will is potential, and partly instinctive. The 
mother is said to will to love her child, not because 
she is always actually having the feeling of love, 
but because the feeling is not against her will, and 
will arise and become actual when an occasion is 
presented. The will belongs properly to man 
alone ; the lower animals are subject to the appe- 
tites of the flesh (appetitus carnis). It may have 
either the just or the expedient as its object. But 
the will of what is just, is not innate, and is not 
always found in man. The unjust man does not 
will what is just; and the affection of willing what 
is just is not an inseparable property, for just 
men sometimes will what is unjust. But from the 
affections of willing justice and of willing in- 
justice, man wills whatsoever he wills. The object 



116 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

of volition may be either an end or a means to an 
end; one may will righteousness in order to 
be saved, or may will to be saved. The will 
may be either positive or negative, that is, a man 
may will to have or not to have. There is, further- 
more, the efficient, the approving, and the permit- 
ting will. In relation to God, this distinction is 
introduced to explain the existence of evil in the 
world. In the philosophy of Anselm, the will 
occupies a position midway between the two dispo- 
sitions in man, the spirit and the flesh, the nature 
which tends upward, and that which tends down- 
ward. When the will joins itself with the carnal 
nature, the soul is degraded ; when it joins itself 
with the spiritual nature, the soul is elevated. 1 

That which decides between two alternative 
courses of action, is called by Anselm liberum 
arbitrium. Following the doctrine of Augustine, 
he holds free will to be a property of God and 
of unfallen angels. The consideration of this 
subject leads us from Anselm' s general conception 
of the will to his particular views respecting free- 
dom and necessity. 

I. Freedom. The conception of freedom may 
be treated of in studying Anselm, either in relation 
to the doctrine of sin, or in relation to the doctrine 
of grace. By the freedom of the will he does not 
mean the liberty of indifference, or the power of 
contrary choice. He means : — 

a. The liberation of the soul from sin, or the 
preservation of righteousness in the unfallen. 

1 Anselm, De Voluntate Libera. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 117 

6. The responsibility of the agent for his self- 
originated actions. 

By freedom of the will is not meant the power 
of sinning or not sinning, inasmuch as God and 
the good angels have free will, and yet have no 
power of sinning. On the contrary, that will is 
said to be the most free, which has the least power 
of falling into sin. 1 Freedom is defined as power, 
and the greater the power, the greater the liberty. 

Quoniam omnis libertas est potestas ; ilia libertas arbitrii 
est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam 
rectitudinem. 2 

The power to retain original righteousness shows 
a greater freedom than a power to either retain or 
desert it at pleasure. Sin was due, however, not to 
the curtailment of human freedom by any external 
coercion, but the willing to sin was within the souls 
of those who sinned, and thus the liberty of retaining 
original righteousness was lost. The act was spon- 
taneous (sponte). 3 Losing the power to retain 
righteousness, man lost the power of willing what 
was right. The freedom which was lost was freely 
lost, and not forcibly taken away by temptation. 
It may be well to call attention at this point to the 
inconsistency of Anselm who finds liberty to consist 
in the power to retain righteousness, and who yet 
affirms that this righteousness was lost by an act 
of free will. In so far as the will sinned, accord- 
ing to his principles, it was not free, and freedom 
to sin is on these principles a contradiction of 

l Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, I. 2 Id., ib. III. 3 Id., ib. II. 



118 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

terms. The will is so identified with a man that 
temptation is simply an occasion for the exercise 
of a will which in the fallen state has an intrinsic 
tendency to sin. 1 

There are two kinds of freedom, first, that which 
is neither caused by another, nor received from 
another, and which is possessed by God alone; 
secondly, that which is given by God and received 
from him. This belongs to angels and men. The 
unfallen angels had righteousness and freedom, and 
they preserved it; the others had it and lost it. 
Further, righteousness may be held separably or 
inseparably. It was held by all angels, separably, 
before the bad angels fell, and before the good 
were confirmed after the fall. It was held sepa- 
rably by man. It is held inseparably by God ; and 
also by elect angels, and by men ; by the former after 
the ruin of the fallen angels, by the latter after 
death. 2 From these principles we may conclude 
that free will consists in determination to right- 
eousness, and the impossibility of doing anything 
but righteousness. Yet, Anselm does not adhere 
consistently to this view. The power to will 
anything but what is right is a weakness. It is 
only in a special and limited sense that we may 
affirm that Adam sinned of his own free will. If 
his will had been absolutely free, even as that 
of God is free, he would have had no power to 
sin. As in the doctrine of Augustine, it is grace 
which restores liberty to the fallen will. Without 
grace, the will is not free, and man is the slave of 

i Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, III.-V. « Id., ib. XIV. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 119 

sin. In what "way the slavery of sin limits the 
free will of man may be seen by the following 
passage from Anselm : — 

Sine repugnantia et servus est, et liber. Nunquam enim 
est ejus potestatis, rectitudinem capere, cum non habet ; sed 
semper est ejus potestatis, servare cum habet. Per hoc, 
quia redire non potest a peccato, servus est : et per hoc, quia 
abstrahi non potest a rectitudine, liber est. Sed a peccato et 
ejus servitute, non nisi per alium potest reverti : et recti- 
tudine vero non nisi per se potest averti : et a libertate sua 
nee per se, nee per alium potest privari. Semper enim 
naturaliter liber est ad servandam rectitudinem, si earn 
habet: etiam quando, quam servet non habet. 1 

With Augustine, Anselm teaches also, that grace 
comes from God, and neither freedom nor right- 
eousness has its source in man. A man may have 
it in his heart to hold the truth, because he knows 
it to be right to hold it. He has a right will (rec- 
tam voluntatem) and righteousness of will (rectitu- 
dinem voluntatis). If such a man be threatened 
with death, unless he consent to lie, he deliberates 
whether he shall sacrifice the right for the sake of 
his life or not, and makes a decision. The act of 
making the decision is arbitrium, and it is free. 
The man cannot have a right will, however, with- 
out the grace of God. That his will is right is due 
not to himself, but to God. If the will in the sense 
of voluntas, that is the disposition, be wrong, then 
the decision, or arbitrium, will be wrong. The 
wrongness of arbitrium, as of voluntas, is caused by 
the absence of grace. But a wrong decision is not 

1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, XI. 



120 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

given against the will : velle antem non potest invi- 
tus, quia velle non potest nolens velle ; nam omnis 
volens ipsum suum velle vult. 1 

Actual sin is always a matter of the will. It is 
only potentially that sin is original. Original sin 
is manifest by its effects. Anselm defines it as 
follows : — 

Originate igitur peccatum non aliud intelligo, quam quod 
est in infante, mox ut animam habet rationalem ; quicquid 
prius in corpore nondum sic animato factum sit, vel post 
Bive in anima, sive in corpore, futurum sit. 2 

Thus deprived of all righteousness (justitia) and 
consequently of all true happiness, men are, in the 
exile of this life, subject to sins which always con- 
front them, unless the divine grace intervenes for 
their relief. Original sin has been transmitted 
from generation to generation, and the realism of 
Anselm implies the fall of the whole race really in 
the person of Adam. Episcopius seems to have 
been right when he associated realism with deter- 
minism to this extent, that whatever qualities as a 
sinner Adam once possessed, are really the qualities 
originally possessed by all sinners descended from 
him. If these qualities determine the will, the 
character is determined irrespective of the will, and 
the will is determined by the character. There is 
no sin actually in the person per se; but to sin one 
must will. The sinfulness of the will is due to the 
sinfulness of the character. In this sense the will 

1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio,V. 

2 Id., De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pecc. XXVII. 






IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 121 

of fallen man is determined to evil. There is some 
difficulty in reaching a conclusion as to the extent 
to which the will is determined by the grace of 
God. If such power were at once given to the 
regenerate man that he could not fall again into 
sin, then it would be plain that freedom was com- 
pletely restored by grace. To regain the power to 
do what is right, and to lose the power to do what 
is wrong are, according to Anselm's first principles, 
the highest kind of freedom. The grace of God 
does not make any one perfect in this life, and so 
the freedom of the will in this sense is not regained 
until after death. But a limited freedom is 
regained; for it becomes possible for a man to 
avoid sin, although actually he may not cease 
altogether from sinning. In so far as it is possible 
for him to sin, his sin must be determined by his 
sinful character, and in so far as he wills what is 
right, his right willing must be determined by the 
grace of God. What, then, is his responsibility for 
his evil deeds as a sinner, and what is his merit for 
his right deeds, done through the grace of God? It 
has been seen how this difficulty was met by Paul 
and by Augustine. Anselm's definition of liberty 
or freedom makes another kind of answer necessary. 
The fact that original sin is inherited, and only 
actual sin is committed by the will, does not free 
the agent from responsibility. This is shown by the 
punishment of sin. All actual sins are sins of the 
will, and all punishments are punishments of the will. 1 

1 Anselm, De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pecc. IV. ; cf . Proslo- 

gium, IX. X. 



122 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

The realism of Anselm raises the question, why 
the other parts of man should be punished for 
that which is done by the will; and he replies, 
that the acts are punished not by the punishment 
of the person who commits them, but by the 
punishment of the will which has made the sins 
actual. All punishment is of the will, because all 
punishment is contra voluntatem. Voluntas is here 
used for the desires, and not merely for the decid- 
ing or executing power of the soul. Responsibility 
does not belong to infants who, although they have 
original sin, have no will ; and only sins of the will 
are punished. 1 When men become intelligent, they 
become responsible. If it be asked why sin, even 
sin of the will is punishable, the answer is, because 
it is personal. That which makes righteousness 
righteous, and sin sinful, is that it belongs to a 
person who wills. Sin is a negation; it is really 
nothing. And if it be objected that it is unjust to 
punish nothing, the answer is that the punishment 
is not on account of the presence of nothing, but 
because of the absence of something, namely, 
righteousness. Nor is man excusable because he 
claims inability to do what he ought, just as a 
servant is not relieved of responsibility by his 
master for presenting such an excuse. 

II. Predestination and Necessity. Prescience and 
predestination have no meaning in so far as they 
are related to God's view of the future ; for to him 
all is present, and there is no past nor future. The 
knowledge of that which is about to be, the pre- 

1 Anselm, De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pecc. 1. 11. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 123 

determination of all events, and the call of men, 
are all events in the present. But as God fore- 
knows, he predestinates. 1 Anselm here differs 
from Augustine in holding that the prescience of 
God is the cause of predestination. And he quotes 
in proof of this the words of Paul: "whom he 
did foreknow, he also did predestinate." Two 
questions rose before the mind of Anselm, which 
were an inheritance from the ancient philosophy 
and from the earlier theology. The first was, 
what relation has predestination to necessity? 
and, second, what relation has predestination to 
free will? 

Anselm says that the term necessary is often 
applied to that which is brought about by no force : 
saepe dicimus necesse esse quod nulla vi esse cogitur ; 
et necesse non esse quod nulla prohibitione remove- 
tur. When it is said that God is necessarily im- 
mortal, or necessarily just, we mean that no force 
obliges him to be immortal or just ; when it is said 
that a man will necessarily sin, it does not mean 
that he will be forced to sin. The chief peculiarity 
about Anselm's view of necessity is in the distinc- 
tion which he makes between necessitas praecedens, 
and necessitas sequens. The distinction is derived 
from one already made by Aristotle, who held that 
necessity could not be predicated of future, but only 
of present and past, occurrences. The difference is 
that Anselm would regard any event which is about 
to happen, as about to happen necessarily, but 
would deny that any event could be said to be neces- 

1 Anselm, De Concord., etc., Q. I. 5. 



124 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 

sarily about to happen. 1 While the distinction is 
not a valid one, and while it is apparently introduced 
only to save from necessity the future free volitions 
of men, it deserves notice as a significant part of 
Anselm's theory. He sets out with the proposition 
that God neither foreknows nor predestinates any 
man to be just, ex necessitate; for without free will, 
which is opposed to necessity, there is no justice or 
righteousness. Still, it is admitted that all things 
which are foreknown and predestinated happen 
necessarily : necesse sit fieri quae praesciuntur, et 
quae praedestinantur. Yet certain things which are 
foreknown and predestinated do not happen with 
that necessity which precedes and effects, but with 
that necessity which follows the event: quaedam 
tamen praescita et praedestinata non eveniunt ea 
necessitate quae praecedit rem et facit, sed ea quae 
rem sequitur. 2 As predestination does not precede 
but follows foreknowledge, God who foreknows all 
contingent events does not predestinate them before 
they are foreknown. He is thus put, according to 
Anselm's theory, in the position of one who consents 
to events, not after they have happened, but after he 
has known that they are about to happen. Nothing 
is predestinated, therefore, which is not foreknown. 
The free or spontaneous acts of men are foreseen 
to be about to happen ; the foreknowledge does not 
make them necessary, for they are foreseen as 

1 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. xvn. Est namque necessitas 
praecedens, quae causa est ut sit res ; et est necessitas sequens, 
quam res facit. 

2 Id., De Concord, etc. Q. II. 3; cf. De Voluntate Dei, V. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 125 

about to happen according to freedom. It is like- 
wise seen that a necessity will follow them, even 
if there is no antecedent necessity. For the con- 
ception of antecedent necessity is inconsistent with 
free will, inasmuch as all necessity is either coactio 
or proliibitio. Necessity can be predicated of future 
events only hypothetically, and not absolutely. 
Of any future event, it is not said that it will 
occur necessarily, but only that if it occur it will 
occur necessarily. This, according to Anselm, is 
only a conclusion from the principle of contradic- 
tion, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same 
time; if, therefore, the event will occur, it is 
inconceivable that it should not* occur at the same 
time, and this constitutes the necessity of the 
future. The fact that it is foreseen, or predes- 
tinated, does not affect it either in the way of 
coaction or prohibition. Without discussing the 
logical validity of such a position, about which 
there is grave doubt, it may be said that An- 
selm's treatise De Concordia, etc., fails to give a 
consistent account of the determination of the bad 
will in original sin, and of the foreknowledge and 
predestination which are so explicitly divorced 
from necessity. 

Necessitas seqvens has no particular meaning 
in relation to future events. To know that an 
event which is about to occur will occur necessarily, 
is an affirmation either that the event is foreknown 
as about to occur, in which case it is impossible 
that it should not occur; or else it is foreknown 
that it is about not to occur, in which case 



126 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

there is no necessitas sequens. But it is difficult to 
see that Anselra has proved that necessitas sequens 
is distinguishable from necessitas praecedens, if it be 
held that God foreknows and predetermines the 
future. Psychologically, the man not knowing 
whether the event is predetermined or not, may 
regard it as not yet necessary, and consequently 
the supposed necessity of the future will not alfect 
his action. That on which Anselrn rests necessity 
is not so much the principle of contradiction as 
that of identity, as appears from his conclusion : — 

Necessitate ergo omne futurum, futurum est ; et si est 
futurura, futurum est, cum futurum dicitur de futuro ; sed 
necessitate sequente, quae nihil esse cogit. 1 

St. Thomas Aquinas 

The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is the most 
perfect result of medieeval scholasticism. While 
his theory of the will in some respects resembles 
that of Augustine and Anselm, he surpasses both in 
the scientific treatment of the subject. His system 
is characterized by uniformity of method, coherence 
of parts, variety and precision of distinctions, and 
extraordinary logical consistency. His theory of 
the will, like that of Spinoza and that of Hegel, 
can hardly be stated, except in relation to the 
other parts of his philosophy. The terms of 
his psychology are equivalents, for the most part, 
of terms used by Aristotle. His definition of the 
soul as the actus or actuality of an organic body is 

1 Anselm, De Concord., etc., II. 




IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 127 



Aristotelian, and so also is his conception of the 
faculties and their relation to the essence of the 
soul. But his doctrine of the will is far more com- 
plete than that of Aristotle, and has had a very- 
remarkable influence, not in the Catholic Church 
alone, but also in the theology of the Eeformers. 

I. The Soul and its Faculties. He rejects the 
theory of preexistence, and affirms that the soul 
first has its esse in the body. Traducianism he 
regards as heresy. 1 The soul is not situated in 
any particular part of the body, but is the life and 
energy of the whole body, — est tota in qualibet 
parte corporis sui. 2 The body is both its object 
and instrument. It is united to the body as form 
and mover, — forma et motor. 3 Instead of making 
the vegetative, sensitive, and other principles, differ- 
ent souls, as was done by Aristotle, he regards these 
several principles as genera of mental powers; and 
of these there are five, — the same with those men- 
tioned by Aristotle, and in certain places called by 
the latter Awa/ms. The soul is that which makes 
the body real, and it is also the esse animatum.* 
Where there is soul, there is life. In its lower 
genera it is to be found in the lower animals ; but 
not the rational soul. The Gnostics and Mani- 
cheans had claimed a knowledge for the lower 
animals, so that they had attributed to these 
rational faculty, and had even maintained that 
beasts might pray. Thomas Aquinas teaches that 
the soul of man alone is rational among corporeal 

l Summa Theol. I. Q. XC. 2, 4. 2 id. I. Q. VIII. 2. 

« Id. I. Q. LXXV. 3 ; Q. LXXVI. 1. * Id. I. Q. LXXVI. 3. 



128 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

beings. And reason and intellect differ only 
secundum perfectum et imperfectum. As individual 
substances, souls- are persons. And by substances 
is 'here meant, not the Greek OiWa, but the Latin 
subjectum, quod substitit in genere substantial. 
The soul as subjectum is one person. There is, 
however, a plurality of faculties, and the soul 
differs from its own faculties or powers, so that 
the latter have a real existence, though not as sub- 
stances. All the powers of the soul have their 
roots in its essence; and when the attention is 
attracted to the operation of one power, it is with- 
drawn from the operation of another, because the 
soul can have but one intention. 1 

Of the five genera of powers enumerated by 
Thomas Aquinas, those which are chiefly related 
to his doctrine of the will are the appetitive and 
the intellective. 2 

Intellect is active and not passive. 3 It moves 
itself; but it may be either speculative or practical. 
These are not two faculties, but one. 4 The first is 
contemplative, and the second is externally opera- 
tive. The speculative intellect per extensionem is 
the practical. Appetite is a faculty or power of 
the soul. It seeks that which the soul does not yet 
possess, and delights in this. Its movement is 
either towards or away from some object. There 
are three kinds of appetite : the natural, the sensi- 
tive, and the intellective or rational. The first of 
these is a more general name for the property of all 

i Summa Theol. I. n. Q. XXXVII. 3 Id. I. Q. LIV. i. 
2 Id. I. Q. LXXVIII. 1. « Id. I. Q. XIV. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 129 

the faculties in so far as they pursue any object : 
appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cujuslibet rei in 
aliquid ex natura sua. 1 It may be said to accom- 
pany every operation of the soul. But appetite 
has not necessarily a bad meaning, for appetitur 
summum bonum, id est Deus. There are two kinds 
of motive power in the soul: one of these com- 
mands, and the other executes motion; one is vis 
appetitiva, the other is vis motiva. One of these 
moves the body, and the other is that whose act is 
'not to move, but to be moved (cujus actus non est 
movere, sed mover i). 2 The sensitive appetite is 
moved by thought and also by imagination. But 
appetite alone is directly motive. Cognition can- 
not effect motion except through appetite. The 
sensitive appetite pursues all objects which appear 
good to the senses. Its acts are called passions. 
It may be either concupiscibilis or irascibilis } but in 
either case is subject to the control of the reason. 3 
The rational appetite is the will, 4 and its acts are 
called volitions. The object of the rational appe- 
tite is the good simpliciter. Distinguished from 
the will (voluntas) is the intellect or understanding 
(intellectus) . There is no will without reason or 
intellect; those things which are without reason 
tend towards an end, on account of natural inclina- 
tion. Both intellect and will are natural properties 
of the soul, and the soul cannot be without them. 
The intellect tends towards things as they are in it, 

i Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXVIII. 1. 

2 Id. I. Q. LXXV. 3. 8 Id. I. Q. LXXXI. 1, 3. 

^ Id. II. i. Q. I. 2; II. I. Q. Vill. 1. 

K 



130 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

but the will as they are in themselves, — intellectus 
is also necessary to vohmtas. 

II. TJie Distinction betiveen Voluntary and Invol- 
untary. As has just been said, will is a rational 
appetite. Following John of Damascus, Thomas 
Aquinas defines voluntary action as motion and 
action from one's own inclination, that is, action 
from an internal principle : motus et actus a propria 
inclinatione, id est quod agere sit a principio in- 
trinseco. 1 It does not involve any external result, 
and may be wholly within the soul. In order that 
action should be voluntary, there must be action 
with reference to some end. The action must be 
intrinsic, and not effected from without. The begin- 
ning of volition lies within the soul, and in this 
consists the spontaneity of man: et ideo cum 
utrumque sit ab intrinseco principio, scilicet quod 
agunt, et quod propter finem agunt, horum motus, 
et actus dicuntur voluntarii. 2 But in order that 
there should be intrinsic action ad Jinem, there 
must be knowledge. The greater the knowledge 
of the end which is sought, the more voluntary will 
be the action. In saying that the principle of 
voluntary action is intrinsic, Thomas Aquinas does 
not mean that it is the first principle, so that it is 
not moved from without or caused. It is a first 
principle in genere appetitivi motus. There is action 
towards an end even in the lower animals, who act 
according to intrinsic causes ; but voluntary actions 
belong, properly speaking, to rational beings. 

The act of will is either mediate or immediate. 

i Summa Theol. I. n. Q. VI. 1. a Id., lb. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 131 

Immediate volition is the act itself of willing; 
mediate is effective only through some medium, as 
in willing to walk, in which the body is the medium. 
In the first case it is simply a certain inclination 
proceeding consciously from some intrinsic prin- 
ciple, while natural appetite is unconscious. Vio- 
lence and coaction cannot be applied to the will, 
since the very nature of the latter is that it is not 
coerced from without. It acts from inclination, 
not from force. When it is moved by some appe- 
tite according to its own inclination, the movement 
is voluntary and not violent. The two terms are 
antithetical. 1 Actions done through fear are mid- 
way between voluntary and involuntary. Per se 
the act performed through fear is not voluntary, 
but it becomes voluntary in the avoiding act to 
escape the evil which is feared. Acts done through 
fear are therefore not necessarily compulsory. 2 
Acts done through concupiscence, however, are 
voluntary. The object of such desire is a supposed 
good; and will is an appetite which seeks the good, 
either real or imagined. More important is the 
doctrine of actions done through ignorance. Aris- 
totle had said that actions done through ignorance 
are involuntary, and with this Thomas Aquinas 
agrees. s That cannot be willed in actu which is not 
known. And this doctrine is complementary to 
one already stated, that intellect is essential to will. 
III. The Will and the Motive. I use motive 
here in a very general sense, as meaning that which 

i Summa Theol. I. ii. Q. VI. 4. ^Iiln. Q. VI. 7. 
8 Id. I. ii. Q. VI. 8; cf. Aristotle, Etb.. 1110, b. 18. 



132 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

moves the will, because a large part of the theory 
| of Thomas Aquinas is devoted to explaining the 
I relation, in this respect, of the various powers of 
| the soul to volition. 1 

1. The Intellect as Motive. As has been said 
above, there is no actual will without intellect, 
and there must be an end in view as object of the 
will. 2 The object to which the will tends is pre- 
sented not by the will itself, but by the intellect. 
The volition is compared in this to the art which 
must be known in order to be practised. The 
helmsman must know how to steer in order to guide 
the ship. 8 It rules the will not by inclining it; 
for the will is itself an inclination towards the 
real or apparent good. It rules the will by demon- 
strating to it the object which is good, and by 
ordering or governing it; but there is no will in 
the intellect, although the latter is active. Nor is 
the intellect subject to the will, except that the 
former may be directed by the latter. In order 
to will there must be intellect, and the latter is 
superior to the former. The will is, however, mis- 
tress of her own actions, and comprehends both 
velle and non velle. 4 It therefore has power to 
move itself. Just as the intellect moves from 
premises to conclusions, so the will, in that it 
desires the end, moves itself towards willing the 
means to secure the end : — 

Manif estum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cog- 
noscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, 

i Summa Theol. II. Q. IX. 1. « Id. II. i. Q. VIII. 

2 Id. II. i. Q. IX. 1. 4!d.,Ib. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 133 

quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum ; et hoc mode- movet 
seipsamet similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult flnem, movet 
seipsam ad volendum ea qua quae sunt ad finem. 1 

The moving of the will by the intellect, and the 
moving of the will by itself, are different ; by the 
intellect the will is moved according to the nature 
of the object; by itself, according to the reason of 
the end. In this respect there is an analogy be- 
tween the intellectus of Thomas Aquinas and the 
practical reason of Aristotle. 

2. TJie Sensitive Appetite as Motive. The object 
of the will is the good, either real or apparent. 
The sensitive appetite is an inclination towards 
the good, and so is capable of moving the will per 
modum objecti. It sets a good end in view, towards 
which the will may be directed. To say that the 
sensitive appetite may move the will is equivalent to 
saying that the will may be moved by the passions. 
But this is not to be understood as meaning that 
the sensitive appetite can dictate to the will : — 

Voluntas igitur simpliciter praestantior est quam sensi- 
tivus appetitus ; sed quoad ilium in quo passio dominatur, 
inquantum subjacet passioni praeeminet appetitus sensi- 
tivus. 2 

3. An External Principle as Motive. In one 
sense external principles may move the will, but 
only indirectly. Between the object which moves 
the will and the act of the will itself deliberation 
must intervene: hoc autem non potest facere nisi 
consilio mediante. 8 Eor example, when one wishes 

i Summa Theol. I. n. Q. IX. 3. 2 id. i. n , q. ix. 2. 
» Id. I. ii. Q. IX. 4. 



134 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

to be cured of a disease, he deliberates as to how 
this may be accomplished, and concludes that he 
has need of a physician. He wills according to 
this conclusion. It cannot be said that he has 
willed to have the volition to have the physician 
or to be cured, for this would proceed ad infinitum. 
The motive in the first instance is the external 
object, but the will is not compelled by the external 
object, because there has been intermediate delib- 
eration. For it is the will itself which wills, 
although it may be moved to will by something 
beyond it. The motion would be violent (violentus), 
if it were contrary to the will ; but in that case the 
action would be not voluntary but involuntary. 

4. God as Motive. By the doctrine that God is 
motive, I mean the answer of Thomas Aquinas to 
the question whether God moves the will. God is 
both cause of the will and cause of the movement of 
the will. The existence of will as a power of the 
rational soul is owing to God, and each will is 
ordained to the willing of the good in general. 
God may move the will, not only towards the good 
in general, but also towards a particular good. To 
will anything by nature, is to will according to the 
tendency of the inclination in the direction of the 
good. As a natural motion, the motion of the will 
is intrinsic, that is, it is according to its own 
nature. Even in moving a stone the motion is in- 
trinsic, that is, it is according to the nature of the 
stone; it is not natural to the stone to move, but, 
being moved, it is moved in accordance with its own 

nature. 1 

i Summa Theol. I. n. Q. IX. 6, 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 135 

Predestination is a certain foreordination by 
God from all eternity of those things which, by 
the grace of God, are to be accomplished in time. 1 
The term grace is in the definition, not because it 
is of the essence of the act, but because of its 
intimate relation to the result. 2 Predestination 
is a part of the providential government of God. 
Strictly speaking, it is applied only to the fore- 
ordination of the good; and the contrary term, 
reprobation, is applied to the predetermination of 
the bad. Predestination cannot be originated by 
man nor obstructed by man. It may be furthered 
and assisted by human instrumentality, by second 
causes, such as good works and the prayers of the 
saints. The cause of predestination is found not 
in man but in God. It is not because their merits 
are foreseen that men are predestinated. 8 The 
will of God is the efficient cause of predestination. 
It is eternal. It does not impose necessity on 
events nor remove contingency. Reprobation is a 
permissive n^t of God by which some men are per- 
ked to fail of salvation. In the mind of God, 

^destination is active; but the mind of the pre- 

: mated is passive to the act of God. The free 

will of man is responsible for acts done when the 

man has been reprobated and deserted by grace. 4 

He who is thus reprobated cannot obtain grace. 

It pertains to providence to ordei things to an 
end. Necessary causes are prepared for necessary 
events, and contingent causes for contingent events; 

i Summa Tbeol. HI. Q. XXIV. 1. 3 Id. I. Q. XXIII. 5. 

2 Id. I. Q. XXIH. 2. * Id. I. Q. XXIII. 3. 



136 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

but the providence of God is eternal. He sees all 
tilings as present. The future is therefore as cer- 
tainly fixed as the past; but the voluntary actions 
of men are contingent. 1 

Grace may be either operative or cooperative, 
prevenient or subsequent. These distinctions are 
Augustinian. God is the cause of operate, and 
moves the soul ; but the soul moves and is moved 
by cooperating grace. There is also a prevenient 
grace which is antecedent to man's voluntary act, 
and subsequent grace which comes as the result 
of man's cooperation with prevenient grace. The 
doctrine of Thomas Aquinas cannot therefore be 
reconciled with the Jansenist interpretation of 
Augustine. If the soul be prepared for the recep- 
tion of grace, this preparation is the effect of 
grace 2 

IV. Voluntas and Idberum Arbitrium. There is 
a general analogy between intellectus and ratio on 
the one hand, and voluntas and liberum arbitrium 
on the other. To know (intelligere) means the sim- 
ple acceptance (acceptionem) of anything; Hence 
principles especially are said to be known. And 
this knowledge is direct, sine collatwne. The know- 
ledge of reason (ratiocinari) is the passing from one 
principle to something else, that is, to the know- 
ledge of something else. 3 Analogically, there is the 
will of an end, which seeks something on its own 
account; and there is choice, which seeks the means 
to an end (voluntas de fine qui propter se appetitur, 

i Summa Thaol. I. Q. XXII 4. * Id. II. i. Q. CXI. 2, 3. 
8 U. I. Q. LXXIX. 8. 



I 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 137 

and eligere est appetere aliquid propter alterum con- 
seguendum). The choice is an act of Hberum 
arbitrium. But just as intellect and reason are 
not two faculties, but one, so voluntas and Hberum 
arbitrium are the same faculty in different acts. 1 
Free will Qiberum arbitrium) is a faculty (facultas), 
for it has potestatem expeditam ad operandum; et 
sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. 
It is a power (potentia) in so far as it can operate 
(utpotens operari), and it is also a habit (habitus) 
in so far as it is fitted or adapted to operate (ut 
aptus ad operandum bene vel male).* 

It is an appetitive not a cognitive power, although 
it is said that the free judgment is an act of the free 
will. Any design is determined first by the opinion 
of the reason (per sententiam rationis), and, second, 
by the acceptance of the appetite (per acceptionem 
appetitus). 3 In so far as we apprehend, the facul- 
ties are intellect and reason; in so far as we are 
appetitive, the faculties are will and Hberum arbi- 
trium. The essence of free will is its power of 
choice. 4 If man did not have this, advice, precept, 
prohibition, would be in vain. The lower animals 
have an action naturali judicio, which takes place 
without any deliberation about alternative courses. 
Man acts, however, by free decision (libero judicio), 
and chooses between alternate volitions : quia per 
vim cognoscitivam judicat aliquod esse fugiendum 
vel prosequendum. The free will is not subject to 
the control of the passions or to the sensitive appe- 

i Summa. Theol. I. Q. LXXXIII. 4. s Id. I. Q. LXXXIII. 3. 
2 Id. I. Q. LXXXIII. 2. * Id. I. Q. LXXXIV. 3. 



138 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

tite in general. Such inclinations are under the 
sway of the reason, and are obedient to the reason. 
But free will holds itself in a state of indifference 
with respect to choosing well or ill: liberum 
arbitrium indiffer enter se habet ad bene eligendum 
vel male. There seems to be a circle in the reason- 
ing of Aquinas with respect to free will in relation 
to intellect. As has been shown, intellect moves 
the will, and without intellect there is no will. It 
has also been shown that will moves the intellect, 
while intellect is implied in every act of will. The 
motion of the will ab intrinseco is not inconsistent 
with either of these statements ; but where the will 
is not moved ab intrinseco, it is moved either by 
an object or by the representation of an object. The 
sensitive appetite may rebel against the reason, but 
the will as an appetite is always rational. 1 

What is called choice (electio) consists in a cer- 
tain motion of the soul towards the good, as its 
object. It is not a deliberative syllogism concern- 
ing the good which is to be willed ; it involves com- 
parison, but the comparison is made by the intellect, 
and choice is the result of the comparison. Ignorant 
choice is made, when there is no knowledge of that 
which is to be chosen. 2 Choice is not subject to 
necessity. A man is able to will or not to will, 
to act or not to act. The conclusion which moves 
the will is not a necessary conclusion, because the 
premises are not necessary; it is only under cer- 
tain conditions that choice is necessary; and the 
fact that choice is necessary only under certain 

i Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXXIII. 1. 2 id. I. n . Q. XII. 1. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 139 

conditions is the ground for affirming that it 
is contingent. Where the conditions attending 
either alternative to be chosen seem equal, there 
is nothing to prevent the intrusion of some condi- 
tion which will overbalance choice of one alterna- 
tive and effect choice of the other. 1 

It seems hardly necessary, after the full state- 
ment of the doctrine of sin in the theories of 
Augustine and of Anselm, that much should be 
said of this aspect of the theology of Thomas 
Aquinas. Like other Catholic theologians, he 
maintained that sin may be original as well as 
actual. It affects not the faculties or powers of 
the soul, but the essence of the soul itself. By 
sin man lost free will (liberum arbitrium). This 
was the loss not of natural liberty, which is the 
effect of coaction, but of liberty from fault and 
from misery. The result is that free will is not 
sufficient for righteousness unless it is moved and 
assisted by God. The choice of the good is deter- 
mined by ourselves : supposito tarn en divino 
auxilio. 

V. Necessity in Relation to the Will. Necessity 
is either material or formal. According to another 
division, it is necessity either of coaction or of the 
end. In general, that is said to be necessary which 
is not able not to be {quod non potest non esse). 
Material necessity is from some intrinsic principle, 
as when it is said that a compound of contraries is 
corruptible; formal necessity is of another kind, as 
when it is said that the angles of a triangle are 
i Summa Theol. 1. 11. Q. XIII. 6. 



140 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

equal to two right angles. Necessity of the end is 
another name for utility, as when without a certain 
thing a certain course cannot be taken, on account 
of some extrinsic cause. Necessity of the end is im- 
plied, when it is said that food is necessary to life, 
or a horse for a journey ; but the extrinsic cause may 
be some agent; the will may be forced by this ex- 
trinsic influence; and this is the necessity of co- 
action. This last form of necessity is altogether 
opposed to voluntary action. The essence of will 
is that it should be an inclination, and inclination 
cannot be coerced. Necessity of coaction removes 
all merit from an action. But the necessity of 
obedience to a precept is not a removal of obli- 
gation or merit. 1 

The contingent is the opposite of the necessary, 
for it is that which can either be or not be : quod 
potest esse et non esse. There is an element of 
necessity in every contingent event. When, for 
example, Socrates is said to run, his running is 
contingent, but it is necessary that Socrates should 
be moved if he runs. Actions of the will are in- 
cluded in the predetermining purpose of God, but 
are not absolutely determined, for choice is con- 
tingent. And because choice is not necessarily 
determined, but is contingent, the will is free, 
although the future is certain. 

While Thomas Aquinas has expressed himself 
with regard to the will in a manner which it is diffi- 
cult to misunderstand, he has been variously inter- 
preted. There is certainly no Pelagian nor Semi- 

i Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXXII. 1. 






IIST CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 141 

Pelagian doctrine in his theology; nor, on the other 
hand, is there any justification for the statement of 
a modern critic, that he makes God a relative being, 
discourages the individual, and reduces him to 
despair or to moral indifference. 1 

The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas was opposed by 
the leading philosopher of the Franciscan order, 
Duns Scotus. He denied the primacy of the intel- 
lect, and affirmed the primacy of the will. In his 
theology there is a tendency towards a Pelagian 
view of the human will in its relation to God and 
to original sin. This opposition did not cease with 
the death of the two leaders of the conflicting 
schools, and the debate was continued by a succes- 
sion of Dominican and Franciscan doctors, who 
were called respectively Thomists and Scotists. 
According to Duns Scotus, the will determines it- 
self, and is not determined by the intellect. Acts 
of the will are contingent, and there is the power 
of contrary choice ; the intellect, however, is neces- 
sarily determined. The will has, indeed, an office 
in knowledge, cooperating with man's receptive 
capacity. In this doctrine Duns Scotus seems to 
have anticipated what Kant afterwards explicitly 
taught, that in the act of knowledge the spontane- 
ous activity of the understanding must supplement 
the mere receptivity of the sensibility. In his 
practical philosophy, Duns Scotus is far from hold- 

1 D'une part, en effet, il fait de Dieu lui-meme un etre relatif, 
dont la volonte est l'esclave de l'intelligence. D'autre part, il 
fait plus que d'humilier l'individu : il decourage et le reduit au 
de'sespoir ou a rindifference morale. — A. Weber, Hist, de la 
Philosophie Europ. 241. 



142 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

ing the doctrines of predestination and determinism, 
even in the moderate form in which they were pre- 
sented by Thomas Aquinas, and yet the former, by 
insisting on the primacy of the will in God, goes 
so far as to maintain that everything which exists 
outside of God has its origin in the will of God. 
God wills necessarily only his own essence; all 
else is secundario volitum. 1 

Calvin 

Questions concerning the will, which among the 
later Schoolmen had chiefly a theoretical interest, 
became of vital importance among the Protestant 
Reformers and their opponents. Scarcely had the 
disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists 
begun to die out, when a controversy arose be- 
tween the leader of the Eeformers and the most 
eminent scholar of the revival of letters. Luther's 
work, De Servo Arbitrio, was followed by the 
Tractatus De Libero Arbitrio, of Erasmus. The 
doctrine of Justification taught by the Eeformers 
explains in some degree their theories of the will. 
In the Reformed theology, justification is not a 
process which goes on within the soul of man, but 
is an act of God; it does not imply that man is 
made just or righteous, but only that he is puta- 
tively righteous, owing to the grace of God. It is 
God who justifies by imputing righteousness to the 
believer, and the condition or instrumental cause 
of justification is faith. Instead of winning par- 

1 Compare Erdmann, Grundr. der Gesch. der Phil. I. 417-419. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 143 

don by means of the sacraments and good works, 
the soul acquires pardon by an act of faith. And 
faith, the Reformers taught, is imparted by the 
free grace of God. Inasmuch as they supposed 
this grace to be bestowed antecedent to any act on 
the part of the individual soul, it was necessary 
that they should explain why some men are 
justified and led into holiness, while others are 
left in sin and misery. Logically they were obliged 
to maintain that the justification, sanctification, 
and perseverance of man must be attributed to the 
sovereign will of God. Any more ultimate expla- 
nation than this, they did not seek to give. The 
choice of some to the exclusion of others, to be the 
recipients of this saving grace, was thought to be 
a secret of the divine plan. This choice was called 
by the theologians election, and the doctrine of 
election in the early Reformation as well as in 
later times has sometimes been made a shibboleth 
of party. Rightly or wrongly the Reformers 
believed that they were logically obliged to lay 
great emphasis on this doctrine. Universal pre- 
destination involves a predestination of means as 
well as of ends. And among certain of the Re- 
formers the importance of the human will was 
minimized, while great emphasis was laid upon the 
grace of God. There were some advocates of the 
doctrine of election who were reluctant to attrib- 
ute the reprobation of the non-elect to the will of 
God, either as permissive or efficient cause. But 
the more logical writers in taking the first position 
were compelled to take the second. To say that 



144 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

man could will to be saved only by the grace of 
God, and without the grace of God would be lost, 
was to establish a certain causal relation between 
the favor of God, and the will to be saved. And 
the violent and exaggerated expressions of Martin 
Luther, his scornful allusions to human righteous- 
ness, and his bold statements concerning the effi- 
cacy of grace doubtless encouraged Antinomianism, 
and libertinism, and made many rest with fatalistic 
complacency upon the divine purpose, and look 
upon their own conduct as non-essential. 

Erasmus, in the treatise just referred to, opposed 
the extreme doctrine which had been expounded 
by Luther, and taught a moderate theory of pre- 
destination, which was not greatly at variance with 
that of many Catholic theologians. For other 
reasons, his teaching was held to be repugnant to 
the Catholic faith, and his work was condemned 
by the Council of Trent. There is, however, no 
necessary opposition between an extreme doctrine 
of predestination and the leading dogmas of the 
Catholic Church. At first sight it would appear 
that a departure from the Augustinian position 
with respect to predestination and grace harmo- 
nized better with the Latin view of justification. 
If a man believes that he is freely justified without 
any sacramental means, and without good works, — 
in short, simply through faith, and that saving 
grace has been bestowed anterior to any good work 
of his own, he will have no difficulty in harmoniz- 
ing that view with extreme predestination. If on 
the other hand a man believes that he is justified 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 145 

by works, he will be less inclined practically to the 
view that his justification and perseverance have 
been predetermined before the foundation of the 
world. Yet there is really no logical difference 
between the two men in their relation to predestina- 
tion. If the first man has been predestinated to 
have faith, he will have faith, and will persevere ; 
and if the second man has been predestinated to 
be baptized and to do good works, he will be bap- 
tized and will do good works. There is no more 
difficulty in supposing the predestination of a 
sacramental act, and of a good work, than there is 
in supposing the predestination of faith and per- 
severance. If a failure to lead a holy life in one 
case imperils the soul, or loses the soul, it is a sign 
that the man was not predestinated to eternal life. 
If a man who has professed faith, does not show 
signs of sanctification, it may be inferred that he 
has not been elected. But in both theories, whether 
election be conditional or unconditional, the elect 
are held to be known only to God. Upon this last 
point all schools of theology which teach election are 
at one. The Catholic Church has indeed always 
been very circumspect in its teaching concerning 
predestination. If, on the one hand, Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas are decided in their doctrine, 
Jansenism was condemned by the same high 
authority which silenced Pelagius. It is in a 
certain school of Protestant theology that the most 
extreme form of predestination has been taught. 
Into the refinements of this discussion during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is not 



146 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

necessary for me to enter. Nor is it of especial 
importance that any further notice should be taken 
of the issue between Luther and Erasmus. The 
dispute between Calvin and the Arminians, how- 
ever, has an important bearing on the theory of 
the will. This brings us to the opening of the 
period of modern philosophy; but the discussion 
is as old as the Apostolic age. It has made an 
immense literature, which is less read than for- 
merly. The different shades of opinion involved, 
and the wide geographical extent of the dis- 
pute, make it impossible, even if it were advis- 
able here, to do more than trace in outline the 
doctrine of the will in the works of John Calvin, 
and in those of Episcopius perhaps the ablest 
Arminian theologian. 

The psychology and ontology of Calvin, in spite 
of his rejection of a great deal of Catholic dogma, 
are not radically different from those held by some 
of the Fathers and Schoolmen. He distinguishes 
the essence of the soul from the essence of the body, 
and gives a classification of mental faculties. Al- 
though man was made in the image of God, his 
soul is distinct from the essence of God. In gen- 
eral the soul has two faculties : intellect or under- 
standing, and will. 1 

Sic ergo habeamus, subesse duas humanae animae partes, 
quae quidem praesenti institute conveniant, intellectum et 
voluntatem. Sit autem officium intellectus, inter objecta 
discernere, prout unumquodque probandum aut improban- 

1 Calvin uses appetitus as a synonym of voluntas (appetitus 
seu voluntas), Inst. II. u. 2. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 147 

dum visum fuerit : voluntatis autem, eligere et sequi quod 
bonum intellectus dictaverit, aspernari ac fugere quod ille 
improbaverit. 1 

Thus it is the office of the intellect or under- 
standing to discriminate between objects, and to 
decide whether they are to be approved or dis- 
approved; it is the office of the will to follow and 
to choose what the understanding declares to be 
good. It is the intellect which governs the soul, 
and the will is subject to knowledge. Avoidance 
and pursuit in the appetite resemble affirmation and 
negation in the intellect. 

Ergo animan hominis Deus mente instruxit, qua bonum 
a malo, justum ab injusto discerneret : ac quid sequendum 
vel fugiendum sit, praeeunte rationis luce videret, unde 
partem hanc directricem TiyefiowcSv dixerunt philosophi. 
Huic adjunxit penes quarn est electio. 2 

Will is therefore used by Calvin, not only as a 
synonym for the act of volition, but for the appetite, 
whether sensitive or intellective. The first man 
had these two faculties, intellect and will in per- 
fection ; and his will was free. Had he so chosen 
he might have had eternal life. Adam fell because 
his will was capable of being inclined in either of 
two ways. His choice of good and evil was free. 
Calvin disposes summarily of the objection that 
God might have made man incapable of falling into 
sin. He replies that God was under no necessity 
to give man any other kind of will. Adam had the 
power to remain righteous had he chosen to exer- 

1 Calvin, Inst. I. xv. 7. 2 Id., ib. I. xv. 8. 



148 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

cise it. But he freely fell. The sin. of Adam has 
polluted the nature of his posterity and all the 
powers of men are depraved. In this way all the 
volitions have become corrupt. Defending this 
extreme doctrine, Calvin opposes those who regard 
the free will as arbiter between the dictates of the 
reason and the appetite, as if man were capable 
of choosing the good and avoiding the bad ; and he 
denies that virtue and vice are in our own power, 
inasmuch as original sin has taken away our power, 
and has even corrupted the faculty by which good 
and evil are recognized. This view of free will 
which he opposes, he attributes to all philosophers 
(Jiaec ergo philosophorum omnium sententiae summa 
est) and he blames theologians who have adopted 
the same opinion. The Patristic teaching generally 
meets with his disapproval. He criticises Chrysos- 
tom for his defence of free will ; and even the Anti- 
Pelagian arguments of Jerome fail to satisfy him, 
for the latter taught that man begins and God 
completes : liberum arbitrium quid esset, quum 
in omniun scriptis identidem occurrat, pauci de- 
finierunt. 1 

According to Peter Lombard, there are three 
kinds of Freedom: 1. Freedom from necessity, 
2. Freedom from sin, 3. Freedom from misery. 
Calvin criticises this arrangement on the ground 
that no distinction is made between necessity and 
coaction. According to him original sin necessarily 
determines the will to evil, but this necessity acts 
upon the will, not against the will. Grace deter- 

1 Calvin, Inst. II. n. 4. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 149 

mines the will to good, fc at this again is necessary- 
determination, and not involuntary nor coercive. 

Calvin opposes another distinction which was 
adopted by the Schoolmen, — that between operative 
and cooperative grace. He regards this distinction 
as obscuring the fact that a good will comes alto- 
gether from the grace of God, for the term co- 
operate implies a good will, and this again implies 
that the grace of God is not essential to such a will. 
Calvin would therefore deny absolutely the ability 
of the will to will what is good, unless determined 
necessarily thereto by the grace of God. And to 
speak of the will cooperating with grace, accord- 
ing to him, implies that the will may resist the 
grace of God. He admits that when men sin they 
sin voluntarily ; but to call this free will is to say 
that man has control over his whole heart and 
mind, so that he is able to incline to whatsoever he 
please. On the contrary, Calvin, in insisting that 
man is depraved, holds that this depravity makes 
man unable to will what is good ; for it has affected 
the faculties of knowing as well as those of acting. 
The emotions are depraved as well as the delibera- 
tions : — 

Quum ergo ratio, qua discernit homo inter bo-num et ma- 
lum, qua intelligit et judicat, naturale donum sit, non potuit 
in totum deleri : sed partim debilitata, partim vitiata f uit, ut 
deformes ruinae appareant. 1 

Sic voluntas quia inseparabilis est ab hominis natura, non 
periit : sed pravis cupiditatibus devincta f uit, ut nihil rectum 
appetere queat. 2 

i Calvin, Inst. II. n. 4. 
2 Id., ib. II. n. 12. 



150 THEOJIE8 OF THE WILL 

Calvin places choice in tin will, however, and not 
in the understanding. Choice depends on right 
reason, that is, on right deliberation. Man natu- 
rally desires what is good, according to his natural 
inclination, which dees not. involve deliberation. 
It is therefore no argument in favor of freedom 
that man naturally desires what ia good. He must 
know what is good according to the right reason, 
and when he knows it., he must choose it, and when 
he has chosen it, he m j orsue it : — 

Nihil ergo hoc ad arbitrii libertatem, an homo sensu natu- 
rae ad bonum appetendum feratur : sed hoc requiritur, ut 
bonum recta ratione dijudicet, cognitum eligat, electum per- 
sequatur. 1 

The inability of the natural will towards the good 
is removed by grace. This grace is not prevenient 
merely, but irresistible. There is no power in 
man to resist or oppose efficacious grace ; although, 
as has been said, it does not force man against 
his will. The sacred Scriptures are appealed to 
by Calvin to support this position. 

The most ingenious and original part of Calvin's 
theory is that in which he opposes those who pre- 
sent objections to this deterministic doctrine. To 
the Pelagian objection that unless sin is of the will 
there is no sin, and if sin is avoidable it is volun- 
tary, Calvin replies that the essence of sin is not in 
its being freely committed, but in its being volun- 
tary, and that determinism does not deny the fact 
but only the freedom of will. Another Pelagian 
i Calvin, Inst. II. n. 26. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 151 

objection was that unless virtues and vices are 
voluntary, there is no ground for rewards or pun- 
ishments, because there is no merit nor demerit. 
Calvin replies that punishments are justly inflicted 
because those who sin are guilty of evil actions by 
their own will. Rewards, on the contrary, do not 
depend upon our own merit, but on the divine be- 
nignity. This is closely related to that other affir- 
mation of Calvin, that men are good because they 
are elect, and their election is due, not to their own 
efforts, but to the mercy of God. Another objec- 
tion raised, is that all exhortations and warnings 
are in vain unless man has free will. The burden 
of Calvin's answer to this is taken from Scripture 
and from the writings of Augustine; but the ra- 
tional argument is that exhortations and warnings 
are secondary causes which determine the will. 
Calvin's attempt to strengthen his case by an ap- 
peal to the writings of Augustine is only partially 
successful, even if we accept the authority of the 
latter as decisive, for, as has already been shown, 
the teaching of Augustine concerning the will is by 
no means free from ambiguity. 1 

Although there is no direct evidence that such 
was the case, I believe that the theory of the will 
afterwards defended by Hobbes was in great part 
derived from the works of Calvin. The similarity 
of language, as well as the similarity of doctrine, 
points to this, especially in those passages in which 
determinism is defended against the objections of 
opponents. In the case of Hobbes the subject is 

1 Calvin, Inst. II. in. 



152 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

discussed with greater regard to psychological prin- 
ciples, and more weight is assigned to the emotional 
elements in man. "While Hobbes had no theologi- 
cal purpose to serve, there is a striking parallel 
between his scriptural citations and those of Calvin. 
With respect to Calvin's doctrine of Predestina- 
tion, very little need be said. In most points it 
covers the same ground which has been already 
traversed in connection with the theories of Paul 
and Augustine. According to Calvin, however, 
the prescience and predestination of God should be 
sharply distinguished. To God, the past, the pres- 
ent, and the future are as one ; all is present. Pre- 
destination is decretum Dei. By this decree is 
determined what shall happen to every man. Some 
are predetermined to salvation ; some are predeter- 
mined to damnation. Each man being created for 
salvation or for damnation is predestinated to either 
life or death. By an immutable and eternal decree, 
God has fixed the salvation or the perdition of 
every man once for all. Calvin admits that this 
view is unpopular ; but God, he maintains, is a law 
unto himself, and cannot be held accountable to 
any other law, much less to human law. God 
owes nothing to any man. The most striking part 
of this discussion is that in which Calvin rejects 
the traditional dogma of the " permissive decree," 
which affirms that God did not predetermine, but 
only permitted the fall of man, and the perdition of 
the non-elect. It is absurd, he maintains, to say 
that God did not determine positively the destiny 
of his principal creation. And in reply to those 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 153 

who contend that such a doctrine makes men indif- 
ferent about their moral conduct, he shows the actual 
results produced by such teaching. 1 

Such ambiguities as were to be found in this 
extreme theology of Calvin were effectually re- 
moved by some of his most acute disciples, and 
while some interpreters are disposed to find the 
theory of Calvin himself less uncompromising than 
I have shown it to be, there is no ambiguity what- 
ever in the writings of such men as Beza, Twiss, 
Edwards, and others of the supralapsarian school. 

Episcopius 

Opposition to the doctrines of the school of Calvin 
arose among the Reformers of Holland. The leader 
of these was Arminius, and their views are best 
represented in the writings of Episcopius. Accord- 
ing to these early Arminians, the distinctive doc- 
trines of Calvin and of Beza are nothing less than 
an affirmation of fatal necessity. 

According to Episcopius, the term will is used in 
three ways : (1) as a faculty, facultas volendi ; (2) 
as the act of willing, actus volendi; (3) as the thing 
willed, res volita. 2 The mistake of the determin- 
ists has been that they have distinguished faculties 
which should not be separated. These faculties 
are judgment and will, or, to speak more precisely, 
intellect and will. These are not two faculties, 
but one. Will without intellect is brute will 
(brutam voluntatem). Will is not merely active, 

1 Calvin, Inst. III. xxi. * Episcopius, Disput. I. VI. 



154 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

it is also intellectual. Vohintatem et intellectum 
non esse duas animae potentias realiter ab ea et a 
se distinctas ; ex hac distinctione orta esse omnes 
circa doctrinam de libero arbitrio difficultates. 1 

Voluntas enim non est f acultas quaedam distincta necdum 
diversa ab intellectu, uti neque intellectus facultas aut poten- 
tia quaedam est diversa a vita divina . . . vita enim divina, 
et anima humana immediatum sint turn intellectionis turn 
volitionis principium . . . quia si voluntatis est potentia 
distincta aut diversa ab intellectu turn necesse est ut volun- 
tas et volitio omnis caeca sit, et stulta sive irrationalis, prout 
suo tempore demonstrabimus fusius. 2 

Episcopius was led to insist upon this identifica- 
tion of the will with the intellect, in order to oppose 
a prevalent doctrine that the will was determined 
by the intellect. He wished to restore the primacy 
of the will, not by raising it altogether above the 
intellect, but by recognizing it as intellect. In so 
doing, he brought back the will to a closer relation- 
ship with the moral agent. He would make the 
will not the slave of the intellect, which waits until 
another faculty has determined whether or how it 
shall act. Will is a self-determining principle, 
just as the intellect is a self-determining principle. 
If this doctrine can be established, then there is of 
course no servitude of the will to the intellect, and 
so far the freedom of the will is defended. But the 
defence of indeterminism is simply removed to 
another arena. It must be shown that the acts of 
the intellect are voluntary. The only other alterna- 

1 Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. II. 

2 Id., Inst. Tlieol. IV. n. 20. 



, 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 155 

tive is, that the dictates of the intellect are offered 
to the will, which has power to decide freely and 
intelligently, prior to action. This would involve 
the contradiction of two principles of intellect in the 
soul, one voluntary, and the other involuntary. It 
is probable that Episcopius wished to avoid such a 
contradiction. He would identify intellect and will, 
not in order to show that intellect is voluntary, but 
that volition is intelligent. Hence the statement 
that will without intellect is brutam voluntatem. 
It is worthy of notice that his countryman, Spinoza, 
not long afterwards, followed the example of Epis- 
copius, in affirming the unity of intellect and will. 
But Spinoza drew another conclusion, holding that 
the identification of the two faculties was a reason 
for denying the freedom of the will. 

Will, according to Episcopius, is free or has 
liberty. And by liberty is meant the dominion of 
man over the acts of intellect and will : per hominis 
libertatem intelligi dominium ejus in actiones volun- 
tatis et intellectus quarum aliae sunt familatrices et 
imperatrices. 1 Free will is that which is able to act 
or not to act, or to do this or that, when all things 
requisite for action are present : liberum arbitrium, 
quod positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, agere 
potest aut non agere, vel hoc vel illud agere. 2 It 
will have been seen that Episcopius does not adhere 
to the principle that the will and the intellect are 
one ; for he distinguishes in the former of these two 
passages the act of one from that of the other. 
The contradictory of freedom is necessity. It is 
1 Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. I. 2 Id., ib. 



156 . THEORIES OF THE WILL 

therefore not sufficient to define liberty as freedom 
from external coercion. The objects of free choice 
are goods (bona) either real or apparent. 1 

In connection with this theory of Freedom, Epis- 
copius denies the doctrine of Original Sin : corrup- 
tions istius universalis nulla sunt indicia nee signa; 
imo non pauca sunt signa ex quibus colligitur na- 
turam totam humanam sic corruptam non esse. 
The cause of sin was the free will of man: fuit 
ipsa hominis libera voluntas spontaneo et libero 
motu sese determinans, et convertens ad objectum 
a mente seducta propositum et affectui desidera- 
tum. 2 And as the free will of man is the cause 
of sin, so it is this free will which makes him re- 
sponsible. Into many of the theological implica- 
tions of this teaching, it is not necessary to enter. 
But Episcopius argues especially against the opinion 
that future events are necessary because they are 
certain, and so are known to God. He admits that 
there is foreknowledge and prediction of future 
events; but this does not determine them neces- 
sarily. They are foreknown as contingent. 3 Of 
two alternatives, one is certain; but because the 
end is certain, it does not follow that the means 
are determined necessarily. Thus the foreknow- 
ledge of our actions on the part of G-od does not 
determine them. God is not the cause of sin, but 
simply permits it. On this point Episcopius op- 
posed Socinius. 4 The latter denied the prescience 
of God, on the ground that this would exclude con- 

i Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. VI. 8 Id., ib. IV. n. 17. 
2 Id., Inst. Theol. IV. v. 2. 4 Id., Bod. Inept. VIII. 



IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 157 

tingent events. In like manner Calvin insisted 
that the future was necessary because it was fore- 
known by God. While there is less uniformity 
among the Arminians than among the Calvinists 
in the matter of doctrine, the opinions of Episco- 
pius were adopted and taught by many noted 
divines upon the Continent, among whom the most 
important were Courcelles, of Amsterdam, Lim- 
borch, a relative of Episcopius, and Le Clerc. The 
Arminians might claim in their favor the traditions 
of the early Patristic age; while the principles of 
Calvin with respect to original sin, and the deter- 
mination of the will, are more closely related to 
the views of Augustine and Anselm. 



CHAPTEE FOUBTH 

THEORIES OP THE WILL IN" BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 
PROM BACOJST TO REID 

At the beginning of the modern period, the grad- 
ual emancipation of philosophy from scholasticism, 
and the change of method are not very evident in 
the treatment of the will. Writers on psychology 
and ethics were still inclined to confine their atten- 
tion to the theological aspects of the subject. They 
continued to discuss it in connection with the doc- 
trine of predestination. The revolution in meta- 
physics and psychology was not immediately 
apparent in the philosophical consideration of 
human agency. That which had been disputed 
with so much energy among the Eeformers, at 
length became an object of purely philosophical 
interest. Whether we look at the thought of the 
Continent or at that of Great Britain, we find 
everywhere the conception of will governed by 
theological opinion. It was not until the publi- 
cation of Locke's Essay and Spinoza's Ethics that 
the subject of voluntary action became actually 
independent of theology. 

The methods of English philosophy, derived 
directly or indirectly from Bacon, did not effect 
uniform results. The period after Locke, which 
158 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 159 

includes the English writers of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, in which the prevailing method was empiri- 
cal, was noisy with the disputes of those who 
affirmed and those who denied the freedom of the 
will. Until the time of Hume, there was no radi- 
cal departure from the earlier views of the nature 
of the will ; and the discussion of freedom was for 
the most part theological. From what has been 
said of the rise of Calvinism and Arminianism, it 
may be inferred that the issue between the two 
was likely to appear in philosophy itself. In Eng- 
land during the sixteenth and seventeenth centu- 
ries, when the public policy was largely affected 
by theological interests, it is not surprising that 
matters of theology should intrude upon scientific 
discussions. Thus we find Hobbes justifying his 
doctrines by appealing to Scripture as well as to 
reason. (The final cause of Berkeley's metaphysi- 
cal theory was the refutation of atheism and mate- 
rialism.) Even Hume is associated in the popular 
mind with attacks on religion, more than with his 
valuable services to the advance of philosophy. 

In the period from Bacon to Hume, there is 
a development from empiricism to scepticism. 
Bacon defined the method ; Hume showed its logi- 
cal results. All subsequent philosophy is related 
affirmatively or negatively to the principles of 
Hume. Affirmatively he is the father of later 
English associationalism and agnosticism, and of 
French positivism. Negatively, his works form 
the starting-point of the later German philosophy, 
and of Scottish thought from Keid to Hamilton. 



160 theories of the will 

Francis Bacon 

Bacon is the apostle of a method, rather than 
the founder of a school. He applies this method 
to the realm of nature, and pays less attention to 
that of mind. His psychology is fragmentary, his 
ethics are unsystematic, and in metaphysics he 
shows a dislike for the subtleties of the mediaeval 
Schoolmen. He lays emphasis, however, upon the 
regularity and universality of causation. He criti- 
cises those who speak of fortune rather than of 
Fate. He finds fault with Epicurus for preferring 
the idea of chance to that of a single principle 
under which all phenomena may be united. 1 There 
is a Providence or divine purpose concerned with 
the most minute events. 

In classifying facultates animae, he distinguishes 
will from intellect, reason, phantasy, memory, and 
appetite. 2 The science of the will is a part of ethics. 
Intellect and will are twins. Both fell in the fall 
of man. Intellect lost its original illumination, and 
will lost its freedom. The action of the will is de- 
termined by the understanding. It is the function 
of the latter to determine, of the former to act. 
Voluntary motion may be incited by imagination, 
and the latter faculty may control the reason. The 
freedom lost by man, according to Bacon, is the 
moral not the natural freedom of the will, — as was 
taught by the theologians. Through divine grace, 
the will becomes an instrument in the attainment 
of virtue. 3 

1 Bacon, De Augmentis, II. xm. 
2 Id., ib. IV. in. s id. } ib . vil. i. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 161 

While these statements might have been made by 
a philosopher of almost any school, they have a cer- 
tain interest as the opinions of one whose influence 
was felt in all subsequent English philosophy. 

Thomas Hobbes 

It has often been denied that Hobbes was a fol- 
lower of Bacon in anything except in time. There 
is, it is true, hardly any mention of Bacon in his 
works; his method is not Baconian, but analytic 
and deductive; he attaches very little value to 
experiments in natural science; and his respect 
for older systems is quite different from the hostil- 
ity of the author of the Novum Organum. It is, 
moreover, difficult to show that any actual influ- 
ence was exercised by Bacon on the mind or on 
the philosophy of Hobbes. It is known, however, 
that the two philosophers were friends ; that both 
of them were profoundly affected by the revival of 
interest in natural science during the sixteenth 
century ; and that the problem before each of them 
was the interpretation of nature. Bacon's view of 
nature was general, and his attention was not con- 
fined to any particular department of knowledge. 
Hobbes would interpret human nature, and his 
philosophy is concerned chiefly with the interpre- 
tation of man as an individual, and of men collec- 
tively in civil society. In order to ask and answer 
the political question, he first asks and answers the 
anthropological question. He will first examine the 
body natural, and then proceed to examine the body 



162 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

politic. Like Bacon, he disregards authority as a 
test of truth, although the political and religious 
character of his age made it important that he 
should show the accordance of his doctrines with 
the Scriptures. But this is different from saying 
that his doctrines are derived from a religious 
source. Unlike Bacon he employs the syllogism 
in his philosophical discussions, but he insists that 
the premises shall be well established in order 
that the conclusions may be valid. But just as 
Locke from the psychological point of view 
sought to reconstruct human knowledge on a nat- 
ural basis, so Hobbes from a political point of view 
seeks to explain the foundation of civil society. 
While he does not recognize his own method as 
empirical, it is evident that his appeal is mainly 
to experience. Next to his political theory, his 
teaching concerning the will is the most important 
part of his philosophy. 

Like Bacon, Hobbes emphasizes the principle 
of causation. Every effect has a necessary cause, 
and the cause is always sufficient to produce 
the effect. 1 The object of the philosopher is to 
seek the causes of given effects, and the effects of 
given causes. 

The_passions of the mind are of two kinds : (1) 
appetites, (2) aversions. The " small beginnings of 
motion within the body of a man, before they ap- 
pear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visi- 
ble actions, are commonly called endeavor." 2 When 
the endeavor proceeds towards a definite object by 

i Hobbes, I. 108. 2 id. m. 39. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 163 

which, it has been excited, it is called appetite or 
desire. Appetite is the approach of the soul to 
a desired object; while aversion is the retiring 
from that which is not desired. 1 He criticises the 
Schoolmen for supposing that there could be mere 
appetite without actual motion. Some appetites 
are innate, others are acquired. Living creatures 
have sometimes appetite and sometimes aversion to 
the same thing, as they think it will be for either 
their good or their hurt. Prior to the actual satis- 
faction of the appetite there may be a "vicissitude " 
of appetites and aversions, — a hesitation between 
two courses of action. This vicissitude Hobbes calls 
deliberation. 2 This lasts as long as the agent has it 
in his power to obtain what is desired, or to avoid 
what is not desired. In order to action there 
must be one last appetite which is satisfied, or in 
accordance with which the action is performed. 
This last appetite is will. 3 Accordingly, the will 
is defined as "the last appetite in deliberating." 
Two conditions of an action about which there i 
deliberation are laid down: (1) it must be future;, 
and, (2) there must be some possibility of the actiym 
being done. Hobbes expresses his meaning clearly 
when he says : " It is all one, therefore, to s&y /will 
and last will ; for though a man express / his 
present inclination and appetite concerning ^the 
disposing of his goods, by words or writings, yet 
shall it not be counted his will, because he hath 
still liberty to dispose of them other ways; but 

i Hobbes, I. 407 f . 2 Id . 40 8. 

3 Id. 409. 



164 THEORIES OP THE WILI, 

when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his 
will." 

Actions are voluntary, or involuntary, or mixed., 
I A voluntary action is that which has its beginning 
in will. All others are involuntary or mixed. An 
involuntary action is one which is done " by neces- 
sity of nature," as when a man falls or is pushed. 
A mixed action is partly voluntary, partly involun- 
tary ; as when a man goes to prison. He may 
walk voluntarily, but he walks to prison involun- 
tarily. 1 

Hobbes is the first philosopher to investigate 
the train of thought in relation to the will. Our 
thoughts proceed in two ways : either without de- 
sign, and under no control of will, or else regulated 
by some desire or design. 2 In the former case the 
links are bound together by the principle of associa- 
tion ; in the latter case, the course is directed to a 
certain end. There is also a distinction made be- 
tween spontaneous and voluntary actions. All vol- 
untary actions that are not done through fear are 
Spontaneous, 3 and are said to be done of a man's 
^wn accord. In such actions there is no necessity 
set >r deliberation. It may be added that Hobbes 
S lv ^uld call voluntary, even the automatic movements 

^--he body as in walking. 

a PFThe will is not the effect of any other faculty, 

^hat is volitio is not the effect of voluntas. Neither 

is will the cause nor the effect of appetite : voluntas 

non est appetitus causa, sed ipse appetitus. 4 The 

i Hobbes, III. 48, 120, 138, 197. « Id. IV. 243. 

2 Id. III. 13, 50, 61. 4 Id. II. 95 (Latin). 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 165 

Schoolmen were mistaken who defined the ■will as 
a rational appetite. For, according to this defini- 
tion, there could be no voluntary act against reason. 
The will is an appetite "resulting from a precedent 
deliberation." 1 

The power of an agent and efficient cause are 
the same. Power and act thus correspond to cause 
and effect. 2 Cause refers to that which has already- 
produced a result. Power refers to the future. 
There is also passive power which is to be identi- 
Jied with material cause. Active and passive power 
together constitute the entire cause. The effect 
follows just so soon as the cause is entire. The 
action in like manner follows just so soon as the 
"power is plenary." Where the power is not 
plenary, the act is impossible. 

Setting out from these metaphysical and psy- 
chological statements, Hobbes treats of the will in 
relation to the ideas of necessity and freedom. 
He sets forth- the doctrine that the will is neces- 
sarily determined. Like Calvin and others, he 
seeks to establish this by an appeal to the Script- 
ures. But his argument is principally philosoph- 
ical. And his writings upon this subject are proba- 
bly the most important that have appeared in 
defence of determinism. 

Hobbes deals with a question which vexed the 
later Greek philosophers. With respect to disjunc- 
tive judgments concerning the future, one of the 
alternatives must be true. If it shall either rain 
or not rain to-morrow, one of the alternative events 

i Hobbes, I. 409. 2 Id. 1. 127. 



/ 



166 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

will happen necessarily. That the alternative is 
indeterminate and contingent, means only that we 
do not know which of the two alternative events 
will come to pass. To say that a thing is, and to 
say that it is contingent is one and the same. But 
Hobbes maintains that contingent causes are, prop- 
erly speaking, no causes at all. They can effect 
nothing without concurrent causes. There is noth- 
ing casual ; for even events like the fall of dice are 
to be attributed to necessary causes. A contingent 
event is only one for which we do not perceive 
the cause. These principles are applied to volun- 
tary actions. The will is an effect among other 
effects. It is determined by necessary causes. 
There are no contingent acts of will. If it be 
asked whether will may not be excepted from this 
law, an answer may be found in the psychological 
part of Hobbes's theory. 

The importance which Hobbes gives to the prin- 
ciple of causation underlies his whole view of vol- 
untary action. His determinism rests not on the 
rather vague relation of the will to the predeter- 
mination of God, but to the union of all events by 
virtue of this general law. In this respect he 
effected a radical change in philosophy, and since 
his day a principal point of controversy has been 
whether the will is an effect among other effects, 
governed by necessary causes, or whether its action 
is an exception to the law. But Hobbes is not con- 
tent to defend his determinism upon metaphysical 
grounds alone ; he founds a great part of his argu- 
ment upon principles of psychology, and recognizes 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 167 

the questions of responsibility involved by his 
denial of freedom. These various aspects of his 
theory may be given in order. 

1. All causes are effects of a first cause, and all 
effects so proceeding from this first cause are neces- 
sary. 1 That is said to be necessary " which is im- 
possible to be otherwise, or that which cannot 
possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore neces- 
sary, possible, and impossible have no significance 
in reference to time past or time present, but only 
time to come." 2 A sufficient cause is one in which 
nothing is wanting to produce the effect. The same 
is a necessary cause. If an act of the will has " a 
sufficient cause, it is necessarily produced." 3 From 
this point of view, all events are necessary, and no 
events are contingent. Even chance events are 
caused necessarily. 4 

2. Hobbes is not satisfied with a mere dialectical 
defence of his theory of determinism. In a truly 
Baconian passage he appeals to experience. In the 
last analysis determinism must be proved empiri- 
cally. Having already shown that the will is the 
last appetite after deliberation, and that volitions 
proceed from the will and from nothing else, he 
seeks to demonstrate psychologically that the will 
is determined. By liberty or freedom is meant 
that which is unhindered, as water which is free to 
flow so long as it is not prevented from flowing, and 
as will which is free, except in so far as it is forci- 
bly restrained. " Liberty is the absence of all im- 

i Hobbes, IV. 261. » Id. IV. 274. 

2 Id. V. 105. 4 i d . Iv . 276. 



168 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

pediments to action that are not contained in the 
nature and intrinsical quality of the agent." 1 A 
spontaneous action is one which is not preceded by- 
deliberation. A free agent is one who can either 
act or refrain from acting ; 2 and his freedom con- 
sists in the absence of external impediments to 
action. Voluntary actions can be called free only 
in the sense that they are not prevented. The de- 
liberation which precedes the action is not will, for 
will is the last appetite after deliberation. The 
contention of Hobbes that will is an appetite, and 
that the appetite is necessarily determined, shows 
him to have been far from holding a theory of " self- 
determination." To resolve to do a thing, is to will 
to do it after deliberation. 8 But no man can deter- 
mine his own will ; for the will is an appetite. In 
this respect it is like hunger. No man can deter- 
mine whether he shall be hungry or not. There is 
some confusion in Hobbes's doctrine at this point. 
He affirms that it is within man's choice whether 
he shall eat or not eat ; but that he has no liberty 
whether he shall be hungry or not. He holds that 
the appetite of hunger is caused necessarily ; it is 
therefore not apparent why he considers the appe- 
tite of the will, which effects eating or not eating,y 
to be less determined than the appetite of hungW 
From his arguments elsewhere, it is plain that h( 
regards all choice as determined ; and in close con 
nection with the doctrine just stated he affirms tha 
" if a man determine himself, the question will stilA 
remain, what determined him to determine himselii 

i Hobbes, III. 196 ; IV- 273, 2 m. iy. 240, 275. » id. v. 34 / 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 169 

in that manner." 1 This contradiction is not ex- 
plained. 

While there is no question of the freedom of the 
will to act, there is no freedom to act in a particu- 
lar way. The will cannot suspend itself, that is, it 
is impossible to will not to will. Furthermore, the 
will is always related to the present. Future pur- 
pose is not will. 

Except in his statement that some appetites are 
native to the soul, Hobbes does not explain why it is 
that extrinsic motives produce different effects in 
different men. For the theory which attributes 
acts of the will to necessary causes should espe- 
cially seek to explain why in any particular case cer- 
tain causes effect certain volitions. Hobbes does 
not dwell upon intrinsic causes of volitions. It is the 
natural efficiency or effaciousness of external objects 
which affect the appetite, and determine the acts of 
voluntary agents. The last dictate of the under- 
standing is something which, as it were, tips the 
scale, and effects the particular action. " TJie last 
dictate of the judgment, concerning the good or bad, 
that may follow on any action, is not properly the 
whole cause, but the last part of it, and yet may be 
said to produce the effect necessarily, in such a man- 
ner as the last feather may be said to break a 
horse's back, when there were so many laid on be- 
fore as there wanted but one to do it." 2 

3. The moral consequences of this theory are 
also discussed by Hobbes. In fact, the particular 
attention which he gave to voluntary action arose 

1 Hobbes, V. 34. 2 id. iy. 268. 



170 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

from a dispute with. Bishop Bramhall concerning 
the relation of the will to the will of God and to 
certain moral principles. Bramhall, as is well 
known, was an Arminian bishop of the English 
Church. In the presence of the Marquis of New- . 
castle, he disputed with Hobbes, and the dispute 
was continued in writing. In the long and able 
defence of his opinions, Bramhall thus enume ates 
the consequences which he supposes follow logi- 
cally from the doctrine taught by Hobbes. His 
objections are not all of equal force; but they 
summarize quite fully the main arguments which 
were once employed in opposition to determinism. 1 

a. That the laws which prohibit any action will 
be unjust. Hobbes replies that it is the will to 
break the law which makes the act unjust, and not 
the necessity of the act. If any one justifies his 
failure to keep the law, on the ground that he was 
necessitated to break it, his punishment will act as 
a cause that others are deterred from crime. 

6. That all consultations are vain. It is replied 
that deliberation or consultation is a necessitated 
means to a necessitated end, and is therefore not 
superfluous. 

c. That admonitions to men of understanding, are 
of no more use than to children, fools, and madmen. 
The same answer is here given as was given to h 

d. That praise, dispraise, reward, and punishment 
are in vain. Praise and blame, reward and punish- 
ment, are not in vain, says Hobbes ; for they are all 
causes which determine the volitions. 

i Hobbes, IV. 252. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 171 

e,f. That councils, acts, arms, books, instru- 
ments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain. As in 
his reply to 6,_Hobbes here holds that because an 
effect shall necessarily come to pass^ it does not 
follow that it shall come to pass without any cause. 
Nor will there be neglect of religious duties, and of 
prayer, in case determinism be accepted. These 
depend for their efficacy upon the power of God, 
because all things proceed from his eternal will. 
That which gives moral quality to acts is not the 
freedom of the agent in willing. Sinful acts are 
sinful not because they are free, but because they 
are voluntary. 1 Hobbes departed from the ancient 
theological opinion that freedom of the will con- 
sists in freedom to do right, or follow the good. 
According to him, there is no freedom to do right 
or to do wrong. Eight and wrong actions are neces- 
sarily determined, and are right and wrong because 
they are voluntary. 

4. His theological doctrine requires some con- 
sideration, in so far as it is related to philosophy. 
All causes are the effects of prior causes, until the 
first cause is reached, which is God: Deus ergo, 
qui vid'et et disponit omnia necessitatem videt 
omnium actionum a sua ipsius voluntate proficis 
centium. . . . Nisi enim voluntas Dei necessitatem 
voluntati humanae imponeret, et per consequens 
actionibus omnibus ab ea dependentibus ; liber tas 
voluntatis humanae omnipotentiam et omniscien- 
tiam et libertatem Dei tolleret. 2 The acts of God are 
said to proceed from his power rather than from 

i Hobbes, IV. 259. * Id. III. 160 (Latin) . 



172 THEORIES OF THE "WILL 

his will. Like the ancient Fatum, the divine 
decree is described as verbum Dei. While Hobbes 
was an opponent of political liberty, and while his 
theories of the state were opposed by the Puritans, 
we find him in theology taking up a position like 
that of the Calvinistic Reformers. He regards the 
doctrine of free will and the denial of predestina- 
tion to be modern inventions of the Catholic theo- 
logians, particularly of the Jesuits. He holds that 
the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of any- 
thing, but that God simply foreknows that which 
has been already determined. He faces without 
flinching the problem as to the origin of evil. 
God is the author of all causes and effects, but is 
not the author of sin. God cannot commit sin, for 
the reason that it ceases to be sin if it is the will 
of God that it should happen. But lest it should 
appear that he is denying the reality of sin, Hobbes 
makes a distinction between the author and ,the 
cause of sin. The author of a Jiing is one who 
orders it to be done; and in this sense God is not 
the author of sin. But God is the cause of sin. 
If it be objected that men are unjustly condemned, 
Hobbes would reply that this objection still leaves 
the difficulty, why God elected some, and did not 
elect others ; and yet punished them in advance of 
their doing good or ill. 1 

He does not think that his theory is inconsistent 
with the idea that God is moved by the prayers of 
pious men. 2 Such prayers do not alter the eternal 
decrees of God ; but just as the gift bestowed has 

i Hobbes, III. 501 (Latin) . 2 Hij n . 124. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 173 

been predetermined, so it has been predetermined 
that it should be bestowed in answer to prayer. It 
is like the slave of Zeno who pleaded that he was 
predetermined to commit theft, but who had also 
been predetermined to be beaten for it. The means 
are predetermined as well as the ends. 1 It may be 
added that Hobbes's doctrines commended them- 
selves as little to the Calvinists as to the Arminians, 
and to this day it is often ignorantly said that he 
was both a materialist and an atheist. 

Locke 

The inconsistencies and ambiguities of Locke's 
philosophy cause some difficulties of interpretation. 
Theoretically, his method is empirical; but the 
results reached cannot be derived from experience 
alone. A more rigorous application of his method 
gave rise to the philosophy which began with Vol- 
taire and Condillac, and ended in the French mate- 
rialism of the eighteenth century. A more liberal 
interpretation of Locke's theory of ideas found 
expression in the philosophy of Berkeley, and in- 
directly in the scepticism of Hume. The first 
principles of Locke are that experience is the 
source of all ideas; that ideas are the objects of 
the understanding when a man thinks; that the 
channels of experience are two in number, sensa- 
tion and reflection; one is outward, the other in- 
ward. The mind is tabula rasa, and there is 
nothing in the understanding but what was previ- 

i Hobbes, IV. 551. 



174 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

ously in the outer and inner sense. Setting out 
from such principles, it was inevitable that Locke 
should encounter difficulties in explaining the activ- 
ity of the soul. In spite of his avowed method, he 
is far from teaching consistently that the mind is 
a mere passive surface, upon which experience 
writes its records. Experience gives, it is true, 
simple ideas of sensation, such as color and sound, 
but there is also the experience of reflection. 
Among the ideas of the inner sense are certain 
faculties or powers. These faculties exhibit the 
soul as spontaneous and active. Locke holds, in- 
deed, that the faculties are simply the powers of 
the one mind, which is working in different ways. 
The power is receptive as well as productive. There 
is spontaneous activity * in the formation of complex 
ideas, such as space, time, cause and effect, and sub- 
stance. The faculties of the mind may be referred 
to two genera : perception or thinking, and volition 
or willing. 2 The latter is enumerated among the 
simple ideas of reflection. 

Locke's theory of the will comprehends a con- 
sideration of power and of freedom. 

I. Power. This is a simple idea derived from 
sensation and reflection. 8 We obtain it from our 
observation that we can, at will, move the several 
parts of our bodies, and that other bodies produce 
changes upon each other. In general, the idea of 
power is caused by our experience of change. The 
possibility of anything having any of its simple 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xn. 

2 Id., I'm- V- II. vi " T V ib. Bk. II. vn. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 175 

ideas changed is power. By simple ideas in this 
sense are meant the qualities of that which is 
changed. Power is thus passive as well as active. 
It is, moreover, "a principal ingredient" in our 
idea of substances. 1 It involves the complex idea 
of relation, although it has been defined as a simple 
idea. But in this doctrine Locke shows a dispo- 
sition to associate power with the conception of 
cause. He holds, also, that the mind receives a 
better idea of power from reflection on its own 
operations than from external sensations. All 
actions of which we have any idea reduce them- 
selves to two, thinking and motion, which are 
apparently correlative to the faculties already 
mentioned, — perception and volition. 

It having been affirmed that the mind has the 
idea of power, it is next shown that we find within 
ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or 
end, several actions of our minds, and motions of 
our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the 
mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding, the 
doing or not doing such or such a particular action. 
This power is the will. Its particular exercise in 
any direction is volition or willing. 2 The forbear- 
ance of that action consequent to such order or 
command of the mind is called voluntary. And 
whatsoever action is performed without such a 
thought of the mind is called involuntary. Else- 
where he adds that volition is an act of the mind 
knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 

2 Id., ib. Bk. II. xxi. 4, 5. 



176 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

have over any part of the man, by employing it in, 
or withholding it from, any particular action. It 
is the power of the mind to determine its thought. 
Stripped of all disguises, will is nothing but the 
power or ability to prefer or choose. 1 

In these statements there is some confusion of 
definition. Locke seems to hesitate whether to 
define as volition the executive act of the mind, or 
the acts of decision and choice. But he holds 
that one faculty does not determine the action of 
another. 2 For example, the understanding does not 
determine the will, nor the will, the understanding. 
It is the mind which determines the will. 

In order that there may be volition, the object 
of the will must be in our power. Deliberation 
precedes the will, but does not determine the will, 
unless a feeling of uneasiness be excited : " We are 
seldom at ease, and free enough from the solicita- 
tion of our natural or adopted desires; but a con- 
stant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock, 
which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped 
up, take the will in their turns ; and no sooner is 
one action despatched, which by such a determina- 
tion of the will we are set upon, but another un- 
easiness is ready to set us on to work." 3 There 
will be a constant rise of alternative desires, some 
of which will claim immediate satisfaction, and the 
main uneasiness which would otherwise determine 
the will may be k:~t — aiting; but this at last 
" stands upon fair terms with the rer.t, to be satis- 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. . 

2 Id., ib. xxi. 19, * Id., ib. xxi. 45. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 177 

fied ; and so, according to its greatness and pressure, 
comes in its turn to determine the will." Locke 
maintains, rather inconsistently, that the mind may 
suspend volition, and decline to prosecute a desire, 
until it has further deliberated. 1 According to his 
own principles, such a suspension of the will would 
be an act of will, and this would imply that some 
particular uneasiness had prevailed. 

II. Freedom. From the account just given, 
Locke's determinism is manifest. He draws a 
strange distinction between will, and liberty or 
freedom. Liberty, according to him, does not be- 
long to the will. For liberty is itself a power, 
and belongs to agents, not to the powers of agents. 
It is not the will but the agent which may be prop- 
erly called free. The question is, therefore, not 
whether the will, but whether the man, is free. 
To ask whether the will is free would be like ask- 
ing whether one power had another power. Ac- 
cording to Locke, man is free, in so far as he can 
choose the existence or non-existence of an action 
by the direction or choice of his mind. Wherever 
there is preference or choice of what lies within 
the power of a man to perform or not to perform, 
the man is free. If it be asked whether man, then, 
wills what he pleases, the answer must be affirma- 
tive. 2 For freedom consists in being able to act 
or not to act, according to choice. 3 The action 
must be externally possible, however, and the con- 
trary action must also be possible. The power of 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 47. 

2 Id., ib. xxi. 14-24. s id., ib. xxn. 27. 

N 



178 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

contrary willing cannot belong to a man, if its con- 
templated object be impossible. Locke overthrows 
all this doctrine, however, when he offers a defini- 
tion of liberty " to the learned world. " " Liberty, " 
he says, "is a power to act or not to act, as the 
mind directs." 1 This definition, although it is 
supposed to refer to liberty in willing, shows the 
inconsistency and confusion of Locke's thought. 
Liberty in acting is confounded with liberty in 
willing. 

That which causes the mind to determine the 
will, however, is some "uneasiness." 2 The term 
is rather indefinite. Hobbes had made no generic 
distinction between will on the one hand, and de- 
sire or preference on the other. With this Locke 
does not agree. He appeals directly to self-con- 
sciousness to establish his view of volition. And 
although he holds that the will and desire may be 
opposed to one another, yet he defines the uneasi- 
ness which moves the will as desire; and, con- 
versely, calls desire the uneasiness of the mind on 
account of some absent good. That which imme- 
diately determines the will, from time to time, to 
every voluntary action is the uneasiness of desire, 
fixed on some absent good — either negative, as 
indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment 
of pleasure. The greater good does not determine 
the will, for man may will the lesser good. Ac- 
cording to Locke life would be unbearable were it 
not that uneasiness carries with it its own remedy 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxn. 71. 

2 Id., ib. Bk. II. xxi. 29, 31 f. 



IK BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 179 

by moving the will to act in avoiding it, and tak- 
ing the first step in the way of happiness- The 
desires are "springs of action" which have been 
put in man as an endowment of the All-wise Maker, 
" suitably to our constitution and frame, and know- 
ing what it is that determines the will." It is, 
however, the present desire rather than the con- 
templation of the prospective good which most 
easily determines the will. " A little burning felt, 
pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures 
in prospect draw or allure." 1 In defending this 
view, Locke criticises effectively the intellect- 
ual theory of human action, according to which 
the mere knowledge of an absent or prospective 
good is sufficient to determine the will. The spring 
of action is within us, not beyond us. It is not 
the natural object which determines the will, but 
the desire or uneasiness of the soul. When some 
one spring of action is in control to the exclusion 
of any other, the will is supreme. 

Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable 
passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient desire 
of revenge keeps the will steady and intent ; and the will, 
thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the 
object, but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the 
body are uninterruptedly employed that way by the deter- 
mination of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness 
as long as it lasts ; whereby it seems to me evident that the 
will or power of setting us upon one action in preference to 
all other is determined in us by uneasiness. 2 

1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 34. 

2 Id., ib. Bk. II. xxi. 38. 



// 



180 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

Although Locke has previously said that one 
faculty does not determine another, the above 
passage implies that the will may determine the 
understanding, and be in turn determined by the 
feelings. For it is not the natural object which 
moves the will or effects the uneasiness. Yet 
Locke says, also, that it is happiness which pro- 
duces or determines the uneasiness. Where there 
are conflicting desires and incompatible feelings, 
the most pressing desire determines the will. In 
the expression "most pressing desire " may be seen 
an equivalent for what some later writers have 
called "the strongest motive." 

But if it is the mind which determines the will, 
what is meant by mind? According to Locke, sub- 
stance is a mere collection of qualities united by 
the imagination. Power is one of these, " a prin- 
cipal ingredient of substance," * volition is another. 
The sum of these qualities is substance. If, there- 
fore, the mind determines the will, it must be the 
other qualities of various kinds which determine 
the will. In any event the spring of action lies 
beyond the will, and itself determines the mind to 
will. Unless the mind were uneasy, it would not 
will in one way rather than another. All that can 
be concluded as to the determination of the will by 
the spring of action, is that Locke finds the latter 
to lie within not without the mind. Judgment, it 
is true, may correct the desires ; there is no com- 
pulsion of the mind in willing. But the conclusion 
is clearly deterministic. This appears further from 
1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxm. 7. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 181 

Locke's statement, that liberty may be hindered by 
external obstacles, but that a man who ceases to be 
a free ag : fc by outward restraint recovers his lib- 
erty when he recover his understanding, and his 
power to act or to forbear. 1 Necessity in relation 
to the will is found in cases where there is no power 
to act or to forbear in accordance with the direction 
of thought. Where there is no thought, there is 
no freedom. But both thought and motion may be 
present and liberty be absent. 

If one were disposed to insist upon a strict inter- 
pretation of Locke, it might be urged that the mind 
should have no freedom, because it has no spon- 
taneity. According to the principles of his method, 
it would be difficult to prove the spontaneity of the 
mind, which is tabula rasa. If we overlook this 
inconsistency, it appears that while the mind may 
arbitrarily move the will at discretion, it is itself 
moved and determined to will by the uneasiness 
which is the spring of action; and the uneasiness 
is produced by an external object. In the Patristic 
and Scholastic philosophy, the will was so identi- 
fied with a man's character and inclination that 
the depravity of the man involved the depravity of 
the acts of will. Voluntary acts were determined 
by original sin. The moment the will is separated 
from the character as Locke separates it, and has a 
place given to it of independence in the hierarchy 
of mental faculties, it loses its identification with 
the self, the true nature of the man, and becomes 

Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 9, 



182 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

subject to judgments and desires, which in their 
nature are involuntary rather than voluntary. 
Belief in freedom may be impossible, if it be sup- 
posed that the character is enslaved by evil; but 
such a view is more easily harmonized with the 
idea of freedom than with the doctrine that the 
faculties of the mind are so many separate powers. 
This is especially true, if these faculties collec- 
tively constitute the substance of the soul. Cousin 
saw this, and in his mistaken criticism of Locke 
appealed to the self -consciousness of the reason to 
refute the theory. 1 There is no more vital doctrine 
in the Essay on the Human Understanding than 
the doctrine of Substance. It is possible that Locke 
himself felt the difficulties attending his meta- 
physical theory when he suggested that God might 
have endowed matter with a power of thinking. 
And while this admission was vigorously attacked 
by Stillingfleet, it was taken up by the French 
school and taught as a dogma by the materialists. 
In Great Britain, it was Locke's doctrine of sub- 
stance which prepared the way for Hume. Accord- 
ing to the French writers, the several ' faculties 
were functions of a material unity in the brain; 
according to Hume, the unity was an illusion, 
for he failed to "catch" self in the act of per- 
ception. 

From Locke's meagre statements it is hard to 
determine the relation of his theory of volitio: 
morality. Moral good consists in the conformity 
of voluntary actions to some standard, with stnc- 

1 V. Cousin, La Phil, de Locke, 155. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 183 

tions. The good or evil which attends upon such 
actions constitutes reward or punishment respec- 
tively. Such sanctions must be known, otherwise 
the wills of men will not be determined to virtue. 
He fails also to consider voluntary action in the 
light of cause and effect. In the Essay his dis- 
cussion of the causal relation is limited to the con- 
sideration of the physical world. It need not be 
said, therefore, that he does not follow Hobbes in 
regarding will as a necessary effect. 

The tendency to deny the primacy of will, as 
well as sharply to distinguish the faculties from one 
another, is henceforth apparent in British philoso- 
phy. One faculty of the mind is set over against 
another. The judgment is independent of the will. 
The bond of union between them is not clearly ex- 
plained. They are "united by the imagination." 
Such a view shows a reaction against the scholastic 
view. But the intellectualism which prevailed in 
European philosophy through the powerful influ- 
ence of Thomas Aquinas harmonizes at some points 
with the conclusions of Locke. To say that the 
intellect determines the will is to say virtually that 
the idea of reflection, which is called judgment, con- 
trols the idea of reflection, which is called volition. 
In the former case the faculties are supposed to 
have a real Union in the spiritual substance of the 
soul. In the latter case, the substance of the soul 
is a congeries of qualities which are called either 
ideas of reflection, or powers, or faculties. That 
mere ontological principles do not lead to any par- 
ticular doctrine of freedom is demonstrated by the 



184 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

fact that Spinoza, with his monistic theory of sub- 
stance, reached deterministic conclusions not far 
removed from those of the English psychological 
school. It was upon the general psychological 
foundation of Locke that Collins and Priestley 
built their extreme theories of necessity, to which, 
however, I can only refer, without giving them 
more extended consideration. 

Before considering the theory of Locke's imme- 
diate successor in British philosophy, I may call 
attention for a moment to an interpretation of his 
philosophy in France, which may be more appro- 
priately mentioned here than in connection with 
the development of the continental philosophy in 
general. Voltaire and Condillac are philosophically 
responsible for the French misunderstanding of 
Locke, and so indirectly responsible for the dog- 
matic materialism of the philosophers just before 
the Eevolution. Voltaire was an admirer of both 
Newton and Locke. He brought their writings to 
the notice of the French public. In his Trait6 de 
Metaphysique, Voltaire readily expresses his in- 
debtedness to Locke; but he does not recognize 
reflection as one of the sources of ideas, and main- 
tains that all our knowledge is derived from the 
senses. 1 In another treatise, he teaches that the 
present is born of the past, that the Great Being 
who holds the chain of events cannot permit it 
ever to be broken, and that inevitable destiny is 
the law of all nature. He denies that man is free 
to will, although he is free to do as he will. There 

i Voltaire, Tr. de Met. Chap. III. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 185 

must be a cause for every volition ; otherwise man, 
and not God, would be master of the world : — 

II est impossible qu'il veuille sans cause. Si cette cause 
n'a son eflet infaillible, elle n'est plus cause. ... II faudra 
toujours reprimer les mecbants ; car s'ils sont determines au 
mal, on leur repondra qu'ils sont predestines au cbatiment. x 

Condillac, while agreeing with Voltaire that all 
knowledge is derived from the senses, affirms that 
the will is free. In his Traiti des /Sensations, 
he compares man to a living statue, which comes 
into being without any previous experience, and 
receives knowledge wholly from without. Con- 
dillac's dissertation on liberty is supplementary to 
his TraiU des Sensations. He supposes that the 
statue which has received the ideas of sensation 
finds itself at length affected by desires which are 
of equal force, so that no one of them can prevail 
over the others : — 

Elle flotte entre plusieurs objets, et elle se porte pas plus 
a l'un qu'a l'autre. 2 

Through experience, the statue finds that unless 
it resists certain desires, it will suffer pain, and in 
consequence of pain will feel remorse. It is there- 
fore led to deliberate as to the preferable course 
of action, when several alternatives are presented 
to it. It resists some desires and follows others. 
It may even choose that which it least desires ; s and 
when the feelings are violent, there will be no de- 

i Voltaire, II Faut Prendre un Parti, XIII. 
2 Condillac, Diss, sur la Liberte, 2. 
3 Id.,ib. 8. 



186 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

liberation. In case the desires are moderate, there 
will be deliberation : — 

Or quelles que soient ses connaiasances, nous avons vu 
qu'elle en sait assez pour etre sujette au repentir: elle en 
sait done assez pour avoir occasion de deliberer. 1 

The consequence of this deliberation will be that 
in some cases the desire which most tempts the 
statue will be that which is conquered or controlled. 
Such an act is called choice ; and when choice has 
once been made, the statue knows by experience 
that it had the power to choose the opposite. Lib- 
erty is the power of doing or not doing in order to 
action. It is through liberty that choice is pos- 
sible : — 

Car la liberte" n'est que le pouvoir de faire ce qu'on ne fait 
pas, ou ne pas faire ce qu'on fait. 2 

It is not a question whether one has the power in 
general to will or not to will; but whether when 
one wills there is also power not to will, and when 
one does not will there is also power to will. 8 But 
without the act of deliberation there is no liberty 
and no choice. Liberty, however, does not consist 
in independent determinations, without reference 
to the action of objects on the subject of the voli- 
tion. Following the terminology of Locke, Con- 
dillac holds that an uneasiness (inquietude) is caused 
by the absence of desirable objects, and that through 
experience choice is regulated so that the most use- 

1 Condillac, Diss, sur la Liberty, 10. 

2 Id., ib. 12. » Id., ib. 14. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 187 

ful and desirable ends may be attained. Know- 
ledge of the means is requisite to secure the end 
sought. It is this which constitutes freedom, and 
not the ignorant will of the end. Liberty is thus 
the effect in determination of deliberation : — 

Confiez la conduite d'un vaisseau a un homme qui n'a 
aucune coimaissance de la navigation, le vaisseau sera le 
jouet des vagues. Mais un pilote habile en saura suspendre, 
arreter la course ; avec un m§ine vent il en saura varier la 
direction ; et ce n'est que dans la tempSte que le gouvernail 
cessera d'obeu a sa main. Voila l'image de l'honime. 1 

The writers who afterwards drew materialistic 
conclusions from Condillac's theory of knowledge 
rejected the doctrine of Indeterminism which has 
just been presented. They followed Voltaire in his 
determinism, but their defence of the latter doc- 
trine is not deserving of special mention. 

Berkeley 

As Locke's theory of ideas was ambiguous, it is 
not surprising that Berkeley should have found in 
it a justification for denying the existence of mat- 
ter. It is not possible, however, to trace any con- 
nection between Berkeley's theory of knowledge 
and his doctrine of the will. He is an opponent 
of determinism, and regards it as a consequence of 
a false theory of the concept. So far there may be 
some ground for considering his nominalism as the 
cause of his indeterminism. Yet Hume, who held 

1 Condillac, Diss, sur la Liberte", 18. 



188 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

substantially the same logical doctrine, was a de- 
terminist. 

The nature of the will is discussed incidentally 
in the Principles of Human Knowledge, and the 
problem of freedom in The Minute Philosopher. 
According to Berkeley, the only existences are God 
and created spirits. A spirit is one undivided 
active being. In so far as it perceives ideas, it 
is called understanding, and in so far as it produces 
or otherwise operates about them, it is called will. 
Berkeley will not recognize these as distinct from 
each other nor from substance in general. Spirit is 
known, not per se, but only by its effects ; but will, 
soul, and spirit " do not stand for different ideas, 
or in truth for any idea at all." 1 

He says : — 

I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and 
vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more 
than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my 
fancy : and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes 
way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth 
very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is 
certain, and grounded on experience, but when, we talk of 
unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, 
we only amuse ourselves with words. 2 

Thus the activity of the soul is identified with 
will, and the ideas themselves are attributed to 
the voluntary agency of God. 

In the seventh dialogue of Tlie Minute Philoso- 
pher, determinism is opposed by Euphranor, who 

1 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, XXVII. 

2 Id., ib. XXVIII. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 189 

represents the opinions of the author. The dis- 
cussion grows out of a theological consideration of 
the will in relation to divine grace. It is said that 
there has been no more fruitful topic for controversy 
than the doctrine of grace, which has engaged the 
attention of Jansenist and Molinist, of Calvinist 
and Arminian. The question is raised as to 
whether grace is a real influence, provided nomi- 
nalism be true. The reply to this is ad hominem; 
if grace cannot be real because it is an abstract, 
then there is no real color, nor man, nor animal. 
But all such general names stand as representative 
of classes of ideas". Berkeley's indeterminism may 
be best presented by arranging the arguments of 
his opponents in a series, and then showing how 
these are answered. 



1. Corporeal objects strike on the organs of 
sense, and the impression is conveyed to the brain 
by the nerves. In consequence of this, there is an 
outflow of motion, which is called volition. There- 
fore so-called voluntary human actions are simply 
mechanical. They are falsely attributed to a free 
principle. There is then no foundation for praise 
or blame, for reward or punishment. 

2. Man is like a puppet; the threads or wires 
are invisible, but he is not independent of them. 

3. Subjectively the process of volition is as fol- 
lows: (a) The understanding considers; (5) the 
judgment decrees ; (c) this determines the will to 
action; (d) the will executes. There is therefore 



190 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

no freedom. In freedom there must be indiffer- 
ence, a power to act or not to act, without pre- 
scription or control. But no matter what moves 
the judgment, the will is controlled by it and cannot 
be free. Neither knowledge nor appetite is volun- 
tary. And in addition to these reasons, the future 
must be fixed, because God foreknows it. 1 

II 

The reply made by Berkeley to these assertions 
and arguments is as follows: — 

1. It is confounding two distinct ideas to affirm 
that motion and will are the same. And if this 
identity be denied, the first argument of the deter- 
minist fails. 

2. Certainty and necessity are not the same; in 
the former notion there is nothing that implies 
constraint; it may be foreseen that an event is 
about to happen, and yet be foreseen that it 
is about to happen through human choice and 
liberty. •. 

3. The abstractions of the determinist pervert 
the truth. In ancient times, when philosophers 
denied the possibility of motion, they were met by 
those who walked before them. In the same way, 
man is a free agent, because he freely wills. This 
argument resembles that of Dr. Johnson in opposi- 
tion to Berkeley's idealism. 

4. It is not judgment that determines the will, 

i Berkeley, The Minute Philosopher, VII. xix. 20. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 191 

but I, being active, determine my own will. Tims, 
although one may not be able to defend the abstract 
idea of freedom, there is no doubt that the individ- 
ual act is free. 

5. A man is free in so far as he can do what he 
will. To act according to will is to be free. To 
pursue the matter any farther is to assert that man 
can will as he wills. Such subtleties are absurd, 
for the notions of guilt and merit, justice and re- 
wards, in the mind of man are antecedent to all 
metaphysical disquisitions ; and according to those 
received natural notions it is not doubted that 
man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-deter- 
mined. 1 

6. The whole argument of the determinist, in 
short, is an excellent illustration of the sophistry 
of abstract ideas. One of the disputants remarks, 
that all arguments which can be urged against lib- 
erty are referable either to realism or materialism. 
Yet human minds are far from being mere machines 
or footballs, acted upon and bandied about by cor- 
poreal objects, without any inward principle of 
freedom or action. The only true notions of lib- 
erty that we have, come from reflecting upon our- 
selves and the constitution of our minds. 

That Berkeley's attitude against determinism 
was so decided may be partly ascribed to his em- 
tic opposition to materialism. The two doc- 
trines were naturally associated in his mind, so 
that in refuting the latter he was led to oppose the 
former. 

1 Berkeley, The Minute Philosopher, VII. xxn. 



192 



THEORIES OF THE WILL 



Hume 

The radical effects of Hume's scepticism are well 
known. The originality of his views with respect 
to the nature of the will is often overlooked. It is 
interesting to find in his theory of the nature of 
volition an anticipation of conclusions which have 
been presented in our own time as the result of 
psychological inquiry. 

According to Hume, all the perceptions of the 
mind may be divided into impressions and ideas. 
The former are those which enter the mind " witl 
most force and violence." They include all oui 
sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make 
their first appearance in the soul. The ideas are 
" the faint images of these in thinking and reason- 
ing." 1 Impressions are of two kinds, original and 
secondary, or those of sensation and of reflection. 
The first include all the impressions of the senses 
and all bodily pains and pleasures ; the second are 
the passions and other emotions resembling them. 2 
The passions are either direct or indirect. Direct 
passions are those which arise immediately from 
good or evil, from pain or pleasure. 3 " Of all these 
direct passions, there is none more remarkable 
than the will." 4 Properly speaking, it is not to 
be included among the passions ; but they cannot 
be understood without a knowledge of it. In his 
treatise on the passions, he thus defines the will , 

i Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part 1. 1. 
a Id., ib. Bk. II. Part 1. 1. » Id., ib. Bk. II. Part 1. 1. 
4 Id., ib. Bk. II. Part III. 1. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 193 

it is " the internal impression we feel, and are con- 
| scious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new 
motion of our body, or new perception of our 
mind." This is incapable of closer definition, 
and any further description would be likely to 
cause confusion. In order that Hume's theory of 
voluntary action may be fully explained, it is ex- 
pedient that his doctrine of cause and effect should 
be recalled. 

I. Cause and Effect. There is a natural princi- 
ple of union in our ideas, which may be described 
as the principle of association. An example of 
such union is presented in the ideas of cause and 
effect. From the empirical doctrine of knowledge 
already laid down, Hume was unable to arrive at 
any justification for the idea of power or of neces- 
sary connection. A cause has no power to produce 
an effect, and the effect is not necessarily connected 
with its cause. "We have no other notion of 
cause and effect but that of certain objects, which 
have been always conjoined together, and which in 
all past instances have been found inseparable." 1 
Why they should be thus inseparable is something 
which we cannot explain. We know only that such 
is the case, and can give no reason for it. The 
invariable succession of phenomena in the past is 
the only warrant that we have for the same sequence 
in the future. The invariable antecedent is cause; 
the invariable consequent is effect. Any different 
conclusion from this is excluded by Hume's doc- 
trine that we know only impressions and ideas. It 

Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part IH. 6. 
o 



194 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

is because we have no impression of any connection 
between cause and effect, that we have no idea of 
such a connection. The relation is one of ante- 
cedent to consequent and no more. 1 

II. Power. All ideas are derived from impres- 
sions or some preceding perceptions. If we have 
any idea of power, therefore, there must be some 
instances in which power is perceived to exert 
itself. According to Hume, such instances can 
never be discovered in body. It has been held by 
some, he says, that there is an innate idea of God, 
and that God is the cause of every change in the 
material world. But having rejected the theory 
of innate ideas, Hume concludes that there is no 
reason to suppose that there is any principle of 
activity in the Deity. It is equally impossible to 
derive any idea of power from matter. It is 
found in none of the qualities of matter. We 
deceive ourselves when we suppose that we have 
any idea of efficacy or power. " All ideas are de- 
rived from and represent impressions. We never 
have any impression that contains any power or 
efficacy. We never, therefore, have any idea of 
power." 2 One other alternative, however, remains 
to be considered, and that is whether we derive the 
idea of power from the action of our wills. 

III. Voluntary Action. Hume proceeds to exam- 
ine the opinion that we feel an energy or power 
in our own mind; and that, having in this man- 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part III. 2. 
Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding, I. 

2 Id., Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part. III. 14. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 195 

ner acquired the idea of power, we transfer that 
quality to matter, where we are not immediately 
able to discover it. In accordance with the doc- 
trine of cause and effect already explained, the 
will is said by Hume to have " no more a discover- 
able connection with its effects, than any material 
cause has with its proper effect. So far from per-, 
ceiving the connection betwixt an act of volition 
and a motion of the body, 'tis allowed that no effect 
is more inexplicable from the powers and essence 
of thought and matter." 1 Nor does the will seem 
to have any greater power over our mind than over 
the material object. The control which we have 
over our thoughts is limited. We perceive a con- 
stant conjunction of ideas in the mind, but no con- 
nection between them which involves power or 
efficacy. "No internal impression has an appar- 
ent energy, more than external objects have." It 
follows from this that there is no faculty of will; 
and that what we suppose to be a feeling of power 
over our bodies or minds is a mere impression, 
which has no apparent energy. This might be 
translated into the language of modern psychology 
to mean that we have no knowledge of any control 
of the body by the will except in the feeling which 
arises when the body is voluntarily moved. 

IV. The Necessary Determination of the Will. 
The greater part of Hume's discussion of the will 
is concerned with this particular aspect of the 
subject. In spite of his empirical principles, he 
asserts that necessity governs all material phe- 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part. III. 14. 



196 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

nomena. "Every object is determined by an ab- 
solute fate to a certain degree and direction of its 
motion, and can no more depart from that precise 
line in which it moves, than it can convert itself 
into an angel or spirit, or any superior substance." * 
Necessity governs also all mental phenomena. It 
has been shown already that Hume denied the 
necessary connection of cause and effect. It is 
further evident that constant union of ideas, 
together with the mind's inference, constitute 
necessity. Wherever we discover these, there is 
necessity. And such a necessity he observes in 
the mind. His proof of this shows some advance 
in the inductive method as employed in psychology. 
Like causes he finds produce like effects in the 
history of mankind. 

a. There is a difference in the physical qualities 
of men; yet all are subject to substantially the 
same physical causes. In like manner there is a 
difference in the mental qualities, and again all 
are subject to the same principle of union or causa- 
tion. The only way of avoiding this conclusion is 
to deny this general uniformity in human conduct. 
" As long as actions have a constant union and con- 
nection with the situation and temper of the agent, 
however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the 
necessity, we really allow the thing." 2 It may be 
answered that necessity is regular and certain, 
while human conduct is irregular and uncertain. 
Yet when we observe apparent irregularities in the 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part III. 1. 
aid., ib. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 197 

material world, we do not deny the uniformity of 
causes, but try to explain the irregularities by 
referring to other causes which may have been 
overlooked. We do not deny the principle of cause 
and effect in the external world because of these 
exceptions; and we have no more reason to deny 
them in the case of the will. Madmen, it is ad- 
mitted by all, have no liberty of will, and yet their 
actions are far more irregular than those of men 
who are supposed to be both sane and free. 

6. The similarity in the characters of men gives 
an assurance that their wills will be determined by 
like causes. Just as a prince who makes laws ex- 
pects the obedience of his subjects, or a general who 
issues orders anticipates that they will be carried 
out, so it is to be concluded that the actions of the 
will are determined by causes ; for the latter doc- 
trine is established by the same kind of moral evi- 
dence. In judging of the actions of men, we rely 
upon causation as much as we do in judging of the 
phenomena of nature. Necessity is of the essence 
of causation, consequently the belief in freedom, 
by removing necessity, removes also causation, and 
leads directly to belief in chance. "As chance 
is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and 
is at least directly contrary to experience, there 
are always the same arguments against liberty or 
freewill." 1 

If such inductive considerations lead to a belief 
in the determination of the will, it is fair to inquire 
why men so commonly affirm that voluntary actions 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part. III. 1. 



198 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

are freely performed. To this Hume replies that, 
in the first place, it is difficult for men who have 
acted to persuade themselves that they might not 
have acted differently. They are conscious that 
their action has been spontaneous, that they have 
not willed on account of any external compulsion, 
and so they confound that which is opposed to vio- 
lence with that which is opposed to causation and 
necessity. " Few are capable of distinguishing be- 
twixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is called in 
the schools, and the liberty of indifference ; betwixt 
that which is opposed to violence and that which 
means a negation of necessity and causes." In the 
second place, men are deceived by the apparent 
mobility of the will into supposing that what 
seems so easy to think of, viz. an alternate course 
of action, might have been easily carried out, and 
so they imagine that this is the liberty of indiffer- 
ence. There is "a false sensation or experience 
even of the liberty of indifference, which is re- 
garded as an argument for its real existence." 1 
Hume considers this idea to be an illusion. No 
matter how capricious and irregular the actions 
may seem to have been, and no matter how we 
may act so as to attempt to prove that we are 
free, we are always bound by necessity. While we 
imagine that we are acting quite freely, the spec- 
tator can commonly infer what the motives of our 
actions are, and what our character is, from the 
actions themselves. And if he were acquainted 
with all the elements of our situation and temper, 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Fart III. 2. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 199 

and our secret springs of action, he would be as- 
sured that our wills were determined necessarily. 

Hume notices the prevailing tendency in philoso- 
phy before him to place the reason in opposition 
to the passions ; to make rational motives superior 
to emotional motives. This doctrine he opposes. 

Reason alone can never move the will. There 
are two general processes of what he calls the 
understanding: one of these is demonstration, the 
other reasoning on probability. The former, which 
is called abstract or demonstrative reasoning, does 
not influence our actions directly, but only guides 
our judgments with respect to causes and effects. 
Nor does probable reasoning affect the will; it 
shows only the causes and effects of emotions. 
Reasoning alone cannot dispute with passion and 
emotion or prevent the will. There is no conflict 
between reason and passion ; for the former is really 
subject to the feelings. It is a part of Hume's doc- 
trine that passion is a more real element in the 
nature of man than is any thought of the under- 
standing. "When I am angry I am actually pos- 
sessed with the passion, and in that emotion have 
no more reference to any other object than when 
I am thin or sick, or more than five feet high." x 
The passion is always an original, while a rational 
process is a copy or representation. Furthermore, 
the passions are unreasonable only on rare occa- 
sions. Such occasions are, first, when it happens 
that the facts about which the passion arises are 
unreal ; and, second, when wrong means are chosen 
1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part III. 3. 



200 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

to secure certain ends. In all other respects reason 
and passion are in harmony. What is thought by 
many to be the determination of the will by the 
reason in opposition to passion, is in reality the 
determination of the will by certain more tranquil 
feelings, which from their tranquillity assume the 
appearance of rational processes. Strength of mind 
and self-control are thus only the predominance of 
the calmer feelings in controlling the will. 

It has sometimes been said that the denial of 
free will is disadvantageous to religion. Hume 
holds, on the contrary, that a belief in necessary 
determination is indispensable to good morals and 
religion. 1 The doctrine of necessary determinism 
teaches that there is a necessary relation between 
a man's disposition and his actions. If the wills 
of men were free, it would be absurd to punish evil- 
doers. For it would be the infliction of punishment 
on a man who was not responsible. " According to 
the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as 
pure and untainted after having committed the 
most horrid crimes as at the first moment of his 
birth, nor is his character any way concerned in 
his actions, since they are not derived from it, and 
the wickedness of the one can never be used as 
a proof of the depravity of the other." 2 Hume 
would, therefore, turn the tables on his adversaries 
by showing the injustice of gauging moral actions 
by the liberty with which they are performed. 

Such are the main arguments by which he en- 

1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part III. 2. 

2 Id., ib. Bk. II. Bart. III. 2. 



IK BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 201 

deavors to prove the determination of the will. I 
do not think it worth while to point out the mani- 
fest inconsistency of his theory with the principles 
which he affirms in the beginning of his Treatise 
of Human Nature. Those who recall his concep- 
tion of the origin of knowledge, and his doctrine 
of cause and effect, will be disposed to dispute 
the cogency of his arguments. Upon Hume's own 
principles, there is no good reason why the will 
should be thought to be necessarily determined, 
unless it is because such determination has always 
been observed. For the denial of any necessary 
connection between cause and effect leaves it pos- 
sible that there should be volition unconnected 
with motives and entirely disconnected with char- 
acter. John Stuart Mill, who afterwards held with 
few modifications Hume's theory of causation, de- 
fended a like theory of determinism. 

Eeid 

The philosophy of Eeid may be considered both 
as a dogmatic reply to Hume, and as the beginning 
of the later development of Scottish thought. It 
has especial importance because of the influence 
which it has exerted not only in Great Britain but 
also in America. In relation to the philosophy of 
the Continent, Eeid may be placed at the head of 
those who appealed to what the Germans called der 
le Menschenverstand; he is a ''common-sense" 
philosopher. 

He adopts the old division of the faculties of the 



202 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

soul into understanding and will. 1 The first of 
these is a faculty of knowledge and speculation; 
the second is a faculty of action. Consequently, he 
speaks of intellectual and active powers. By the 
latter, as well as by the former, man is distinguished 
from the brutes. The brutes follow the strongest 
impulse, and seem to have no capacity for self-gov- 
ernment. They deserve, therefore, neither praise 
nor blame for what they do or fail to do. They 
may be governed by discipline, but not by law. 
Man, on the contrary, acts from motives of a higher 
nature. He has a conception of duty, and feels 
that when he does his duty, the action is meritori- 
ous, and when it is left undone, the action is worthy 
of blame. 2 

I. The Conception of Active Power. Eeid criti- 
cises Hume's definition of active power : it is not as 
Hume said, "A lively idea related to or associated 
with a present impression." While declining to de- 
fine the conception, Eeid explains it as follows: — 

1. It is not derived from any of the external 
senses, nor from self-consciousness. So far Hume 
was right in opposing Locke. 

2. Power is one of those things of which we have 
only a relative and indirect impression; that is, 
power is known not per se but only by means of its 
effects. 

3. Power is a mere quality, and has no existence 
independent of the subject to which it belongs. 

3 Reid, Active Powers, Introduction, 
a Id., ib. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 203 

4. But the degree of power belonging to any- 
thing cannot be inferred from the effects produced, 
for a given thing may not manifest the amount of 
power which it possesses. 

5. There are some powers which have a con- 
trary, and some which do not. Vice is the contrary 
of virtue; but there is no contrary of power. There 
are only conceptions of privations of power, such as 
weakness or impotence. 1 

The exercise of active power is called action. 
While all power is to be traced ultimately to God, 
there is a relative power which the mind has over 
its own operations. 

II. Active Power and the Will. The only con- 
ception which we get of active power in relation to 
its cause is from the way in which our own active 
power is exercised. 2 Every man is naturally led to 
attribute free will to himself, and to regard volun- 
tary acts as in his own power. Human power can 
be exerted only by will. We cannot conceive of 
any power to be exerted without will. We impute 
our actions to ourselves, and consider ourselves to 
be the causes of our own actions. 

III. Definition of the Will. 

Everyman is conscious of a power to determine, in things 
which he conceives to depend upon his determination. 
To this power we give the name of will; and as it is usual, 
in the operations of the mind, to give the same name to the 
power and to the act of that power, the term will is often 

1 Reid, Active Powers, 1. 1. 
,2 Id., ib. 1.5. 



204 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

put to signify the act of determining, which more properly 
is called volition. 

Volition, therefore, signifies the act of willing and deter- 
mining ; and will is put indifferently to signify either the 
power of willing or the act. 1 

It may be more briefly defined as the determi- 
nation of the mind to do or not to do something 
which we conceive to be in our power. 

Reid further explains the term, "to distinguish 
it from other acts of mind, which from the ambi- 
guity of words are apt to be confounded with it." 2 
And the following characteristics are enumerated: 

1. Every act of the will must have an object. 

2. The immediate object of the will must be 
some action of our own. Desire and will are alike 
in that there is an object before both. But they 
differ in that the object of the will must be an 
action, while desire may be directed towards the 
object of appetite or affection or passion. 

3. The object of the will must be something 
within our power. 

4. When we will to do anything immediately, the 
volition is accompanied with an effort to execute. 

If a man wills to raise a great weight from the ground hy 
the strength of his arm, he makes an effort for that purpose 
proportioned to the weight he determines to raise. A great 
weight requires a great effort ; a small weight a less effort. 
Great efforts, whether of body or mind, are attended with 
difficulty, and when long continued produce lassitude, which 
requires that they should be intermitted. This leads us to 

1 Reid, Active Powers, II. 1. 
2 Id.,ib. II. 1. 



I 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 205 

reflect upon them, and to give them a name. The name 
effort is commonly appropriated to them ; and those that are 
made with ease, and leave no sensible effect, pass without 
observation and without a name, though they be of the same 
kind, and differ only in degree from those to which the 
name is given. This effort we are conscious of, if we will 
but give attention to it ; and there is nothing in which we 
are in a more strict sense active. 1 



This view of effort which is here so plainly- 
expressed was for a long time prevalent in psy- 
chology, but of late years has been vigorously 
opposed. 

Acts may be excited by instinct which do not 
involve either understanding or will, as when a 
man recovers his balance after stumbling, or plays 
a tune without there being a special volition for 
each particular note. Appetites, passions, and 
, desires without judgment may direct actions, and 
such actions are not properly voluntary. While 
passion may influence or control the will, there 
may be involuntary passionate actions. 2 

Although the faculties of understanding and will 
are easily distinguished in thought, they are rarely, 
if ever, disjoined in operation. When understand- 
ing and will are combined, there are three species 
of volition, — attention, deliberation, and resolu- 
tion. 3 Attention may be given to objects either of 
sense or of intellect, in order to form a distinct 
notion of such objects. Deliberation consists in 
the forming of some judgment as to what ought to 

1 Keid, Active Powers, II. 1. 

2 Id., ib. II. 2. s Id., ib. II. 3. 



206 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

be willed, and the general rules of deliberation are 
the axioms of morals. Resolution does not imply 
immediate action, but is used both for present and 
future actions and volitions. 1 

IV. Motives. There are two parts in the human 
constitution that may have influence upon our vol- 
untary actions : these are passion and reason. They 
are described by Eeid as motives, or as principles 
of action, or as incitements to action. Eeason influ- 
ences the voluntary acts which man regards as his 
own, while actions done through passion are thought 
of as being alien to a man's true self. 2 Thus we find 
him following the ancient view already noticed 
which puts passion in opposition to reason, and 
regards the former as taking possession of the soul, 
and so enslaving it. Eeid says : " What a man does 
coolly and deliberately without passion is imputed 
solely to the man, whether it have merit or dement ; 
whereas what he does from passion, is imputed in 
part to passion. The demerit is removed in propor- 
tion to the excess of the passion. It is judgment 
which compares the principles of action, and decides 
which is worthiest to be pursued." It is not neces- 
sary that the incitement to action should be effec- 
tive in order to be a motive, and so, as will be 
seen, motives do not determine the will. Eeid 
classifies principles of action as follows: (1) me- 
chanical principles; (2) animal principles; (3) ra- 
tional principles. 3 Mechanical principles are such 
as require no attention, no deliberation, and no 

i Reid, Active Powers, II. 3. 2 id., ib. HI. 1. 
8 Id., ib. III. 1. 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 207 

will. They are of two kinds : instincts and habits. 
An instinct is a natural blind impulse to certain 
actions, without any end being in view, without 
deliberation therefore, and very often without any 
clear conception. 1 A habit is the facility of doing 
a thing, acquired by having done it frequently. 2 
Animal principles of action are such as operate upon 
will and intention, but do not involve any exercise 
of judgment or reason. 3 Among these are the appe- 
tites, which are distinguished from other desires in 
that they are accompanied by sensations of uneasi- 
ness proper to them, and are not constant, but peri- 
odical. Another kind of animal principles of action, 
E-eid calls desires. These are without the marks or 
properties which have just been described as belong- 
ing to animal appetites. Other animal principles of 
action are benevolent and malevolent affections, pas- 
sions, disposition, and opinion. In speaking of dis- 
position, Eeid gives a very superficial treatment of 
that important principle, and does not refer to it 
later in his discussion of freedom. 4 

Eational principles of action are so called because 
they can have no existence in beings not endowed 
with reason. They involve the exercise of inten- 
tion, will, and reason. B,eid makes a distinction 
between two kinds of rational function: it is one 
function of the reason to regulate our belief, and 
another to regulate our actions and conduct. 5 What- 
ever is rational commands our assent, and assent 

1 Reid, Active Powers, III. 2. 

2 Id., ib. in. 3. * Id., ib. in. 2-8. 
» Id., ib. in. 1. s id., ib. UI. 1. 



208 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

influences our will. The notions of the good in 
general, of duty, moral obligation, and rectitude, are 
among the rational principles of action. 1 

V. Freedom. Reid's discussion of the freedom 
of the will is elaborate, although somewhat diffuse. 
He defines the liberty of a moral agent as " a power 
: over the determination of his own will." 2 If the 
determination of the will be the necessary conse- 
quence of something involuntary in the state of the 
mind, or of something external to the mind, then 
the agent is not free, and not moral. He is con- 
trolled by necessity. Such freedom presupposes 
understanding as well as will ; and in free actions, 
practical judgment is involved. Necessity is de- 
fined, negatively, as the want of this moral liberty. 3 
Eeid objects to defining liberty as a power to act as 
we will, which implies that we will to will, and so 
on to infinity. He distinguishes three kinds of 
liberty : (1) liberty as opposed to physical restraint ; 
(2) liberty as opposed to obligation by law ; (3) liberty 
as opposed to necessity. 4 

It is liberty of the third kind that is properly pred- 
icated of will. 5 Necessity is not a philosophical 
notion only, but is a principle which the vulgar 
have appealed to in every age to exculpate them- 
selves and avoid being held responsible for their 
acts. According to E-eid the advocate of necessity 
lays stress chiefly upon motives. The strongest 
motive prevails, and determines the will. And the 

1 Reid, Active Powers, III. 2-7. 

2 Id., ib., IV. 1. *Id.,ib. 
8 Id., ib. 6 id., ib. 



> 



IN BEITISM PHILOSOPHY 209 

advocate of necessity affirms that if man be free it 
is impossible that he should be governed by regard 
for rewards or punishments. To this objection 
Eeid replies that all rational beings are influenced 
by motives, but these are not sufficient to determine 
the will. They are not causes nor agents, they per- 
suade or inform, but acts of will are not necessary 
effects of them. Motives suppose liberty in the 
agent, otherwise they could have no influence at 
all. Keid ridicules the idea of the Asinus Buridani, 
and holds that the conditions of the problem are 
contrary to experience. It is possible for men to 
choose in an entire absence of motives, and it can 
never be proved that the motive determines the 
will. To hold such a deterministic opinion is to 
affirm that men never act from wilfulness, caprice, 
or obstinacy. There is no way of telling what the 
strongest motive is, except by volition itself : — 

How shall we know whether the strongest motive always 
prevails, if we know not which is the strongest? There 
must be some test by which their strength is to be tried, 
some balance in which they may be weighed, otherwise, to 
say that the strongest motive always prevails, is to speak 
without any meaning. 1 

The relation of opposing motives to the act of 
will may be explained as follows : — 

Contrary motives may very properly be compared to 
advocates pleading the opposite sides of a cause at the bar. 
It would be very weak reasoning to say, that such an advo- 
cate is the most powerful pleader, because sentence was 
given on his side. The sentence is in the power of the judge, 

1 Reid, Active Powers, IV. 4. 
p 



210 THEORIES OF' THE WILL 

not of the advocate. It is equally weak reasoning in proof 
of necessity, to say such a motive prevailed, therefore it was 
the strongest ; since the defenders of liberty maintained that 
the determination was made by the man, and not by the 
motive. 1 

The strength of the motives is apparent very 
often by the effort which the mind makes and 
makes successfully to resist them. So far the 
defence of freedom is negative. Positively Eeid 
argues in the following manner : — 

1. The will is free, because there is a natural 
conviction of its freedom. This is an appeal to the 
common sense of mankind. And this mode of 
argument is quite in harmony with Reid's philosoph- 
ical method in general. This natural conviction 
is manifest, from the exertions which we make by 
the power of our will, from the deliberations which 
presuppose a power to act freely in accordance with 
the result of them, from our resolutions to act, which 
imply a belief in our liberty, and from our making 
promises which imply belief in our ability to keep 
them. Blame and praise also show the existence 
of this natural conviction. 2 

2. The will is free, because man is morally 
accountable for his actions. In fact, Eeid affirms 
that the distinction between just and unjust implies 
the freedom of the will. 3 

3. The will is free because man has the power of 
"carrying on, wisely and prudently, a system of 
conduct, which he has before conceived in his mind, 

1 Reid, Active Powers, IV. 4. 

2 Id., ib. IV. 6. 3 Id., ib. IV. 7. 



A 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 211 

and resolved to prosecute." This proposition, Eeid 
defends, strange to say, by an appeal to the princi- 
ple of causality. 

" Every indication of wisdom, taken from the 
effect, is equally an indication of power to execute 
what wisdom planned. And if we have any evi- 
dence that the wisdom which formed the plan is 
in the man, we have the very same evidence, that 
the power which executed it is in him also." l 

And yet Eeid was seeking to prove, not the power 
of the agent, but his liberty. His argument is more 
ad rem in his criticism of Leibnitz. He objects to 
the principle of sufficient reason as stated by the 
German philosopher. For, according to Eeid, two 
or more means may be equally fit for the same end ; 
" in such a case there may be a sufficient reason for 
taking one of the number, though there be no reason 
for preferring one to another, of means equally 
fit." 2 

He asserts that to apply the principle of suffi- 
cient reason to man's voluntary acts is to make 
man a machine. If we suppose the principle to 
be applied to a given action, we shall ask whether 
there was a sufficient reason for this action or not. 
Eeid admits that there was a motive, but not neces- 
sarily a motive sufficient to justify the action. He 
admits also that there was a cause, but that if the 
aeu "> was the man's, the man himself was the 
cause. J?nt he denies that it was necessarily pro- 
duced. When, therefore, it is affirmed that vol- 

1 Eeid, Active Powers, IV. 8. 

2 Id., ib. IV. 9. 



212 THEORIES' OF THE WILL 

untary acts are effects necessarily produced, it 
should be answered that the cause of the volition 

t is the man who wills, and that the volition itself is 

I the necessary effect of nothing else. This argu- 
ment Eeid follows up with a general attack upon 
Hume for insisting that the will is an effect, while 
denying the efficiency of causation. x 

Eeid attaches more importance, however, to the 
argument against freedom founded on the fore- 
knowledge of God. "The most formidable argu- 
ment of this class, ... is taken from the prescience 
of the Deity." 2 

He analyzes the inference that because God 
foresees every determination of the human mind, 

t that which he foresees must happen necessarily. 

I He distinguishes certainty from necessity. That 
'what will certainly be, will certainly be, he does 
not dispute; but this differs from the assertion 
that because an event will certainly be, therefore 
its production must be necessary. He denies also 
that prescience involves predestination, or that 
there is a causal relation between God's foreknow- 
ledge that an event will happen, and the necessity 
that such an event must happen. If it be denied 
that any free action can be foreseen, Eeid would 
say that such a denial involves the denial of God's 
free agency, since God's future actions can be fore- 
seen by men; also that while the Deity foresees 
his own free actions, this does not determine those 
actions necessarily. Lastly, he criticises Dr. Priest- 
ley's doctrine of necessity and contingency. 

i Reid, Active Powers, IV, 9. 2 id., ib. IV. 10. 



1 



IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 213 

Priestley had denied that a contingent event 
could be an object of knowledge. His argument 
had been as follows : — 

As certainly as nothing can be known to exist but what 
does exist, so certainly can nothing be known to arise from 
what does exist, but what does arise from it, or depend 
upon it. But according to the definition of the terms, a 
contingent event does not depend upon any previous known 
circumstances, since some other event might have arisen in 
the same circumstances. 1 

Reid replies that a thing may arise from what 
| does exist, either freely or necessarily. A contin- 
gent event arises from its cause, not necessarily, 
but freely. But another event might have arisen 
from the same cause. Besides this, Priestley's 
argument simply proves that a contingent event 
cannot be known to arise necessarily from what 
does exist, which, however, was not disputed. The 
whole reasoning is, according to Reich based on an 
assumption, that nothing can be known to arise 
from what does exist, but what arises necessarily 
from it. The major premise, in which this assump- 
tion is contained, is not proved, and so Reid discards 
Priestley's conclusion. 

Any one who is familiar with the psychology 
since the time of Reid may be disposed to criticise 
his doctrine of the will. But whatever estimate 
be made of it, it should be remembered that he 
published his essays on the Active Powers at a 
time when British philosophy had been disturbed 

1 Quoted by Reid, Active Powers, IV. 10. 



214 THEORIES OF THE "WILL 

by the scepticism of Hume, and indirectly by the 
determinism of Spinoza and Leibnitz. Reid's argu- 
ments with respect to freedom are instructive, par- 
ticularly when compared with the theories of the 
Post-Kantian metaphysicians. In his philosophy 
of common sense, he attempted to reply to Hume's 
theory of knowledge; and it is evident that the 
same defects which made this reply insufficient, 
are more or less manifest in his empirical treat- 
ment of the will. While maintaining the objective 
validity of the principle of causality, he at the same 
time regards the subject which wills as practically 
a first cause. By recognizing only the faculties of 
the understanding and the will, he did not, like the 
Germans, resort to the reason as a superior power 
through which he might transcend the causal prin- 
ciple, and so justify a belief in freedom. Just as 
Butler's Analogy determined for many years the 
method and principle of Christian apologetics, so 
the philosophy of Eeid was for many years the 
foundation of all indeterministic theories in Great 
Britain and America. Like most Englishmen of 
his time, he shows no sign of having been partic- 
ularly impressed with the force of Spinoza's phi- 
losophy ; and it may be doubted whether the latter 
awakened much interest or found intelligent appre- 
ciation during the eighteenth century, except on the 
continent of Europe. It is probable, however, that 
in Reid's clear statements, and able reasoning, the 
indeterminists may find their most adequate em- 
pirical defence. 



CHAPTER FIFTH 

CONTINENTAL THEORIES OP THE WILL FROM DES- 
CARTES TO LEIBNITZ 

The metaphysical doctrines of the philosophers 
on the continent during the seventeenth century- 
are in striking contrast to the more psychological 
discussions of the writers in England and Scotland. 
In the construction of their systems, the Cartesians, 
and those more or less directly related to them, set 
out from the idea of substance. There is little 
uniformity, however, in their conclusions with re- 
spect to either knowledge or will. The thought 
of Great Britain, during this period, was almost 
altogether emancipated from the traditions of the 
mediaeval schools. But on the continent the de- 
parture from the older methods is not so marked. 
It is, of course, easy to observe the antagonism be- 
tween the philosophy of Descartes and that of even 
the most advanced schoolman, but his extensive use 
of a deductive method, and the formal presentation 
of his doctrine, remind one of the older writers. 
Malebranche, in spite of his attacks on Aristotle, 
I v t a belated schoolman ; the method of Spinoza 
elastic ; and in Leibnitz especially are to be 
found few signs that any very radical change has 
passed over the methods of philosophy. 
215 



216 theories of the will 

Descartes 

The philosophy of Descartes is theistic and dual- 
istic. While the English philosophers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries "were con- 
cerned primarily with the theory of knowledge, 
and especially the nature and origin of ideas, 
those on the continent set out from the ontological 
doctrine of substance. The effects of the latter 
method are apparent in the conclusions of the 
leading writers of France, Germany, and Hol- 
land, especially in the systems of Spinoza and of 
Leibnitz. 

According to Descartes, substance is either un- 
created or created. The former is that which 
depends on nothing else for its subsistence; the 
latter is that which depends only on God for its 
subsistence. There is one uncreated substance, 
which is God. Created substances are mind and 
matter. The essence of the former is thought; 
that of the latter is extension. While the soul of 
man is closely united to his body, it is distinct in 
essence ; for it is of the essence of the soul to think. 
The soul as extended substance resides in every 
part of the body: l'ame est veritablement jointe 
a tout le corps. 1 For it is not only unextended, 
but indivisible ; it cannot be separated, nor can it 
separate itself when different parts of the body are 
moved or affected. Besides this general connection 
of the soul with the body, there is a particular point 
of union between the two in the brain. By many 

1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 30. 



FKOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 217 

preceding philosophers, it had been taught that the 
centre of the soul's life in the body was the brain, 
or the heart. Sometimes both organs were associ- 
ated with the functions of knowledge and feeling. 
According to Descartes, the point of union is the 
pineal gland situated in the interior of the cere- 
brum. The central situation of this part of the 
brain, together with its mobility, led him to sup- 
pose that it was the point where the affections of 
the body were transmitted to the soul, and where the 
volitions were transmitted to the members of the 
body : toute Taction de l'ame consiste en ce que la 
petite glande a qui elle est etroitement jointe se 
meut en la facon qui est requise pour produire 
l'effet qui se rapporte a cette volonte. 1 The animal 
spirits or nerves serve to connect this physiological 
centre with the extended world beyond the body. 
The will acting on the gland can produce move- 
ments in various parts of the body. 

The explanation given of this crude physiological 
psychology need not be given in any detail ; it is 
sufficient to observe that Descartes regards the 
volitions as finding expression through the animal 
spirits, either inwardly through the pores of the 
cerebrum, or outwardly to the muscles : cette vo- 
lonte fait que la glande pousse les esprits vers les 
muscles qui servent a cet effet. 3 

The soul has no direct knowledge of what takes 
place in the gland. Will has simply the power to 
move the gland in such a way as will propel the 

1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 41. 

2 Id., ib. I. 42. 



218 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

animal spirits towards the pores of the brain, as in 
imagination, or in the act of attention ; it can also 
expel the animal spirits to the muscles of the body, 
as has just been said. It is, however, not always 
the will to excite some motion within us, or some 
other effect, which can make us excite it. Such 
excitation takes place in accordance with changes 
which nature or habit have diversely joined with 
each thought. For example, in looking at a distant 
object, there will be a particular will to enlarge the 
pupil, and at a near object, to contract the pupil. 
The will to enlarge or contract is useless; that 
which effects the enlargement or contraction is the 
movement of the pineal gland. The effect is indi- 
rectly produced when the soul wills to look at a 
distant or near object. 1 

This physiological hypothesis of Descartes was 
afterwards severely criticised by Spinoza ; 2 yet 
however obscure and extravagant it may now 
seem, it is a sign of interest in that aspect of 
voluntary action which has led to the most consid- 
erable results. 

Thought in the Cartesian philosophy has a 
general denotation. It includes various kinds of 
knowledge, — sensations, phantasms, and ideas ; it 
includes also the passions and the will. These 
varieties of thought are attributed to several facul- 
ties. The faculties do not constitute the essence 
of the soul. The latter can be conceived as exist- 
ing even in the absence of the faculties; while 

1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. M. 
a Spiuoza, Etli. V. Praefat. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 219 

they cannot be conceived as existing without the 
soul. They appertain, or are attached, to a think- 
ing substance : pour me servir des termes de l'ecole, 
dans leur concept formel, elles enferment, quelque 
sorte d'intellection : d'ou je concois qu' elles sont 
distinctes de moi comme les modes le sont des 
choses. 1 There is a passive faculty which receives 
ideas, and an active faculty which produces ideas. 
Among thoughts, some are images of realities, and 
others are only ideas. As examples of the former 
are the images of those things which have been 
perceived through the senses ; as examples of the 
latter are those of which the self is the subject, 
such as fear, desire, and conceptions. The latter 
class may be divided into volitions or affections, 
and judgments. 

This brief account of certain general principles 
in the Cartesian system will perhaps be of assist- 
ance in the interpretation of the special theory of 
volition. 

I. Definition of the Will. The account given by 
Descartes of the nature of the will is so ambigu- 
ous, that it is difficult to know whether it is to be 
classified as an action, or as a passion of the soul. 
In a limited sense, it is that which directs the 
attention, and which moves and controls the body. 
But it also comprehends desire, aversion, assurance, 
denial, and doubt. 2 Yet desire is denned as a pas- 
sion, which refers to the future. In a letter to 
Regius, Descartes says : — 

1 Descartes, Meditations, VI. 9. 

2 Id., Prin. Phil. I. 32. 



220 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

Intellectio enim proprie mentis passio est, et volitio ejus 
actio ; sed quia nihil unquam volumus, quin simul intelliga- 
mus, et vix etiam quidquam intelligamus, quin simul aliquid 
velimus, ideo non facile in iis passionem ab actione distin- 
guimus. 1 

From this and other parts of his philosophy, it 
would appear that in a limited sense will is con- 
sidered by Descartes as active, especially as it may 
control the passions. 2 But he also uses it in the 
old general sense as equivalent to disposition and 
its manifestations. 

II. The Will and the Passions. The passions can- 
not be directly controlled by an act of the will. 3 
They may, however, be excited or controlled indi- 
rectly. Things which are associated with such 
passions as we wish to arouse may be voluntarily 
represented to the mind, or things which are re- 
mote from the passions which we wish to avoid 
may be voluntarily recalled; the effect will be to 
excite or allay the feeling. A man, for example, 
cannot will directly to be angry, but may volun- 
tarily recall the objects which excite his anger. 
He cannot will not to be angry, but may volunta- 
rily recall considerations which dissipate the feel- 
ing. But passions cannot be successfully resisted 
by direct volition. During their intensity, they 
have a reality like that of an object present to the 
senses, which persists whether we will it to be 
there or not. 4 

1 Descartes, Epistolae, CIII. 

2 Id., Les Passions, I. 45, 46. 
8 Id., ib. 4 id., ib. 



FROM DESCAKTES TO LEIBNITZ 221 

Descartes alludes to the opinion that a conflict is 
possible between the inferior and superior parts or 
principles of the soul, — between the higher and 
lower passions. Such a conflict, he believes, is un- 
real. The opinion that it is real is due to a con- 
fused idea of soul and body. Passions which have 
a bodily origin are attributed to the lower principle 
of the soul ; the supposed conflict is not in the soul, 
but in two contrary impulses of animal spirits meet- 
ing in the pineal gland. Some impressions are con- 
veyed to the brain which do not affect the will, but 
only move the body. The will, having no direct 
control of the passions, is constrained to use in- 
dustry in checking the latter, and to apply itself 
successively to different expedients, which gives 
rise to the view that there is a conflict between 
the inferior and superior passions. 1 

A weak will is one in which the volitions are con- 
trolled by the passions; and a strong will is one 
which is controlled by the judgment. 

III. The Understanding and the Will. The rela- 
tion of knowledge to volition is important ; for that 
which distinguishes will, as a mere passion, from 
will as a directing and controlling faculty, is its 
relation to the understanding. By the understand- 
ing alone, however, nothing is either affirmed or 
denied. Its office is only to conceive the ideas of 
things which may be either affirmed or denied. The 
errors into which men fall are thus due partly to 
the understanding and partly to the will. 2 

1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 47. 

2 Id., ib. Me'ditations, IV. 7. 



222 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Gassendi criticised Descartes for maintaining that 
the sphere of the will was wider than that of the 
understanding. The former maintained that the 
two powers were of equal extent, puisque la vo- 
lonte ne peut se porter vers aucune chose que 
l'entendement n'ait auparavant prevue. Descartes 
insists, however, that the two powers have an un- 
equal extension. We can will several things about 
one and the same thing, although we may know very- 
little about the thing. And when our judgment is 
defective, it is not because we will evil, but only- 
something which may have evil connected with it. 
There is a will which is not joined with intelligence, 
which acts en impulse and insufficient knowledge ; 
and the motive for willing, as well as the conse- 
quences of willing, may lie beyond our knowledge. 1 

The significance of this discussion can be better 
appreciated in connection with Descartes's doctrine 
of freedom. The participation of the will in the 
errors of the understanding is quite foreign to the 
conceptions of the earlier philosophy. And yet Des- 
cartes, considering the errors of his mind as signs of 
his imperfections, ascribes them first to the faculty 
of knowledge, and second to the faculty of choice. 
There is indeed, he maintains, nothing in the mind 
which can be called error, provided the word error 
be taken in a proper sense. On the one hand, will 
is not the cause of my errors, for it is very ample 
and perfect in its kind ; on the other hand, the under- 
standing is not the cause, for I cannot be deceived 
by the God who has given me the faculty. The 

1 Descartes, Gassendi, Reponses, etc., 71. 



FKOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 223 

cause of error is to be found in the fact that the 
will is wider than the understanding, and instead 
of confining volition within the limits of what I 
understand, I extend it to things which I do not 
understand. Thus it easily wanders, and leads me 
into mistakes. 1 

IV. The Will and Freedom. Descartes uses the 
term free will in a peculiar way. He makes a dis- 
tinction between indifference and freedom. The 
indifference of the will is due to ignorance. Having 
maintained that the will has a wider field than the 
understanding, indifferent volition comes from the 
exercise of will in the absence of knowledge. When 
the judgment does not determine it, it is indifferent. 
Freedom, on the contrary, is in proportion to the 
knowledge which determines the exercise of the 
will. The term indifference, says Descartes, has 
been used in two ways : first, when the mind has 
no knowledge concerning certain courses of action, 
as to whether they are bad or good; and second, 
when the mind wills to follow one course of action 
in the presence of an alternative. In the latter 
case there is freedom to choose the good and reject 
the bad. But the latter use of the term indiffer- 
ence he does not recognize. The latter case he 
regards as an illustration of true liberty. The ex- 
tent of our freedom consists in the knowledge which 
determines our action. The greater the knowledge 
the greater the freedom. Consequently our liberty 
is better exhibited when we are commanded to fol- 
low a certain course, and decline to obey the com- 

1 Descartes, Prm. Phil. I. 6. 



224 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

mand, than when we are inclined by nothing either 
within or without, to do one thing in preference to 
another. By freedom, then, Descartes does not 
mean freedom from determination, but only free- 
dom from ignorance on the one hand and constraint 
on the other. The will is so free in its nature that 
it cannot be constrained; but its freedom consists 
in its determination by knowledge, i.e., by the intel- 
lect. Unless this be the proper interpretation of 
the theory of Descartes, he appears to teach that 
our freedom is in proportion to our determination ; 
but this is only to say that when we will according 
to knowledge we are free, and it is knowledge which 
determines the will. 1 

Descartes is here referring to will in its active 
significance. If will be considered only as a pas- 
sion, then it is absurd to ask whether or not it is 
free ; nor can we ask whether the mind has control 
over aversion, assurance, and doubt, if these be 
species of will. This would be to ask whether we 
can control the will by the will. But the power 
of freedom is not only proportionate to the know- 
ledge we may have of the object of volition ; it is 
also proportionate to the inclination which we may 
have towards a given course of action. The more 
settled our inclination, the greater our liberty, just 
as the more distinct and the clearer our knowledge, 
the greater our liberty. Freedom thus depends on 
knowledge and inclination. Freedom consists in 
being able to do or not to do a given thing, that 

1 Descartes, Reponses aux sixiemes objections par divers 
theol. et phil. (II.) VI. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 225 

is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid, the objects 
presented by the understanding. No external force 
constrains the will ; for that to which there is the 
greatest inclination is that which is willed, and we 
are enabled by God to will in accordance with our 
inclinations. Certain Patristic writers had looked 
upon freedom as determination of a moral kind. 
Descartes looks upon freedom as determination of 
an intellectual kind. When the understanding 
determines the will, the man is master of his own 
acts ; and it is for this reason that he is worthy of 
praise or blame. That the inclinations are not 
altogether voluntary is proved by Descartes's state- 
ment that it is nature which teaches the avoidance 
of things which give pain, and the pursuit of those 
which give pleasure. There is thus such a harmony 
between our knowledge and our action, that we are 
able to refer sensations to that part of the body 
from which they produce their first effects, and 
we take voluntary measures to avoid or encourage 
the continuance of the feeling. If we had suffi- 
ciently clear and distinct ideas of good and evil, 
we should always pursue the former and avoid the 
latter. 

The doctrine of freedom is still further enforced 
by an appeal to internal experience 1 after the man- 
ner of the Scottish psychologists. While indiffer- 
ence and freedom may be incomprehensible, we are 
conscious that they are real. Although we do not 
will to deceive ourselves, it often happens that our 
judgments are precipitate. When our knowledge 

1 Reponses aux cinq, objections de M. Gassendi (50), III. 
Q 



226 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

is insufficient, that which is untrue is considered as 
true, and ignorance determines the will. 

The essence of the freedom of the will of God 
differs from that of the human will. The will of 
God is absolute, not only over all events, but over 
all truth. God wills what is good or true; and 
truth and goodness depend for their being on 
the will of God. Thus an entire indifference in 
God is looked upon as a proof of his power. He 
wills absolutely, without any external reasons for 
his will. 1 

The indifference of God arises from his omnip- 
otence and omniscience; that of man. from his 
impotence and ignorance. The actions of men 
are simply second causes which operate in 
order that what God has willed may be carried 
out. God is not the author of sin; for (a) sin is 
nothing, and (&) whatever God wills is right, 
because He wills it. 2 Yet in a letter to the Princess 
Elizabeth, Descartes hesitates to apply his theory 
too rigorously to the action of God. When we 
think of the infinite power of God, we are obliged 
to believe that all things, even our own wills, 
depend on his. For it is a contradiction, he 
says, to hold that God has created men with 
wills independent of His own, and so has limited 
his infinite power. And yet we have experience 
of our own freedom, and we should not let this 
make us doubt the existence of God, but only 

1 Reponses aux sixiemes objections par divers theol. et. phil. 
(II.) VI. 

2 Descartes, Prin. Phil. I. 6, 23. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 227 

recognize that our actions are on this account 
worthy of praise or blame, and that all men are 
subject to God. This position of Descartes has 
been taken since his day, by almost all those who 
believe in predestination. 

While Descartes added nothing of any great 
importance to the science of volition, he raised 
some questions which have a distinct bearing on 
some of the more important problems of the pres- 
ent. His statement that there are acts of the soul 
without knowledge, in response to affections of the 
body, is an anticipation of the principle of reflex 
action. 1 Still more suggestive are his denial that 
the lower animals have any principle of intelli- 
gence or will, and his explanation of all animal 
movement upon mechanical grounds. It remained 
for our own century to find in the motions of 
animals one of the most valuable aids to the 
explanation of the phenomena of will in man. 

Malebranche 

The philosophy of Malebranche may be regarded 
as a link in the chain of development from the 
dualism of Descartes to the monism of Spinoza. 
It is, however, not this alone which makes a notice 
of his theory desirable. His doctrine of the will 
has a peculiar interest from its relation to the theory 
of occasional causes. Together with principles de- 
rived more or less directly from Descartes, Male- 
branche adopts elements of Augustine's philosophy, 

1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 47. 



228 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

and modifies them to suit his own conclusions. His 
system is at once a natural theology and an ontol- 
ogy. While he deals psychologically with the will, 
his special interest in it is connected with predes- 
tination and grace. Instead of the extreme dualism 
of Descartes he sets forth a peculiar species of 
idealism, resembling in some points that of his 
contemporary Berkeley, who was thought to have 
borrowed from the French philosopher. 

Malebranche divides the operations of the soul 
into sense, imagination, understanding, inclina- 
tions, and passions. The object of his principal 
work, Recherche de la Verite", is to show how these 
several operations give rise to errors, and to pro- 
vide a remedy. In his account of the passions he 
is greatly indebted to Descartes. The following 
points in his philosophy are comprehensive of his 
treatment of will. 

I. Faculties. The mind has two general facul- 
ties, understanding and will. There is an analogy 
between the properties of mind and those of mat- 
ter. The properties of matter are that of receiving 
impressions or figures, and that of being moved. 
These correspond respectively to understanding, 
which receives impressions, and will, which pro- 
duces motion. He speaks of the capacity of the 
will to receive inclinations, by which he means ap- 
parently the power to will certain things. 1 

II. Definition of the Will. Will is that impres- 
sion or natural motion which carries us towards 
universal and indeterminate good. Freedom is 

1 Malebranche, Recherche de la Ve'rite', 1. 1. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 229 

considered as a power, as in the system of Locke. 
It is the power which the mind has of turning 
towards agreeable objects, and terminating our 
natural inclinations upon some particular object, 
which was previously indeterminate with reference 
to will. Even the natural inclinations are volun- 
tary. They are not free, however, in the sense of 
having liberty of indifference. The liberty of in- 
difference is simply the power of willing or not 
willing; that is, willing the contrary of natural 
inclination. The love of the good is voluntary, 
for love proceeds from the will. Yet it is impos- 
sible to force the inclination of love freely, just as 
it is impossible to govern the will by force or con- 
straint. 1 

III. Will and Understanding. Will is a blind 
power, unless it is guided by the understanding. 
In order that it may have some content, it must be 
applied to the understanding. For the latter is 
subject to the control of the will. The power that 
the will has to determine its inclinations is in- 
volved in the ability to apply the understanding to 
objects at will. In order to illustrate this rela- 
tionship, Malebranche supposes the case of a man 
who represents to himself an honor or preferment, 
under the conception of the good, which he may 
hope for. He wills the good directly. The impres- 
sion which is continually carrying his soul towards 
universal good inclines it towards the honor which 
he represents to himself. This propensity towards 
indeterminate good is fixed and natural; so far 

1 Malebranche, Recherche de la Vel-ite, I. i. 



230 THEORIES OE THE WILIi 

there is no voluntary action or free action. But 
the soul has choice as to whether it will or will 
not identify this particular honor with any species 
of the universal and indeterminate good. In this 
consists its voluntary power. The soul may further 
suspend both its judgment and affection with respect 
to this particular object — this honor. It may do 
this from a want of conviction that the particular 
object desired comprehends all the good which the 
soul is capable of loving. Malebranche adds that 
the soul may compare all good things with each 
other, may love them according to their order, and 
in proportion to their excellence. It may consider 
them with reference to that universal good which 
contains all, and which alone is adapted to satisfy 
the affections of the soul. 1 

It is a peculiar doctrine of Malebranche that the 
understanding has no power of judging. The func- 
tion of the understanding is to perceive. To judge 
is a function of the will. All errors are therefore 
voluntary. 2 The understanding perceives only sim- 
ple things and their relations, and the relations of 
these relations. It is the will which judges and 
reasons. In this confused use of terms, Male- 
branche has fortunately had few imitators. We 
are said to attribute judgments to the understand- 
ing, when the consent seems so evident that the 
voluntary element remains unnoticed; but, as a 
matter of fact, all judgments are voluntary. It is 
only that the will in such cases seems to follow, 

1 Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite, 1. 1. 

2 Id., ib. I. ii. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 231 

not to guide the understanding. . The latter makes 
the representation to the former, and when there 
is easy acquiescence, the judgment is thought to be 
involuntary. Yet the will may decline to consent 
to what is represented by the understanding, and 
in such cases the voluntary nature of judgment is 
more easily recognized. Malebranche criticises 
those who distinguish between assent to the action 
of the understanding and consent to the good. He 
holds, on the contrary, that the data of the under- 
standing command our assent without awakening 
doubt. The good may therefore be freely recog- 
nized, and yet the will may not be fixed as to 
whether the particular good represented ie to be 
loved. Consent of the will to truth is therefore to 
be distinguished from consent of the will to follow- 
ing the good. The reason why man consents so 
readily to truth is that his interests are less nearly 
involved. Truth which does not affect the pas- 
sions and inclinations of men is more readily 
recognized than when man's selfish interests are 
involved. 

IV. Freedom. Man wills and determines his 
own actions. It is God who causes him to will, 
not directly, but indirectly. This view of the will 
is a part of Malebranche's theory of occasionalism. 
The efficiency of causes comes not from the action 
of these causes alone. That which makes any cause 
efficient is the concurrent action of God. Accord- 
ing to Malebranche's epistemology, the soul sees 
all things in God. And in like manner the soul 
performs all actions by the concourse of God. I 



232 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

know that I will and that I will freely; and this 
volition is the true cause of the movement of the 
body. But there is no actual relation between 
soul and body. Consequently, that the former may 
have any effect on the latter, there must be, as it 
were, a supernatural interposition through the! 
agency of God. There is no analogy between voli- 
tion and motion. There is a physiological change 
when the soul wills, and the animal spirits proceed 
to the muscle which is to be moved; but I have no 
share in this process. That the effort of the soul*! 
becomes effective is due to the will of God, which 
never fails of its effect. 1 It is singular to find 
here a rapprochement to the view afterwards taken 
by Hume. Like Hume, Malebranche fails to find 
any efficiency in the mind acting as cause to pro- 
duce the effect. No relation between the twol 
phenomena can be discovered which can be called 
efficiency, or even necessary connection. There 
are no efficient second causes. Malebranche admits 
that there is a feeling of effort or endeavor which 
is a concomitant of the volition, but, like Hume, 
he denies that this is the efficient cause of the 
movement. The motion of the arm, for example, 
is performed at the very moment that the effort is 
felt; but the soul has no knowledge of what nerves 
must be excited in order that the movement may 
be produced. The efficiency of the will in such a 
case is owing to the efficiency of the will of God. 
Volitions, like cognitions, are thus miraculous 
events. 

1 Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite - , II. Liv. VI. 3. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 233 

What is true of the willing of movements, is true 
also of the willing of ideas. It is only a prejudice 
which leads to the belief that man originates his 
own ideas. We overlook the action of God, because 
he is an invisible spirit, and so we attribute our 
ideas to our own desires. 1 This general view is 
further enforced by the argument that a contradic- 
tion is implied in saying that men are the authors 
of their own movements or ideas. For a true cause 
is that between which and its effect the mind per- 
ceives a necessary connection. But there is none 
except the most perfect being between whose will 
and its effects the mind can perceive such a con- 
nection. The application of this to the theory of 
knowledge is that the understanding is receptive, 
not active j and particular volitions are only occa- 
sional causes of ideas in the understanding. 

Spinoza 

In the philosophy of Hume volition was inter- 
preted in terms of feeling ; in that of Spinoza it is 
interpreted in terms of intellect. In the systems 
of these two philosophers the result is shown of that 
gradual exclusion from the conception of will of 
those elements which are not immediately related 
to action. From his theory of knowledge Hume 
was led to exclude the idea of abiding character, to 
notice the result only of a process which the earlier 
philosophy had identified with will. With him, 
feeling as the effect of action is all that may be 

i Malebranche, 111. II. ; Liv. VI. 3. 



234 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

called will. Will is not judgment, nor choice, nor 
decision, nor an efferent impulse. It is an impres- 
sion. By a totally different method, and upon 
totally different principles, Spinoza likewise ex- 
cludes from will any originative power and all emo- 
tional elements. With him it is simply affirmation 
and denial, for the will and the intellect are one. 

The principle from which he sets out is that of 
substance. It is not the dualism of Descartes. 
His theory is not theistic, but pantheistic. Sub- 
stance is that, the conception of which requires the 
conception of nothing else for its subsistence : per 
subtantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se 
concipitur: hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget 
conceptu alter ius rei, a quo formari debeat. 1 

An attribute is that which the intellect perceives 
concerning substance as constituting the essence 
of substance: per attributum intelligo id quod 
intellectus de substantia percipit, tamquam ejus- 
dem essentiam constituens. 2 God is the only sub- 
stance. Instead of the created substances of 
Descartes, we have here thought and extension de- 
fined as attributes of this one substance. Neither 
of these attributes is cause of the other. God is 
the efficient cause of all things. 3 As free cause, 
be is called natura naturans. He is an immanent 
and proximate cause of those things which are 
determined by him. 4 They are determined to exist 
by him in such a way that without him they can- 
not be conceived of. They are related to him as 

1 Spinoza, Eth. I. Def. 3. » Id., ib. I. xvi. Coroll. 1. 

2 Id., ib. I. Def. 4. * Id., ib. I. xvn. et Coroll. 2 ; xxvni. Schol. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 235 

the properties of a triangle are related to the tri- 
angle. All that proceeds necessarily from God is 
called natura naturata. The attributes have a 
unity in God, but there is no reciprocal action be- 
tween thern. There is, however, a correspondence 
between these two attributes. The order of ex- 
tended things, and the order of ideas, that is of 
unextended things, is one and the same. This is 
because potentia cogitandi in God is the same 
yfith. %)otentia agendi; 1 one is considered under the 
attribute of thought, the other under the attribute 
of extension. A mode is an affection of substance, 
or that which is in another by means of which it 
is conceived : per modum intelligo substantiae 
affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod 
etiam concipitur. 2 Particular things (res particu- 
lars) are affectus of the attributes of God. They 
are modes which express the attributes of God in 
a certain and determinate manner. A mode is 
either a body or a thinking thing (corpus or res 
cogitans). The term affectus 3 in Spinoza's phi- 
losophy is almost equivalent to passion in the 
philosophy of Descartes. He himself makes it the 
same with the Greek bp^rj, and he speaks also of 
affectum seu passionem. Passions are affections 
of bodies ; in relation to thought, or viewed under 
the attribute of thought, they are ideas of affec- 
tions. But the order of things and the order of 
ideas is the same. By means of the affections, the 
power of the body for acting is increased or dimin- 

i Spinoza, Eth. II. vn. et Coroll. 2 1^ i D , i, D e f . 5. 
« Id., ib. III. explic. ad fin. ; III. Def. 3. 



236 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

ished. 1 The mind of a man is res particularis, or 
more specifically res cogitans. The mind is united 
with the body, and the idea of the body is in the 
mind. The two constitute one individual mode, 
considered under the attribute of thought and under 
the attribute of extension. When we are the cause 
of our affections, they are called actions, otherwise 
they are called passions. The former arise from 
adequate, the latter from inadequate, ideas. The 
essence of the mind consists in thought: mentis 
essentia in cogitatione constitit. 2 

I have recalled these fundamental definitions and 
principles to the reader in order to prepare the way 
for the special consideration of Spinoza's theory of 
the will. 

I. The Theory of Faculties. Spinoza's criticism 
of this theory, which suggests some of the prob- 
lems left unsolved by Aristotle, has had a very 
extensive influence upon modern psychology, and 
is of importance especially in relation to the science 
of volition. In the mind there is no absolute 
faculty of knowing, desiring, loving, or willing. 
The so-called faculties are either convenient pre- 
tences (Jictitias) or metaphysical abstractions, or 
are universals such as we are accustomed to form 
from particulars. 3 Intellect and will have the 
same relation to this or that idea of the mind, that 
lapideitas has to lapis, or homo to Peter or Paul. 
They are not called mere names, by Spinoza, but 
universal notions (notiones universales) . The only 

i Spinoza, Eth. III. 1-3. 2 h., ib. V. xxxviii. 

3 Id., ib. I. Appendix; II. XLVin. Schol. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 237 

faculty of intellect, then, is the idea or the ideas 
which the mind has as the objects of thought, and 
there is no faculty called the will, but only this 
or that volition. In mente nulla datur absoluta 
facultas volendi et nolendi, sed tantum singulares 
volitiones, nempe haec et ilia affirmatio, et haec et 
ilia negatio. 1 Thus in Spinoza's philosophy one 
faculty is not set over against another, nor is one 
faculty determined by another. The soul is res 
cogitans, and its cogitationes are individual ideas, 
which are modes of the attribute of thought, which 
in turn expresses the essence of God in a certain 
and determinate manner. 

II. The Nature of the Will. As has just been 
shown, no absolute faculty is recognized. Both 
intellect and will are modes belonging only to 
natura naturata. Voluntas is only a certain mode 
of thinking; and individual volitions are related 
to the mind as the properties of the triangle are 
related to the triangle. Concipiamus itaque sin- 
gularem aliquam volitionem nempe modum cogi- 
tandi, quo mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli 
aequales esse duobus rectis. 2 Eor the sake of 
making his meaning clear, however, Spinoza often 
speaks of will and intellect as faculties; and so 
he defines the will as a faculty of affirming and 
denying, by which the mind affirms what is true, 
and denies what is false. 3 It is not a desire by 
means of which the mind pursues or avoids : facul- 
tatem, inquam, intelligo, qua mens, quid verum 

1 Spinoza, Eth. II. xlix. 2 j^ ft,. 

8 Id., ib. II. xlviii. Schoi. 



238 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

quidve falsuni sit, affirmat vel negat, et non cupi- 
datem, qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. 1 Voli- 
tions are individually nothing but the ideas of 
things; they are concepts of thought, cogitationis 
conceptus. 2 To this radical view of volition, the 
first natural criticism which might arise is that in 
this case there is no difference between intellect and 
will. But this conclusion is accepted by Spinoza, 
who says: voluntas et intellectus unum et idem 
sunt. 3 Descartes had held that, while will is infinite, 
intellect is finite ; and Spinoza considers that this 
might be urged as an objection to his affirmation of 
their identity. 4 He replies that if by intellect is 
meant a knowledge of clear and distinct ideas, then 
the will is wider than the intellect ; but if reference 
is had to perceptions of all kinds, then the field of 
the will is not more extended than that of the 
intellect; for the will acts only in so far as there 
is knowledge. According to the definition, it sim- 
ply affirms or denies, and so is one with the intel- 
lect. A second criticism which he supposes may 
be made to his theory is, that the mind can suspend 
judgment as to affirmation or denial; while intel- 
lect in knowing, must affirm or deny. But Spinoza 
denies that we can suspend judgment. When it 
is said that we suspend judgment, the meaning is 
that we do not adequately perceive the object. A 
third supposed objection is that we do not seem to 

i Spinoza, Eth. II. XLvni. Schol. 2 Id., ib. 

8 Id., ib. II. xlix. Coroll; Korte Verhandeling, II. 16; Cog. 
Met. II. 12. 

4 Id., ib. H. xlix. Schol. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 239 

need a greater power for affirming a thing to be 
true which, is true, than for affirming a thing to be 
true which is false; but we perceive one idea to 
have more truth and reality than another, which 
proves that will and intellect are not the same. 
Spinoza replies that the affirmation of truth is 
related to the affirmation of falsehood as being is 
related to nothing. Lastly, the objection is made 
that if will be only affirmation or denial, a man 
who is in a state of equilibrium, like the famous 
Asinus Buridani, will die of hunger or thirst. 
Spinoza replies, with some vivacity, that, under the 
conditions assumed, death by starvation or thirst 
will follow; but that it might be asked whether 
such a man would be an ass or a man. He would, 
for his part, say that he did not know what value 
should be put on a man who suspended himself in 
this way, nor did he know what value should be 
put on the judgments of children, fools, and mad- 
men: dico me nescire, ut etiam nescio, quanti 
aestimandus sit ille, qui se pensilem facit, et 
quanti aestimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc. 1 

Many critics have called attention to the use of 
the term conatus by Spinoza, and have objected 
that he should have spoken of effort or endeavor, 
if the will is only affirmation or negation. Con- 
sidering his care in defining the terms of his phi- 
losophy, it is prima facie improbable that Spinoza 
should have fallen into an inconsistency in this 
respect. The term conatus in his Ethics is 
applied to body as well as to mind. It is either 

1 Spinoza, Eth. II. xux. Schol. ; Cog. Met. II. 12. 



240 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

an affection or the idea of an affection of the body. 
He says: Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in 
suo esse perseverare conatur. 1 It has been said 
already that singular things are modes which 
express the essence of God in a certain and 
determinate manner. It follows from this that 
nothing has in itself anything by which it could 
be destroyed, but on the contrary is opposed 
{opponitur) to everything which could deprive it 
of existence. The conatus is simply the persist- 
ence of modes of God, whether extended or non- 
extended. It is therefore perfectly evident that 
Spinoza does not use conatus as meaning a mere 
phenomenon of consciousness, but as an objective 
property of all modes of thought and extension. 
The conatus of a stone is its persistence in being 
a stone; the conatus of the mind is its persistence 
in being as a mode of thought. In the volition, 
conatus is only the mind by affirmation, persisting 
in its existence as res cogitans. 2 

Because the conatus is such persistence in the 
existence of res cogitans, it stands for its actual 
essence. 3 That this interpretation of Spinoza's 
doctrines is correct is evident from the statement 
that the mind is conscious of conatus, in so far as 
it has ideas, and endeavors to persevere in its own 
being in a certain indefinite duration: mens tarn 
quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus con- 
fusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare 

1 Spinoza, Eth. III. vi, in Part III., prop. 6. 

2 Id., ib. III. vi.-vhi. and xxx. Compare Prin. Phil. Cart. III. 
Def. 3. 8 id., ib. III. vi. vii. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 241 

indefinita quadam duratione, et hujus sui conatus 
est conscia. 1 The conatus of mind alone is will; 
the conatus of mind and body together is appetite : 
hie conatus, cum ad mentem solam refertur, Vo- 
luntas appellatur, sed cum ad mentem et corpus 
simul refertur, yocatur Appetitus. Men follow 
their appetites, which tend to their conservation as 
men. Cupiditas, or desire, relates to men in so far 
as they are conscious of their appetites. In one 
place, conatus and cupiditas are used synonymously. 

That there is no effective effort in the ordinary 
meaning of the term is further proven by the argu- 
ment that the mind does not determine the body, 
nor the body the mind. As has been said already, 
Spinoza regards God as the efficient cause of all 
things, and as determining all things, as well as 
all events. The ideas of the mind are thus not 
caused by body, nor do the volitions of the mind 
determine the acts and affections of the body. 
Their relationship is in God, and not in reciprocal 
action. 2 

And inasmuch as both mind and body are one 
and the same mode, one being perceived under the 
attribute of thought, and the other under that of 
extension, it would be absurd to say that either of 
them determines the other. Nor are the passions 
determined by the will. In so far as they are re- 
lated to the mind, they can neither be coerced nor 
removed, except by the idea of a contrary affection 
of body, and by the affection of a stronger body. 
But both mind and body are determined necessarily 

1 Spinoza, Eth. III. is.. 2 Id., ib. II. xxi. xxn. 

R 



242 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

by nature. Descartes is criticised for saying that 
the mind has any power over its acts. Spinoza 
gives some attention to the reasons which lead to 
the belief that the body is moved by the mind, espe- 
cially by the will. No one has yet had experience 
as to what his body might do without his mind ; no 
one understands the structure of the body well 
enough to explain its action; yet the instinct of 
the lower animals is in many respects superior to 
the intelligence of man. To assert that the mind 
is the only thing that can move the body is to 
speak ignorantly. Spinoza asks what becomes 
of the mind when the body is inert, as in sleep ; 
he shows the interdependence of mind and body, 
and he affirms that so far from speech, appe- 
tites, memory, and forgetting, being controlled by 
the will, all these are beyond a man's control. 
What has been called decretum mentis is not to be 
distinguished from imagination or memory. It is 
nothing except that affirmation which the idea 
quatenus idea necessarily involves. 1 

III. The Will and Freedom. Spinoza denies that 
there are any contingent events. All things are 
determined from the necessity of the divine nature, 
so that they exist and act in a certain way. It is 
of the nature of the reason to perceive things not 
as contingent but as necessary ; and this is the very 
necessity of the eternal nature of God. The term 
contingent has only a relative meaning. 2 Things 
are regarded as contingent in so far as we find 

1 Spinoza, Eth. III. n. Schol. 

2 Id., ib. IV. Def. III. and I. xxix. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 243 

nothing pertaining to their essence which neces- 
sarily supposes their existence, or which prevents 
their existence. Real contingency cannot be pred- 
icated of volitions. As has been already seen, they 
are determined, not by the will of God, for God 
has no will in the sense that man uses the term, 
but by the nature of God. 1 A man can therefore 
no more will freely, than a triangle can have its 
three angles equal to more than two right angles. 
God himself acts according to the necessity of his 
nature, and has no free will. Still less can man 
be called a free cause. His will acts necessarily. 
Nothing which proceeds from God could have been 
differently produced, and all is necessarily deter- 
mined. The mind is determined to will this or 
that by a cause, and this cause is determined by 
another, and so on ad infinitum* Belief in free- 
dom comes from the consciousness that men have 
of their own actions, and their ignorance of the 
causes by which they are determined : ratio doceat, 
quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse cre- 
dant, quia suarum actionum sunt conscii, et cau- 
sarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari. 3 The decrees 
of the mind (decreta mentis) are only the appetites, 
which vary with the disposition of the body. The 
only case in which man can be said to be free is when 
his will is determined wholly by reason; and to act 
from reason is to do those things which follow from 
the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. 

1 Spinoza, Eth. I. xxix. Schol. ; xxxn. 

2 Id., ib. II. XLvm. and Epist. XX. 

8 Id., ib. III. ii. Schol. ; Korte Verhandeling, II., xvn. 



244 THEORIES OE THE "WILL 

It is interesting to find repeated in Spinoza's 
Ethics the same expressions of doubt concerning 
tlie power of the soul to affect the body which 
have been already noticed in connection with the 
theories of Descartes and Malebranche. However 
unsatisfactory one may think the supposition of 
Descartes as to the supposed function of the pineal 
gland, or the miraculous theory of causation taught 
by Malebranche, or the assertion of Spinoza that 
will does not move the body, it will be found that 
in all of these systems of philosophy there is an 
anticipation of the problem of the will as it has 
appeared in the psychology of our own day. Here 
are the questions about feeling of effort, and inner- 
vation-feeling in the germ. 

Leibnitz 

I. TJie Theory of Monads. — The first principles 
of the philosophy of Leibnitz are contained in his 
Monadologie. Like Spinoza, he proceeds from a 
doctrine of substance; but his conception of sub- 
stance differs in important particulars from that of 
his predecessors. Substance is not one, but many ; 
its essence is not in extension, nor in thought, but 
in force. The plurality of substances which com- 
pose the world are called monads. Of these there 
is an infinite number, of which God is the highest. 
A monad is a simple substance which enters into 
all compounds. 1 It is unextended and without parts. 
It is therefore indivisible. Each monad has entele- 

i Leibnitz, La Monadologie, 1. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 245 

chy, — a terra -which is not to be taken in the Aris- 
totelian sense. By it Leibnitz means a primitive or 
substantial tendency. Monads differ in proportion 
to the clearness and distinctness of the perceptions 
which they possess. For the nature of the monad 
is spiritual, not material. Each is free from sub- 
jection to any external influence. Changes occur 
within the monad, but it is not altered from with- 
out. The principle of change is internal, — the 
inner activity of each monad. Yet while each is a 
unit, it may have a plurality of affections ; although 
the substance remains one and undivided. The 
action of a monad consists in the changes of its per- 
ceptions. 1 Perception is a term which is used 
by Leibnitz in the most general way, denoting 
thoughts of every kind. The principle of inner 
change is designated by the term appetition. 3 
The soul may be defined as that which has percep- 
tions and appetitions of this general kind. It is not 
necessary that the soul should be conscious of these 
perceptions and appetitions ; there are many changes 
of the soul which are not the objects of consciousness. 
The tendency of the soul in appetition becomes ac- 
tion when it is not interfered with. Du vouloir et 
dupouvoir joints ensemble, sont Paction. 3 The dis- 
tinction between appetition and volition is that the 
former is the result of unconscious perceptions, while 
the latter is the result of conscious perceptions. 

II. The Will and the Faculties. Leibnitz regards 
the doctrine of independent faculties in the soul as 

1 Leibnitz, La Monadologie, 15. 2 Id., ib. 15. 

8 Id., Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 5. 



246 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

a logical deduction from realism ; and quotes approv- 
ingly from Episcopius to show that such a logical 
theory forbids a doctrine of freedom. 1 It is not cor- 
rect to say that the will is a superior faculty of the 
soul, that it rules and orders all things, that it is 
free or that it is not free, that it determines the in- 
ferior faculties, that it follows the dictates of the 
understanding. For the faculties are not agents 
with distinct actions. It is not the qualities 
or the faculties which act, but the substances by 
means of the faculties. In the Nouveaux Essais, 
Leibnitz follows closely the teaching of Locke with 
respect to the will and freedom. Power (puissance) 
is the possibility of change. 2 It is of two kinds, ac- 
tive and passive. Active power is faculty; passive 
power is receptivity. Will may be defined as the 
power to change the actions of body and mind. This 
was the definition of Locke ; and Leibnitz would mod- 
ify it, and say that the will is the effort (conatus) or 
tendency to attain the good and avoid the bad : pour 
parler plus rondement et pour aller peut-etre plus 
avant, je dirai que la volition est l'effort ou la ten- 
dance {conatus) d'aller vers ce qu'on trouve bon et 
loin de ce qu'on trouve mauvais, en sorte que cette 
tendance resulte immediatement de l'apperception 
qu'on en a. 3 The close connection between Leib- 
nitz's conceptions of substance, of power, and of 
will, is shown in his view of the spontaneity of sub- 
stance. If all changes within the monad consist of 

1 Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 6. 

2 Id., ib. II. xxi. 4. 
«Id.,ib. II. xxi. 5. 



FEOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 247 

the alternation of perceptions, and if the tendency of 
the monad is towards action, there is no definite line 
dividing knowledge from volition. Spontaneity is 
of the very inner nature of the soul ; it belongs to 
the soul because the principle of our actions is not 
external to us, but is an inward principle. 1 Exter- 
nal things have, strictly speaking, no effect upon the 
soul whatever. This spontaneity is common to all 
substances, and in the substance which is free and 
intelligent, it governs all actions. 

Volition must, however, not be confounded with 
desire. While it rarely happens that an action of 
the will is produced in us, unaccompanied by some 
desire, will and desire should not be confounded : 
il arrive rarement qu'aucune action volontaire soit 
produite en nous, sans que quelque desir l'accom- 
pagne ; c'est pourquoi la volonte et le desir sont si 
souvent confondus ensemble. 2 There is an uneasi- 
ness which excites desire, and there is an uneasiness 
which moves the will. Wherever there is desire, 
there is uneasiness ; but one cannot say that wher- 
ever there is uneasiness, there is desire. In an act 
of volition, in the true sense of the word, there is a 
concurrence of several perceptions and inclinations. 
And volition cannot subsist without desire or avoid- 
ance. Yet sometimes a violent passion can act 
upon the mind, without knowledge, and without 
intervening volition : comme le vent le plus furieux 
agit sur nos corps. 3 

1 Leibnitz, The'odice'e, 59. 

2 Id., Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 39. 
» Id., ib. II. xxi. 12. 



248 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

III. TJie Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony. 
The freedom of the monad from all external affec- 
tions, and the reflection in its consciousness more 
or less perfectly of the entire universe, raise the 
question of the possibility of such knowledge. 1 
External objects are not known by their effects 
upon the soul; nor does the soul see all things 
in God, as Malebranche had supposed. Leibnitz 
teaches that there is a correspondence between the 
ideas in the consciousness of the monad, and the 
ideas or events in the world without. The theory 
resembles that implied in the statement of Spinoza, 
that the order of ideas and that of things are 
the same. This, according to Leibnitz, does not 
arise from the unity of substance, but from the 
harmony preestablished by God, between the world 
beyond the soul, and the world within the soul : et ; 
par son moyen l'univers entier, suivant le point de 
vue propre a cette substance simple; sans qu'elle 
ait besoin de recevoir aucune influence physique du 
corps: comme le corps aussi de son cote s'accom- 
mode aux volontes de Fame par ses propres lois, et 
par consequent ne lui obeit qu'autant que ces lois le 
portent. 2 The soul is thus so spontaneous that it 
depends only on God and itself in its actions. 

IV. The Principle of Sufficient Reason. This 
forms an important element in Leibnitz's theory of 
the determination of the will. Two principles lie 
at the foundation of all our reasoning : that of 
contradiction, and that of sufficient reason. The 
following is the definition of the principle of suffi- 

i Leibnitz, La Monadol. 51 f. 2 id., Theodicee, III. 291. 



PROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 249 

cient reason : there is nothing true or existent, no 
real statement (enunciation), without there being a 
sufficient reason why it should be so and not other- 
wise, although the reasons cannot generally be 
known to us. This principle does not exclude con- 
tingency, because of the immense variety of things 
in nature, and the division of bodies ad infinitum} 
Specifically, there is an infinity of imperceptible 
inclinations in the soul which enter into the final 
cause of action. But this view of nature is not 
mechanical, although each body is a kind of divine 
machine or natural automaton. The machines of 
nature differ from those of art, in that they are 
related, not to a particular end, but to infinity : les 
machines de la nature, c'est a dire les corps vivants, 
sont encore machines dans leurs moindres parties 
jusqu'a l'infini. 2 The principle of sufficient reason 
implies that there is nothing dead, or sterile, or 
useless in nature. 

V. The Will and the Idea of Freedom. The 
term liberty, or freedom, is ambiguous. It does 
not refer to liberty from external restraint. With 
relation to the will, it is of two kinds : (a) when 
the will is not constrained by the passions, i.e., by 
the affections of the mind itself ; (&) when the will 
is not constrained by necessity. 3 The first of these 
is freedom in the sense of the Stoic philosophy. 
But the relation of the will to necessity is of more 
importance. Voluntary is not opposed to neces- 
sary, but to involuntary. And volitions are not 

l Leibnitz, La Monadol. 32 f . 2 i&. y ft. 64. 

3 Id., Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. b. 



250 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

necessary, but contingent. By the necessary Leib- 
nitz means that of which the contrary is impossible, 
or that which implies contradiction. Acts of the 
will are only hypothetically necessary, which is the 
same as saying that it is contingent, whether a cer- 
tain action of the will is about to take place. If 
we accept the above definition of the necessary, it 
will follow that volitions, although they are deter- 
mined, are not necessary. 1 If it be asked then 
what determines the will, the answer given is that 
the mind determines the will ; but the mind is 
determined by some uneasiness, and the latter is 
the motive of volition. It is internal, not ex- 
ternal. Leibnitz follows Descartes in holding 
that freedom of the will is dependent on know- 
ledge. When there are several desires before the 
mind, the mind may consider them in succession 
previous to the final volition. This is called delib- 
eration, and in it consists liberum arbitrium in its 
true sense. And this deliberation is not a defect, 
but rather a perfection of our nature : vouloir et 
agir conformement au dernier resultat d'un sin- 
cere examen, c'est plutot une perfection qu'un 
defaut de notre nature. 2 Our choice is not com- 
pelled by our judgment, or by any antecedent 
cause. It is said to be inclined, and not necessi- 
tated : la prevalence des biens apercus incline sans 
necessiter, quoique tout considere cette inclination 
soit de*terminante et ne manque jamais de faire son 
effet. 3 The desire, as has been said above, must 

1 Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 11-13. 
3 Id., ib. II. xxi. 48. 8 Id., ib. II. xxi. 49. 



PROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 251 

not be confounded with the will. The former is a 
kind of incomplete volition ; it is excited by happi- 
ness, and inclines the will. 1 There is no power of 
contrary choice. This is not inconsistent with the 
contingency of acts of the will, for objectively the 
certainty of these actions is assured. It is some- 
times said that we can will not only what we please, 
but what we do not please to will. This Leibnitz 
declares to be absurd : le choix est toujours deter- 
mine par la perception. The perception is not 
always before consciousness. There are impulses, 
accompanied by pleasure and pain, and all percep- 
tions are either new sensations or imaginations 
remaining from some past sensations, which renew 
the inducements which these sensations have pre- 
sented at former times. This renewal may be 
either accompanied by memory or not, and is in 
proportion to the vivacity of the imagination. The 
prevailing effort {V effort prevalant) is the result of 
all these impulses, which realizes the action of the 
will. It is possible that the most pressing uneasi- 
ness may not determine the will. This failure 
occurs when the other impulses taken together pre- 
vent the decisive volition in accordance with the 
otherwise strongest motive. Up to the time of the 
volition, there is, as it were, a balancing of motives. 
The order of determination will appear from what 
has been said: it is happiness which excites the 
uneasiness, and it is uneasiness which, in union 
with the judgment, determines the will in accord- 
ance with the inclination of the mind. Leibnitz 

1 Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 30. 



252 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

differs from Hobbes in that he does not regard the 
motives as efficient causes of volition. The voli- 
tion is determined, not by an efficient, but by a final 
cause. Efficient causes operate only in the cor- 
poreal world, while the soul is governed by final 
causes : les ames agissent selon les lois des causes 
finales par appetitions, fins et moyens. Les corps 
agissent selon les lois des causes efficientes ou des 
mouvements. Et les deux regnes, celui des causes 
efficientes et celui des causes finales, sont harmo- 
niques entre eux. 1 But from a more general point 
of view, it is the principle of sufficient reason 
which requires the affirmation that the will is 
determined. The freedom of indifference is an 
impossibility, if the principle of sufficient reason 
be admitted. As for freedom, it consists only in 
the power of deliberation which precedes the final 
volition. In this Leibnitz is in agreement with 
Locke. Considering the polemic which is carried 
on in parts of the Nouveaux Essais, against the 
principles of Locke's philosophy, it is singular that 
the chapter on power and the will contains no im- 
portant criticism of the English philosopher's doc- 
trine. Like Spinoza and other preceding writers, 
Leibnitz considers the problem of the Asinus Bu- 
ridani. 2 Baylo had maintained that under such 
circumstances, which were quite possible, the ani- 
mal would starve to death. Leibnitz denies that 
such a case is possible ; but admits that if it were, 
that result would follow. He is careful to explain 

1 Leibnitz, La Monadol. 79. 

2 Id., Theodicee, I. 49. 



« FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 253 

that the determination of the will does not conflict 
with the spontaneity of the soul. He objects that 
Hobbes and Spinoza have defended a doctrine of 
absolute necessity which makes the will inactive 
(la volonte paresseux). 1 The soul, he concludes, is 
a kind of spiritual automaton ; although contingent 
actions in general, and free actions in particular, 
are not on this account necessary, with an absolute 
necessity, which would be incompatible with con- 
tingency Samuel Clarke, who was engaged in 
active controversy with Leibnitz, criticised the doc- 
trine of the latter, holding that it conducted to 
necessitarianism and fatalism. The activity which 
Leibnitz admitted in the soul was urged by Clarke 
as a proof of its freedom. The motive may be 
external; it impresses the mind, which so far is 
passive ; but when the mind is thus impressed, it 
is aroused to action, and freely wills. The motive 
is not " the principle of action ; " for the spring of 
action is the free will. Clarke also raises the 
rather formidable objection that absolute necessity 
is the only true necessity, and that the hypothetical 
or moral necessity of which Leibnitz speaks is a 
mere figure. The question is whether the motives 
are causes of volition or not. It may be added 
that the death of Leibnitz prevented his replying 
to Clarke's last criticism. 2 

In the Theodicie, the will is considered in relation 
to God ; and most of the questions which engaged 

1 Leibnitz, Tbeodicee, I. 67. 

2 Recueil de Lettres entre Leibnitz et Clarke. 4me ^crit de 
M. L. 5me ]£crit de M. L. 5me Replique de M. C. 



254 THEORIES OF THE WILL * 

the attention of the theologians of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, with respect to grace and 
original sin, were discussed by Leibnitz. God is 
said to foreknow the future, because the future has 
been predetermined. But Leibnitz declares that 
there are two famous labyrinths in which our reason 
wanders : one relates to the question of necessity 
and freedom, including the problem of the origin 
of evil ; the other has reference to the constitution 
of matter. There is, he says, a good and a bad 
kind of fatalism. The first is the imperfect fatal- 
ism of the Mahometans ; the second is the philo- 
sophical fatalism of the Stoic philosophy and the 
Christian religion. The good doctrine teaches that 
man should do his duty, and leave the result to an 
overruling power. God permits evil, but is Dot 
the positive cause. It is admitted, however, that 
the permissive will of God has efficaciousness in 
bringing on evil. God's will is either antecedent 
or consequent. The antecedent will of God is the 
general willing of the best result among infinite 
possibilities. The consequent will of God is a 
single volition embracing the final effect of the 
diverse evil and good willing in the contingent 
world. 1 

Down to the time of Kant, the theory of Leibnitz 
prevailed in Germany. His determinism was 
emphasized by Wolff, who gave the dogmatic phi- 
losophy its German form. According to Wolff, the 
soul of man has the power to present or to repre- 
sent the universe to itself ; and from this representa- 
1 Leibnitz, Theodice'e, Preface. 



FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 255 

tion (Vorstellung) arises an effort on the part of the 
subject to change these presentations. This effort 
may assume one of two forms: impulse or will. 
There is in man a tendency to follow the good, and 
avoid its opposite. If the idea of the good be 
obscure, the effect is merely appetite ; if it be 
clear, the effect is will. If a greater and a lesser 
good be contemplated by the mind, the greater 
good, or what seems to be the greater good, will 
inevitably determine the will. 1 

1 Wolff, Verniinftige Gedanken, etc., passim. 



CHAPTER SIXTH 

THEORIES OF THE WILL IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 
FKOM KANT TO LOTZE 

Philosophy on the continent of Europe until 
the time of Kant has no national peculiarity. The 
development of doctrine from Descartes to Wolff 
leads us from France to Holland, and from Hol- 
land to Germany, and shows many traces of the 
influence exercised by Hobbes and Locke. While 
the development of the German philosophy, begin- 
ning with Kant, was more or less due to the stimu- 
lating effects of Hume's scepticism, the German 
systems of the nineteenth century are distinctively 
national; although of late years there has been a 
free exchange of philosophical ideas between the 
several European nations. Lotze forms a con- 
necting link between the old and the new. His 
predecessors had deduced their theories of the will 
from their metaphysical doctrines. Lotze, while 
eminent as a metaphysician, was among the first 
to take the theory of the will out of the metaphysi- 
cal domain, and consider it in the light of positive 
science. Whatever estimate may be made of the 
value of his conclusions, it can hardly be denied 
that, since the appearance of his first psychological 
256 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 257 

treatise, no German philosopher of importance has 
been able to overlook the questions raised by his 
method and inquiry. 

Kant 

In the system of Kant the psychological aspects 
of volition are for the most part unnoticed, while 
the metaphysical and moral aspects appear promi- 
nently. Not the nature of the will as a psychical 
act or process, but the freedom of the will as a 
metaphysical or moral principle, is the prevailing 
conception. And whereas the philosophy before 
Kant had at length reached a point of specializa- 
tion in which the extent of the will had been 
limited to an act of the mind as a result of delib- 
eration, or to the act of deliberation itself, Kant 
returned in a measure to the older view of the will. 
He uses it in its most liberal significance. It is 
more than an act of affirmation or denial; it is 
more than a feeling of effort or an executive faculty. 
In the absence of any doctrine of an Ego, other than 
the synthetic unity of apperception, and of any 
definite theory of personality, he identifies the 
practical reason with the will, and apparently with 
the autonomous and spontaneous soul itself. Prac- 
tically the will acts in obedience to certain laws, 
but it is its own lawgiver. It is not only a faculty, 
but a fundamental faculty, the existence of which 
does not have to be demonstrated, and the freedom 
of which has to be postulated, in spite of the limita- 
tions of speculative philosophy. 



258 THE0P.IES OF THE WILL 

In the philosophy of Kant there is both a theo- 
retical and a practical doctrine of the will, in 
accordance with the general Kantian method. The 
first of these is contained in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. The second is already anticipated in that 
theoretical work, and is explicitly presented in the 
Critique of Practical Reason and in the Metaphysics 
of Ethics. 

I. Theoretical Doctrine of the Will. This is for- 
mally set forth in the Third Antinomy of the Tran- 
scendental Dialectic. In order that it may be the 
better understood, certain fundamental principles 
of the Critique of Pure Reason must be recalled. 

1. Matter and Form. The matter of knowledge 
must be distinguished from the form. The first 
of these comes from experience, and is a posteriori; 
the second is that which makes experience pos- 
sible, but is not given by experience. It is a 
priori. The matter of knowledge comes from the 
outer and from the inner sense, in the sensible 
intuition (Anschauung) . The forms of sensibility 
are space and time. They are a priori, not a pos- 
teriori, forms. In sensibility the mind is receptive. 
Space is the form of external, and time of internal, 
phenomena. A higher faculty than sensibility is 
the understanding. This is not receptive, but spon- 
taneous. It is the faculty by which the knowledge 
of the intuition is thought in concepts or categories. 
It is a formal faculty, and its a priori concepts or 
categories are deduced from the forms of the logical 
judgment, with respect to quantity, quality, rela- 
tion, and modality. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 259 

The problem of the Critique of Pure Reason 
is stated thus: how are synthetic judgments a 
priori possible? This, in less technical language, 
means : how do we reach a knowledge of necessary 
truth? and the solution of the problem is to be 
found in Kant's doctrine of a priori forms. The 
necessary truths of science, whether mathematical 
or physical, cannot be derived from experience. 
The failure of empiricism had been proved by 
Hume. "Experience teaches us, indeed, that any- 
thing is created in such and such a way, but not 
that it cannot be otherwise." It does not give 
necessity : 

Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar dass etwas so oder so beschaffen 
sei, aber nicht dass es nicht anders sein konne. Findet sich 
also erstlich ein Satz, der zugleich mit seiner Nothwendigkeit 
gedacht wird, so ist er ein Urtbeil apriori. 1 Nothwendigkeit 
und strenge Allgemeinheit sind also sichere Kennzeichen 
einer Erkenntniss a priori, und gehoren auch unzertrennlich 
zu einander. 2 

It is the a priori forms which make the a priori 
or necessary judgments possible. That is abso- 
lutely necessary the opposite of which is in itself 
impossible. All our conceptions of inner necessity 
in the qualities of possible things, of whatever 
kind, proceed from this, that the opposite involves 
a contradiction. 3 Thus the doctrine of Hume is 
denied, that the empirical cognition through the 
force of custom or habit becomes necessary. 

2. The Phenomenon and the Thing in itself. This 

i Kant, Werke [Hartenstein], III. 35. 
a Id., II. 125. aid., III. 34. 



260 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

is the most important distinction in the Kantian 
philosophy, and is at the foundation of the whole 
system, both theoretically and practically. It is 
said that we know only phenomena, and not things 
in themselves : was die Gegenstande an sich selbst 
sein mogen, wurde uns durch die aufgeklarteste 
Erkenntniss der Erscheinung derselben, die uns 
allein gegeben ist, doch niemals bekannt werden. 1 
The phenomena themselves are not things, because 
space and time are not given by experience, but 
are a priori forms. We have, therefore, no assur- 
ance that the forms of our intuition are forms of 
the real world. To go beyond this is dogmatism. 
That there are things in themselves (Dinge an sich) 
is not denied; it is only affirmed that they are 
unknown. This ignorance of the Ding an sich has 
reference to the world in time as well as to the 
world in space. The Ego, or self, according to this 
doctrine, is unknown as thing in itself. Just as 
we know only the phenomena of matter, and not 
matter as thing in itself, so in like manner is our 
knowledge of mind limited. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason, instead of self, or Ego, there is the 
formal principle which Kant calls the synthetic 
unity of apperception {die synthetische Einheit der 
Apperception.) In the proposition "I think" is by 
implication contained an act of spontaneity. This 
Kant calls "pure apperception" (reine Apperception). 
While I am conscious of myself as identical with 
respect to the manifold content of consciousness, 
because I can call them my ideas, yet the manifold 

i Kant, III. 72. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 261 

is not given by means of the Ego. But the highest 
principle of the possibility of all intuition in rela- 
tion to the understanding is that all the manifold 
of the intuition stands under the conditions of the 
original synthetic unity of apperception. The Ego 
as Ding an sich cannot be an object of knowledge; 
and so, to account for the unity of the manifold, 
and the identity of the subject in experience, Kant 
presents the principle of synthetic unity of apper- 
ception. This has a merely theoretical significance, 
so that it is not a principle of volition, but only of 
knowledge. In the Critique of Pure Reason, there 
is likewise no definite doctrine of. personality, 
and one must go to the practical philosophy for an 
explanation. The doctrine of the unity of apper- 
ception is not put forward as an explanation of the 
moral personality, but in order to establish the 
important principle of the Ego cogito, for the sake 
of the unity of thought: durch den allgemeinen 
Ausdruck, ich denke, zusammenfassen kann. 1 

Corresponding to this distinction between the 
phenomenon and the noumenon, (Ding an sich) is 
that between the sensible and intelligible world. 
The value of the intelligible in relation to the doc- 
trine of the will is first apparent in connection with 
the Third Antinomy. 

Kant's insufficient explanation of the Ego in his 

1 Kant, III. 19. See, also : Ich bin mir also des identischen 
Selbst bewusst, in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen der mir in 
einer Anscbauung gegeben Vorstellungen, weil ich sie in- 
gesammt meine Vorstellungen nenne, die eine ausmachen, III. 
117, 118. 



262 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

Critique of Pure Reason has been justly criti- 
cised, and undoubtedly leads to great confusion. 
From the fact that we know only phenomena, it 
is obvious that our knowledge of self can be only 
phenomenal, and consequently it is difficult to 
interpret the assertion that "I am conscious of 
myself," however the term self be explained. In 
Kant's theoretical philosophy, the Ego is identified 
with none of the faculties of knowledge, and the 
relation of the faculties to that which has or exer- 
cises the faculties is quite obscure. I simply refer 
to this in passing, as Kant's discussion of the will 
in the first Critique is not essentially related to 
any particular doctrine of the Ego. In another 
work, he attributes autonomy not only to the prac- 
tical reason, but also to the understanding and to 
the faculty of judgment (Urtheilskraft) . « 

3. Causality. Causality is a category of relation 
which is deduced from the hypothetical judgment. 
It is not derived empirically, but is a condition 
which makes experience of natural phenomena pos- 
sible > Cause and effect form a sequence in time, 
and a necessary sequence. The necessity of the 
causal judgment comes from the a priori nature of 
the category. Cause and effect are necessarily 
connected, not because they are associated in experi- 
ence as invariable antecedent and consequent, but 
because they are thought in the understanding in 
the category of causality, which is a priori, and 
therefore necessary. 1 

Like all other formal elements in our knowledge, 

i Kant. III. 174 ff. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 263 

the category of causality is applicable only to 
phenomena. Whether things in themselves are 
thus causally connected we do not know, for we 
know only phenomena, and not things in them- 
selves. In the observation of phenomena it is 
observed that a certain condition of things prevails 
at one time, and another condition just before. 
The two observations are combined in time. The 
combination or conjunction is not effected through 
the sensibility or through intuition, but is the 
product of thought. The conception of their neces- 
sary union is due to the understanding. The con- 
ception is that of the causal relation. Effects are 
thus observed as changes, and for every change a 
cause is thought necessarily. Often the cause and 
effect are simultaneously observed, but this does 
not contradict the law of succession. The temporal 
sequence of effects is required because the cause can- 
not exercise its whole effect in one moment: hier 
muss man wohl bemerken, dass es auf die Ord- 
nung der Zeit, und nicht den Ablauf derselben 
angesehen sei; das Verhaltniss bleibt, wenn gleich 
keine Zeit verlaufen ist. Causality suggests action, 
and action suggests force, and force suggests sub- 
stance. But it may be added that substance, like 
cause, is not given in experience, but is itself an a. 
•priori concept or category. 1 

4. Freedom, and Causality. The Critique of 
Pure Reason has to do with knowledge, not with 
will. It deals with judgments, not volitions. The 
latter are phenomena like other phenomena, are 

i Kant, III. 183, and cf. 144. 



264 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

known in the same way, and are subject to the 
same laws. The volition is known, not as the Ego 
choosing or deliberating or acting, but each voli- 
tion is a change, is known as an effect, and is 
conceived as necessarily determined by an ante- 
cedent cause. The difficulties which this conclu- 
sion suggests are discussed in the Transcendental 
Dialectic. 

The Transcendental ^Esthetic, which is the first 
part of the Critique has to do with the a priori 
forms of intuition; the Transcendental Analytic, 
which is the first subdivision of the Transcen- 
dental Logic, is the science of the a priori forms 
of the understanding. The ^Esthetic shows how 
mathematics as a science is possible; the Ana- 
lytic shows how a science of nature is possible. 
The Transcendental Dialectic, which is the 
second part of the Logic, deals with the ques- 
tion whether metaphysics as a science is possible. 
According to Kant, metaphysics is the science of 
the ideas of pure reason. An idea is a conception 
of the totality of experience. 1 The conceptions or 
concepts of the understanding have no significance 
unless their form is filled by the content which 
comes from the intuition, which in turn comes 
from experience, being known in the forms of space 
and time. But the ideas of pure reason have no 
corresponding empirical content. The being of 
these ideas cannot be denied, and even if they are 
illusions, they must be examined. 2 The totality of 
experience is the content of the idea, and we have 

i Kant, III. 261, 262. « Id. III. 247. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 265 

no intuition of such a totality. In this respect 
specially, the concept of the reason, that is, the 
idea, differs from the concept of the understanding. 
The reason is the faculty of reasoning. In this 
process we are led from conclusion to premises, 
and from these premises to other premises, from 
which the former are conclusions. This process 
may either proceed ad infinitum, or else a premise 
may be reached which depends on no antecedent 
premises. In either case the result is the uncon- 
ditioned. In one case, the series is unconditioned, 
because unlimited; in the other case, the principle 
is the unconditioned. In the ^Esthetic and 
Analytic the unconditioned, or Ding an sick, was 
simply a negative limit to knowledge. It was 
that which is unknown. In the Dialectic, it has a 
positive significance, for it is the idea of the reason. 
Whether it is a valid conception or not, meta- 
physics exists, and the validity of the science has 
to be examined. 

There are three ideas of the reason, which are 
deduced from three forms of the syllogism, — 'the 
categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. 
From the first of these, by a regressits from predi- 
cate to subject, and from this subject to another 
subject, we arrive at last either at an infinite 
series, or at a subject which is the predicate of no 
other proposition. 1 

The idea of the unconditioned subject is the idea 
of the soul, which is the object of rational psy- 
chology. The hypothetical syllogism leads us to 

i Kant, III. 262. 



266 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the idea of a proposition which is conditioned 
by no antecedent. This is the idea of the world 
which is the object of rational cosmology. The 
disjunctive syllogism leads us to the idea of an 
aggregate of members of a unity in the uncon- 
ditioned, which is the idea of God, the idea of 
rational theology. 

It is only the second of these ideas of the reason 
which need here be considered. 

The idea of rational cosmology, as has just been 
suggested, is derived from a regressus from each 
antecedent to a preceding consequent, until a propo- 
sition is reached which does not depend on any 
other antecedent; or else the regressus is ad in- 
finitum. The meaning of this, if we drop the lan- 
guage of logic, is that either there is an infinite 
regressus in the series of causes and effects, or else 
a first cause is reached which is an effect of no 
preceding cause. 1 Either of these alternatives is 
capable of demonstration, and the result is the 
Third Antinomy. 

The Third Antinomy 
Thesis 

Causality according to the Laws of Nature is not the only 
[causality] from which the totality of the phenomena of the 
world can be derived. There is another causality through 
freedom, to be accepted as necessary for explaining these 
[phenomena]. 

(Die Causalitat nach Gesetzen der Natur ist nicht die 
einzige aus welcher die Erscheinungen der Welt ingesammt 

i Kant, III. 297. 



IX GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 267 

abgeleitet werden koimen. Es ist noch eine Causalitat durch 
Freiheit zu Erklarung derselben anzunebmen nothweudig.) 

Antithesis 

There is no Freedom, but everything in the world happens 
altogether according to the Laws of Nature. 

(Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern alles in der "Welt geschieht 
lediglich nach Gesetzen der Natur. 1 ) 

It will be at once observed that the thesis is a 
statement of the possibility of free will, and the 
plain assertion that there is a causality through 
freedom. The antithesis insists that all events 
happen in the causal series, and that freedom is 
impossible. Judged by the principles of the Ana- 
lytic, the thesis has no scientific value; and the 
problem raised in the Dialectic is : can there be an 
exception to the laws of nature which have been 
deduced in the Analytic ? It is further to be noticed 
that the law of cause and effect as deduced from 
the hypothetical judgment is a necessary law, and 
to suppose that an effect can occur without a cause 
implies a contradiction. Nevertheless, here the 
necessary law is contradicted in the thesis. 

In the presence of these two alternative conclu- 
sions, one might be justified in holding that there 
was no possibility of demonstrating the truth of 
either freedom or its opposite, and the result would 
be scepticism. This is not the attitude taken by 
Kant. In the discussion of the Antinomy, we 
find him seeking a reconciliation of these two con- 
tradictory conclusions. If the conclusion of the 
thesis is valid, however, then the results of the 

l Kant, HI. 316, 317. 



268 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

critical method in the Analytic are not final. For 
if there is freedom from the necessity of causal- 
ity, then either freedom is not a phenomenon, or 
else the law of causality is not necessary. Kant 
takes the former alternative. Freedom is not phe- 
nomenal. But, according to him, the freedom 
affirmed in the thesis is not empirical, but tran- 
scendental freedom. It refers to a spontaneous 
beginning of a causal series, but not to a temporal 
or chronological beginning. It is a noumenal, not 
a phenomenal freedom, and is thus independent of 
the form of time, which is a form of phenomena, 
not of things in themselves. 1 It is independent 
also of the category of causality, which is a form 
of phenomena as well. To posit a free cause is to 
supply a need of the reason. Kant admits that 
the thesis is dogmatic, 2 because freedom is predi- 
cated of the Ding an sich, which according to the 
critical method cannot be known. To believe in a 
free cause, and to believe that I am free, are the 
two foundation stones of religion and morality. It 
is not a matter of mere speculative interest whether 
the thesis or the antithesis be accepted as true. 
There is a practical interest as well. The antithe- 
sis fails to answer the question how the series of 

1 Es wird aber immer merkwiirdig bleiben, dass Kant, nach- 
dem er zuerst Dinge an sich von Erscheinungen nur negativ, 
durch die Unabhangigkeit von der Zeit, unterschieden, nachher 
in den metaphysischen Eroterungen seiner Kritik der prakti- 
schen Vernunf t Unabhangigkeit von der Zeit und Freiheit wirk- 
lich als correlate Begriffe behandelt hatte, etc. Schelling, W. 
I. vn. 351, 352. 

2 Kant, III. 332. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 269 

causes has begun, or whether it has had a begin- 
ning. The thesis has popularity on its side; for 
the ordinary understanding has no difficulty in 
imagining a beginning of the series, or the freedom 
of the will. Nor can the antithesis be denied by 
the empiricist, for that would be empirical dog- 
matism. 1 The antithesis requires an infinite re- 
gressus, which is a conception too great for a 
synthesis of the properties of the universe. The 
thesis is, moreover, the foundation of the concep- 
tion of practical freedom. Freedom in the practical 
sphere is the independence of the will of necessity, 
especially of the necessity of sensible causes. 2 The 
fact that a man does not have to obey the senses 
and the sensible impulses, but can will in opposi- 
tion to them, shows that he has a free faculty which 
determines the act independent of these impulses. 
The knowledge of freedom does not conflict with a 
knowledge of natural causality; for the former is 
"intelligible," 8 the latter is phenomenal. The 
freedom of the Ding an sich is intelligible, that is, 
it is not derived from experience, nor is it condi- 
tioned by the forms of experience. Kant's con- 
tention is that the reason, which exists in neither 
space nor time, 4 and which is itself transcendental, 
is unconditioned, and can be conceived as a free 
cause. Causality, while it is a category of phe- 
nomena, is not a category of noumena. And 
causality through freedom, while it cannot be 
proved, cannot be disproved. 

i Kant, IU. 332 £f. 343 f. 8 Id. III. 374. 

a Id. III. 371. * Id. III. 382. 



270 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

In holding that the freedom of the will is not 
known empirically, Kant differs radically from the 
majority of indeterminists. Their contention is 
that consciousness informs us empirically that we 
are free, while Kant holds that experience teaches 
us that the will is determined. This is to be ex- 
plained partly from the influence of Hume on Kant, 
but more particularly from Kant's doctrine of cau- 
sality in relation to the phenomenal world. While 
apparently desirous of vindicating the validity of 
the thesis of the Antinomy, he admits that it is 
as easy to think of an infinite number of successive 
changes, as to think of eternally existing sub- 
stances. But the practical interest in the thesis is 
that which triumphs in weighing the alternative 
conclusions. The ideas of the pure reason are not 
scientifically necessary, but they are indispensable 
to practice. Indeed, Kant defines practical as all 
that is possible by means of freedom: praktisch 
ist alles, was durch Freiheit moglich ist. 1 But 
freedom can be established, not as a constitutive 
principle, but only as a regulative principle. It is 
related to action, not to theory. From this point 
of view, we have no longer to ask whether freedom 
is possible. For practically we are brought to 
recognize it as a canon of moral action. 2 What 
this freedom implies is left in some obscurity 
by Kant. Transcendental freedom must mean, of 
course, freedom from causes which determine the 
will; and it means also freedom from sensual im- 
pulses. For we have a faculty which can postpone 

i Kant. III. 529. 2 m, HI. 529 f. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 271 

the reaction against the impulse, and can resist the 
inclinations of sense. 1 

It need hardly be said that this Antinomy has 
been a favorite point of attack for the critics of 
Kant. Whether a defence of the thesis is con- 
sistent with the validity of the results reached by 
the critical method may be fairly open to doubt. 
At all events Kant's practical philosophy awakens 
in the reader a suspicion that the doctrine of regu- 
lative principles introduced at the close of the first 
Critique is advanced in order to admit practically 
what had been excluded theoretically, and to save 
ethics after the foundation of ontology had been 
undermined. That the thesis is regarded as even 
possibly true, opens the way for the practical 
discussion of volition as contained in the Critique 
of Practical Reason and in the Metaphysics of Ethics. 

It is part of the irony of fate that Kant's practi- 
cal philosophy should have been accepted by many 
who have denied the validity of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. He has often received high praise 
as a defender of the rights of the moral law, of 
conscience, and of free will, by those who found 
their belief in freedom on an appeal to conscious- 
ness, and who dissent altogether from the great 
critical distinction between the phenomenon and 
the Ding an sich. Such philosophers apparently 
overlook two facts with respect to the Kantian 
philosophy. The first of these is that Kant main- 
tained that the empirical method leads inevitably 
and logically to determinism ; and the second is that 

i Kant, III. 531. 



272 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

according to Kant, unless the distinction between 
phenomenon and Ding cm sich be made, there is no 
ground upon which the freedom of the will can be 
defended. 

II. Practical Doctrine of the Will. Certain affir- 
mations made in the Critique of Pure Reason in- 
troduce Kant's practical doctrine of the will. His," 
statements that there may be a causality through 
freedom in the intelligible world, that freedom is 
essential to morality, and that it is empirical 
dogmatism to deny the existence of transcendental 
freedom, introduce the principles of his practical 
philosophy. 

It is admitted that free will is not given empiri- 
cally, and is therefore not subject to the principle 
of causality. Everything in nature acts according 
to laws, but the will is not subject to the laws oh 
nature. It gives its own laws; it is autonomous. 1 
The introduction to the Kantian ethics is the 
treatise on the Metaphysics of Ethics, in which 
an attempt is made to discover the principles or 
laws of a pure will. These laws are necessary; 
they do not depend on empirical conditions. They 
carry with them absolute necessity. They exclude 
all contingency. Only a rational being has the 
faculty to act according to the idea of certain 
principles. That faculty is will. The will is de- 
fined as a faculty of choosing only that which 
reason, independent of inclination, recognizes as; 
practically necessary. That which is practically 
necessary is identical with the good. 2 That which 
i Kant, IV. 281, 284 ; V. 30, 35. * Id. IV. 260. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 273 

in all the world deserves to be called good, without 
limit or qualification, is a good will. Its peculiar 
characteristic or property is a good character. For 
a good will is good per se, and not because of its 
volitions or results. 1 The nature of a good will is 
made still plainer by the definition of duty. Duty 
is the necessity of an action, out of respect for law. 2 
If the will is determined by external necessity, it 
cannot be called good. The good will is determined 
by its own laws, that is, by subjective laws. Hence 
it is both rational and free. Kant identifies these 
three conceptions, freedom, the will, and the prac- 
tical reason. Die Freiheit ist demnach, ein Yermo- 
gen, welches zugleich praktisch und vernunftig 
ist: sie ist Wille und praktische Vernunft. 3 The 
will is a fundamental faculty (Grundvermogen), 
it is therefore incapable of more exact definition 
and explanation: nun ist aber alle menschliche 
Einsicht zu Ende, sobald wir zu Grundkraften oder 
Grundvermogen gelangt sind. 4 This fundamental 
character of the will, or, to adopt a later term, this 
primacy of the will, implies that it is a faculty 
which controls all subjective moving causes. It is 
Kant's doctrine, not only that the will is free from 
external co-action, and free from the determination 
of external motives, but is free from any causality 
of subjective states or processes. It is subject to 
its own laws, and by virtue of this autonomy it is 
free. It is not determined by another, but is self- 
determined. The determinists of the seventeenth 

i Kant, IV. 242. 8 cf. Id. IV., 260; V. 16. 

2 Id. IV. 248, * Id. V. 50. 

T 



274 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

and eighteenth centuries, had taught that the mo- 
tive is the efficient cause of the volition. Kant holds 
that the will controls the motives, and determines 
whether or not the volition shall be in accordance 
with them. Thus the principle of every human 
will is the unconditional law which it imposes upon 
itself. This law, which is none other than the 
moral law, is a priori, and therefore universal and 
necessary. The principle of autonomy of the will 
is distinguished from that of heteronomy. In the 
heteronomy of the will there is no element of mo- 
rality. In such a case the will is under an alien 
law, and is neither good nor free: Autonomic ist 
also der Grund der "Wurde der menschlichen ucd 
jeder verntlnftigen Natur. 1 The Scottish moralists 
of the sentimental school, and the French sensual- 
ists of the eighteenth century had regarded moral- 
ity as obedience to certain feelings of different 
degrees of worth. Kant excludes the feelings from 
his ethical principles, and regards volitions as abso- 
lute when they are moral. We are free because we 
are autonomous, and we are autonomous because 
we are free. 2 The only proof of this freedom is to 
be found in the demands of morality. The reason 
why we believe that we are free, is that we believe 
in the imperative obligation to be moral. And 
conversely, the reason why we believe that the 
obligation is imperative, is because we believe in 
the freedom of the will. Yet freedom must be 
postulated as ultimate, and cannot be proved. It 
is incapable of any theoretical demonstration. It is 

l Kant, IV. 284. « Id. IV. 297, 298. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 275 

the only idea of the reason, the possibility a priori 
of which is known without comprehending how it 
is the condition of the moral law. Freedom is 
ratio essendi of the moral law ; and the moral law, 
ratio cognoscendi of freedom. 1 ' 

Kant says : — 

Freiheit ist aber die einzige unter alien Ideen der specula- 
tiven Vernunft wovon wir die Moglichkeit a priori wissen, 
ohne sie doch einzi^sehen, weil sie Bedingung des morali- 
schen Gesetzes^t, welches wir wissen. 2 

Kant thus defends the freedom of the will in an 
entirely novel manner. Former philosophers did 
not so distinguish the phenomenal and noumenal 
world, as to limit the application of the principle 
of causation to the former. They were unable to 
explain how the will as phenomenon or as noume- 
non or as both together in a world of causes and 
effects, could be free from the law of causality. 
Kant claims, and justly claims, thathe has discovered 
a way of avoiding the difficulty. For by insisting 
that the will as Ding an sich is not subject to the 
principle of causality, he virtually asserts its free- 
dom. At least, he asserts that its freedom is not 
unthinkable. He is able then to open the practical 
consideration of the doctrine with a prima facie 
case. It is, however, not empirical, but transcen- 
dental freedom. It is the practical reason willing 
as Ding an sich, in obedience to a moral law. It 
wills, not according to desire or inclination, but be- 
i Kant, V. 4, note. > id. y. 4. 



276 THEORIES OF THE "WILL 

cause of an imperative maxim. 1 While duty and 
desire may coincide, the will does not conform to 
duty because of desire, but because of the principle 
of " ought " (sollen) . Whereas in the natural order 
of things^ the reason is determined by objects, and 
has no freedom ; in the moral order the will deter- 
mines the objects. 2 If we cannot prove conscious- 
ness of freedom directly, still less can we show how 
it is possible : wie nun dieses Bewusstsein der 
moralischen Gesetze, oder welches einerlei ist, das 
der Freiheit, moglich sei, lasst sicfc. nicht weiter 
erklaren, nur die Zulassigkeit derselben in der theo- 
retischen Kritik wohl vertheidigen. 3 The moral 
law, which is absolute, is a law of causality through 
freedom. It has a standing equal to the causal 
necessity of the phenomenal world. Causality is 
contained in the idea of will ; and in the conception 
of pure will (reinen Wille), that is, of pure practical 
reason, is included the idea of causality with free- 
dom. From this idea of freedom is derived that 
of personality. Personality consists in the free- 
dom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nat- 
ure. Man is peculiar in this respect that he is an 
end to himself in moral action: nur der Mensch 
und mit ihm jedes vernilnftiges Geschopf, ist Zweck 
an sichselbst. The requirement for personality is 
susceptibility to respect for the moral law, as a 
sufficient motive for the will. 4 

Kant's extreme conception of autonomy is espe- 

i Kant V. 93. a Id. V. 48. 

3 Id. V. 49. 

* Id. V. 91 ; VI. 121. Compare Rosmini, Sistema. 206. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 277 

dally apparent in his scornful treatment of the 
determinism of Leibnitz. 

He denies that the determinism of Leibnitz is con- 
sistent with freedom in any true sense; for causality, 
whether it be that of mind or of material objects, is 
inconsistent with freedom. The determination of 
the will by psychological causes takes the volition 
out of the power of the agent, as much as material 
causes would do. This VerJcettung der Vorstel- 
lungen der Seele gives what Kant calls "psycho- 
logical freedom," Vnich differs toto coelo from tran- 
scendental freedom : und wenn die Freiheit unseres 
Willens keine andere als die letztere (etwa die psy- 
chologische und comparative, nicht transcendentale, 
d. i. absolute zugleich) ware, so wlirde sie im 
Grunde nichts besser, als die Freiheit eines Braten- 
wenders sein, der auch wenn er einmal aufgezogen 
worden, von selbst seine Bewegung verrichtet. 1 

The reality of transcendental freedom, according 
to Kant, depends on the validity of the distinction 
between phenomena and things in themselves. 
Eational freedom is a quality of the causality of 
living beings, in so far as they are rational. As 
free, the will is independent of every kind of cau- 
sality except its own spontaneous and autonomous 
determination. Therefore, as a rational being, Man 
can never think of his own will except as a free 
cause. 2 

With respect to the liberty of indifference, it 
would appear that Kant accepted the doctrine, and 
was moreover disposed to lay very little emphasis 

i Kant, V. 101, 102. 2 Id. V. 300. 



278 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

upon the original badness or goodness of men. His 
theory is Pelagian rather than Augustinian. 1 

The Absolute Philosophy 

In general there have been two interpretations of 
the Kantian philosophy. In one case, the Critique 
of Pure Reason has been interpreted in the light 
of the practical philosophy, and an attempt has 
been made to avoid the destructive results of 
the first Critique by reconstructing a system on 
the foundations of Kant's practical treatises. In 
the other case, the conclusions of the second 
Critique have been thought inconsistent with those 
of the first; and attempts have been made to 
overthrow the practical doctrines by an appeal to 
the speculative conclusions of Kant. In this way a 
difference has arisen between two schools of thought, 
both of which claim a Kantian justification. The 
so-called philosophers of the Absolute, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel, represent the first of these 
interpretations ; and the critical sceptics, like 
Schulze and Maimon, represent the second. At 
the present time these two classes still exist, and 
the watchword of both is " Back to Kant." There 
are those who maintain that to go back to Kant 
is to go back also to the successors of Kant, who 
are thought to be the philosophers of the Absolute. 
But there are also those who recommend a return 
to Kant, because they believe that the philosophers 
of the Absolute do not exhibit a faithful develop- 

i Kant, VI. 114. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 279 

ment of the Kantian principles. In few cases is it 
urged that there should be a return to the results 
of both the speculative and the practical philosophy 
of Kant, and that his philosophy should be adopted 
as he left it. Indeed if the critical method were 
applied to Kant's practical philosophy, it might be 
shown that there is a dogmatism in the latter, equal 
to the dogmatism against which Kant primarily 
rebelled. And if Kant himself could know the 
results of his revolution in philosophy, as these 
appear in the systems of the Absolute, he would 
no doubt conclude that much of his labor had 
been in vain. 

There has, perhaps, been undue emphasis laid, 
especially in England and America, upon the rela- 
tion between the Critical and the Absolute philoso- 
phy, and a tendency to regard the latter as an 
inevitable and logical result of the former. This 
misapprehension has not been shared, and has been 
partially corrected by some of the leading historians 
of philosophy in Germany. It has been demon- 
strated, for example, that Lessing, Herder, and 
Jacobi were not without considerable influence on 
Post-Kantian thought. It will be admitted that 
there is as much of Plato as of Kant in the specu- 
lations of Hegel. But almost as conspicuous as 
the effect of Kant has been that of Spinoza on all 
later German philosophy. This is evident, not 
only in the unity of principles from which these 
systems set out, but also in many points of method, 
and in the prominence of the ethical element. 
Much of this may be the result of tradition, descend- 



280 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

ing through Kant or apart from Kant, from the 
earlier German dogmatism. But in spite of the 
fact that Fichte is looked upon as an able opponent 
of Spinoza's philosophy, it is not too much to say- 
that the influence of the latter is as evident in 
Die Wissenschaftslehre, as is that of Hume in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. The indebtedness 
of Schelling to Spinoza, 1 especially in the late period 
of the former's career, is well known ; and it is not 
without reason that Hegel regarded acquaintance 
with Spinoza as requisite for the pursuit of philos- 
ophy at all. That which differentiates these later 
systems from the system of Spinoza is, however, 
the emphasis laid upon the principle of evolution; 
and this, it must be admitted, is altogether foreign 
to the latter's conception of the universe. Instead 
of a statical system founded on the doctrine of 
substance, attributes, and modes, we find now a 
dynamic philosophy, developed from a principle 
which is active and essentially changing. It is a 
process, not a mere subsistence. The Ding an sich, 
which Kant had declared to be unknown, becomes 
the first principle of philosophy in the systems of 
his successors. It is this which is the principle of 
principles in the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel. 

Fichte. 

The first principle of the philosophy of Fichte is 
a postulate or requirement ; it is not a hypothesis, 

i On the contrast between Schelling and Spinoza, see Schell- 
ing, Werke, I. vn. 348, 349. 



\ 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 281 

nor an assumption, nor a datum of experience. It 
is not the result of observation or of proof. It is 
the affirmation or position of the active Ego ; and 
to affirm or posit the Ego is to become conscious of 
myself. The first principle of the Wissenschafts- 
lehre is not objective, but subjective, and as sub- 
jective principle it is known not by sensible, but by 
intellectual intuition. This is the Kantian Ding an 
sich. It belongs, not to the sensible, but to the 
intelligible world, and so the intuition by means of 
which it is known is intellectual. 

I. The Ego and the Non-Ego. Through the 
positing or affirmation of the Ego, self-consciousness 
arises ; the activity of the Ego is self-consciousness. 
The activity and the self-consciousness go together, 
and the cause of both is the will. Will is therefore 
logically antecedent to knowledge. The activity of 
the Ego, by which it is required to be self-conscious, 
is voluntary activity. The beginning, middle, and 
end of Fichte's system is the free activity of the 
Ego. This activity is called Thathandlung, which 
means, literally, an activity which performs a deed. 1 
In the philosophy of Kant, a world of things 
(JDinge an sich) was affirmed as the limit of the 
phenomenal universe, and in these was found the 
reason (Grund) of all phenomena. In the phi- 
losophy of Fichte, the world of self-consciousness is 
the only world ; it is the world of experience, and 
as experience it proceeds from the Thathandlung of 
the Ego. The Ego corresponds to the practical 
reason in the philosophy of Kant. The Ego is a 

i FicMe, I. 91. 



282 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

practical principle, and is theoretical only in so far 
as it is practical. As subject, the Ego may be 
regarded either as knowing or as active; as that 
which knows, it is active intelligence, and as that 
which does, it is active will. But both theory and 
practice are the objects, not of two sciences, but of 
one. 

The Ego not only posits or affirms itself, it also 
posits or affirms a Non-Ego, which is simply its 
opposite. Without the Ego, there would be no| 
]STon-Ego. The Non-Ego is, because the Ego is. 
The Non-Ego is not Ding an sich, but has the 
ground and origin of its being in the Ego. Daher 
ist der Satz ; ohne Ich kein Nicht-Ich, gleich deru 
Satze; das Ich setzt ein Nicht-Ich. The position 
or affirmation of the Non-Ego is the affirmation of 
the objective world, through the TJiathandlung of 
the Ego. 1 

The Ego not only posits itself, and posits the 
Non-Ego, but it also posits the reciprocal limitation 
of Ego and Non-Ego. These are not to be con- 
ceived of as two opposing principles, for there is no 
dualism in Fichte's philosophy. The limitation of 
the Ego by the Non-Ego to a certain extent cancels 
or removes the activity of Ego, and this is know- 
ledge of the objective world. The limitation of the 
Non-Ego by the Ego is an overcoming of this limita- 
tion, and corresponds to free action. This distinction 
corresponds also to that between theoretical and prac- 
tical philosophy. Neither of these processes takes 
place alone. There is no activity of the Ego 

i Cf . Fichte, Werke, I. 276. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 283 

without passivity (Leiden), and no passivity without 
activity. The objective activity results in passion 
or affection, and this is known intuitively. It is 
an intuition of the impossibility of the opposing 
activity. It is a feeling of compulsion which is 
represented to the imagination as compulsion, and 
this is necessity: wird im Verstande fixirt als 
Nothwendigkeit. In contrast to this activity which 
is conditioned by passive affection, is free activity, 
which may be presented to the imagination as an 
alternation or hesitation (Schweben) between the 
performance of one and the same action; and in 
the understanding, this is possibility. Both species 
of activity are joined in one synthesis; free activity 
determines itself to self -affection, and freedom arises 
from compulsion. Freedom in this sense is not 
mere activity in vacuo, but is activity as a conse- 
quence or concomitant of the compulsion exercised 
by the Non-Ego upon the Ego in the process of 
limitation. 1 The Ego, however, is independent, 
and everything else depends upon it. The essence 
of the Ego is in its activity, and this activity is 
constitutive, not regulative. 2 Just as the source of 
the influence of the Non-Ego on the Ego is to be 
found in the latter, so there would be no activity 
manifested in the latter without the former. 3 Thus 
the causality of the Non-Ego does not consist in ac- 
tion ( WirJcung) but in interaction ( Wechselwirkung). 
The original activity of the Ego is not determined 
from without, nor are its inclinations and impulses 
determined by the Non-Ego. In all its activity it 

i Fichte, I. 238 f . 276. « Id. I. 272. 3 Id. I. 239. 



284 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

is spontaneous, and all the objects of its feelings 
and inclinations are posited by itself. But freedom 
and spontaneity are not the same. Before there 
can be freedom there must be limitation; and the 
process is endless — the limitation of the Ego by 
the Non-Ego, and the ceaseless endeavor of the Ego 
towards freedom, which is its ethical goal. 

The force of the Ego is an object of feeling. The 
feeling of force (Kraftgefuhl) is the principle of all 
life. It is the transition from death to life. Eorce 
is felt as impulsive (treibendes), but this impulse is 
without causality upon the Ego ; it may furnish an 
object for the exercise of free activity, but does not 
itself originate any activity. This is a sufficient 
statement of Fichte's general theory of the motive. 
It is deduced from his doctrine of the relation 
between the Ego and the Non-Ego. The motive 
does not determine the free activity of the Ego ; it 
is only feeling without self-consciousness. And 
just as the Non-Ego is necessary to the exercise of 
the free activity of the Ego, so, in order to volition, 
there must be a presentation of the object of volition. 
The two are in necessary reciprocity. 1 

II. TJie Will and Freedom. While Eichte some- 
times refers to several faculties in the soul, he 
regards it as unphilosophical to hold that the 
Ego differs from its act and its product (seine That 
und sein Product). It is not a substratum in which 
activity as a mere faculty resides. The Ego is not 
something which has a faculty ; it is itself not a 
faculty, but an active, acting being: Das Ich ist 

i Fichte, I. 296, 372. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 285 

nicht etwas das Vermogen hat, es ist tiberhaupt 
kein Vermogen, sondem es ist handelnd ; es ist was 
es handelt, und wenn es nicht handelt, so ist es 
nichts. 1 The will is, therefore, not a faculty of the 
Ego, but is the Ego itself exercising its free activity ; 
it is not in the Ego, but is a way in which the Ego 
acts. In another way this relation is expressed by 
Eichte, when he says that there are two manifes- 
tations of substance: thought and will. "I find 
myself as myself, only willing" (Ich finde mich 
selbst als mich selbst, nur wollend). 2 This means 
that I consider myself as one with the object 
known; it is assumed that it is known what 
volition means, and the volition is known through 
the intellectual intuition. I am conscious of will- 
ing, and this consciousness is immediately and 
simultaneously related to a substance, which sub- 
stance I am. The manifestation which alone I 
originally ascribe to myself is volition. It is only 
under the condition that I become conscious to 
myself of it as such, that I am conscious of myself. 
The volition is not an ideal activity; it is a real 
self-determination of one's self through one's self. 
Thus the expression "find myself" is equivalent 
to "find myself willing." While in philosophi- 
cal abstraction, we may speak of will or volition in 
general, in observation it is always singular and 
determinate; it is the willing of some particular 
object. An object of the Non-Ego is always pos- 
tulated in all volition. But will in general, as this 
abstraction, must be distinguished from the individ- 

i Fichte, III. 22. * Id. IV. 19. 



286 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

ual will, which is called Wollen. 1 In general it is 
characteristic of Fichte' s teaching to emphasize the 
supremacy of the will. It alone is said to be the 
original expression of the reason. It is that which 
effects the representation of the infinite in the 
finite Ego. In positing myself as active, I posit a 
determinate activity. More specifically it is the 
will which has immediate causality in reference to 
the body ; not that it directly creates the body, but 
that it uses the body as an instrument. 2 But the 
relation of knowledge to volition is of such a kind, 
that the former is necessary to the latter ; for the 
volition is not volition in general, but, as has been 
said already, volition (Wollen) and presentation 
(Vorstellung) go together. 3 

Prom Fichte's teaching concerning the act of 
will, it is easy to anticipate his theory of freedom. 
Objectively considered, all being is necessary being, 
and is not thought as the product of freedom. 
But being must itself have proceeded from 
thought ; and thought is the product of free activity. 
Fichte refers with approval to Kant's statement, 
that freedom is the power absolutely to begin a 
new condition of things. But the doctrine of the 
Wissenschaftslehre is necessary to explain this 
beginning. For this shows how the Ego posits itself 
as free activity. In positing myself as active, I 
posit myself as rational, and in positing myself as 
rational, I posit myself as free. The conception 
of freedom involves before all, only the faculty of 

i Fichte, IV. 23-25. s Id. III. 21. 

2 Id. IV. Vorrede, x. and 11. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 287 

projecting conceptions of our possible activity, 
through absolute spontaneity : — 

Im Begriffe der Freiheit liegt zuvorderst nur das Vermogen 
durch absolute Spontaneitat Begriffe von unserer moglicher 
Wirksamkeit zu entwerf en ; und nur dieses blosse Vermogen 
schreiben Yerniinitige Wesen einander mit Nothwendig- 
keit zu. 1 

The Ego thinks itself as free, and thinks this 
necessarily. Freedom is the only true being, and 
is the basis of all other being. Belief in the sub- 
jective validity of the phenomenon of Freedom is 
derived from the Thathandlung of the Ego. Belief 
in the objective validity of the phenomenon of 
Freedom is deduced from the consciousness of the 
moral law. 

I am really free, is said to be the first article of 
belief which makes a transition to the intelligible 
world possible, and offers a firm place to stand. 
Doing is not the second idea, and being the first ; 
but doing is the first, and being the second. 2 For I 
am conscious of myself as an independent free being. 
This is not an inference from effects, but is imme- 
diate. This fact is established in spite of the sub- 
jection of nature to determining causes. Indecision 
is the war of opposing forces; while it is of the 
essence of freedom, not to be decided, but to decide. 
I am therefore the author of my own thought, and 
am free. 3 The difference between freedom and the 
general spontaneity of the mind is carefully drawn 
by Fichte when he says: Ein Act des Geistes, 

i Fichte, HI. 8. 2 jd. rv. 54 £. 8 id. n. 187. 



288 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

dessen wir uns als eines solchen bewusst werden, 
heisst Ereiheit. Ein Act ohne Bewusstsein des ; 
Handelns, blosse Spontaneitat. The freedom of 
the will is freedom from mechanical necessity of 
any kind ; and it is limited only by the content 
of the volition. 1 

While Fichte reiterates the doctrine of indeter- 
minism in a great variety of forms, he does not 
find it necessary to argue at length in opposition 
to the contrary theory. This is because his doc- 
trine is deduced from the principles of his philoso- 
phy ; and if the latter be accepted, the possibility of 
a denial of freedom is eliminated. If the universe 
is the result of a TJiatJiandlung of the Ego, there is 
nothing which can limit the Ego unless it be the 
Ego itself ; and so determinism extrinsically consid- 
ered is excluded, and the only determinism is the 
determination of the Ego by itself, which is free- 
dom. On the contrary, the self-dependence and 
freedom of the Ego are not given empirically ; they 
are abstractions independent of the conflict between 
inclinations, desires, and impulses. 

Considered practically, the conception of freedom 
determines the moral imperative. And because 
other men are free like myself, I should treat them 
as if they were free, while my own body should be 
used as a means to freedom. However the motives 
may conflict, in the free act the opposition ceases 
because they are united in the same thought. In 
the free act one does not feel his own will, but 
feels the limitation of activity and its successful 

i Fichte, II. 217. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 289 

em oval. In the series of natural phenomena, 
very member can be explained by some antecedent 
ember; but in the volitional series no such ex- 
planation is possible : Jedes ist ein erstes und abso- 
utes. 1 In the one case there is the principle of 
:ause and effect; in the other, that of substance. 
Che last member of the natural series is impulse 
Trieb), but this is not a cause. The impulse or 
nclination does not cause the particular volition. 
The volition is effected by my force: meine Kraft. 
Belief in determinism is ascribed to defective in- 
uition; and its advocates are only discursive 
hinkers : man muss gegen sie nicht disputiren, 
ondern man sollte sie cultiviren, "wenn man 
konnte. 2 In short, the will is absolutely free ; and 
bo deny this is an absurdity : Kurz der Wille ist 
schlechtin frei; und ein unfreier Wille ist ein 
Unding. 3 

SCHBLLING 

It is customary to distinguish three stages in the 
development of Schelling's philosophy. These are 
a manifestation partly of an inner process of evo- 
lution, and partly of external influences. He did 
not teach three systems of philosophy, but in each 
period the same system is exhibited with different 
modifications. In the philosophy of Fichte, the 
conception of the will was transferred from the 
narrower psychological and ethical territory which 
it had occupied in some of the theories of an ear- 
lier time; it was no longer regarded merely as a 

i Fichte, IV. 134. 2 id. IV. 136. s id. IV. 159. 

u 



290 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

faculty or as a phenomenon. In the philosophy of 
Fichte, and in that of Schelling and Hegel, the 
will is a first principle. The Ego of the Wissen- 
schaftslehre is the equivalent of Kant's practical 
reason; it is formal will. And there is some jus- 
tice in Schopenhauer's claim to have been the most 
faithful interpreter of the Kantian philosophy, in 
so far as he identified the Ding an sicli with will. 
In the first period of his philosophical career, 
Schelling takes his departure from the principles 
of Fichte, but differs from Fichte in his view of 
the development of intelligence out of nature. In 
the second period, he identifies subject with object, 
and finds their unity in the absolute, which is higher 
than both. In the third period his philosophy is 
modified in accordance with ideas taken from Plato, 
Bohme the German mystic, and Aristotle. There 
is a greater difference between the philosophy of 
the second and that of the third period, than there 
is between the philosophy of the first and that of 
the second period. The doctrines of the absolute 
and the identity of subject and object are contained 
implicitly in the writings of the earliest part of his 
literary activity. Up to the time of his excursion 
into mysticism, the gradual composition of his 
system illustrates in many ways the development 
of German philosophy from the point where Kant 
left it to the more elaborate discipline of Hegel. 

In considering Schelling' s theory of the will, it 
is more convenient to disregard the above threefold 
division, and to notice his teaching as it is con- 
tained in the writings of the first period and of 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 291 

the third: on the one hand, in his Philosophy of 
Nature and Transcendental Idealism; on the other, 
in his treatise on human freedom. 

I 

According to Schelling there are two funda- 
mental sciences. One sets out from the idea of 
nature, and seeks to explain the development of 
consciousness or intelligence; the other sets out 
from the idea of intelligence, and seeks to explain 
nature. The first of these sciences is the Phi- 
losophy of Nature; the second is the Transcen- 
dental Idealism. It is chiefly in the second that 
his earlier view of the will is presented. 

Nature, according to Schelling, is not dead, but 
only unconscious. It is not being, but becoming. 
It is a process, the end of which is intelligence. 
According to Fichte, the objective world was the 
Non-Ego which was affirmed or posited by the Ego ; 
according to Schelling nature is unconscious spirit. 
In distinguishing conscious and unconscious spirit, 
Schelling shows the influence of Leibnitz, and pre- 
pares the way for von Hartmann. Nature is an 
activity, and has the potentiality of consciousness 
within it. The realization of consciousness is the 
goal of its evolution. While the lower processes 
in this evolution are mechanical, the unity of nature 
is to be found in a world-soul. There are two prin- 
ciples of force in nature, one positive, the other 
negative; one progressive, the other limitative. 
The unity of both is a formative and organizing 
principle which is called the world-soul : — 



292 THEORIES OE THE "WILL 

Diese beiden streitenden Krafte zugleich in der Einheit 
und im Conflikt vorgestellt, fukren auf die Idee eines organi- 
sirenden, die Welt zum System bildenden Princips. Ein 
solches wollten vielleicht die Alten durch die Weltseele 
andeuten. 1 

When the natural process is manifested in life, 
individuation is the result, and individual beings 
or organisms are determined according to a telos, 
and are not merely mechanical. The highest stage 
in this evolution is reached with man ; but it cannot 
be explained, or is not explained, how intelligence 
is evolved from the unconscious. The individuality 
of man as Ego is superior to the stream of causes 
and effects in nature. 2 

The beginning of all philosophy, according to 
Schelling, is the postulate that there is a produc- 
tive Ego which is both subject and object of an 
intellectual intuition. The Ego is the identity of 
being and production; it is both process and prod- 
uct. By free activity, Schelling does not here 
mean free choice, but only the active process by 
which the Ego comes to a knowledge of itself. As 
productive of being, it is not a conscious, but a 
blind, unconscious activity; and so we are theo- 
retically coerced in appearance, by knowledge which 
limits the Ego's activity. In the objective world 
we see our free activity conditioned by objects; but 
it is the same activity which limits itself, and yet 
is unlimited. The active Ego, then, is not deter- 
mined except by itself; it is both bestimmbar and 
bestimmt. The distinction implied here may be 
i Schelling, I. n. 381. * Id. I. n. 17. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 293 

otherwise expressed by saying that, as activity, 
the Ego is undetermined, but as being, it is deter- 
mined: — 

Aber ein "Werden lasst sich nicht denken als unter Beding- 
ung einer Begrenzung. Man denke eine unendlich produci- 
rende Thatigkeit als sich ausbreitend ohne Widerstand, so 
wird sie mit unendlicher Schnelligkeit produciren, ibr Produkt 
ist ein Sein, nicht ein Werden. Die Bedingung alles Werdens 
also ist die Begrenzung oder die Schranke. Aber das Ich 
soil nicht nur ein Werden, es soil ein unendliches Werden 
sein. 1 

The productive activity and the activity of the 
product imply one another; and so idealism and 
realism imply one another. Theoretical phi- 
losophy is idealistic; practical philosophy is real- 
istic. 

Ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen) arise 
within us, proceeding from the world of thought 
into the world of reality. The productive source 
of these is the active Ego, and its activity is mani- 
fested in acts of will. All free activity is produc- 
tive; and the objective world is product of free 
activity. 2 Eor the proper understanding of the 
conceptions of philosophy two things are neces- 
sary : first, that we should be the productive causes 
of presentations (Vorstellungen) ; and, second, that 
we should be both the subject and the object of 
the intuition (Anschauung) . Nothing can be predi- 
cated of the Ego per se, excepting activity, which 
is manifested as self-consciousness. And it is only 
through a particular act of freedom that the Ego 

i Schelling, I. in. 383. 2 Id. I. in. 348. 



294 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

becomes the object of consciousness. An original 
underived knowledge of the Ego is impossible, — 
it is not an inference, nor demonstration, but an 
intuition. It is an intellectual intuition, because 
the Ego is at once the subject and the object of the 
intuition : — 

Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist das Organ alles tran- 
scendentalen Denkens. Denn das transcendentale Denken 
geht eben darauf, sich durch Freiheit zum Objekt zu 
machen, was sonst niclit Objekt ist. 1 

The intellectual intuition presents the Ego to us 
as productive of itself as object, and is a free act. 
The Ego, as both subject and object of an intel- 
lectual intuition, is the principle from which one 
must proceed in the transcendental philosophy. 

In the Transcendental Idealism this process is 
reversed, and the problem is to explain the produc- 
tion of the object by the subject. In the Philoso- 
phy of Nature, the first principle was the Non-Ego, 
out of which the self-conscious Ego was supposed 
to proceed; in the Transcendental Idealism, the 
first principle, as in Eichte's philosophy, is the 
Ego, the productive activity of which is manifested 
in the objective world. In the Philosophy of Nat- 
ure, certain problems were suggested, but were not 
solved: whence is man, what is he, and what is 
his meaning? If, on the one hand, man is a prod- 
uct of nature, on the other hand he is himself the 
beginning of a series of causes, and this is not the 
effect of natural causes. It is this view which 

l Schelling, I. m. 369. See Fiehte, II. 33, 38. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 295 

makes the Transcendental Idealism necessary as a 
complement of the Philosophy of Nature. 

Like Fichte, Schelling makes a distinction be- 
tween matter and form, which has a bearing on 
his theory of will. Matter is determined, but form 
is free. But both matter and form are so related, 
that, if one be taken away, the other is also removed 
(aufgehoben). That is, the free process of the Ego's 
activity goes on, and its product is the matter of 
knowledge. The world of the productivity of the 
Ego is free, but the product, the world produced, 
is determined. 1 

The Ego is not to be understood as being a thing 
{Ding) ; it is productive activity. The product of 
this activity is a thing ; but the latter is the nega 
tion of free activity. Knowledge depends on the 
agreement between the objective and the subjective ; 
that which is objectively a product of the evolution 
of nature is subjectively the result of the produc- 
tive activity of the Ego. The productive activity 
of the Ego begins outside of all space and time, 
and so is not thought in the category of causality, 
it is absolutely free. The principle of causality 
is only a principle of the succession of ideas ; for 
there is no arbitrary succession : — 

Alle Kategorien sind Handlungsweisen, durch welche uns 
erst die Objekte selbst entstehen. Es gibt fur die Intelligenz 
kein Objekt, wenn es kein Causalitatsverhaltniss gibt, und 
dieses Verbaltniss ist eben desswegen von den Objekten 
unzertrennlicn. 2 

i Schelling, 1. 1. 347, 348. 
2 Id. I. in. 471. 



296 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

This shows that the activity of the Ego is prior 
to the principle of causality ; and while this activity 
is limited by the production of the object, and while 
the object has a causal effect upon the activity of 
the Ego, and limits it, the source of the causality, 
like the source of the free activity, lies in the Ego 
itself, and so there is no determination of the 
transcendental will. 

The beginning of consciousness can only be ex- 
plained as self-determination, that is, as an act of 
the intelligence upon itself. This self-determina- 
tion is called volition, in the most general meaning 
of the term : — 

. . . eine Handlung, wodurch die Intelligenz sich selbst 
v astimmt, ist ein Handeln auf sich selbst . . . Jenes 
;>elbstbestimmen der Intelligenz heisst Wollen in der allge- 
:aeinsten Bedeutung des Worts. 1 

In this act there is a combination of will as such, 
in its free activity, and the will to effect a possible 
object. It is the free Ego which determines the 
object and the will towards the object. In pro- 
ductive activity there was opposition between that 
process and its product ; in volition there is har- 
mony, in that there is idealizing intelligence on the 
one hand through freedom, and realizing intelli- 
gence on the other hand through the product. 2 
The free act of the productive Ego is hot itself 
volition, but simply furnishes the object of volition. 
Mere activity is not the willing of anything; and 
in order to free volition, an object must be presented 

i Schilling, I. m. 533. » id. I. m . 546. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 297 

as an occasion of volition. There is an object, and 
an impulse towards an object, and the realization 
of the impulse is volition. The activity of the 
Ego is infinite, but a finite object is presented, 
which serves as a point of departure for the vol- 
untary act. There is a harmony preestablished 
between the ideal and the real, for this is not the 
effect of interaction : — 

indem jenes von diesem und dieses von jenem so getrennt 
ist, dass gar kein wechselseitiger Einfluss beider aufeinander 
moglich ware, wenn nicht durch etwas ausser beiden Leigen- 
des eine Uebereinstimmung zwiscben beiden gestiftet ware. 1 

Thus, as in the philosophy of Eichte, objects are 
eternally presented to the free activity of the Ego, 
which is so far limited by them ; yet by virtue of 
its freedom it conditions these objects by which it 
is itself only relatively conditioned. Free will in 
the individual is only a phenomenon of the abso- 
lute will: — 

also ist die "Willkiir die von nns gesucbte Erscheinung des 
absoluten "Willens, nicbt das ursprunglicbe Wollen selbst, 
sondern der zum Objekt gewordene absolute Ereibeitsakt, 
mit welcbem alles Bewusstein beginnt. 2 

It is evident that in Schelling's earlier phi- 
losophy there is very little if any advance upon 
the position occupied by Eichte. While the Phi- 
losophy of Nature contains some elements which 
did not enter into Eichte's purely subjective 
idealism, the position of Schelling seems less logi- 

i Schelling, I. in. 579, 580. 2 Id. I. in. 576. 



298 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

cal and satisfactory than that of his predecessor. 
Even assuming that the Philosophy of Nature 
has successfully explained the evolution of con- 
sciousness, and that the activity of the Ego has 
successfully accounted for the presentation of an 
object, the relation between the two points of view 
is left in some obscurity. If the question be raised, 
what is the ultimate relation between the uncon- 
scious nature, from which we set out, and the un- 
conscious Ego which freely produces the objective 
world, only two answers seem possible : either sub- 
ject must be derived from object and object from 
subject, in an endless circle, or else their unity 
must lie in some principle above them both. The 
latter answer seems to be implied in the writings 
v? Schilling's first period, in which nature has its 
unity in a Weltseele, and is productive of a con- 
: ' ious Ego. But in the writings of the second 
period, the problem of the relation of the two 
principles is solved by finding the identity of sub- 
ject and object in the absolute. This part of 
Schilling's system has great significance in the 
general history of philosophy. In so far as the 
theory of the will is concerned, it raises for con- 
si ieration some questions which did not occur to 
ichte, but which are discussed by Schelling in 
the writings of his latest period. Just as Kant 
left insufficiently explained the relation between 
his theoretical and practical philosophy, so the 
writings of Schelling' s first period leave unex- 
plained the relation of the Philosophy of Nature 
to the Transcendental Idealism. But he does not 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 299 

commit this explanation to his successors, and so 
enters himself a region where it is difficult to 
follow him. 

II 

Without discussing specially the doctrines of the 
second period of Schelling's philosophical develop- 
ment, I shall pass directly to the consideration of 
the doctrine of the will contained in his treatise on 
the Essence of Human Freedom (Philosophische 
Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschlichen 
Freiheit), which belongs to what has been some- 
times called the mystical period in the development 
of his system. In his identity-philosophy he had 
reached the unity of subject and object in a prin- 
ciple which is the identity of both. Setting out 
from this pantheism, his aim is to avoid the con- 
clusion that God, the Absolute, is the cause of evil ; 
and so he is led to explain the -nature of freedom 
and necessity, and the relation of the human will 
to God. In the philosophy of identity, he showed 
that the first principle of the universe is one ; in 
the treatise just mentioned, he seeks to show that 
the first principle of the universe is free. He is 
more polemical in manner in this very interesting 
work than in any of his other formal treatises. 
While he adopts much from the philosophy of 
Spinoza, he opposes many of his doctrines. He 
finds fault with the doctrine of evil in the The- 
odicee of Leibnitz ; he criticises the subjective 
idealism of Fichte. 

According to Schelling, the opposition between 



300 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

necessity and freedom raises the inmost central 
question of philosophy. Just as it had been shown 
that the opposition between subject and object is 
removed by the absolute identity of intelligence 
and nature, so the opposition between freedom and 
necessity is to be removed by showing their iden- 
tity in the absolute. When it is said that God is 
nature, or that freedom is necessity, the relation 
between subject and predicate is that of antece- 
dent and consequent, of implicitum and explicitum; 
and Schelling speaks severely of those who mis- 
understand the significance of such propositions, 
and draw absurd conclusions, as if subject and 
predicate were exchangeable terms. He finds fault 
also with those who maintain that the idea of free- 
dom is incompatible with any systematic view of 
the universe, and holds that it is only by defining 
the term systematic incorrectly that freedom can be 
excluded from such a consideration of philosophy. 1 
But he holds also that the will must be considered 
from a point of view far wider than that of subjec- 
tive idealism. The principle of the universe is not 
the Ego nor the Non-Ego, but the absolute. He 
would prefer to deny the existence of freedom to 
affirming that only the Ego has will : — 

Ktirzer oder entscheidender ware, das System auch im 
Wille oder Verstande des Urwesens zu leugnen ; zu sagen, 
dass es Iiberhaupt nur einzelne Willen gebe, deren jeder 
einen Mittelpunkt fur sich ausmache, und nach Fichte's 
Ausdruck ernes jeden Ich die Absolut Substauz sei. 2 

l Schelling, I. vn. 336 ff . 2 Id. I. vn. 337. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 



301 



To solve the problem of the relation of freedom 
to the system of the universe is the problem of 
problems, and its solution is necessary if philosophy 
is to have any value. But an opposition between 
freedom and necessity is necessary : — 

ohne den "Widerspruch von Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit 
wiirde nicht Philosophic allein, sondern jedes hohere Wollen 
des Geistes in den Tod versinken, der jenen Wissenschaften 
eigen ist, in welchen er keine Anwendung hat. 1 

The problem is one from which Schelling does 
not shrink; and he finds it as absurd to deny neces- 
sity as to deny freedom. If it be said that panthe- 
ism is necessarily fatalistic, Schelling is ready with 
a denial. Yet by freedom we do not mean an abso- 
lute power which in man is equal to that of God. 
Infinite power extinguishes all lesser powers, as 
the sun puts out the light of the stars. If absolute 
causality be predicated of any one being, then all 
other beings must be passive. It is here that it is 
difficult to prove the reality of freedom. But the 
difficulty may be avoided if it be affirmed that man 
exists, not outside of God, but in God: dass der 
Mensch nicht ausser Gott, sondern in Gott sei, und 
dass seine Thatigkeit selbst mit zum Leben Gottes 
gehore. 2 

If it can be shown that such a view of man's 
relation to God is in harmony with the possibility 
of freedom, and if most men have a firm belief in 
the reality of freedom, it may, Schelling thinks, be 
said that such a solution is probably true. God 



Schelling, I. vn. 338. 



2 Id. I. vn. 339. 



302 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

according to his nature is eternal, and the indi- 
vidual things exist only in so far as he exists, as 
a consequence of his being. But things proceed 
out of God, as the result of his self-revelation; 
they thus have a life and character of their own. 
And man, as a manifestation of God, is God's repre- 
sentative. The pantheism of Schelling differs from 
that of Spinoza. The latter was realistic, while 
that of Schelling is idealistic. The absolute of 
Schelling is the God of Spinoza endowed with life 
and energy: der Spinozische Grundbegriff, durch 
das Princip des Idealismus vergeistert. 1 The rela- 
tion of things to God is of such a kind that their 
very relationship involves their endowment with 
life and freedom; for God is not the God of the 
dead, but of the living. Individual freedom is 
related to universal necessity as the eye is to the 
rest of the organism. While the eye would not 
exist without the rest of the organism, yet it has 
a certain function and mobility of its own. The 
relation of the human will to that of God is not 
mechanical: wobei das Bewirkte nichts fur sich 
selbst ist. 2 God reveals himself in man, and man 
must therefore resemble God. The individual man 
is a derived absolute ; and this brings out an essen- 
tial point in Schelling's theory. Immanence in 
God and freedom are not contradictory. Only that 
which is free, and in so far as it is free, is in God ; 
and that which is not free, in so far as it is not 
free, is necessarily outside of God : — 

1 Schelling, I. vn. 350. 
a Id. I. vu. 347. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 303 

So wenig widerspricht sich Immanenz in Gott und Frei- 
heit, dass gerade nur das Freie, und soweit es frei ist, in 
Gott ist, das Unfreie, und soweit es unfrei ist, nothwendig 
ausser Gott. 1 

The mechanical law of causality has no appli- 
cation to that which exists in God. By his 
idealistic pantheism, Schelling seeks to avoid the 
determinism of Spinoza. The first principle of 
Spinoza is a Ding, and all things in his system are 
governed mechanically; but his pantheism- is not 
held responsible for this : — 

Dieses System ist nicht Fatalismus, weil es die Dinge . in 
Gott begriffen sein lasst ; denn, wie wir gezeigt haben, der 
Pantheismus macht wenigstens die formelle Freiheit nicht 
unmoglich ; Spinoza muss also aus einem ganz andern und 
von jenem unabhangigen Grand Fatalist sein. 2 

The reality of freedom is an ultimate reality; for 
ultimate being is nothing else than will : es gibt in 
der letzten und hochsten Instanz gar kein anderes 
Sein als Wollen. 3 

Schelling proceeds to consider freedom in a more 
special sense. According to him there is no liberty 
of indifference. To suppose that freedom consists 
in an equilibrium between two alternate courses of 
action, so that there is equal inclination towards 
either, and a possibility of free decision in favor 
of one, is absurd. The problem of the Asinus 
Buridani presupposes an impossible condition of 
things. There is no exercise of volition without 

i Schelling, I. vn. 347. * id. i. ra 349. 8 id. 1. V n. 350. 



304 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

some reason; and to suppose that there is liberty 
of indifference is to suppose that the will in order 
to be free must be irrational. It makes free voli- 
tion equivalent to chance volition : — 

Zufall aber ist unmoglich, widerstreitet der Verminft wie 
der nothwendigen Einlieit des Ganzen ; und wenn Freiheit 
nicht anders als mit der ganzlichen Zuf alligkeit der Hand- 
lungen zu retten ist, so ist sie iiberhaupt nicht zu retten. 1 

Bti$*4£ freedom in such a sense is to be rejected, 
so also, according to Schelling, is determinism to 
be rejected, which regards all volitions as the 
product of necessary causes. The mistake which 
men have made is in supposing that only one of 
these alternatives can be true, and in neglecting 
that higher unity of necessity and freedom with 
which Schelling's treatise is concerned. If the 
will be determined at all, it must be necessarily 
determined, and the modification of the theory of 
necessity in the philosophy of Leibnitz is not jus- 
tifiable. It is idealism which saves us from either 
of these extreme conclusions. According to tran- 
scendental and absolute idealism, the intelligible 
essence of man is outside of time and beyond the 
series of causes and effects : — 

Das intelligibile "Wesen jedes Dings, und vorzuglich des 
Menschen, ist diesem zufolge ausser allem Causalzusam- 
menliang, wie ausser oder iiber aller Zeit. 2 

Man's volition is determined by nothing which 
goes before, and it makes all that follows it possible. 

i Schelling, I. vn. 383. a Id., ib. 383. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 305 

The act of the will is free, because it has its origin 
in the intelligible being of man, and proceeds from 
it. It is determined only in so far as the nature 
of the subject which wills determines it. This 
determination is not effected by external causes, 
nor through the inclination of the will by causes, 
but by the essence or being (Wesen) to which the 
will belongs. If it be said, however, that it is 
determined by the nature from which it proceeds, 
and yet that this nature is undetermined, it is 
difficult to see wherein we hav 3 avoided the ab- 
surdity of the libert}' of indifference to which 
Schelling has called attention. If it be held that 
the free will of the intelligible essence acts with- 
out a motive, then the free will must be indifferent, 
which has been denied. Schelling replies that the 
reconciliation of the determination and indeter- 
mination of the will lies in the fact that it is the 
very nature of the being which determines the will 
to be itself indetermined. The result is deter- 
mined, but the cause is not determined : — 

Es ist ja kein bestimmtes Allgemeines sondern bestimmt 
das intelligibile Wesen dieses Menschen ; von einer solchen 
Bestinimtkeit gilt der Spruch determinatio est negatio. 1 

ISTo matter how freely the intelligible nature may 
act, it must act in accordance with its own nature.; 
and so such action, although absolutely necessary, 
is a manifestation of the highest freedom. 

In this way, then, Schelling seeks to avoid the 
absurdities of chance, and yet to save the freedom 

i Schelling, I. vn. 384. 



306 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

of the will. It may be asked, wherein lies this inner 
necessity? If the intelligible essence were lifeless 
being (todtes fieiri), and the action were mechani- 
cally produced, there would be an end of freedom; 
for the cause of the act would be external. But 
the inner necessity is itself freedom. Necessity 
and freedom are thus two aspects of one and the 
same thing. As Fichte said : — 

y - "Das Ich ist seine eigne That. Bewusstsein ist Selbstsetzen 

aber das Ich i«t nichts von diesem verschiedenes, sondern 
eben das SelbstsetzeL. selber. 1 

Intelligible being, then, is primitive volition. 
The will is Ursein ; and intelligible being is Ur-und 
Grundwollen. Man determines himself, and the de- 
termination happens. before time, and not in time; 
for man, although born in time, was created from 
the beginning. As a product of nature, and as 
existing in God, the life of man reaches back to 
eternity; and man is from the beginning indeter- 
mined. 2 The conclusion from this is that when a 
man is good, he is good not arbitrarily, but from 
the necessity of his nature ; and when he is bad, 
he is bad not arbitrarily, or by chance, but from 
the necessity of his nature. This does not mean 
that he is good or bad against his will, but that he 
wills the good or the bad because he is either good 
or bad. Judas Iscariot betrayed his Master, but 
no creature could have prevented him from willing 
this act of treason. And yet he was not coerced, 
but acted according to his inclination. The good 

i Schelling, I. vn. 386. 2 id., ib. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 307 

man is not forced to be good, but even the gates of 
bell cannot prevail to make bim bad. Tbe volun- 
tary act does not perform itself; it is performed 
by tbe man, and if performed by bim, be is to 
blame, or be bas tbe merit of tbe act. He knows 
also tbat be is accountable. Schelling supports tbis 
conclusion by calling attention to the early manifes- 
tation of character, so that even in infancy a certain 
bias in a bad direction may be observed, without 
any deliberate volition. - "'~ 

Schelling therefore agrees with Fichte in holding 
that the will is not determined, but self-determined. 
As to the origin of the character which determines 
the will, he is scarcely less mystical or mythical 
in his treatment than Plato. As has been already 
shown, Plato accounted for character by supposing 
that man had freely chosen his own destiny in a 
preexistent state. Schelling holds that the fault of 
those who have taught the doctrine of predestina- 
tion has been that they attributed the evil in the 
world and in man to a decree of God in time, and 
did not perceive that before time there was no 
succession, but that man was born from all eter- 
nity, and that his character had no beginning in 
time. The determination of the wills of men is 
not the effect of a special decree or act of God; but 
this determination is the effect of their eternally 
predestinated characters. As man acts here, so he 
has acted from all eternity. For these reasons, no 
choice more free could be demanded than that which 
now belongs to man. 

If it be further asked why some men necessarily 



308 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

determine themselves to will what is bad, and some 
to will what is good, we have one of the riddles of 
the universe suggested. Not content with the bold 
attempt to harmonize necessity and freedom, Schel- 
ling proceeds to grapple with the question of the 
origin of evil. It would carry this exposition too 
far away from the subject were I to enter into any 
detailed consideration of this doctrine of Schel- 
ling's philosophy, which is a remarkable speculative 
achievement. Schelling himself regarded the prob- 
lem of evil as f he most difficult problem connected 
with the doctrine of freedom. Having shown that 
all things exist in God, he must now show that 
God is not the cause of evil. He rejects the 
optimism of Leibnitz, and draws a distinction 
between existence and the ground of existence. It 
is evident that God cannot be altogether viewed in 
this twofold way; for, as has already been shown, 
all things exist in God, and the existence and the 
ground of existence must therefore be included in 
God. The ground (Grund) of the existence of God 
is in absolute nature. Nature and God are in- 
separable, but are distinguishable. There is a 
circle in the principle of God and nature; that 
which is produced produces the producer. The 
ground of God's existence is not God as God, but 
is in that which exists eternally with him. The 
ground of God's existence is in the desire (Sekn- 
sucht) which the Absolute has to beget himself. 
And this Sehnsucht is to be interpreted as will. 
Will is therefore the eternal principle of the uni- 
verse and of God : — 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 309 

Der erste Anfang der Schopfung ist die Sehnsucht des 
Einen, sich selbst zu gebaren, oder der Wille des Grundes. 1 

Following the longing of the One to beget itself, 
is the second beginning of creation, which is the 
will of love, by means of which God makes himself 
a person. The first kind of will is not free in the 
same sense in which the second is free. For the 
first will {Der Wille des Grundes) is unconscious 
and blind, and proceeds according to natural neces- 
sity. The revelation of the second will is ap,t ?^1 
deed (Handlung und That). In Go4 is the union 
of all living forces, and man is a part of this union 
in so far as he remains good; but so soon as he falls 
from this equilibrium of forces in the divine being, 
and makes his own will the principle of his action, 
then he becomes bad, and is in darkness. Where 
God is, there is light. 

This theory of the origin of evil was the occa- 
sion of a letter written by Eschenmayer (1810), 
in which he opposed Schelling's idea of God, to 
which Schelling wrote a reply. Some years later 
he found that in the development of his philosophy 
he had made the idea of freedom less prominent 
than he had at first desired, and he published his 
treatise Ueber die Natur der PhilosopJiie als Wis- 
senschaft. In this he seeks to remove the contra- 
diction between freedom and necessity by a species 
of mysticism. The apparent contradiction between 
the two is said to be removed by the soul rising in 
ecstasy to a view of the union and harmony of the 
two conceptions. 

i Schelling, I. vn. 395. 



310 theories of the 'will 

Hegel 

The connection is very close between the general 
principles of Hegel's philosophy and his doctrine 
of the will. The will is explained in a statement at 
the beginning of the Philosophie des Bechts ; but 
the principles from which this statement proceeds, 
and on which it depends, are found in the theo- 
retical part of his system. For this reason I shall 
notice, first, his idea of the Absolute ; second, his 
theory of subjective and objective spirit, including 
his view of iae will in relation to the principles of 
freedom and necessity. 

I. The Absolute. Philosophy is defined as the 
science of the absolute. The absolute is not sub- 
ject alone, as in the philosophy of Fichte ; it is not 
nature alone, nor God as distinguished from the 
world. It is not the mere identity of subject and 
object. It is best defined as spirit; it is also ab- 
solute subject, an all-embracing principle, the first 
principle of all thought and of all philosophy : — 

diejenige Eegion, worin alle Rathsel der Welt gelost, alle 
Widersprtiche des tiefer sinnenden Gedankens enthullt sind, 
alle Schmerzen des Gefuhls verstummen, die Region der ewi- 
gen "Wahrheit, der ewigen Ruhe. 1 

On the one hand, the absolute is the negation of 
all predicates ; on the other hand, it is the position 
or affirmation of all. It is therefore the most 
formal contradiction (der formellste Wider spruch). 2 
The absolute of Hegel differs radically from the 

i Hegel, XI. 3. , 2 id. xi. 179. 



EST GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 311 

God of Spinoza in that it is becoming as "well as 
being ; it differs from the Ego of Eichte in that it 
is the identity and unity of subject and object; it 
differs from the absolute of Schelling in that it is 
not transcendent, but only immanent. Although it 
is known by reflection, it is not known as a being 
here and now, but as a becoming, a process, so that 
the complete being of the absolute is a process and 
a result (Resulted). It is an evolution or develop- 
ment, not in an infinite succession, but as a cycle of 
self-movement (Selbstbewegung). The development 
starts from the absolute an und fur sick ; this is the 
first moment ; the absolute as such is an implicit and 
explicit principle. The second moment in the evo- 
lution is the externalization of the absolute as nat- 
ure (im Andersseiri). The third moment is the 
return of the absolute out of nature to itself, com- 
pleting the cycle, and attaining to self-consciousness. 
Logic treats of the first of these stages, the philoso- 
phy of nature of the second, and the philosophy 
of spirit of the third. The process which begins 
with the absolute ends with the absolute. 

The absolute cannot be adequately manifested in 
nature ; its real manifestation is in the world of 
finite spirits. The consciousness of finite spirits is 
only a stage in the life of the absolute, in the pro- 
cess towards that Resultat which the absolute is. 
The end or last stage in the evolution of the abso- 
lute is spirit, which is a return of the absolute out 
of nature. Nature is bound by a necessary chain 
of causes and effects ; but the essence of spirit is 
freedom. Every system is a system of freedom and 



312 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

necessity. Freedom and necessity are ideal factors. 1 
They are not really in opposition. The absolute 
does not posit itself exclusively as free ; nor exclu- 
sively as governed by necessity. As an inner prin- 
ciple, freedom is characteristic of the absolute ; in 
so far as the absolute is externalized or manifested 
as objective totality, necessity is characteristic of 
it. Yet necessity belongs to intelligence in a cer- 
tain sense, just as freedom in a certain sense belongs 
~ie nature. Every form (Gestalt) of the intel- 
ligence is conditioned by means of its opposite; 
while the freedom of nature consists in the fact 
that as becoming, it is posited by itself, and is not 
produced by any extrinsic principle. The causes 
of evolution are inner and free. In the possibility 
of spirit manifesting itself, lies the possibility of 
its return to freedom. Freedom and spirit are in- 
separable conceptions : — 

Das Wesen des Geistes ist deswegen f ormell die Freiheit, 
die absolute Negativitat des Begriffes als Identitat mit sich. a 

The absolute as the infinite and universal abides 
as becoming ; but it is actualized in the finite and 
individual spirits which come and go. 

The three moments in the life of the absolute 
correspond with the three parts of Hegel's dialecti- 
cal method. In this method, the concept is first 
apprehended immediately (unmittelbar) as an und 
fur sich. A second stage of the method is the cog- 
nition of the concept as that which is not immedi- 
ate and stable, but as mediate and fleeting, as the 
i Hegel, I. 265. * Id. VII 2 , 24, 25. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 313 

negation or opposite of the first. The third stage 
is the apprehension of the truth of the first in the 
second, the union of the two moments, and the 
cancellation (AufJiebung) of the opposition between 
them. x 

II. Subjective and Objective Spirit, in Relation to 
Will. As was said just now, the absolute is best 
denned as spirit ; and the adequate manifestation 
of the absolute is not in nature, but in the succes- 
sion of finite spirits. In this process' is the 
actuality of spirit. In subjective spirit, the actu- 
ality of the absolute is manifested in knowledge 
and will ; in objective spirit, in right (JRecht), the 
state and history. The unity of these is absolute 
spirit, with which we are here not immediately 
concerned. 

Hegel uses the term psychology in a wider and 
in a narrower sense. In a wide sense it is the 
whole science of subjective spirit, and includes 
anthropology, the science of the natural soul 
(Seele oder Naturgeist), phenomenology, the science 
of consciousness, and psychology in the narrower 
sense. In this sense, psychology is the science of 
the self-determining spirit as explicit subject (Sub- 
jectfur sicJi). Anthropology treats not only of the 
natural soul (die naturliche Seele), but of feeling 
and the actual soul. Phenomenology treats of 
consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, as 
the three stages in the development of the subjec- 
tive spirit. Psychology in the narrower sense 
treats of the theoretical, the practical, and the free 
i Hegel, VI 2) 33, 40 £f. 



314 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

spirit. The science of the natural, feeling, and 
actual soul, which is discussed in the anthropology 
of Hegel, is conversant with soul in relation to 
body, and includes a consideration of the influence 
of various external influences, such as climate, 
race, and magnetic forces. The phenomenology, 
which is a name given also to Hegel's first im- 
portant treatise, deals with the stages of develop- 
ment in the subjective life, particularly with the 
cognitive process. 1 In the phenomenology, the 
soul, through the negation of its corporeality, rises 
to ideal identity with itself, and becomes an Ego. 
But the Ego of the phenomenology is still implicit 
(an sicli), since its being is only in relation to 
something else, that is, to something which is given 
(ein Gegebenes). The freedom of the Ego is here 
only an abstract, conditioned, and relative free- 
dom, just as the Ego in the theoretical science of 
Eichte was conditioned relatively by a Non-Ego. 
That which conditions the Ego is the externaliza- 
tion of the absolute, and so far the Ego does not 
reach actuality and freedom. The activity of the 
Ego consists in its filling up the vacuum of its 
abstract subjectively, and in so doing it creates the 
objective within itself, and makes the subjective 
objective : — 

Die Thatigkeit des ich besteht hier darin, die Leere 
seiner abstracter* Subjectivitat zu erfiilleii, das Objective 
in sich hinein zu bilden, das Subjective dagegen objectiv 
zu macben. 2 

i Hegel, VII 2,40 ff. 
aid. VII 2 44. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 



315 



In consciousness the content of spirit becomes 
objective, and in self-consciousness it becomes sub- 
jective. This general self-consciousness is in itself 
and for us (an sicli und fur uns) reason ; but in the 
third part of the science of subjective spirit, reason 
becomes an object to itself. That part of the 
science of subjective spirit which is especially 
related to the will is psychology in the narrower 
sense. Spirit and reason are related as body aucL 
gravity, or as will and freedom, are related. The 
reason forms the substantial nature of spirit. 
Spirit, as including both the subjective and the 
objective, posits itself subjectively as theoretical 
and practical, that is, as knowledge and will. 1 
That which the intelligence knows is the objective 
concept, while the object loses the form of a con- 
tent which belongs to the spirit itself. Psychology 
treats of the forms of the theoretical and practical 
spirit. The soul is a unity, and cannot be properly 
split . up into a number of faculties, or distinct 
forces, or activities. It is a 'self-conscious, real 
idea. It acts necessarily, but overcomes this 
necessity, and attains to freedom. In the expres- 
sion Ego = Ego, the principle of the absolute reason 
and freedom is pronounced. Freedom and reason 
consist in this, that I raise myself to the form of 
Ego=Ego: — 

kurz darin, dass ich in Einem und demselben Bewusstsein 
Ich und die Welt habe, in der Welt mich selber Wiederfinde, 
und umgekehrt in meinem Bewusstsein Das habe, was ist, 
was Objectivitat hat. 2 

l Hegel, VII 2 , 43-45. 2 id. yil 2 , 267. 




316 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

This again resembles the doctrine of Fichte, the 
affirmation or positing of the Ego by the Ego. The 
Ego is known as snch, not alone, but as a member 
of a system: dass ich jedes Object als ein Glied in 
einem Systeme Desjenigen fasse, was ich selbst 
bin. 

There are several steps or stages in the develop- 
ment of knowledge. There is sense, which gives 
^& knowledge that objects exist; perception, which 
gives a knowledge of their qualities; understand- 
ing, which gives a knowledge of the essence, and 
laws of phenomena. 1 

When, in the process of cognition, the theoretical 
intelligence has reached thought, it attains to a 
kind of freedom. The relation between the thought 
and the object of thought is free. The intelligence 
knows itself as determining the content, which is 
determined as being, as well as being its own. 
And this intelligence is will : Die Intelligenz sich 
wissend als das Bestimmende des Inhaltes der 
ebenso der ihrige, wie als seiend bestimmt ist, ist 
Wille. 2 Spirit as will knows itself as determining 
itself in itself, and realizing itself out of itself: 
Der G-eist als Wille weiss sich als sich in sich 
beschliessend, und sich aus sich erflillend. 3 The 
inward determinateness of the will is in its bring- 
ing freedom into existence. The determinate 
concept of the will is in its giving its own content 
(Inlialt) ; and true freedom in the moral sense 
consists in the will making the content not selfish, 
nor subjective, but universal. In this Hegel's 

l Hegel, VII 2 , 261 ff . 2 id. yil 2) 358. « Id. VII 2 , 359. 



IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 317 

doctrine is derived from the Kantian impera- 
tive. 

Thought which forms the point of departure, as 
it were, for freedom, is the last stage in the process 
of the knowledge of theoretical reason. The first 
stage is intuition or perception of an external world 
in space, and of an inner world in time, after the 
manner of the Kantian JZsthetic. The second 
is the presentation (Vorstellung) consisting rrfL 
memory, phantasy, and the reproduction of Ideas. 
The third is thought, in which the knowledge of 
the two former processes is appropriated and made 
object. 1 

Practical spirit is developed, in general, in three 
stages, in practical feeling, inclination or impulse 
(Trieb), and happiness. In the first of these 
psychological stages, the will is in the form of 
immediateness (Unmittelbarkeif). It has not yet 
posited itself as free, as objectively determining 
intelligence. It only finds itself as objective deter- 
mination : — 

Zunachst erscheint der "Wille in der Form der Unmittel- 
barkeit ; er hat sich noch nicht als frei und objectiv bestim- 
mende Intelligenz gesetzt, sondern findet sich nur als solches 
objectives Bestimmen. 2 

Inclinations or impulses, and voluntary decision 
between them, is the second stage. Whether the 
desire agrees with the inner determination of the 
will is only contingent. When such an opposition 
between desire and will exists, the will cannot 
i Hegel, VII a , 308. a id. VII 2 , 360. 




318 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

remain satisfied, but asserts itself. Inclination or 
impulse (Trieb), is more than desire. Desire is a 
mere fact of self-consciousness, while impulse 
requires satisfaction, and is a form of will. Yet 
in so far as man is governed by impulse he is not 
free. In relation to impulses, the will must be dis- 
tinguished as thinking, and as free ; as a unity, it 
reflects in the presence of a manifold of inclina- 
tions. It decides between them; this is Willkiir. 
Er isu suf dem Standpunkt, zwischen Neigungen 
zu wahlen, und ist Willkiir. 

In this sense it is explicitly (fur sich) free. But 
it must be observed that such a will is merely the 
realization of one inclination to the exclusion of 
another. It is choice between inclinations, and not 
necessarily a free, that is, a moral choice. As Kant 
expressed it, the will is in this case heteronomous, 
not autonomous. 

Happiness is the representation of an abstract 
universal of content, which ought to be, but is not. 
The content becomes particularized, and is willed. 
In such a determination of content, in which the 
concept and the object are identical, and in which 
the will determines itself, consists the freedom of 
the will : — 

Die Gliickseligkeit ist die mir vorgestellte, abstracte Allge- 
meinheit des Inhalts, welche nur sein soil. Die Wahrheit 
aber der besondern Bestimmtheit, welche eben so sekr ist, 
als aufgehoben ist, und der abstracter! Einzelnheit, der 
Willkiir, welche sich in der Gliickseligkeit eben so sehr einen 
Zweck giebt als nicht giebt, ist die allgemeine Bestimmtbeit 
des Willens an ibm selbst, d. i. sein Selbstbestimmen selbst, 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 319 

die Freiheit. ... In dieser Wahrheit seiner Selbstbestim- 
mung, worm Begriff und Gegenstand identisch ist, ist der 
Wille, — wirklich freier Wille. 1 

Hegel is far from agreeing with Kant, however, 
that the freedom of the will is simply a practical 
postulate, which cannot be demonstrated theoreti- 
cally. In his criticism of the Third Antinomy, his 
chief objection is that Kant regarded the contradic- 
tion of thesis and antithesis as absolute i .whereas 
it is only a contradiction which manifests the two 
first stages in the dialectical method. The contra- 
diction is cancelled in the absolute. 2 

The most difficult point of interpretation in the 
Hegelian theory of the will is that in which it is 
asserted that the will when free has freedom as its 
content and object and end. In the interpretation 
of Hegel's philosophy, it is always possible to mis- 
apprehend his meaning, because of his peculiar use 
of terms ; but if I have correctly stated his doc- 
trine, it is difficult to say in what sense the indi- 
vidual will can be free. The evolution of the 
absolute is a process of the free activity of the 
absolute, and inasmuch as spirit and freedom are 
as inseparable as body and gravity, the finite 
spirit as well as the absolute spirit must be free. 
It is admitted by Hegel that spirit is limited by 
the content of the will, but as in the systems of 
Fichte and Schelling, that which is limited is also 
that which limits, and the contradiction is can- 
celled. Moreover, when spirit reaches self-con- 

i Hegel, VH 2 , 371, 372. a id. yi. 105, 115, 116. 



320 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

sciousness, it knows itself as free. The ultimate 
result of the development of the absolute is to 
know itself as free spirit theoretically ; and practi- 
cally to will its freedom. Whether such a doctrine 
should be called deterministic or not, is a mere 
matter of definition. 

Der Geist, der sich als frei weiss und sich als diesen semen 
Gegenstand will, d. i. sein Wesen zur Bestimmung und zum 
Z weeks- hat ist zunachst iiberhaupt der verniinftige Wille, 
oder an sich die Idee, darum nur der Begriff des ahsoluten 
Geistes. 1 

According to Hegel, the willing of freedom in a 
moral sense seems to be the willing on a basis of 
character, not of inclination. But if freedom is 
realized through the will to be free, the inference 
is that such volition is not yet free ; if freedom is 
already possessed, it is a work of supererogation to 
will to have it. The ever ready dialectic is at hand 
to remove this contradiction, which disappears in 
the higher unity: — 

Die Freiheit, zur Wirklichkeit einer Welt gestaltet, erhalt 
die Form von Nothwendigkeit, deren suhstantiellerer Zusam- 
menhang das System der Freiheits-Bestimmungen, und 
deren erscheinender Zusammenhang als die Macht, das 
Anerkanntsein, d. i. ihr Gelten im Bewusstsein ist. 1 

At the same time, it is doubtful whether Hegel 
intended to affirm that the subjective spirit was 
actually free, for he speaks of its freedom as a 
Schein, or false appearance of freedom, and attrib- 

1 Hegel, VII 2 , 359. » Id. VII 2 , 376. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 321 

utes true freedom to the objective spirit only, in 
which personality is actualized. 

In any case the practical freedom of the will is 
unambiguously asserted. In the Philosophie des 
Bechts, it is said that will without freedom is an 
empty word ; and there is no freedom except that 
of the willing subject. Will is not antithetical to 
thought. Man does not have will in one pocket, 
and thought in the other. The difference betwes^r 
them is only the difference between practical and 
theoretical conduct. Will is only a particular mode 
of thought. It is thought translating itself into 
existence. It is the impulse to give existence to 
itself. 1 When I think of an object, I make it a 
thought, it becomes essentially and directly mine. 
It is no longer something beyond me, but it is my 
own. To think is to make a thing universal. 
The Ego is thought ; not a special thought, but a 
general thought, empty, a metaphysical point, and 
simple (leer, punktuell, einfach). The image of the 
world is before me ; I make its content mine. So 
much for the theoretical side. The practical side 
is that the Ego posits itself as opposed to the world, 
and determines an opposition between the world and 
itself. This opposition and distinction are again 
my own. I myself have made these determinations 
and differences. Thus the theoretical is contained 
in the practical. Eor there is no will without intel- 
ligence. The theoretical intelligence is included in 
the will. That which is willed is an object for me 
(fur mich). 2 The will determines itself. 

l Hegel, VIII. 33. « Id. VIII. 41-16. 



322 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

Freedom is given as a fact of consciousness, and 
must be believed. It is possible to prove the 
reality of freedom ; but it is more convenient to 
appeal directly to inner experience. The will 
contains (1) the element of pure indeterminate- 
ness. There is a will in general, expressed in 
needs and desires immediately without any con- 
tent. There is an absolute possibility of any de- 
termination which I may find in myself. This, 
however, is mere empty freedom. It is negative, 
not positive. It is one-sided. The will contains 
(2) the transition from this negative condition to 
the determining of a particular content and object. 
This content may either be given by nature, or may 
be created and generated by the concept of the mind. 
By affirming itself as determined, the Ego attains 
to existence in general. This second moment, like 
the first, is negative ; it is the negation of the first 
negation. It is one-sided, for the will is posited or 
affirmed as determined. This second moment is a 
part of freedom, but does not constitute freedom in 
the true sense. In the first moment, the will is 
purely will, without the willing of anything in 
particular. In the second moment, the will is a 
will of something, but this something is limited, 
and so the will is limited by its content. The will 
is (3) the unity of these two moments. Neither 
the first nor the second moment is the will in 
the true sense. In the third, it is the Ego, not the 
object nor the possible object, which determines 
the will. This self-determination is freedom of the 
will : — 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 323 

Ich bestimmt sich, insofern es die Beziehung der Negati- 
vitat auf sich selbst ist ; als diese Beziehung auf sich ist es 
ebenso gleichgultig gegen diese Bestimmtheit, weiss sie als die 
seinige und ideelle als blosse Moglichkeit, durch die es 
nicht gebunden ist, sondern in der es nur ist, weil es sich in 
derselben setzt. — Diess ist die Freiheit des Willens. 1 

Thus we have on the one hand an abstraction 
from all determinateness, which is the universality 
of the will, and on the other hand a determinate 
object and content, which is the particulw"will. 
They are both moments of the understanding. 
The true and speculative moment is reached, when 
the concrete conception of freedom is attained, with- 
out the universality on the one hand, and the par- 
ticularity on the other. The will is at first pure 
activity ; it then determines itself, and from being 
universal becomes particular, because it has posited 
a content. In the third moment, it does not cease 
to retain the universal, although it is determined. 
In this deter minateness, man does not feel deter- 
mined, for in the recognition of another, as another, 
he attains to real self-feeling. 

From the standpoint of the understanding, the 
will is determined, not only as to matter or content, 
but also as to form. As to form, the will is deter- 
mined by the final cause. The final cause, which is 
first an inner conception, is objectified, and made the 
external object of the will. The content determines 
the will, but the will is free, in that the possibility 
exists of the content being different from what it is. 
At first the will is a natural will, and is affected by 

i Hegel, Vin. 41. 



324 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

the various inclinations and impulses; but it has 
the power to make one object its content, to the 
exclusion of other objects. It is not like the lower 
animal will, subject wholly to the desires or appe- 
tites. It is above these, and decides between 
the desires. As was shown in the doctrine of sub- 
jective spirit, true freedom of the will is not in 
following one inclination to the exclusion of an- 
other. 1 In such volitions, there is an alien content. 
True Vaedom consists in the willing of the will's 
own realization. From the point of view of arbi- 
trary volition between inclinations, freedom is an 
illusion; for the will is really determined. It is 
the self-realizing will which is free. In the will 
between inclinations, the content is determined, not 
by the nature of my will, but by contingency or 
chance (ZufalligJceit). The will which follows an 
inclination may be called free, but it is really de- 
termined by its content. In the true act of free 
will, the desire, that is, the finite content, is de- 
stroyed or set aside, and the content is the product 
of the will itself. The willing of itself is the will- 
ing of the right, 2 and so we reach in the end a point 
in Hegel's theory where he is in substantial agree- 
ment with Kant. What Kant lays down as a 
postulate of morality, that Hegel reaches by the 
application of his method to the evolution of the 
absolute. Free will according to such a view as 
Hegel's must be viewed rather as an ideal than as 
a reality. The natural will is the finite will which 
is governed by inclinations. So we have also in 

i Hegel, VIII. 43 ff. a Id. VIII. 48-60. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 325 

Hegel's philosophy a return to the Patristic doc- 
trine, that the finite will is evil rather than good. 
Freedom is an ideal which the natural or finite 
will has not reached. 

Schopenhauer 

In the philosophy of Schopenhauer the will is 
both an universal principle and a faculty of man. 
These two are ultimately the same. The woiiu'is^ 
will, but it is my will. The thing in itself (Ding 
an sich) of the Kantian philosophy is not a mere 
negative limit, but the sufficient reason of being 
and knowledge. The thing in itself is will. 

By many writers Schopenhauer is described as a 
reactionist against the post-Kantian systems which 
preceded him. This is partially true. His is a 
philosophy of the understanding, not of the reason. 
The idea of the absolute as spirit or nature, or as 
the identity of both, is absent from his thought. 
His interpretation of Kant is radically different 
from that of the absolute philosophers. He is a 
pessimist, while the German philosophy before him 
was optimistic. And yet, in spite of these and 
other differences, there is a strong resemblance 
between the system of Schopenhauer and those 
which he attacks with so much spirit. While he 
criticises the theory of the Ego in Fichte's phi- 
losophy, as being a merely formal principle, his 
own doctrine that the world is my will is not essen- 
tially different from Fichte's conception of the 
Thathandlung of the Ego as the first principle of 



326 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

philosophy. Schopenhauer's modification of the 
Platonic theory of ideas is not out of harmony 
with certain phases of Schelling's thought. The 
analogy between Schelling and Schopenhauer is 
well illustrated in the philosophy of von Hart- 
mann, who is indebted to them both. 

In a system which begins and ends with the will, 
it is difficult to separate the special from the more 
general teaching. The philosophy of Schopenhauer 
is pseeminently a theory of the will. But I shall 
here consider it, first, as one of the fundamental 
principles of his philosophy; secondly, as a human 
faculty or phenomenon of the soul of man; and, 
thirdly, in relation to the principle of sufficient 
reason. 

I. The World as Will and Presentation. Accord- 
ing to Schopenhauer, the world is my presentation, 
and the world is my will. One side of the world 
is knowledge ; the other side is will. To say that 
there is anything which is neither presentation nor 
will is absurd. Neither idealism alone nor ma- 
terialism alone can explain the universe. The 
explanatory principle is neither matter nor know- 
ledge. It is will. 1 

The will is not the cause of the universe; it is 
the universe. As it exists in neither space nor 
time, it is not a cause, and it is not known in 
causal relation with anything else. 2 It is, how- 
ever, the sufficient reason of the world, and is 
objectified in the presentation (Vorstellung). The 
will as thing in itself cannot he :3rfir>erl. The term 

i Schopenhauer, II. 3-5. s Id. II. 1«6 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 327 

indicates the inner essence of the nature of every- 
thing. We know it better than we know anything 
else. 1 Every cognition or conception is presenta- 
tion, but will is not presentation, but an inner 
principle. It lies beyond the principle of sufficient 
reason, and needs no explanation. The objectified 
will is body. The latter is a presentation like other 
presentations. It is an object among objects. The 
subject, as distinguished from the object, finds itse.lt 
in the world as an individual. That is tks subject 
of knowledge. That to which the presentation is 
made appears as an individual. It is the will which 
determines the changes of the body ; and body is 
immediately known as will. Every movement of 
the body is an act of will; they are not two differ- 
ent acts, but they are one. These acts are given 
in two ways, — first, by immediate knowledge ; and 
second, by the intuition (Anschauung) of the under- 
standing. The act of the body is only objectified 
will. 

Die Aktion des Leibes ist nichts Anderes, als der objekti- 
virte d. h. in die Anschauung getretene Akt des Willens. 2 

The will is the cognition a priori of the body; 
and the body is the cognition a posteriori of the 
will. Deliberations about the future and resolu- 
tions are rational acts, and not acts of will. Will- 
ing and doing are the same. We may separate 
them in reflection, but they are not actually sepa- 
rable. Every act of will is an act of body; and 
every effect upon body is an act of will. In so far 
as the body is known, the will is known. 

i Schopenhauer, II. 131, 132. 2 id. n. 119. 



328 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

Ich erkenne meinen Willen nicht im Ganzen, nicht als 
Einheit, nicht vollkommen seinem Wesen nach, sondern ich 
erkenne ihn allein in seinen einzelnen Akten, also in der 
Zeit, welche die Form der Erscheinung meines Leibes, 
wie jedes Objektes ist : daber ist der Leib Bedingung der 
Erkenntniss meines Willens. 1 

The importance of body in Schopenhauer's phi- 
losophy is manifest here. The corporeal world, in 
-se far as it is not presentation, is will. The reality 
or actuality of the will is the actuality of the body ; 
and the movements of the latter are visible acts of 
the former. In like manner the so-called vital 
forces, the various bodily functions, the members 
and organs of the body, are expressions of the 
will. 2 Will is the active principle in all nature, — 
in the movement and changes of organic as well as 
inorganic bodies, in gravitation, heat, and light. 
It is, however, one, and not manifold; the forces 
of nature are its manifold appearance. 

There are certain stages in the " objectivation " 
of will. In its lowest stage, it is blind force or 
tendency, which is not known immediately as will. 
In organic nature it appears as impulse. In man 
it comes to consciousness. In the objectivation of 
will, man is the highest stage. 3 The nature of this 
process of objectivation is difficult to understand. 
It is the Schwerpunkt of Schopenhauer's otherwise 
lucid philosophy. The will is said not to be the 
cause of the phenomena; for as thing in itself, it 
lies outside the causal series, and is not subject (as 
Ding an sich) to the principle of sufficient reason. 

i Schopenhauer, II. 121. a m, i. 127. 8 id. n. 178, 179. 



IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 329 

Nor is the relation of the objectified will to the 
intelligible will that of mode to substance, as in the 
philosophy of Spinoza. The presentation is said 
to be gewordene Wille, 1 and yet the will is not its 
cause. But while the will as intelligible is not in 
the causal series, the will as phenomenal is an 
effect among other effects. In his criticism of the 
Kantian philosophy Schopenhauer says : — 

Wenn von Ursach und Wirkung geredet wird, darf daa-- 
Verhaltniss des Willens zu seiner Erscheimmg (oder des 
intelligibeln Charakters zum empirischen) nie herbeigezogen 
werden, wie bier geschiet ; denn es ist vom Kausalverhaltniss 
durcbaus verscbieden. 2 

II. The Will as Phenomenon. The will is not 
only Ding an sich. It is likewise phenomenon in 
space and time. Individual acts of the will are 
presentations (Vorstellungen) and so belong to the 
empirical or phenomenal world. Man is the most 
perfect manifestation of the will, and in man the 
will comes to full self-consciousness. The relation 
of will to intellect is that of Ding an sich to phe- 
nomenon, and so Schopenhauer ascribes what he 
calls primacy to the will over the intellect. 
Spinoza is criticised by Schopenhauer because 
he affirmed that will is an act of thought, an 
intellectual affirmation or denial. Schopenhauer 
takes an opposite view. It is will which is the 
original and primitive; knowledge is a phenome- 
non of will and its instrument. Man does not 
become what he is by means of knowledge. Will 

i Schopenhauer, II. 199. 2 Id. II. 601. Cf. Id. I. 133-135. 



330 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

makes him what he is, and knowledge : s only the 
manifestation of will. 1 TL bhe instru- 

ment of the will, just as the ixconmer is an instru- 
ment of the smith. 2 

The subject knows itself as willing, but not as 
knowing. I know is an analytic proposition, while 
I will is synthetic; for it cannot be said, I know 
that I know. I will is a datum of experience ; and 
there are many gradations of will, from the mildest 
"Inclination to the most passionate resolve. The 
identity uf the subject which knows, with the sub- 
ject which wills, is something which cannot be 
explained; it is der Weltknoten. 

Die Identitat nun aber des Subjekts des Wollens mit dem 
erkennenden Subjekt, vermoge welcher (und zwar nothwen- 
dig) das Wort "Ich" beide einschliesst und bezeichnet, ist 
der Weltknoten und daber unerklarlich. 

But personal identity is founded on the identical 
will and its unchangeable character: im Herzen 
steckt der Mensch, nicht im Kopf. 8 

Will is not peculiar to man. There is blind, 
impulsive will in the lower animals, but in man it 
comes to consciousness. It is not connected with 
any particular part of the body, but is everywhere 
present. It is not consciousness but will which 
constitutes the essence of the animal soul. The 
latter remains after the body perishes ; but intellect 
depends for its existence on the body. 

III. The Will in Relation to the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. As phenomenon, but not as 

i Schopenhauer, III. 224. 2 Id. III. 253. « Id. I. 143. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 331 

noumenon, the will is subject to the principle of 
sufficient reason. Schopenhauer's treatise on this 
subject is fundamental to his whole philosophy. 
The principle is especially related to his doctrine 
of motive. 

As there is a reason for everything, the most 
important of all scientific questions is expressed 
in the word why. Why, says Schopenhauer, is the 
mother of all the sciences. 1 In it is implied the 
principle of sufficient reason. This principle he 
states in the form adopted by Wolff : Nihil est sine 
ratione cur potius sit quam non sit (Nothing is, with- 
out a reason why it is rather than is not). 2 All 
our knowledge implies a subject which knows and 
an object which is known. To be object for the 
subject, and to be presentation ( Vorstellung), is one 
and the same. All presentations are objects for 
the subject; and, conversely, all objects for the 
subject are presentations. All our presentations 
stand in relation to one another in a regular deter- 
minate union (Verbindung), according to a priori 
forms. Nothing in our knowledge is independent 
and separable. The principle of this union is that 
of sufficient reason. The expression of this prin- 
ciple varies with different classes of objects. The 
principle is the same, but its root varies. 3 

1. Principle of Sufficient Heason of Becoming 
(principium rationis sufficientis fiendi). Here it 
appears as the law of causality. It is applicable 
exclusively to changes, and to nothing else. Every 
change is an effect, and every cause is an effect of 
i Schopenhauer, I. i. 2 m. i. 5. 8 id. 1. 27. 



332 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

some previous cause. The series has no beginning. 
There has been much sophistry concerning the 
definition of cause. Many difficulties are removed, 
according to Schopenhauer, if it be shown that it 
is not an antecedent object which constitutes a 
cause, but the condition as a whole which precedes 
any event or change : — 

Bei genauerer Betrachtung hingegen finden wir, dass der 
ganze Zustand die Ursache des folgenden ist, wobei es im 
"Wxsntlichen einerlei ist, in welcher Zeitfolge seine Bes- 
timmungen zUsammengekommen seien. 

Ganz f alsch hingegen ist es, wenn man nicht den Zustand, 
sondern die Objekte Ursache nennt. 1 

Cause brings nothing new into being ; it involves 
only change in that which has continuous existence. 
The law is known a priori; it is transcendental and 
valid for all possible experience. Given a first rela- 
tive condition, a second determinate condition must 
follow according to a rule. The relation is a neces- 
sary relation. There is a succession in time usually 
to be observed, with the cause as antecedent, and the 
effect, as consequent; but sometimes the sequence 
is so rapid that it can hardly be said which is cause 
and which effect. In opposition to Kant and Hegel, 
Schopenhauer declares that the category of reci- 
procity ( Wechselwirkung) has no meaning. It rests 
on the misconception that the effect is part of the 
cause. 

Aus dieser wesentlichen Verkniipfung der Kausalitat mit 
der Succession folgt wieder, dass der Begriff der Wechsel- 
wirkung, strenge genommen, nichtig ist. Er setzt namlich 

1 Schopenhauer, I. 35. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 333 

voraus, dass die Wirkung wieder Ursacli ihrer Ursacli sei, 
also dass das Nachfolgende zugleich das Vorhergehende 
gewesen. 1 

It is the previous condition in point of time 
which constitutes the cause. There are three spe- 
cies of causality: (1) cause in the narrow sense; 
(2) stimulus (Beiz) ; and (3) motive. In the first 
of these, the effect seems to be proportionate to the 
cause. The second is the cause which operates in 
the organic world, and in this case there is no pro- 
portion necessarily between the caiise and" its effect. 
The medium of motive, which is the third species, 
is knowledge, and intellect is implied in its action. 2 

According to Schopenhauer, Locke entertained 
two false conceptions with respect to causality. 
He taught that the action of the will on the body 
was one type of causality, and that the other 
type was the resistance offered by the body to 
objects external to it. Schopenhauer agrees with 
Hume in denying these propositions, and he holds 
that there is no causal nexus between the act of 
the will and the movement of the body. The move- 
ment of the body is the actualization of the will. 
They are immediately one and the same act, which 
is perceived in a twofold way, — by self -conscious- 
ness as an act of will, and by external intuition as 
an act of body. Resistance as a sensation is not 
an objective intuition, but merely a feeling which 
of itself gives no idea of causality. That the re- 
sistance is attributed to an external something 
implies, but does not originate, the conception of 
i Schopenhauer, I. 41, 42. 2 id. I. 46 f . 



334 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

causality. It is motive which differentiates the 
will in man from that in the lower animals. 

Schopenhauer's whole theoretical discussion of 
the human will, and its relation to the intelligible 
will which he regards as the first principle of the 
world, shows that the Third Antinomy of the Kant- 
ian philosophy forms the essential centre of all such 
discussion. At the root of Schopenhauer's deter- 
minism is his scepticism with respect to the know- 
ledge of the reason. It was an appeal to reason 
which saved the absolute philosophers from reach- 
ing a like deterministic conclusion. But if all our 
knowledge is in the form of presentation, then every 
event known must be known as causally determined. 
Any appeal to an intelligible freedom is an appeal 
to something which is an illusion. The freedom as- 
cribed by Schopenhauer to the will as Ding an sich 
is simply an activity which has no particular direc- 
tion and no particular meaning. The only will 
which is known to us is a determined will. 

Erom this statement of the principle of sufficient 
reason, it appears that the motive is the necessary 
cause of the act of the will. The motive is that 
without which there would be no volition. In what 
way the effect is produced, we do not know. It is 
a mystery. But our knowledge of the action of 
the will is more intimate than our knowledge of 
the action of external objects, because the motive 
acts through cognition. Motivation is causation 
viewed from within. In so far as there is voluntary 
control and direction of knowledge, it is because of 
the identity of the knowing with the willing sub- 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 335 

ject. In knowledge which is controlled by will, 
the sequence is so rapid that we do not distinguish 
the cognition from the volition : — 

Die Thatigkeit des Willens hiebei ist jedoch so unmittel- 
bar, dass sie meistens nicht ins deutliche Bewusstsein fallt ; 
und so schnell dass wir uns bisweilen nicht ein Mai des 
Anlasses zu einer also hervorgerufenen Vorstellung bewusst 
werden, wo es uns dann scbeint, als sei Etwas ohne alien 
Zusammenhang mit einem Andern in unser Bewusstsein 
gekommen. 1 -— -~~ 

Thus every image which comes before conscious- 
ness is due to an act of will, which act has a 
motive; although neither motive nor volition may 
have attracted notice. 

Motives do not determine that I shall will, but 
only what I shall will. 2 The fact that the will as 
Ding an sich is not subject to the principle of suffi- 
cient reason, has led to the belief that there is 
freedom of the will. 8 Every man thinks before- 
hand that he is free, and that in any given past 
case he might have willed differently; but a pos- 
teriori he must admit that his volitions have been 
determined by motives. Acts of the will in so far 
as they are known are controlled by causes, and so 
are necessarily determined. While the principle of 
sufficient reason does not control my will as intel- 
ligible, that is, as Ding an sich, it controls necessarily 
the manifestations of my will. 4 The only freedom 
is the action of the will in general ; the particular 
direction is absolutely determined. It is not neces- 

i Schopenhauer, 1. 143-146. 8 Id. II. 133-135. 

2 Id. II. 127. 4 Id. II. 105, 320. 



336 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

sary that the motive should be clearly before con- 
sciousness, but the intelligible will works freely in 
organic processes, and in the instinct of animals. 
Freedom is a negative conception ; it is a concep- 
tion of action in the absence of the principle of 
sufficient reason. It is not only because the will 
is thing in itself that man is persuaded of his free- 
dom. The conflict of motives within him gives 
him such an impression ; but in reality the strong- 
est-motive always triumphs, and is the cause of 
the volition. 1 

Character is an expression of the will, and when 
once the will has been expressed in a man's char- 
acter, the latter cannot be changed. 2 Variations in 
the will are effected by changes in the motive, and 
these are effected by various kinds of knowledge 
and different degrees of certitude. But persuasion 
does not change the character or the will. It may 
change the means which are to be willed for a cer- 
tain end, but the character remains constant. The 
will cannot be taught, and so virtue is not teach- 
able. It is therefore absurd for a man to will to 
be other than he is. 8 It is no argument in favor of 
freedom for a man to assert that he can do what he 
will. Freedom of the will is not to be confounded 
with physical or intellectual freedom. 4 An appeal 
to consciousness is not sufficient to establish the 
freedom of the will. Self-consciousness is not 
broad enough to give us the exact truth concerning 
the relation of the particular volition to the motive 

i Schopenhauer, II. 336-341. * i d . n. 347. s id. n. 361. 
* Id. IV. 3-9 (Die Freiheit des Willens). 



IIS GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 337 

and the character upon which it depends. While 
the volition itself is given in self-consciousness, 
the conditions of the volition are not given. The 
act of will is first known as a movement of body. 
There is no possibility of any of man's volitions 
being other than it is. The supposed possibility 
arises from the conflict of motives and desires. 
Which of the conflicting principles is triumphant 
can be known only after the fact of volition. 
The possibility of alternate courses is a possibility 
which is delusive : — 

Ich kann than was ich will : ich kann, wenn ich will, 
Alles was ich habe den Armen geben und dadurch selbst, 
einer werden, — wenn ich will ! — Aber ich vermag nicht, es 
zu wollen ; weil die entgegen stehenden Motive viel zu viel 
Gewalt uber mich haben, als dass ich es konnte. 1 

In thus including all conscious volitions in the 
same class with natural phenomena, Schopenhauer 
rejects definitely the doctrine of freedom, and 
leaves no escape to those who would find in 
the character a self -determining principle. The 
variety of effects which similar motives will pro- 
duce on different men is ascribed to differences 
in character. Yet character is not known before- 
hand, but only empirically. It is innate, and, as 
has been said, cannot be changed. 2 If we say that 
character is formed freely through acts of will, we 
make all explanation of it impossible. To suppose 
that the will is free is to suppose a miracle ; for 
every uncaused event is a miracle. As for the 

i Schopenhauer, IV. 43 (ib.) . * Id. II. 357. 

z 



338 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

common consciousness of mankind, its affirma- 
tion that we are free has no force with Schopen- 
hauer, who holds that the ordinary understanding 
is incompetent to grasp the truth of either idealism 
or determinism. 1 

Schopenhauer's view of necessity need not be 
extensively considered, for, from what has been 
said, it is plain that everything and every event 
which is related to sufficient reason is neces- 
sary, end so contingency is a negative idea. Nor 
need the moral aspects of his doctrine be discussed, 
except in so far as to say that his pessimism led 
him to oppose the principles of Kant's Practical 
Philosophy. He finds a contradiction in saying 
that man is under obligations to will in any par- 
ticular way; and so far from accepting the fact of 
freedom as a postulate of morality, he would prefer 
to deny the possibility of morality, and so find the 
determinism of the will in harmony with his prin- 
ciples of ethics. 

That which moves the will in the lower animals 
is impulse, and there is no motive in the true 
sense. In man the motives lie in thought; and 
thus the will acts according to choice. In human 
action there may be intention and purpose, with 
deliberation according to a plan and according to 
maxims : — 

"Wenn gleick die Handlungen des Menschen mit nicht 
minder strenger Nothwendigkeit, als die der Thiere erfol- 
gen ; so ist doch durch die Art der Motivation, sof ern sie 
hier aus Gedanken bestebt, welcbe die Wablentscbeidung 

1 Schopenhauer, IV. 45-47. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 339 

(d. h. den bewussten Konflikt der Motive) moglich machen, 
das Handel n mit Vorsatz, mit Ueberlegung, nach Planen, 
Maximen, in Uebereinstimmung mit andern u. s. w. 1 

2. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing 
(principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi) . This 
refers to the truth that all knowledge implies a 
reason from which it is a consequence. The forms 
of this root of the principle are the fundamental 
laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded mid- 
dle. 2 

3. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being {prin- 
cipium rationis sufficientis essendi) . This refers to 
the ground or reasons of arithmetical and geometri- 
cal propositions. For example, the relation of the 
angles in a triangle is a principle of the relation 
of the sides of the triangle. 3 

4. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Acting {prin- 
cipium rationis sufficientis agendi). This refers to 
the immediate object of the inner sense. This is 
the subject of volition, which is object for the 
knowing subject. 4 

IV. The Denial of the Will. Near the close of 
his principal treatise, Schopenhauer suggests a way 
by which the will may be freed from subjection to 
the principle of sufficient reason, so that a general 
quietive of volition (ein allgemeines Quietiv) 5 may 
be possible. Having shown that the will as phe- 
nomenon is determined by motives, that the object 
of the will, even when attained, does not afford 

i Schopenhauer, I. 97. 2 Id. I. 105, 106. « id. j. 131, 133, 
4 Id. I. MO. 6 Id. II. 477. 



340 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

satisfaction, and that the character cannot be 
changed, he teaches that a recognition of the 
will as Ding an sich, apart from the principle of 
individuation, will free the individual from the 
control of motives, and that the latter will cease 
to be active and effective. This is the cancellation 
of the motive and of the character in so far as their 
influence on the volitions is concerned. He com- 
pares such a result to the effect of regenerative 
gr^e in the doctrine of Christian theology. This 
is, in his opinion, the only true freedom of the 
will : — 

sie tritt erst ein, wenn der Wille, zur Erkenntniss seines 
Wesens an sich gelangt, aus dieser ein Quietiv erhalt und 
eben dadurch der Wirkung der Motive entzogen wird, welche 
im Gebiet einer andern Erkenntnissweise liegt, deren Objekte 
nur Erscheinungen sind. 1 

This is the self -cancellation (Selbstaufhebung) of 
the will. It is not explained, however, under what 
conditions such a self-cancellation is possible. 
There is no regenerative grace vouchsafed to effect 
this change of knowledge, and we are left in doubt 
as to whether the object of the volition in the will 
to deny the will may not be as elusive as the phe- 
nomenal object after which the will has striven, 
but which it has failed to attain. 

Lotze 

It has been said that Lotze's philosophy cannot 
be systematically stated; and it must be admitted 
1 Schopenhauer, II. 478. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 341 

that his doctrines are suggestive rather than con- 
vincing. His indebtedness to Herbart is often 
evident, especially in the importance which he 
attaches to psychology. 

I. TJie Soul and its Faculties. Among all people 
there is a tendency to believe in a psychical unity, 
as opposed to the mere variety of phenomena. 
This belief tends also to separate the soul from 
the ordinary course of nature, and to attribute to 
it a self-determining energy. It is an immateiiai 
substance, and from its nature proceed the phenom- 
ena of knowledge (Vorstellung), feeling, and will. 
These are progressively developed as the result of 
a reciprocity between the outer world and the 
soul's inner activity. It is a mistake to think of 
the soul under material forms, or to make it a mere 
background or skeleton of psychical phenomena. 
It is rather the source of certain known properties. 
It is a centre of effects or activities, and is a sub- 
stance. But whatever view be taken of the soul 
per se, scientific interest is confined to the known 
properties. And the plainest way of regarding 
these properties is from the standpoint of mental 
faculties, a conception which is antiquated, and 
capable of being wrongly interpreted. 1 

It is not to be supposed that the faculties exist 
independent of any occasion of their exercise. The 
theory of faculties rightly interpreted holds that 
the reason for the activity of every manifestation 
of the soul is the external stimulus. Upon the 

1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, Leipzig, 1852, 145-150; 
Mikrokosmus, I. 160. 



342 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

occasion of such stimulus, the soul may choose 
between different and equally possible reactions in 
response. The different expressions of the soul 
in so responding do not depend on the nature of a 
given stimulus, but on the soul's original nature 
and capacities. A certain stimulation takes place, 
the soul is in a certain state of receptivity, 
and a third condition is the resultant of the two 
former conditions. For such an explanation, 
-the- theory of faculties is convenient. There are 
secondary disadvantages in this conception, and 
the hypothesis of faculties is somewhat barren. 
They are, however, sources of explanation (ErJcld- 
rungsquellen) of the quality of their products : — 

Die Seelenvermogen dagegen sind nicht aus Massverhalt- 
nissen psyckischer Erscheinungen, sondern lediglich aus 
ihrer Qualitat abstrahirt; sie konnen daher auch nur als 
Erklarungsquellen der Qualitat ihrer Erzeugnisse gelten. 1 

II. The Will. Although we seem to have the 
power of moving our bodies, yet in this we are 
often deceived. To will is not to perform. The 
movement of our bodies is a part of the chain of 
mechanical phenomena of the world. Although our 
will is closely connected with these, the changes 
in the organism in connection with an act of will 
take place without our cooperation. Our own 
part in the process is to furnish points of depart- 
ure (Ausgangspunkte) for these physical processes. 2 
The soul is not like an artisan who has constructed 
the machine with which he performs his work, and 

1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 151. 2 Id., ib. 288. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 343 

inows the reason and manner of its working. It 
is rather like one who has been taught by arbitrary- 
rule to manipulate a mechanism, the structure and 
inner workings of which are unknown to him. 
The soul is not identical with the body, but 
is the master of the body : — 

Das Verhaltniss der Seele zu dem Leibe ist nie das der 
Identitat, sondern stets das einer Herrschaft. 1 

There is a great variety in the responses of the 
soul to outward stimulus; and even if the latter 
did not occur, it is not to be supposed that the body 
would be motionless, as the condition of the nerves 
in the absence of such stimulus would doubtless give 
rise to movement. A variety of motions is pro- 
duced, however, at the first moment of life. The 
stated repetition of these movements is an occasion 
for the development of voluntary activity. The co- 
ordination of motions occurs automatically, with- 
out our voluntary interference and without our 
consciousness. When the stimulus does not reach 
the soul itself, the action is reflex and mechanical. 
The reflex-motor actions are not psychical in origin, 
but purely mechanical. And too much stress must 
not be laid upon the telos which they seem to in- 
volve. The reflex movements are the letters of 
the alphabet, the elements of further teleologic 
activity. Having observed them in experience, 
the soul can combine them and imitate them. But 
it is to the advantage of the organism that they 

1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 289. 



344 THEORIES OP THE WILTj 

should be mechanical, in so far as they tena to the 
preservation of life and to defence : — 

Nur die Beberrscbung ernes gegebenen Mecbanismus kann 
fiir die Seele von Werth sein, ihn selbst bervorzubringen mid 
zu dirigen, wiirde nur eine lastige und liberflussige Ersebwe- 
rung ihrer Aufgabe sein. Sind docb jene Bewegungen zum 
Theil dazu bestimmt, als beilende Beactionen scbadlicbe 
Reize zu entfernen, oder als niitzliche Triebe zur Erbaltung 
des Korpers mitzuwirken. Aber wie scblecbt wiirde es in 
der Tbat um unser Leben steben, sollte die TJeberlegung es 
vertiieidigen, und nicbt der Mecbanismus. 1 

This passage was written some years before the 
appearance of von Hartmann's Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, and the question of a non-mechanical 
but still unconscious activity in reflex phenomena 
is not raised. 

In automatic movements, like playing the piano, 
the movements follow one another so rapidly that 
it is inconceivable that they should be directed 
or controlled by specific independent acts of will. 
In such automatic processes, the soul exercises an 
act of will at the beginning, while the succeeding 
steps take place mechanically. In certain patho- 
logical conditions movements take place with ap- 
parent purpose, when any psychical control is out 
of the question. 3 

Many crimes likewise have an automatic genesis, 
when there is no train of feeling sufficiently strong 
to oppose them. The act takes place without real 
deliberation or conscious volition. The transition 
from idea to act is immediate. This does not free 

1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 291, 292. 
3 Id., ib. 293, 294. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 345 

the agent from responsibility, because the idea of 
the crime should have been resisted at an earlier 
stage. But this does not apply to the insane. It 
is only when the state of mind is intense j it is not 
when it is abnormal. 

Wholly different from these elementary reflex 
phenomena are the voluntary employments of mus- 
cular contractility, by which the will accomplishes 
a purpose. Yet, like those acts already considered, 
they are only voluntary combinations of involuc- 
tary elements. The will's efficiency is limited to 
a certain self-chosen combination and succession in 
the production of those inner psychical conditions, 
as related to the origin of the movement : — 

dass auch sie nur willkiihrliche Combinationen unwillku.hr- 
licher Elemente sind, oder selbstgew&hlten Verbindung und 
Eeihenfolge jene innern psychischen Zustande erzeugen, 
an welche die Organisation die Entstehung der Bewegung 
geknupft hat. 1 

Midway between reflex action and conscious and 
intentional acts of the will is the blind impulse. 
Motions which proceed from impulse seem to be 
neither mechanical nor conscious. Impulse does 
not reach its goal as the physical cause does, but 
is an endeavor to reach a given end. The only 
clear perception of this impulse is furnished in 
the conscious voluntary endeavor. It may be 
checked, and this gives rise to the feeling of 
effort : — 

Aher eben dieser Begriff des Strebens hat seine einzige 
klare Anwendung, wo er identisch mit dem bewussten 
1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 296. 



346 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

"Wollen einer Seele gef asst wird ; die iibrige Welt der 
Ereignisse kennt nur ein Geschehen, das sich frei ent- 
wickelt, oder in solches, das in der Erreichung seines ihm 
sonst gewohnlichen Erfolges gebindert wird, Der letztere Eall 
ist es, wo wir glauben, dass die gehemmte Kraft sieh in ein 
Streben verwandle und gegen das Hinderniss einen Druck 
ausiibe, den wir als eine absichtliche Anstrengung zu seiner 
Hinwegraumung deuten. 1 

When there are no obstacles, the effect of the 
will's action is not attended with effort. There is 
no more effort in the act of will than in the impulse 
which is actualized. All these feelings of resist- 
ance are purely physical in their origin. This 
serves to make the nature of the impulse more 
conceivable. 

In every impulse there are three moments. The 
beginning of the impulse as a whole consists of 
certain bodily or mental occurrences (Ereignisse), 
as, for example, nervous activity, or ideas which 
may be a reason for motion. If the soul were con- 
scious of these, it would be conscious of them as 
disturbances only, but would not be awakened to 
impulse. A second moment is in the case of these 
occurrences awakening pleasure or pain; yet in this 
there is no essential element of impulse. The first 
excitation to impulse is the consciousness of a 
peculiar position in which the soul finds itself, like 
the uneasiness described by Locke. Experience 
has taught us what to do when this occurs. The 
peculiar feeling is removed by motion from the 
uneasy position. Inclination and disinclination 

i Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 296. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 347 

are the result. These are characteristic of grow- 
ing impulse (Triebwerclens), but are not impulse 
itself. Thus impulses arise out of experience, and 
ultimately are the result of feelings. Appetites, 
such as hunger and thirst, are not impulses, but are 
only disagreeable feelings of change in the nerves 
which terminate in the intestine, by reason of cer- 
tain deficiencies. In the lower animals the reaction 
produced by these painful feelings is automatic. 
This is true of certain higher feelings peculiar to 
man. The poetic impulse has an automatic char- 
acter, for it arises from a feeling which finds no 
relief until it is satisfied, and yet its satisfaction 
is not deliberate. The poetic impulse cannot be 
exercised without experience. 1 

These impulses play a very prominent part in 
our life. Impulsive actions are more common than 
deliberate voluntary actions. 

The act of will cannot be defined or explained. 
It has to be experienced : — 

Man wird nicht verlangen, dass wir den Act des Wollens 
schildern sollen, der so einfach eine Grunderscheinung des 
geistigen Lebens ist, dass er nur erlebt nicbt erlautert 
werden kann. 2 

There are, however, two mistaken views of this 
act which must be corrected. One regards the will 
as only a clear idea {Mare Vbrstellung) ; the other 
concentrates it in a dense atmosphere of a capacity 
to act. The first makes the will do nothing; the 
second makes it do everything. I will does not 
mean I shall ; to will to be happy is different from 

i Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 297-300. 2 Id., ib. 300. 



1 



348 THEORIES OE THE WILL 

a certain occurrence of happiness. One of these 
mistaken conceptions confounds volition with the 
thought of volition, while the other confounds voli- 
tion with the bringing to pass of the thing which 
has been willed : — 

Wie nun die erwahnte Ansicht Wollen mit Vorstellen 
des Gewollten, so verwechselt die andere Wollen und Voll- 
bringen des Gewollten. 1 

That which accomplishes the volition is only 
bodily organization carrying out the purpose of 
the will, and this is a purely mechanical process. 
While, on the one hand, the thought of a future 
act is different from the actual volition, so, on the 
other hand, the will simply removes such psychical 
obstacles as stand in the way of setting in motion 
the process of the body. We are brought back to 
the idea of the will as point of departure (Ausgang- 
spunkt), as already explained. 

In dealing with the important question whether 
the feeling of effort is of central or peripheral origin, 
Lotze holds that what we feel in a voluntary effort 
is the effect of the impulse on the termination of the 
nerve in the muscle. And although each muscle 
must have its own nerve terminations, yet the mus- 
cular feeling is a general one, like the sensation of 
heat, and is so localized in the organism. The 
feeling of effort, then, is not a feeling of the out- 
going impulse, but of an effect of that impulse : — ' 

Wir schliessen daher, dass es nicht der "Willensimpuls, 
sondern seine Folgen sind, die das Geftihl veranlassen. 2 

1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 301. 2 Id., ib. 310. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 349 

The will is not a function of the brain, but it is 
of purely mental origin. The common control of 
the various motor centres requires something more 
than a mere physiological unity. 

Lotze defends a doctrine of the freedom of the 
will. There is a general belief that man has the 
freedom of self-determination, — that there is a 
free activity independent of the natural necessity 
which governs natural conditions. All our spirit- 
ual existence, all worth of our actions, and the \ dlu« 
of our own personality, are connected vv ith the idea 
of freedom. And yet it must be admitted that 
empirically we do not gain such a knowledge of 
freedom as the importance of the fact seems to 
demand. "While many of our voluntary move- 
ments seem to be uncaused, yet most of them seem 
to depend on antecedent states of stimulation and 
irritation; so that reflection inclines us to the idea 
that the will must be determined. This is at vari- 
ance with our moral conceptions with respect to 
the worth of our actions. But to make moral re- 
quirements the ground of an argument in favor of 
freedom is not sufficient, for there are those who 
make moral requirements the ground of an argu- 
ment in favor of necessity. Furthermore, the close 
connection between states of body and states of 
mind increases this suspicion that the will is condi- 
tioned. Yet these mechanical antecedents do not 
at all account for the variety of our inner life, and 
so do not explain the determination of the will. 
Materialistic determinism is unthinkable. In any 
event the principle of the plurality of cause forbids 



350 THEORIES OP THE WILL 

us to suppose that the mental effect is due directly 
to a material cause. 1 It must also be considered 
that the mind itself has properties. We are prone 
to attribute to will many mental phenomena which 
are really involuntary, such as the change of ideas 
in consciousness from one subject to another. Most 
changes in the direction of thought and feeling are 
involuntary, and are due to impulse, not to will. 
Active volition is comparatively rare; the prevail- 
ing principle of action is impulse from the senses, 
or from ohe inner spiritual self. Impulse (Trieb) 
is not free, but mechanical. Will is not inclina- 
tion, which is common to man and the lower ani- 
mals. It is free choice, and the conception of will 
is almost coincident with that of freedom. The 
fact of free will cannot be denied. But if we 
attempt to defend it, or to reduce it to simpler 
terms, this is found to be impossible. Lotze 
opposes, on the one hand, the prejudice which 
finds the freedom of the will inconsistent with the 
order of nature ; for freedom of the will does not 
mean freedom to accomplish, and God, the author 
of nature, is absolutely free. Nor does the invaria- 
bility of causality interfere with the truth of free 
will. So far from deducing determinism from the 
law of causality, we should rather modify our law 
of causality in order to reconcile it with the fact 
of freedom. 2 

In his Metaphysics, Lotze characterizes the doc- 
trine of determinism as an opinion of the scien- 
tific school (Meinung der wissenschaftslichen Schule), 

i Lotze, Mikrokosmus, 1. 162 ff. 2 Id., ib. I. 286-289. 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 351 

and holds that the common sense of mankind is a 
guarantee of the falsity of such a doctrine. 1 The 
spirituality of the soul implies the freedom of the 
will. Yet, while taking this position, he adds that 
too much emphasis must not be laid upon freedom, 
in case men lose the clew to the general course of 
ideas in the active consciousness. The course of 
nature in general determines the sphere of the 
will's activity. It is seldom that any individual 
is sufficient for solving the problems whioh ihe 
general feelings and thoughts of the mass present 
to him. The man of genius is not, however, the 
child of circumstances, but is one who through 
freedom overcomes circumstances. Thus, although 
human progress is slow, it is changed and furthered 
by the free voluntary acts of individual men. 

Fechner, who was partly contemporary with 
Lotze, made a still bolder defence of freedom, 
which he sought to reconcile with an explicit 
pantheism. According to him the universe is com- 
posed of unextended atoms, which are simple in 
their constitution. The substantial being of both 
soul and body is made up of these atoms. God 
and the world are not substantially different, but 
are the inner and outer aspect respectively of the 
same being ( Wesen). The world on the one hand 
is a mass of atoms, and on the other hand is a col- 
lection of individual self-conscious beings. But 
all the latter are comprehended in God, and every 
soul is immanent in the divine substance. 2 The 

1 Lotze, Metaphysik, 473. 

2 Fechner, Ueber die Seelenfrage, 204-210. 



352 THEORIES OF THE WILL 

harmony between the individual and the divine 
will is sustained by an appeal to certain facts 
which Lotze had also noticed. Many of our 
thoughts and feelings, as well as actions, proceed 
not only independently of our will, but against our 
will. If we, as voluntary agents, have so many 
involuntary thoughts and feelings, a fortiori must 
this be true of God; and just as our involuntary 
acts are possible, so it is possible for beings which 
are immanent in God to will without his will, or 
even in opposition to his will. Freedom is as 
conceivable upon the supposition that the soul has 
its being in God, as if it is supposed to have an 
independent existence. And as our wills are not 
the same with the will of God, so God is not re- 
sponsible for our misdeeds. As for the will of God, 
it accomplishes not what is best for certain men 
individually, but what is suitable for men collec- 
tively. To use the phraseology of Bentham, God 
wills "for the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number." 

The theory of Lotze brings us virtually to con- 
temporary philosophy. From about the middle of 
the present century, the activity in subjective psy- 
chology, the fruitful researches in the physiology 
of the brain and other parts of the nervous system, 
the restatement and new interpretation of the 
ancient doctrine of natural evolution, have opened 
new avenues, and have suggested new solutions of 
many of the older problems. It is not my inten- 
tion to anticipate in any way conclusions which may 



IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 353 

hereafter be drawn with, respect to the many points 
which this progress has brought into prominence. 
It is plain that no man can hope to defend 
his doctrines without justifying them, not at the 
bar of reason only, but also at the tribunal of posi- 
tive science. For this reason, the work done by 
Kant must not be forgotten, and yet the work done 
by Kant must be done over again in a new way. So 
long as there is a distinction drawn between reason 
and understanding, so that the conclusions of the 
latter are not valid in the domain of the former; 
so long as psychologists are willing to regard the 
soul as a creation and not a development ; and so long 
as the moralist dictates what we shall think about 
freedom because of presuppositions as to what we 
ought to think about freedom, — so long must the 
way of progress lie through destructive criticism 
to a clearer recognition of the facts and laws of 
nature. It is to be hoped that the confusion which 
a speculative philosophy has occasioned in psycho- 
logical science, having been partly removed, may 
eventually disappear. 
2a v 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Academy, The New, 12, 71, 82, 

107. 
iEnesidemus, 74. 
^Ischylus, 10, 13, 14. 
Anaxagoras, 21. 
Anselm, St., 115-126, 139, 157. 
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 126-141, 

142, 145, 183. 
Aristotle, 5, 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, 22, 

39-54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 69, 

70, 78, 123, 127, 133, 215, 236, 

290. 
Atomists, The, 20, 51, 64, 65,66, 

67. 
Augustine, St., 5, 11, 89, 90, 91, 

105-114, 115, 119, 121, 123, 126, 

136, 139, 145, 157, 227. 
Avitus, 97. 

Bacon, 158, 159, 160-161, 162. 

Bayle, 72. 

Bentham, 352. 

Berkeley, 173, 187-191, 228. 

Beza, 153. 

Bohme, 290. 

Bramhall, 170. 

Butler, 241. 

Calvin, 90, 91, 142-153, 157, 

165. 
Carlyle, 15. 
Carneades, 71, 74. 
Chrysippus, 59, 61, 64, 69, 70, 71, 

74, 75. 



355 



Chrysostom, St., 148. 

Cicero, 17, 60, 64, 67, 70, 71, - 

Clarke, 253. 

Cleantbes, j6. 

Clement of Alexandria, 94-95. 

Ccelestius, 108, 109. 

Collins, 184. 

Comte, 12. 

Condillac, 173, 184, 185-187. 

Courcelles, 157. 

Cousin, 182. 

Democritus, 20, 65, 66, 67. 
Descartes, 5, 215, 216-227, 228, 

234, 235, 242, 244, 250. 
Diodorus, 68, 69, 70. 
Dominicans, The, 141. 
Du Maistre, 9. 
Duns Scotus, 141-142. 

Edwards, 153. 

Eleatics, The, 21. 

Empedocles, 20, 22. 

Epictetus, 61. 

Epicureans, The, 6, 12, 16, 20, 

55, 64-68, 70, 71, 93, 160. 
Episcopius, 120, 146, 153-157, 
, 246. 

Erasmus, 142, 144, 146. 
Eschenmayer, 309. 
Euclid, 68. 

Fechner, 351-352. 

Fichte, 278, 280-289, 290, 291, 



356 



INDEX OF NAMES 



297, 298, 299, 306, 307, 310, 311, 
316, 319, 325. 
Franciscans, The, 141. 

Gnostics, The, 78, 89, 90, 93, 96, 
99, 100, 127. 

Hamilton, 159. 

Hartmann, von, 291, 326, 344. 

Hegel, 12, 278, 279, 280, 290, 

310-325. 
Heraclitus, 20, 68. 
Herbart, 341. 
JHerder, 279. 
Hesiod, 9, 10. 
Hippolytus, 93. 
Hobbes, 151, 152, 159, 161-173, 

178, 183, 252, 253, 256. 
Homer, 8. 
Hume, 5, 159, 173, 182, 187, 192- 

201, 202, 212, 214, 232, 233, 
256, 259, 280. 

Irenseus, 92-93. 

Jacobi, 279. 

Jansenists, The, 136, 145, 189. 

Jerome, St., 97, 101-105, 109, 148. 

Johnson, 190. 

Justin Martyr, 91-92. 

Kant, 5, 21, 141, 255, 256, 257- 
278, 279, 280, 281, 286, 290, 
298, 317, 318, 319, 324, 325, 
329, 332, 334, 338, 353. 

Laud, 4. 

Le Clerc, 157. 

Leibnitz, 211, 214, 215, 244-255, 

277, 291, 299, 304, 308. 
Limborch, 157. 
Locke, 158, 162, 173-184, 187, 

202, 246, 252, 256, 333, 346. 
Lombard, Peter, 148. 
Lotze, 256, 340-351. 

jii .etius, 1, 16,67, 105. 
Luther, 142, 144, 146. 



Maimon, 278. 

Malebranche, 215, 227-233, 244, 

248. 
Manicheans, The, 78, 82, 90, 106, 

107, 127. 
Marcion,101. 
Megarics, The, 25, 55, 68. 
Methodius, 93. 
Mill, 201. 
Milton, 4. 
Molinists, The, 189. 

Origen, 94, 95-98. 

Paul, St., 77, 78-89. 
Pelagians, The, 89, 90, 101, 107, 

108. 
Pelagius, 91, 108, 145. 
Plato, 8, 10, 20, 22, 24, 25-39, 

40, 48, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 

78, 79, 93, 95, 99, 279, 290, 

307. 
Plutarch, 61. 
Priestley, 184, 212, 213. 
Prodicus, 21. 
Protagoras, 66. 
Pyrrho, 74. 
Pythagoreans, The, 19, 20, 26, 

30. 

Regius, 219. 
Reid, 201-215. 

Schelling, 278, 289-310, 319, 326. 

Schopenhauer, 2, 290, 325-340. 

Schulze, 278. 

Scotists, The, 141, 142. 

Seneca, 11, 56, 62, 63. 

Socrates, 22, 24, 25, 33, 34, 62. 

Sophists, The, 21. 

Sophocles, 13. 

Spinoza, 5, 92, 126, 155, 158, 183, 
214, 215, 216, 218, 227, 233- 
244, 248, 252, 253, 279, 280, 
299,302,303,311,329. 

Stillingfleet, 182. 



INDEX OF NAMES 



357 



Stobaeus, 62. 

Stoics, The, 20, 51, 53, 55-64, 71, 
79, 91, 93. 

Tertullian, 98-101. 
Thomas Aquinas, St. See Aqui- 
nas. 
Thomists, The, 141, 142. 
Timon, 74. 



Twiss, 153. 

Voltaire, 173, 184-185, 187. 

Wolff, 255, 256, 331. 

Xenophon, 24. 

Zeno, 173. 



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